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Abstract 
 
 
The importance of strategic alliances in the form of international joint ventures (IJVs) is 
growing in the present international business environment where competition is on a global 
scale. A review of the IJV literature, especially in developing countries, shows an over-
emphasis on China and the NIEs (the first tier newly-industrialising economies: Taiwan, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea). To date, relatively little attention has been paid 
to the ASEAN4 countries (the high-performing economies of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations: Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia), even though since the 
1990s this region has had one of the fastest growing economies in the world.  This study 
provides new empirically based insights into the under-researched phenomenon of IJV 
formation in the South East Asian region. 
 
The study takes Thailand as an example of the ASEAN4 countries. Drawing on an 
unpublished official database of international joint ventures (IJVs) and a survey of 
managers of IJVs operating in Thailand, the study sets out to identify recent trends in Thai 
international joint ventures (IJVs), explore the motives and contributions of firms that 
participate in such IJVs and examine some of the factors that influence their performance.  
 
The study provides for the first time an in-depth analysis of a key dimension of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) in Thailand. Recent trends in Thai IJVs were found to be an 
upward path for IJV formation in the post 2000 period and the continued dominance of 
Japanese manufacturing companies as investors. Similarly key motives were found to 
differ markedly between foreign and local investors, while among the factors affecting 
performance were found to include IJV commitment, organisational learning and 
similarities in organisational culture. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction to the Study 
 
1.1  Introduction 
A recent OECD (2000) report states that strategic alliances between firms, especially 
multinational enterprises (MNEs), have substantially increased over the last three decades. 
Strategic alliances are co-operative business activities formed by two or more independent 
firms for various strategic purposes (Yoshino and Rangan, 1995).  For instance, Holt 
(1998: 288) argues that MNEs attempt to seek ‘upstream value chain’ from their partners, 
especially in developing countries, and also try to fulfil their ‘downstream value chain 
activities’ from allies in developed countries, and that these are among the main strategic 
reasons for forming strategic alliances.  Daniels et al. (2004: 415), on the other hand, 
generally view strategic cooperative motives of firms from two perspectives: general and 
international.  The first type includes spreading and reducing costs, specialising in 
competencies, avoiding or countering competition, securing vertical and horizontal links, 
learning from other companies and so forth, whilst the latter category consists of gaining 
location-specific assets, overcoming government constraints, diversifying geographically, 
and minimising exposure in risky environments. 
 
Dunning (1993) argues that recent trends of strategic alliances are interesting and different 
from those of the past in several aspects, including: 1) their growing significance as an 
inter-organisational form for participating firms to enhance competitiveness and to 
generate innovation-led growth; 2) the range, depth and closeness of the interactions 
among co-operating partners; and 3) the effect that such alliances are having upon 
corporate and overall industrial performance.  Accordingly, strategic alliances now seem to 
be a powerful mechanism for combining competition and co-operation and for industrial 
restructuring on a global basis. 
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Hamel et al. (1989: 133) argue that companies nowadays are obliged to learn to cooperate 
with their rivals in order to ‘win’.  Contractor and Lorange (1988: 5) also acknowledge this 
notion in that “today, we are in a more negotiated, circumscribed, competitive world, at 
least as far as several industries are concerned.  In many situations, an international firm is 
better seen as a coalition of interlocked, quasi-arms-length relationships”.  Hence, there is a 
significant need for, in addition to the academic study of the subject, executives and 
managers in firms to understand the nature of strategic alliance activity; they have to learn 
the arts of competing and cooperating as equally valid aspects of corporate strategy. 
 
Growing interest in strategic alliances was evident in the 1980s, since there was a surge in 
the formation of international joint ventures (IJVs) at that time.  This mode of governance 
is a form of strategic alliance.  A large number of researchers (for example, Harrigan, 
1988, 2003; Buckley, 1994; Lee and Beamish, 1995; Glaister and Buckley, 1998) assert 
that IJV study is one of the fastest growing subjects in the international business literature.  
They also claim that IJV formation is the entry mode used by nearly half of all MNEs from 
developed countries to enter developing countries.  Despite the apparent growth in both the 
incidence of IJVs and academic interest in the matter, to date, few studies have been 
undertaken in the context of the ASEAN4 countries (the high-performing economies of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Indonesia, referred to hereafter as the ASEAN4), especially Thailand. This is despite the 
fact that the economies of these four countries have developed dramatically, and that IJV 
formation in this region has also grown significantly in the past three decades (Julian et al., 
2004; OECD, 2004; Julian and O’Cass, 2004; UNCTAD, 2007). 
 
Davidson (1980) argues that accessing new markets is a prime strategic reason for MNE’s 
deciding to invest abroad.  Market size considerably influences their decision making.  
Indro and Richards (2007) cite the World Bank statistics report on average GDP per capita 
growth for over 200 countries in the 1990s, which shows the ASEAN4 as being among the 
top 15 countries with the highest growth rate.  This evidence may indicate an “increasing 
standard of living that potentially gives these countries’ citizens greater purchasing power” 
(Indro and Richards, 2007: 178).  Accordingly, the ASEAN4 are likely to represent 
significant business opportunities for MNEs due to their market size.  This rationale is 
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supported by the UNCTAD report (2006), which points out that rapid economic growth in 
this region has contributed to a continuing increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inflows.  The importance of the region in the world economy and its high growth rate has 
made it more attractive to ‘market-seeking FDI’ (UNCTAD, 2006: 50). 
 
FDI inflows to Thailand have increased substantially since the second half of the 1980s, 
after the currency appreciation in Japan and the first tier newly-industrialising economies 
(NIEs): Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea.  During 1986-1989, Thailand 
attracted on average US$ 1 billion per year of net FDI inflows, accounting for around 7 
percent of private sector investment.  From 1990 to 1996, FDI hovered around a plateau of 
over US$ 2 billion per annum (Bank of Thailand, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997).  In 1997, FDI 
inflows showed a dramatic increase, totalling US$ 3.6 billion in 1997, US$ 5.1 billion in 
1998, US$ 3.6 billion in 1999, US$ 3.1 billion in 2000, and leaping to US$ 8.0 billion in 
2001.  Since 2001, FDI inflows to Thailand have increased remarkably, totalling US$ 10 
billion in 2002, US$ 11 billion in 2003, US$ 13 billion in 2004, US$ 15 billion in 2005, 
and reaching US$ 20 billion in 2006, an all-time record for FDI inflows to Thailand (Bank 
of Thailand, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2007).  A recent UNCTAD (2007) report also 
indicates that, of the ASEAN4 countries, Thailand is the major recipient of FDI. 
 
On the basis of such evidence, one can expect an increase in interest in the phenomenon of 
IJV formation in the ASEAN4, since IJV formation is a subset of FDI.  This study takes 
Thailand as a representative example for studying IJV in the ASEAN4 context.  This is not 
to suggest that Thailand is at the heart of the ASEAN4.  It is rather because Thailand’s 
foreign investment policies and regulation in response to foreign direct investment, and 
especially to IJV formation, and the country’s economic situation are similar to those of 
the other members of the ASEAN4. 
 
In brief, the growing importance of IJV formation, a form of strategic alliances, together 
with the lack of research in the field of IJV formation in the ASEAN4 region (which is one 
of the fastest growing economies in the world) provides the rationale for carrying out this 
research. 
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1.2  The Aim and Objectives of the Study 
The aim of the study is to examine a number of aspects of international joint venture (IJV) 
activity in the context of the ASEAN4 countries by using Thailand as a representative 
example.  The specific objectives of the study are as follows: 
 
       1.2.1    To ascertain the characteristics of the activities, distribution, and trends of 
international joint ventures in Thailand.  Specifically, the study investigates IJV 
formation, with analyses by sector, country of origin of foreign parent companies, and 
equity participation of the venture. 
 
       1.2.2   To determine the strategic motives of IJV parent companies in forming 
IJVs, and to identify factors which affect location choice decisions by foreign firms 
when considering IJV formation.  An attempt is made to establish why foreign and 
Thai parent companies establish IJVs in the first place; to explain the host country 
location factors taken into account; and, more specifically, why foreign firms choose 
Thailand as a location for IJV formation.  
 
        1.2.3    To examine the contributions which parent companies provide to IJVs and 
analyse the relationship between those contributions and the characteristics of IJV 
operation in the context of Thailand as a Southeast Asian country.  The IJV entity is 
seen as evolving over time, and the strategic positions as well as the resources supplied 
by IJV parent companies influence this process and also the way in which the IJV 
operates.  Hence, an effort has been made to study the impact of IJV parent companies’ 
contributions on the characteristics of how IJVs develop and operate.   
 
        1.2.4   To assess IJV performance in the context of the ASEAN4 countries, 
particularly Thailand.  Since the literature has shown that each performance assessment 
approach has limitations in respect of evaluating IJV performance, an eclectic approach 
has been adopted for this study.  The relationship between approaches has also been 
examined. An attempt is also made to establish whether IJV performance varies with 
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strategic motives of parent companies in forming IJVs and characteristics of IJV 
operation. 
 
       1.2.5   To analyse the determinants which influence IJV performance in Thailand 
as a developing country.  This is because a number of IJV researchers argue that IJV 
management is difficult to carry out successfully and that IJVs tend to produce fragile 
relationships, with a particularly high failure rate in developing countries.  An attempt 
is made to identify factors potentially affecting IJV performance in the context of the 
ASEAN4, especially Thailand. 
1.3  The Significance of the Study 
Previous studies (Anderson, 1990; Hu and Chen, 1996; Luo, 1997; Calantone and Zhao, 
2000; Yan and Gray, 2001) have indicated that the trend towards an increase in numbers 
and strategic importance of IJVs from the 1980s until the present day is likely to continue 
vigorously.   Research into IJVs in developing economies has, however, concentrated 
disproportionately on such countries as China, India, and the NIEs (Lee and Beamish, 
1995; Osland and Cavusgil, 1996; Luo, 1995, 1997; Luo and Chen, 1997; Liu et al., 1999; 
Calantone and Zhao, 2000; Luo et al., 2001; Pothukuchi et al., 2002).  To date, relatively 
little attention has been paid to the ASEAN4 countries, even though since the 1990s this 
region has had one of the fastest growing economies in the world (OECD, 2003, 2004).   
Accordingly, this is an important and under-researched area. It is important to recognise 
that the ASEAN4 countries are different from other developing countries in a number of 
respects, such as FDI policy and attractiveness as a location for FDI.  The results of 
previous IJV studies of other regions may not therefore be relevant to the present situation 
of the ASEAN4.  Accordingly, this study has set out to present new data and new empirical 
insights into IJV formation in the ASEAN4 context, and especially in Thailand.  
 
In addition, an official dataset from the BOI (Thailand Board of Investment) has enabled 
this study to empirically provide a new and original understanding of the patterns, 
distribution, and trends of IJV formation in Thailand.  Unlike any of the previous studies of 
IJV formation, for the first time an official database has been used for studying IJVs in the 
ASEAN4 region.  A thorough review of the IJV literature (for example, Morris and 
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Hergert, 1987; Glaister and Buckley, 1994; Garcia Canal et al., 2003) has established that, 
to date, the economic and business press have been widely used for creating the database 
for this type of research.  A number of researchers have pointed out the weaknesses of such 
a method (for example, Marangozov, 2005).  In order to ensure greater reliability and to 
minimise a number of possible distortions, this study has therefore made it a major priority 
to obtain a database prepared and updated by a government institution. 
 
Needless to say, it has to be borne in mind that governments sometimes choose to distort or 
be selective in their provision of sensitive data.  While conscious of this possibility, the 
present researcher judges that the official statistics of the government of Thailand in this 
area are reliable, and believes that the same is probably true of other governments of the 
ASEAN4 countries. 
 
Furthermore, this study has provided new insight into IJV activities in the ASEAN region 
especially Thailand in various aspects.   These, for instance, include the principal strategic 
motives inducing foreign and local parent companies to form the IJV mode of strategic 
alliance.  An explanation of the use of IJVs is derived from the theory relating to how 
strategic behaviour influences competitive positioning of the firm, and a number of 
researchers (for example, Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Harrigan, 1988; Glaister and 
Buckley, 1996) have attempted to identify the strategic impetus behind IJV formation. This 
has included access to markets, cost and risk sharing, economies of scale, access to new 
technologies, and so forth. These researchers claim that understanding the strategic 
motivation of IJV formation is the most important initial stage for understanding 
subsequent IJV behaviour as a whole. Despite the fact that studies on the strategic 
motivations of IJV formation are prevalent in the literature (Tallman and Shenkar, 1990; 
Yan and Gray, 1994; Demirbag et al, 1995; Dacin et al, 1997; Dong and Glaister, 2006), 
very little has so far been undertaken in respect of such developing countries of the 
ASEAN4 as Thailand. 
 
A body of empirical knowledge in respect of IJV performance assessment in the Southeast 
Asian environment of Thailand has been established by this study.  This was a response to 
the observation in international business literature (Makino and Delios, 1996; Indro and 
 6
Richards, 2007) that few attempts had been made in this respect, leading to an incomplete 
picture of IJV performance evaluation in the context of the ASEAN4.   Also, this is a 
pioneering attempt to evaluate IJV performance in the ASEAN4 context using an eclectic 
approach (that is, an approach which measures IJV performance using a variety of 
indicators). Such an approach has been adopted because of disagreement among many IJV 
researchers, who continue to dispute over an appropriate measure for assessing IJV 
performance.  They argue that each currently available IJV performance evaluation tool 
has its weaknesses (Geringer and Hebert, 1991; Luo, 1997; Glaister and Buckley, 1998; 
Lasserre, 1999; Pangarkar and Lee, 2001; Pothukuchi et al., 2002).  In order to overcome 
these limitations of the various individual approaches, this study has adopted an eclectic 
approach to the measurement of IJV performance in Thailand.  This includes objective 
measurement (assessment of stability, duration, and survival), subjective measurement (a 
general assessment of the degree of perceived satisfaction), and composite measurement 
(multi-perceptual assessment of numerous aspects). 
 
To sum up, this study moves the focus away from China, India and the NIEs, presenting 
new empirically based insights into the under-researched phenomenon of IJV formation in 
Thailand, one of the ASEAN4 countries.  On the basis of research into unpublished, 
official and survey sources rather than the business press, it provides an original 
contribution to the knowledge and understanding of IJV establishment in the region.  It 
gives insights into such aspects as the strategic motives behind IJV formation, IJV 
performance assessment, and so forth. 
1.4  The Organisation of the Study 
Chapter 2 analyses the pattern of foreign direct investment in the ASEAN4 countries.  It 
outlines the volume of FDI in the ASEAN4 economy, trends, country of origin, and 
sectoral distribution.  The chapter also presents and discusses changing FDI policies, and 
investment promotion in the ASEAN4 in response to economic and industrial development 
in these four countries. This review of the literature underpins Chapter 5. 
 
Chapter 3 reviews the literature relating to theoretical perspectives on IJV formation.  This 
includes strategic behaviour theory; organisational knowledge and learning theory; 
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transaction cost theory; and the resource-based view.  It also reviews the literature about 
the characteristics of the activity, distribution, and trends of IJV formation; strategic 
motivation in establishing IJVs; host country location factors; contribution of parent 
companies to IJVs; IJV performance measurement; and IJV performance determinants.  
Chapters 5 to 8 are underpinned by these reviews of the literature. 
 
The research methodology for this study is set out in Chapter 4, which first briefly 
discusses the alternatives in order to justify the choices in the present study.  Aspects 
covered in the chapter include also the methods and procedure in collecting data, the data 
analysis method, and the validity and reliability of the research. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the analysis of IJV database.  It describes and analyses the 
characteristics of the variety, distribution, and trends of IJV activities in Thailand.  A brief 
description of the official government database and its advantages over a dataset 
established on the basis of information solely from the economic and business press is also 
presented in this chapter. This chapter also analyses an issue related to factors affecting 
MNEs’ decision to choose Thailand as their host country for IJV formation. 
 
The data analyses from a survey are presented in Chapters 6 to 8.  Chapter 6 explores 
factors motivating foreign and local Thai parent companies to form the IJVs.  This chapter 
also investigates the variations of the relative importance of strategic motives according to 
industrial sector of IJVs and country of origin of foreign parent companies. Exploratory 
factor analyses (EFA) are conducted to produce the parsimonious set of distinct strategic 
motives.  
 
Chapter 7 examines the contributions which parent companies provide to IJVs and analyse 
the relationship between those contributions and the characteristics of IJV operation. 
Correlation analysis and regression analysis based on factor scores from the EFA are used 
to analyse these relationships. 
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Chapter 8 assesses IJV performance in the context of the ASEAN4 countries, especially 
Thailand.  It also explores the relationship between each performance evaluation approach.   
Furthermore, this chapter also examines the multivariate determinants of IJV performance 
in Thailand. Correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis are adopted to analyse 
the issue. 
 
Chapter 9 presents the conclusions.  It provides a re-statement of the aim and objectives of 
the study, followed by a summary and discussion of the major research findings.  It 
identifies the overall contribution of the research, the policy implication of the findings, 
limitations of the study, and identifies areas for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Foreign Direct Investment in ASEAN 
 
2.1 Introduction  
A recent OECD (2004) report states that during the 1990s, ASEAN (the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations) countries were collectively among the world’s largest recipients 
of foreign direct investment (FDI).  ASEAN  is a geo-political and economic organisation 
of 10 countries located in Southeast Asia, and was formed on 8 August 1967 by Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Since then, membership has expanded 
to include Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. The economy of this 
region has grown considerably in the past three decades (OECD, 2003, 2004), especially 
the ASEAN4 countries of Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia.  Foreign 
investors have been a driving force behind this region’s economic development.  In 
addition, at a time of financial crisis in Asia in 1997, FDI played an important role in 
reviving the region’s economies and was an essential source of foreign capital during the 
crisis.  Foreign firms have by no means been the only actors, but they have played an 
important role in developing the industrial sectors of ASEAN host countries, especially 
those sectors (automotive, electronics) with the fastest export growth. 
 
For many years, the countries of the ASEAN4 were among the most open to foreign 
investment in the developing world. They were quick to recognise the powerful role that 
foreign investors could play in fuelling export-led growth, and were well placed to attract 
such investment during the years of regional structural adjustment in the late 1980s.  In 
addition, after the financial crisis which affected the whole region, FDI inflows into the 
ASEAN4, and especially Thailand, continued to grow rapidly, partially reflecting the fact 
that many foreign investors bought out their joint venture partners, recapitalised their 
affiliates, and entered new sectors which had been opened up in response to the crisis.  It is 
instructive to look at the FDI experience of the various ASEAN4 countries and the role of 
foreign investors in their economic development.  
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The purpose of this chapter is to describe and analyse, on the basis of the literature, the 
pattern of FDI, and to review changing government policies towards FDI in the ASEAN4 
countries.  This will serve as a frame of reference for the following outcome chapters of 
this study, especially Chapter 5. This chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 presents 
the pattern of FDI in the ASEAN4 countries, while Section 2.3 focuses on FDI policies in 
those countries. The impact of FDI on ASEAN4 development is set out in Section 2.4, and 
the final Section 2.5 provides a summary and concluding remarks. 
2.2 The Pattern of FDI in the ASEAN4 
2.2.1 Trends and Country of Origin of FDI Inflows 
With the exception of the Philippines, which, as Thomsen (1999) has pointed out, did not 
generally welcome foreign investors until the 1990s, the ASEAN4 have all been major 
recipients of foreign direct investment. The period of most intense foreign investment 
activity occurred in the late 1980s when firms from Japan and the NIEs (the first tier 
newly-industrialising economies of Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea) 
were looking for production bases abroad to counteract domestic currencies which were 
appreciating after the Plaza Accord1.  A number of UNCTAD (2004, 2005, 2006) reports 
show that the trend of FDI inflows into the ASEAN4 has continued to rise overall since the 
1990s, although there were fluctuations in the early 2000s. 
 
Since the mid-1990s, roughly one third of FDI inflows into the ASEAN4 countries have 
come respectively from Asia, Europe and the rest of the world, principally North America. 
Table 2.1 shows these FDI inflows by country of origin between 1995 and 2001.  The data 
show that Thailand is the largest FDI recipient, accounting for approximately 52% of total 
FDI inflows in the ASEAN4, while FDI flowing to Malaysia and the Philippines is about 
22% and 18% of the total respectively. Indonesia receives roughly 8% of the total inflows 
of these four countries.    
 
 
                                                 
1 The Plaza Accord was an agreement signed on September 22, 1985 by the then G5 Nations (France, West 
Germany, Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom).  The G5 agreed to devalue the US dollar in 
relation to the Japanese yen and German deutschmark by intervening in currency markets. 
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The share of each source region has varied over time and between the ASEAN4 countries.  
Over this period, Japanese and NIEs firms have tended to favour Thailand, followed by 
Malaysia, whilst European firms have invested extensively in Thailand, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia. American firms have invested mainly in Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines.  
 
An OECD (2004) report points out that some of the variation in investment patterns can be 
explained by the differing profile of investors from each region.  Asian investors include a 
number of comparatively small enterprises seeking low-cost offshore production platforms.  
These firms are often forced offshore by rising labour costs or appreciating currencies in 
their home countries and, given their limited resources, seek to minimise search costs by 
choosing locations in neighbouring countries or in those with which they have a cultural 
affinity. 
 
Table 2.1: FDI inflows into ASEAN by source country during 1995-2001 (USD 
million; percent) 
     
Source                   ASEAN 
 
Indonesia          Malaysia               Philippines        Thailand           
EU                     36,528      26% 3,351                 2,888                     1,726               3,684                 
Other Europe    11,713       8%    728                      67                       97                      443               
United States     24,349      17%          -1,368                5,399                     2,818               4,067                 
Canada                 2,836      2%    234                  -114                        3                        19                  
Japan                 22,151      16% 1,069                 1,207                    2,291                 6,645                
ASEAN**         15,257      11%             136                 2,422                    1,026                 3,903            
 NIEs*               11,693        8%    344                   342                      912                   3,035              
Other                 17,832      13%   -206                    54                      1,242                 6,750             
World               142,359  4,288                12,265                  10,115              28,546              
 
NB: * Hong Kong; Taiwan; South Korea 
         ** All countries in ASEAN including Singapore 
         Source: ASEAN Statistics Yearbook 2003. 
          
 
The large Asian MNEs are more likely to resemble investors from Europe and North 
America.  Many of them pursue complex strategies of diversifying value chains across 
countries, while at the same time supplying local markets through their own affiliates.  In 
other words, they consider an array of factors including market size, openness to foreign 
trade, quality of enabling environment and availability of domestic competencies,            
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all of which favour the more developed economies.  These companies are often more 
interested in the quality of  the labour force than labour costs.  This putative link between 
investor size and nationality, and changing patterns of investment over time in this region 
helps to explain changes over time in the origin of investment for individual ASEAN4 
countries. 
 
In Malaysia, for instance, Japanese and Taiwanese firms were the largest investors in the 
early 1990s as they sought what was then a low-wage location for their offshore 
production.  In 1990, these two countries accounted for no less than 60 percent of approved 
foreign projects.  Their share has since fallen almost every year, and since 1998 has 
averaged only 17 percent of approvals. Faced with rising labour costs in Malaysia, many of 
these firms chose to expand more rapidly in other countries. They have since been replaced 
by European and American firms; investors from the United States and Germany have 
represented 41 percent of approvals since 1998.  They have sought a relatively skilled 
workforce and access to the ASEAN market.  
 
Given its historical links with the United States, the Philippines traditionally received 
mostly American investment from firms seeking to supply the local market behind high 
tariff barriers. Since the mid-1990s when the Philippines launched its programme of export 
processing zones, these zones have attracted a massive share of investment, more than 50% 
of which comes from Asia. 
 
In Thailand, roughly half the FDI inflows into the country came from within the region 
itself (evenly divided between Japan, the NIEs, and ASEAN). Thailand was the most 
favoured place to receive the massive FDI inflows from Japan and the NIEs in the late 
1980s, which were searching for lower wage costs and more competitive exchange rates.  
The role of the petroleum sector in Indonesia explains the relative prominence of European 
firms, while Japanese firms are the second most important source of FDI inflows, using 
this country as a low-cost offshore production platform. 
 
It can be seen that not all the foreign investment in ASEAN4 countries comes from outside 
the region: roughly one tenth originates from other ASEAN members. The share ranges 
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from 3 percent in Indonesia, 10-15 percent in the Philippines and Thailand, to 20 percent in 
Malaysia. In almost all cases, this intra-regional activity represents investment by firms 
operating from Singapore. 
2.2.2  FDI Inflows by Sector 
FDI inflows into the ASEAN4 by sector in 1999-2001 are shown in Table 2.2.  The data 
shows that manufacturing is the most important source of FDI inflows into these countries. 
An OECD (2004) report indicates that Japanese trading companies (sogo shosha) and 
European financial firms were among the major investors in ASEAN4 countries.  Like 
many investors, they appear to have been driven by local and regional market 
considerations, including providing services to other foreign investors already in the 
region. 
 
Within manufacturing, the electronics sector has been by far the most important recipient 
of foreign investment, which is one reason why this sector now accounts for a third of 
goods exported from ASEAN4 countries.  In the Philippines, electronic parts and products 
account for 58 percent of all projects, and electrical machinery accounts for another 13 
percent.  The electronics industry has also been a leading investor in Malaysia, particularly 
around Penang.  Almost 90 percent of US manufacturing investment in Malaysia is in 
computers and electronic products, compared to one half in the Philippines. 
  
However, in the case of Thailand, FDI inflows into the machinery and transportation sector 
exceeded those in the electronics sector after 1997, and the increase, especially from 
Japanese investors, appears related to the clearly successful development of the automotive 
industry in Thailand.  Overall, the Thai government has applied very different policies to 
develop these two industries.  Trade and FDI liberalisation policies have been applied to 
the electronics industry in the context of overall liberalisation of FDI, but closed or 
protectionist policies have been generally applied towards the automotive sector. 
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Table 2.2: FDI inflows into ASEAN4 by sector during 1999-2001 (USD million) 
 
                Sector 
 
Japan                      US                          EU                     ASEAN             Other Asia 
Agriculture, fishery and forestry -18                          -4                           96                            71                          -21 
Mining and quarrying 157                         707                        1,178                        732                         21 
Manufacturing 1,439                    3,526                    2,484                        1,059                         792 
Construction -267                       -327                        3                              27                            -88 
Trade/Commerce 2,858                     1,081                   1,848                         181                            589 
Financial services -1,862                    1,507                   5,858                          95                             915 
Real estate -415                           67                      -16                          -231                            32 
Other services 489                          552                      335                           928                           587 
Other sectors 116                          214                    1,407                          366                           324  
Total 2,496                    7,322                  13,192                        3,227                        3,152 
 
NB: Source: ASEAN Statistics Yearbook 2003. 
 
2.3 FDI Policies in the ASEAN4 
2.3.1  Changing FDI Policies 
Import substitution policies were pursued in all four countries in the 1960s, in keeping with 
the prevailing development view that government intervention was necessary to promote 
industrialisation.  Strategic sectors were protected from foreign competition through high 
tariffs.  In some sectors, foreign investment was proscribed, and in most it was heavily 
circumscribed.  Foreign investors were limited to minority shares in companies, and were 
required to transfer technology and sometimes to divest after a number of years. 
 
The switch to export promotion policies began at different times in different countries. 
Malaysia started to promote exports as early as the 1970s, although for both Malaysia and 
Thailand, the real export push began only in the mid-1980s.  Indonesia and the Philippines 
converted to the export-oriented approach in the late 1990s.   Thomsen (1999); Felker and 
Jomo (2000) assert that the following external factors were important in encouraging a 
change in FDI policies in the ASEAN4 countries: the example of the successful and 
outward-orientated approach of the NIEs; the prolonged commodity slump in the 1980s; 
and the opportunities offered by exchange rate realignments after 1985.  Currency 
realignments, the switch to export promotion, including FDI liberalisation, and the rapid 
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inflow of FDI from Japan and the NIEs all combined to account for the dramatic export-led 
recovery of the ASEAN4 economies after 1985. 
 
Rather than replacing import substitution, export promotion was superimposed on the pre-
established structure.  The restrictions on FDI for the domestic markets remained largely 
intact; indeed, some of them are enshrined in national constitutions.  There has 
nevertheless been some relaxation in the implementation of these policies, often on a 
temporary basis, as a result of the financial crisis in 1997, but the basic regulatory structure 
for domestic-orientated investment remains in place. 
2.3.2 Investment Promotion in the ASEAN4 
Export-orientated firms, particularly those locating in export processing zones, are given 
numerous incentives in all four countries, including automatic approvals, land ownership, 
full control of the affiliate, tax holidays, and duty free imports of components.  Thomsen 
(1999: 22) comments that “from a regulatory point of view, investors wishing to export 
most of what they produced would find the ASEAN4 countries almost as open as OECD 
countries”. 
 
All four countries have a priority list of activities for which both domestic and foreign 
investors receive special promotional privileges.  Sometimes this list includes specific 
sectors which the government would like to promote, but in many cases the priorities relate 
to particular attributes of the investment rather than the sector itself.  For instance, in the 
case of Thailand, five priority target industries have been identified for aggressive 
promotion: agro-industry, fashion, automotive assembly, information communication 
technology including electronics, and high value-added services (BOI, 2005).  Thus, 
investors wishing to export most of their output or to transfer technology will generally be 
favoured. 
 
Incentives can take two forms.  The first are tax incentives for a defined period.  Malaysia, 
Thailand and the Philippines all offer such fiscal incentives.  Indonesia has been more 
reticent in this area, although certain industrial sectors may benefit from incentives.  The 
second type of incentive represents exemptions from various restrictions on inward 
 16
investment as well as from import duties on capital goods and raw materials and other 
trade barriers.  These incentives have been fully implemented in all four countries. 
 
Although incentives across the ASEAN4 countries are broadly similar, there are qualitative 
differences.  A number of previous studies (Chia and Whalley, 1995; Thomsen, 1999; 
OECD, (2004) indicate that, of all the countries, Thailand places the greatest emphasis on 
the location of investment as part of a policy of regional decentralisation, in order to 
relieve congestion in the Bangkok area and to spur growth in outlying regions.  Both 
Thailand and Malaysia are shifting away from their previous emphasis on export 
promotion towards greater targeting of strategic sectors.  In contrast, Indonesia and the 
Philippines still actively promote investment in labour-intensive export sectors in order to 
activate national pools of under- and unemployed labour.  
2.4 The Role of FDI in ASEAN4 Development 
Thomsen (1999: 23) argues that the role of FDI in development is as ‘multi-faceted’ as 
FDI itself. On one level, FDI has been seen as having a potential to contribute to 
development and global economic welfare similar to any other form of capital flow, by 
channeling resources from countries where they are abundant to those where they are 
scarce.  Thus, inflows of capital in the form of FDI allow host countries to invest in 
productive activities beyond what could be achieved by domestic savings alone.  Unlike 
other forms of capital flows, FDI proved remarkably resilient during the financial crisis. 
 
The 1997 crisis brought into relief the importance of FDI as a stable source of finance for 
development compared with other forms of international capital flows.  The OECD (2004) 
report shows that total net FDI inflows to Asia fell from US$ 110 billion in 1996 to only 
US$ 14 billion in 1997, while FDI inflows to the ASEAN4 remained unchanged.  Indeed, 
in some ASEAN4 countries, inflows actually increased.  One can only imagine the shock 
to the regional economy if such FDI flows had not been sustained under these 
circumstances. 
 
On another level, the benefits of FDI resemble those from trade, especially in sectors 
producing goods and services which tend not be traded internationally.  Thus, foreign firms 
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can potentially enhance the level of competition in an economy and bring in ideas, 
innovation, expertise and other forms of technology which the host economy would not 
necessarily have created on its own.  Multinational enterprises (MNEs), with their global 
network of affiliates, can also channel exports from the host country to affiliates elsewhere 
in the form of intra-firm trade.  Through this mechanism, FDI permits an international 
division of labour within the MNEs which, owing to high transaction costs, might not 
otherwise occur. 
 
The success of ASEAN4 countries amply demonstrates how FDI can play a major role in 
bringing about rapid, export-led growth.  Rapidly rising exports have fuelled the world’s 
fastest growth rates in these four countries.  For instance, in Thailand exports have been 
the main engine of economic growth, particularly since the mid-1980s.  Historically one of 
the world’s leading rice exporters, it has become a major exporter of manufactured goods, 
with these rising from only one third of total exports in 1980 to over 80 percent by 1997.  
This shift in exports is mirrored in the structural transformation of the Thai economy, from 
agriculture to industry.  While agriculture’s contribution to GDP was three times that of 
manufacturing in 1960, by the early 1990s, it was less than half as important as 
manufacturing.  The Malaysian experience is similar to that of Thailand, with exports 
growing quickly after the mid-1980s.  Although the substantial currency depreciation at the 
time was a major catalyst, investment liberalisation was an important complementary 
factor. 
 
In addition, one of the potentially most enduring benefits in developing countries from FDI 
inflows is the transfer of technology.  Exports can drive rapid economic growth over a long 
period, but technology transfer can do much more to promote sustainable development by 
enhancing indigenous capabilities.  In this area, the record from decades of FDI in the 
ASEAN4 is not encouraging.  A number of researchers (Tran Van Tho, 1991b, Saad, 1995; 
Thomsen, 1999) find that technology transfer to the ASEAN4 countries from FDI has been 
rather limited.  In Indonesia, technology transfer has taken place mainly through on-the-job 
training and has been limited to basic technological capabilities, while in Thailand 
according to the study of TDRI (1998) technology transfer from FDI has been only 
moderate. 
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 One reason for the poor performance in technology transfer is considered to be that the 
capacity of local workers to absorb foreign technologies is weak.  Because much of the 
technology and know-how which has been transferred has come through on-the-job 
training, policy initiatives in this area could have a significant impact.  Local capabilities 
are fostered in the long run by educational policies which enhance the capacity of local 
workers to assimilate foreign technology and know-how.  Reforms in the ASEAN4 are 
occurring in this area, but any improvement will take a long time to filter through the 
economy. 
 
A second and more important mechanism for technology transfer arises through the 
linkages between firms, as local firms co-operate with foreign investors either as joint 
venture partners or as suppliers.  One way to enhance the ability of local firms to absorb 
technology is to improve the level of training of the workers themselves.  Presently, 
government policies of the ASEAN4 countries are attempting to influence this exchange 
more directly by increasing the scope for collaboration between foreign and domestic 
firms. 
 
FDI policies of the ASEAN4 can directly hinder technology transfer from foreign 
investors. Many of the policies adopted in the ASEAN4 towards FDI are designed, 
implicitly or explicitly, to develop indigenous capabilities.  These include any or all of the 
following requirements: local joint venture partners; divestiture of foreign control after a 
certain period of time; local content levels which force investors to purchase a high share 
of inputs locally; expatriate personnel limits, including on the board of directors; and 
compulsory licensing and other forms of mandatory technology transfers.  The ASEAN4 
countries have adopted most of these strategies at one time or another.  Some remain in 
place, particularly for domestic market orientated investment. 
 
Policies such as these may have several unintended consequences.  They may discourage 
potential inward investors who are unwilling to be bound by such conditions.  Proprietary 
technologies and other intangible assets are the backbone of most firms, and they are 
understandably reluctant to share with others who might one day become rivals.  Thus, the 
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more the technology required to produce an item, the less likely the investor will be to 
locate in a country which imposes the types of restrictions mentioned above.  This is 
implicitly recognised by the ASEAN4 countries in their efforts to attract export-orientated 
firms.  Such investors typically face few restrictions on their activities.  Local content 
requirements sometimes encourage FDI in components producers, but the fundamental 
problems of linkage with local firms remain. 
 
These policies may also limit the eagerness of firms which do decide to invest because of 
the risk of leakages to potential rivals.  The most common policy in the ASEAN4 countries 
concerns joint venture requirements.  A number of researchers have found that such 
requirements do not achieve the objective of enhancing technology transfers.  For instance, 
according to FIAS (1995: 30) “Limits on foreign investor ownership have also had the 
perverse effect of reducing the investor’s incentive to make a success of the projects.”   
 
According to Pornnavalai (1997), IJV has been the main form of FDI in Thailand during 
the past three decades (the 1970s-1990s) as a result of the Thai government’s requirement 
that foreign firms must form IJVs with the local partners and limits foreign investor 
ownership of IJV firms in the following circumstances:  (a) if the IJV concentrates on the 
Thai market, manufacturing products mainly for the local market, foreign partner firms 
may not hold venture equity in the IJV of more than 49% of the total; in the non-
manufacturing sector, foreign firms cannot hold more than 40% of the IJV’s total equity;  
(b) in an IJV where at least 50% of the total output is exported, foreign firms may hold a 
majority share of the equity;  (c) if a firm exports 100% of its products, foreign firms may 
hold 100% of the equity.  In this case it would not, of course, be an IJV.  It is likely that in 
most cases, however, even a firm exporting 100% of its products overseas might still need 
a local partner to provide indigenous knowledge or marketing know-how. 
 
Such limits have only served to weaken the quality of FDI.  In their efforts to boost 
technology transfer from foreign investors, the ASEAN4 countries have subsequently 
attempted to relax or rescind the foreign equity restriction in joint ventures.  In the case of 
Thailand, after 1999, the Foreign Business Act replaced the Alien Business Law.  This new 
legislation has no foreign equity restriction in joint ventures. 
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 Similar conclusions have been reached in respect of other policies designed to increase 
technology transfer.  Kokko and Blomstrom (1995) observe a negative relationship 
between technology inflows and host country technology transfer requirements.  In 
Indonesia and the Philippines, divestiture requirements are reputed to have reduced 
investment and product- and process-technology flows and have done little to enhance 
domestic capabilities. 
 
Technology transfer requirements and other regulations concerning FDI are just a first 
layer of policies impinging on technology transfers.  On a much broader level, the 
emphasis of host countries on export promotion may also have been an obstacle.  Export-
orientated investors are often less willing to establish links with local companies because 
of the need for high quality inputs at competitive prices in order to compete in world 
markets.  Most of these inputs come from other foreign firms, either through imports or 
from home-country suppliers which have also invested in the host country. 
 
A number of previous studies suggest that domestic market-orientated investment might be 
better placed to transfer relevant technologies to the host economy.  For instance, an early 
but comprehensive study by Reuber et al. (1973) found that export-orientated projects 
purchased only one half as much of their inputs locally as other projects.  In addition, 
technology adaptation was much less in the former than the latter, in large part because 
local market-orientated firms had to adapt their products to specific demands of local 
consumers. 
 
In this light, then, it was argued that technology transfer might be enhanced by a neutral 
policy environment which permitted equal access for foreign investors to both domestic 
and export markets.  A gradual elimination of barriers to imports would of itself help to 
alleviate the most adverse effects of the existing dualist FDI policy, by removing one of the 
principal distortions within the ASEAN4 economies.  However, this would still not 
eliminate the discriminatory treatment of different types of foreign investors found in the 
FDI regulations of most of the ASEAN4 countries.  The reassessment of development 
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strategies in the light of the 1997 crisis was seen as providing an opportune moment for 
switching to a more open and balanced regulatory framework for FDI. 
2.5 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
During the 1990s, FDI flow to ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 
increased dramatically and rose to a world record level.  This was particularly true of the 
ASEAN4 countries of Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia (OECD, 2004).  
It can be seen that FDI has played an important role in economic development in the 
region.  
 
This chapter presents and analyses the FDI situation in the ASEAN4 countries on the basis 
of the existing literature.  Analysis of the pattern of FDI in the ASEAN4 indicates that 
Thailand has been the largest FDI recipient, accounting for about half the total FDI inflows 
in the ASEAN4, followed by Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia respectively.  FDI in 
this region began to take off in the late 1980s and early 1990s at a time when Japanese and 
NIEs firms (especially Taiwanese firms) were seeking offshore production platforms as a 
result of rising labour costs and appreciating currencies in their home countries.  FDI 
inflows into the ASEAN4 have continued to rise from 1995 until the present day, although 
there were fluctuations in the early 2000s.  
 
Since the mid-1990s, the major FDI inflows into the ASEAN4 have come from Asia, 
Europe, and North America.  Throughout this period, Japanese and NIEs firms have 
generally tended to prefer Thailand, followed by Malaysia, while European firms have 
invested extensively in Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia.  US firms have invested more 
in Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines.  FDI in the manufacturing sector is dominated 
by projects in electronics, with significantly more investment in that sector than in any 
other manufacturing activity in the ASEAN4.  However, in Thailand since 1997 FDI 
inflows into the machinery and transportation sector have been greater than into the 
electronics sector. The increase in this sector, especially from Japanese investors, appears 
related to the clearly successful development of the automotive industry in Thailand. 
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In addition, analysis of FDI policies of the ASEAN4 indicates that to a substantial extent 
these have been an integral part of overall development strategies.  Import substitution 
policy was replaced by export promotion policy in the early 1970s, although the real export 
push began only in the mid-1980s.  Firms wishing to export most of their output are often 
treated as favoured investors.  They are given numerous incentives in all four countries, 
including automatic approvals, land ownership, full control of their affiliate, tax holidays 
and duty free importing of components.  In contrast, foreign investors interested in 
providing goods and services to the local market face numerous restrictions on their 
activities, including an outright prohibition in some sectors. 
 
The financial crisis of 1997 added impetus to FDI liberalisation in the ASEAN4 by 
allowing greater access to the domestic market for foreign investors, including through the 
acquisition of local firms and relaxation or rescinding of foreign equity restriction in joint 
ventures.  Such liberalisation is to be welcomed, but it is unlikely by itself to foster greater 
foreign investor confidence or to put future development on a more sustainable basis.  
Sustainable development depends on the quality of investment received more than on the 
quantity.  The experience of countless developing countries over the past few decades 
suggests that benefits from inward direct investment are not automatic: they depend 
crucially on the overall policy environment in which the firm invests.  Policies towards 
foreign investment in the ASEAN4 can be seen with hindsight to have created distortions 
which hampered the traditional mechanisms through which foreign investors transfer 
technology and other know-how to the local economy. 
 
Foreign investors have not been the only exporters from the ASEAN4, but they have been 
well represented in those sectors with the fastest export growth.  Through export-orientated 
FDI, ASEAN4 countries were able to move quickly towards a manufacturing-based 
economy in which economic growth was driven by rapidly expanding exports.  The record 
of export performance speaks for itself, but so too does the manifest failure in many cases 
to translate export success based on FDI into something more durable.  Not only have 
exports been limited to a small number of products (usually intermediate ones) and sectors, 
but to varying degrees these export sectors have been virtual foreign enclaves within host 
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countries.  Investments in these enclaves have often been characterised by a poor record of 
technology transfer. 
 
The dualist policy of aggressively promoting export-orientated investment while protecting 
the local economy from both imports and market-seeking inward investment is seen as 
having ultimately undermined the very benefits it was intended to achieve.  To export 
successfully to world markets, foreign investors have had to purchase inputs principally 
from abroad or from other foreign investors in the host country. Many of the most 
successful export sectors in the ASEAN4 are highly import dependent, and this has limited 
the impact on exports of massive devaluations in these economies. 
 
Outward orientation through foreign investment promotion remains a viable development 
strategy which will continue to yield rapid economic growth.  Indeed, the potential role of 
foreign firms may have increased since the 1997 crisis.  At the same time, however, 
selective incentives based on the degree of export orientation have been shown in the light 
of the crisis to have created a dual economy in which technological transfers were few.  
These transfers, rather than exports per se, should evidently be the focus of investment 
policies. 
 
Whatever problems it may have created, however, one undoubted result of the regulation 
imposed by the Thai and other ASEAN4 governments on foreign direct investment has 
been to promote the explosive growth of IJVs as the major form of FDI in their countries. 
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Chapter 3 
Review of the Literature on International Joint Ventures 
3.1  Introduction 
The previous chapter illustrated the pattern and environment of FDI in the ASEAN4 
countries, particularly Thailand, providing the setting for this research. That review of the 
background aimed also to facilitate a better understanding of the literature and of the 
empirical analysis presented in later chapters.  The purpose of the present chapter is to 
define international joint ventures (IJVs) and review the literature relevant to the subject of 
our study.  The review first covers theories relevant to explaining the rise of IJV formation, 
which include the transaction cost theory, the organisational knowledge and learning 
theory, the resource-based view, and the strategic behaviour theory.  This examination of 
aspects of each theory leads on to identification of strategic behaviour theory as the theory 
most appropriate and useful to the aim and objectives of the study, and an explanation is 
given of why this is so. 
 
The chapter further reviews the literature on characteristics of the activities, distribution, 
and trends of IJV formation.  These include the strategic reasons why parent firms 
establish IJVs; host country location factors (that is, factors affecting MNEs’ choice of 
location when considering IJV formation); the contribution parent firms make to the IJV; 
IJV performance assessment; and IJV performance determinants.  The review of this 
literature underpins the empirical analyses in Chapters 5 to 8. 
3.2  Definition of International Joint Ventures 
Joint ventures are legally and economically separate organisational entities created by two 
or more parent organisations which collectively invest capital and other resources to pursue 
certain strategic objectives (Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976).  A generally similar approach is 
proposed by Kogut (1988), who defines joint ventures as being when two or more firms 
pool a portion of their resources within a common legal organisation.  Stuckey (1983) has a 
slightly sharper definition, seeing a joint venture as “the organisational and legal entity 
created when two or more separate groups jointly participate as co-owners of a producing 
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organisation” (Stuckey, 1983: 149).  A definition emphasising the financial implications 
proposes that a joint venture is a new organisation which has shared equity and is 
undertaken by two or more companies (Beamish and Banks, 1987), while Harrigan gives a 
more organic definition of a joint venture as a separate entity with two or more active firms 
as parents, where the emphasis is on the “child” (Harrigan 1984: 7). 
 
Subsequently, joint ventures have been subdivided into two categories:  equity joint 
ventures (EJVs) and non-equity joint ventures (NEJVs).  Geringer (1991) defines EJVs as 
being where two or more legally prominent companies are each involved in the decision-
making processes of a jointly owned entity.  Killing (1988) regards EJVs as typical joint 
ventures, created when two or more partners join forces to establish a new corporate entity 
in which each has an equity position, and accordingly expects a proportional share of 
dividend as compensation, and proportional representation on the board of directors. 
 
As regards NEJVs, Contractor and Lorange (1988) explain this kind of collaboration as 
contracts between companies intending to collaborate in some specific manner.  The 
agreement does not create a new corporate entity, but will establish a regulatory framework 
to manage distribution of resources, expenditures and returns, and the allocation of work.  
Exploration consortia, research partnerships and co-production agreements are examples of 
NEJVs. 
 
Further, a joint venture is regarded as an international joint venture (IJV) if at least one 
partner has its headquarters outside the venture’s country of operation, or if it has an 
important level of operation in more than one country (Geringer and Herbert, 1989).  
Shenkar and Zeira (1987) also define IJVs as “a separate legal organisational entity 
representing the partial holdings of two or more parent firms, in which the headquarters of 
at least one is located outside the country of operation of the joint venture.  This entity is 
subject to the joint control of its parent firms; each of which is economically and legally 
independent of the other” (Shenkar and Zeira, 1987: 547). 
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This study focuses on EJVs in which at least one parent company is from Thailand and at 
least one is from a foreign country.  The Thailand Board of Investment (BOI) helpfully 
made available a database of international equity joint ventures (IEJVs) for this study. 
3.3 The Theoretical Perspective on International Joint Ventures 
and Conceptual Framework of the Study 
In the international business literature, researchers have proposed a number of theoretical 
approaches to explaining IJV formation, with the emphasis on conceptual and empirical 
evidence. These views can be summarised into four major theoretical approaches: the 
transaction cost theory, the organisational knowledge and learning theory, the resource-
based view, and the strategic behaviour theory. 
The first approach, transaction cost theory, was initiated by Coase (1937) and considerably 
developed by Williamson (1975, 1985, 1988).  This approach emphasises cost 
minimisation considerations.  The second approach, organisational knowledge and learning 
theory, is derived from organisational theory and is premised mainly on the assumption 
that firms learn or seek to retain their capabilities by accessing knowledge from a partner. 
The third approach of a resource-based view (RBV) focuses on firms’ resources.   A 
number of researchers (Wernerfelt, 1984; Das and Teng, 2000; Tsang, 2000) argue that this 
perspective takes a more internally focused view and aims to account for creation, 
maintenance and renewal of competitive advantage in terms of the resource side of the 
firms.   The fourth approach, the strategic behaviour theory, focuses on strategic 
motivations, competitive position, and the impact of positioning on profitability.  The 
fundamental logic of this approach in explaining the IJV formation is an attempt to 
maximise profits through improving a firm’s competitive position in relation to rivals 
(Kogut, 1988). 
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3.3.1  Transaction Cost Theory 
The transaction cost theory is grounded in economic analysis and was initiated by Ronald 
Coase (Coase, 1937; 1988).  The basic unit of analysis is the economic transaction, which 
is defined as an exchange of goods or services between two parties.  Coase (1937) divides 
transactions into the two major categories of “market” and “hierarchy” in accordance with 
their organisational form.  The deciding factor is whether a particular transaction can be 
undertaken at lower cost through the market or internally within a firm (“hierarchy”).  If 
the costs of undertaking the transaction via the market are high, then the firm can gain 
economic benefits by “internalising” the transaction within its own organisation (Buckley 
and Casson, 1988).  Coase’s theory was subsequently considerably developed by 
Williamson (1975, 1985) with his “transaction cost economics” theoretical framework by 
examining the relationship between uncertainty with regards to how the parties may 
behave, and transaction costs.    In the view of this theory, organisations will tend to favour 
the IJV as an alternative mode if it incurs lower transaction cost than other modes of 
governance. 
 
Williamson (1975, 1985) suggests that firms decide how to transact after considering how 
best to minimise total production and transaction costs.  Production costs may vary 
between one firm and another depending on the scale of operations and proprietary 
knowledge.  Transaction cost refers to the expenses incurred in writing and enforcing 
contracts, haggling over terms and contingent claims, deviating from optimal kinds of 
investments in order to increase dependence on a party or to stabilise a relationship, and in 
administering a transaction (Williamson, 1975, 1987).   He establishes an organisational 
failure framework by explaining that, “first of all, markets and firms are alternative 
instruments for completing a related set of transactions.  Second, whether a set of 
transactions ought to be executed across markets or within a firm depends on the relative 
efficiency of each mode.  Third, the costs of writing and executing complex contracts 
across a market vary with the characteristics of the human decision-makers involved with 
the transaction on the one hand, and the objective properties of the market on the other.  
Fourth, although the human and environmental factors that impede exchanges between 
firms (across a market) manifest themselves somewhat differently within the firm, the 
same sets of factors apply to both” (Williamson, 1975: 8).  A presumption of market 
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failure is warranted where it is observed that transactions are shifted out of a market and 
into a firm, whereas a presumption of internal organisational failure is warranted for 
transactions that are unshifted (continuing to be market-mediated).  Therefore, the 
organisational failure framework is a symmetrical term meant to apply to market and non-
market organisations alike (Williamson, 1975; 1985). 
 
Williamson (1975; 1985) points out that the choice of mode of governance between the 
market and hierarchies is determined by a set of related environmental and human factors.  
These factors lead to circumstances under which complex contingent claims contracts are 
costly to write, execute, and enforce.  Encountering such difficulties, and considering the 
risks that simple (or incomplete) contingent claims contracts pose, a firm may decide to 
bypass the market and resort to hierarchical modes of organisation.  Transactions that 
might otherwise be conducted in the market are instead performed internally and governed 
by administrative process. 
 
Two environmental factors which lead to prospective market failure are uncertainty and 
small numbers-exchange relations.  Two human factors are ‘bounded’ rationality and 
opportunism.  Williamson (1975; 1985) indicates that a combination of the human 
environmental factors need not obstruct market exchange, unless the factors interact.  He 
emphasises that the pairing of uncertainty with bounded rationality and a combining of 
small numbers with opportunism are especially damaging.  
 
Bounded rationality results, according to Williamson, from the fact that “the capacity of 
the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared 
with the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behaviour 
in the real world” (Williamson, 1975: 9).  Simon (1957) long ago identified 
neurophysiological and language limitations which restrict rationality.  Opportunism refers 
to a lack of candour or honesty in transactions, and includes “self-interest seeking with 
guile” (Williamson, 1975: 26). 
 
According to Goffman (1969: 105), quoted by Williamson (1975), opportunistic behaviour 
involves making “false or empty, that is, self-disbelieved, threats and promises” in the 
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expectation that individual advantage will thereby be realised.  Highly opportunistic 
behaviour can lead firms to experience diminishing performance levels (Coase, 1937).  
Buckley (1988) claims that the opportunism of individuals may influence them to act in 
their own interests rather than the organisation’s, and this leads to the arising of potential 
costs of monitoring and enforcing agreements and contracts. 
 
There can be situations where “a small number of agents/amount of bargaining” are 
present, where only a few or even just one buyer and one seller exist (Williamson, 1975, 
1985; Ouchi, 1979, 1980).  Klein et al. (1978) argue that in small number conditions, the 
cost of switching partners will be high and one party can be held to ransom by another.  
Under these circumstances competitive pressure will vanish, creating a small number of 
suppliers who behave opportunistically to claim higher costs and supply poor quality work. 
Williamson (1975, 1985) asserts that when opportunism is combined with a small-numbers 
condition, the trading situation will be greatly improved if allocation of resources takes 
place on a basis of ‘hierarchy’ or ‘internal organisation’.  The transaction costs arise 
because of conducting business in imperfect markets.  Accordingly, it can be more 
efficient for firms to use internal structures rather than market intermediaries (Beamish and 
Banks, 1987).  
 
A hierarchical, internal solution has many attractions, given the problems which affect 
contracts because of bounded rationality and the possibility of opportunistic behaviour 
where small-scale operations are concerned.  Internal organisation can be a way of 
overcoming information “impactedness”, defined as a condition which arises mainly as a 
result of uncertainty and opportunism, as well as bounded rationality.  According to 
Williamson, information impactedness is present when the true circumstances underlying 
the transaction are known to one or more parties but cannot be discovered by others 
without expense.  It need not be a problem for a market-based solution if the parties do not 
behave in an opportunistic manner; or if there is no problem of bounded rationality; or if 
sufficient competition is present because of a large numbers situation.  If all of these are 
absent, however, hierarchy rather than market may be the best way to curb opportunism.  
Internal organisation may minimise the problem of bounded rationality with its 
accompanying dangers of opportunistic behaviour.  Williamson (1975) argues that it is, 
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nevertheless, mainly the incentive, auditing and dispute settling benefits of internal 
organisation which reduce information problems. 
 
Williamson (1985) also emphasises the importance of “asset specificity”, by which he 
means durable investments made in support of particular transactions, “the opportunity 
cost of which investment is much lower in best alternative uses or by alternative users 
should the original transaction be prematurely terminated” Williamson (1985: 55).  He 
argues that parties whose mutual trade is supported by substantial investment in 
transaction-specific assets are effectively operating in a bilateral relationship.  As such, 
“Harmonising the contractual interface that joins the parties, thereby to effect adaptability 
and promote continuity, becomes the source of real economic value” (Williamson, 1985: 
30).  In effect, transactions heavily dependent on asset specificity will be more 
economically dealt with through hierarchy.  There is, of course, a risk of high costs arising 
with a hierarchy transaction mode because of such bureaucratic costs as planning, control, 
measuring and co-ordination (Williamson, 1975; 1985). 
 
To apply the transaction cost framework to IJV formation, a number of researchers (for 
example, Beamish and Banks, 1987; Hennart, 1988; Kogut, 1988; Buckley and Casson, 
1988) argue that in a situation where both market and hierarchy modes would cause 
excessive costs, a transaction mode in the form of IJVs may be an appropriate alternative.  
An IJV mode is a specific type of bilateral governance based on transactional reciprocity, 
and can serve to reduce the defects of both market and hierarchy modes (Williamson, 
1985). 
 
Hill and Kim (1988) argue that the IJV creates dedicated assets from at least one of the 
partners and these assets are protected by a reciprocal long-term exchange agreement.  The 
IJV thus creates a ‘mutual hostage’ situation, which may mitigate the risks of opportunism 
(Kogut, 1988).  In addition, Hayes and Wheelwright (1984) assert that in some situations, 
an IJV solution can simultaneously incorporate long-term reciprocity and retain the 
benefits of market contracting, like economies of scales or economies of scope, which are 
of considerable importance in manufacturing. 
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To explain transaction cost theory in an international context, Hennart (1988) claims that, 
in global business environments, MNEs which sell their products overseas must first 
decide on the production site: whether to produce at home and export to the foreign 
markets, or to locate their production abroad.  This decision is based on a comparison of 
delivery costs.  It reflects the relative production costs of the home location compared with 
a foreign location, plus transport costs and tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. 
 
Whether MNEs organise their interdependence with investors in host countries through 
market or hierarchical means is the second decision.  Transaction cost theory can be 
applied here.  Firms have to compare and choose a governance structure which will 
minimise their transaction costs.  They have to rely either on the price mechanism 
operating through market transactions, or on hierarchy seeking alignment of corporate 
goals and performance.  A decision in favour of the hierarchy mode, due to high 
transaction costs in the situation of an imperfect market, leads to the establishment of a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of the MNE (Buckley and Casson, 1988).  However, Kogut 
(1988) argues that forming wholly-owned subsidiaries often entails a significant amount of 
investment and other resource input.  Accordingly, where equity partnership incurs lower 
transaction costs than other organisational modes, the IJV may be selected as more 
appropriate. 
 
Williamson considers the IJV approach to be a hybrid occupying a position between the 
two extremes of the market-hierarchy continuum, and to provide stronger incentives and 
adaptive capabilities than hierarchies, while also providing more administrative control 
than markets (Williamson, 1985).  In other words, MNEs need to decide whether they 
should establish wholly-owned subsidiaries (hierarchy mode), conclude contractual 
agreements with local agents (market mode), or establish IJVs (hybrid mode) on the basis 
of which option will minimise their transaction costs.  
 
To summarise, then: the central contention of the transaction cost theory is that 
transactions can be classified by organisational form.  Coase presented the idea that the 
market and the firm are alternative ways of organising similar kinds of transaction, and that 
one or the other may prove to have a lower cost depending on the circumstances of the 
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transaction.  The theory was further developed by Williamson (1975; 1985) who 
introduced the classification of “markets” and “hierarchies”.  This defines a set of human 
factors and a set of environmental factors which, taken together, establish the efficiency of 
a particular form of contracting.  The human factors are bounded rationality and 
opportunism.  The environmental factors are uncertainty and small numbers.  There are the 
further conceptual tools of information impactedness, which is compounded from 
uncertainty and opportunism, and asset specificity.  Where these factors are problematical 
they may encourage a firm to bypass the market and resort to hierarchical modes of 
organisation.  
 
In other words, transaction cost theory describes the market as a mode of economic 
transaction with certain in-built risks.  Market transactions become risky when information 
relevant to a contract is asymmetrically distributed between the parties, or when contracts 
cannot spell out all the contingencies which might arise during the duration of the contract 
(Williamson, 1975).  This kind of information disparity is likely to encourage opportunistic 
behaviour in the party enjoying the advantage, and particularly in “small numbers” 
bargaining situations where competition is limited.  Guarding against opportunism may 
lead to such extra costs as monitoring and enforcement.  Hierarchy is seen as the solution 
to market failure in this situation, mitigating transaction risks.  (Williamson, 1975; 1985)  
Where the parties to a transaction operate within a single hierarchy, incentives to 
opportunistically exploit information disparity and asset specificity are reduced. 
 
In transaction theory terms, where both the monitoring costs associated with a market 
transaction and the bureaucratic costs of a hierarchy transaction are excessive, the IJV 
transaction mode may be an attractive compromise.  
 
Transaction cost theory has been criticised as having limited applicability in at least two 
major respects when applied to such collaborative strategies such as IJVs.  First, it has 
been suggested that the theory’s single-party, cost-minimisation emphasis neglects the 
inter-dependence of the partners in an IJV.  Second, it is seen as placing too much 
emphasis on the structural features of trading at the expense of other important aspects.  
Zajac and Olsen (1993) suggest that the proliferation of collaborative arrangements has 
 33
more to do with anticipated gains than anticipated losses incurred in attempting to restrict 
opportunistic behaviour. 
 
Further, it is sometimes complained that the theory assumes it is a simple matter to 
separate production and transaction costs, which is often not the case.  It can be very 
difficult in practice to measure, or even to define, transaction costs.  In his study of the 
automotive industry Dyer (1997) suggested that the mode of governance affects not only 
transaction costs but also production costs in ways which are difficult to identify and 
quantify.  The exact costs associated with a strategic choice are difficult to calculate, so 
that the theory probably needs to be supplemented by the use of other analytical tools.  
(Kogut, 1988; Dunning, 1993) 
 
Although transaction cost theory emphasises bounded rationality, it makes little allowance 
for other factors which affect decision-making.  There is an unspoken assumption that a 
company’s sole objective is to maximise profit and minimise cost, but in reality there can 
be conflicts of interest between managers, and the interests of managers and shareholders 
do not necessarily coincide completely.  The power of individuals within an organisation 
can have an important impact on decision-making. 
 
3.3.2  Organisational Knowledge and Learning Theory 
The second perspective on IJV formation is offered by the organisational knowledge and 
learning theory.  This paradigm views IJVs as a means by which firms can learn or seek to 
retain their capabilities by obtaining knowledge from a partner.  An IJV mode is a 
propeller of learning to facilitate inter-firm knowledge transfer in the interests of the parent 
firms.  Hennart (1988) sees the transference of knowledge as an area particularly at risk of 
market failure.  Buyers are reluctant to pay for something so ill-defined, and sellers are 
anxious that buyers will renege on a contract once they are in possession of the knowledge 
they need.  Kogut (1988) feels this is something which transaction cost theory also fails to 
account for.  He suggests that the rationale behind IJV formation may be a firm’s desire to 
learn or to retain their capabilities.  What is being sought in an IJV is a knowledge base or 
competency not easily transferred across the boundaries of a firm. 
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The IJV is a vehicle by which “tacit knowledge” is transferred.  Other forms of transfer, 
such as licensing, are impossible, not because of market failure or high transaction costs, 
but because the very knowledge being transferred is organisationally embedded (Kogut, 
1988). 
 
Polanyi (1958) is clearly aware that individual knowledge, know-how and skills are not 
always easily communicated.  He remarks that it is “a well-known fact that the aim of a 
skilful performance is achieved by observance of a set of rules which are not known as 
such to the person following them.”  Polanyi (1958: 49)  He continues that, in the exercise 
of individual skill, many of the actions involved are not the result of deliberate choices but 
automatic responses, much like those which enable a cyclist to stay on his bike. 
 
Teece (1977) argues that much in the routine operation of a business firm is done 
automatically in response to signals coming from within the organisation or its 
environment.  It is accordingly not more easily communicable, indeed probably less so, 
than individual capabilities.  He sees this “routinisation” in an organisation as itself the 
most important store of its specific operational knowledge.  Teece points out that 
organisational knowledge ensures not only that all the members know their routines, but 
also that they know when to perform them.  The individual must be able to interpret 
incoming messages from other members of the organisation and from the environment, and 
then to utilise the information to select an appropriate routine from his own repertoire.  To 
view organisational memory as merely the sum of the memories of individual members is 
accordingly to overlook the complex linking by shared past experiences which have 
established the highly specific communication system underlying routine performance. 
 
Teece insists that while there is good reason to believe that remembering by doing may 
often be more cost effective than committing routines to paper, it makes it much more 
difficult to effect a market exchange of such knowledge in order to transfer it to a different 
organisation.  Transferring key personnel can take the process part of the way, with the 
individuals becoming consultants or teachers of their routine knowledge, but more often 
what is needed is the transfer of organisational as well as individual knowledge.  Teece 
concludes that, while an individual may understand a part of the company jigsaw 
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extremely well, and may indeed understand where the piece fits into the puzzle as a whole, 
removed from its organisational context that individual’s knowledge may be of little value. 
 
Kogut (1988) points out that the market is best replaced by the IJV mode not where 
tacitness is a cost stemming from opportunism, but rather from the need to replicate 
experiential knowledge which is not well understood.  More generally, tacitness is an 
aspect of the capital stock of knowledge within a firm.  He argues that there is an important 
distinction between this “knowledge capital” embodied in particular individuals, which 
may be tradeable in the labour market, and knowledge capital embodied in organisations as 
skills and routines.  The only way of obtaining the latter may be to replicate or take over 
the organisation itself. 
 
To put it more simply, there are two types of knowledge: explicit knowledge and implicit 
knowledge.  The first is relatively easily transferred between firms.  A market transaction 
may function as an instrument to acquire and assimilate this kind of knowledge (Inkpen, 
1998).  Hence, knowledge can be transferred through whole industries and become 
accessible to most firms regardless of whether they form IJVs.  The second type of 
knowledge is highly embedded in host firms and thus may be extremely difficult to access 
through a market transaction.  There is, accordingly, a need to transfer such tacit 
knowledge by establishing a closer and more interactive relationship with the firms who 
possess it (Hamel, 1991; Lyles and Salk, 1996).  From this standpoint, IJVs can be the 
means that makes it possible for knowledge and skills to be transferred from one partner to 
another. 
 
The organisational knowledge and learning theory perspective, then, views IJVs primarily 
as a means by which firms may acquire organisational knowledge which it is otherwise 
difficult to obtain.  Some forms of knowledge cannot be readily transferred by way of a 
market transaction, so the need arises to establish IJVs so that “tacit” knowledge and skills 
can be transferred from one partner to another.  From the viewpoint of this theory, 
establishing an IJV will make good sense if either of two conditions are met:  a) one or 
both firms desire to acquire the other’s organisational know-how, or b) one firm wishes to 
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maintain its existing organisational capabilities while benefiting from another firm’s more 
up-to-date knowledge. 
 
The organisational knowledge and learning approach has been citicised for being 
excessively abstract, and probably more applicable to knowledge-intensive industries 
(Kogut, 1988).  Furthermore, the applicability of the theory to analysing the strategic 
alliances which are IJVs is also seen as being limited by cursory analysis of the role of 
knowledge in alliance relationships and the presumption that the goal of alliances is to 
facilitate organisational learning. This emphasis on learning – the acquisition of knowledge 
fails to recognise the central attribute of the strategic alliance as an organisational mode 
which can reconcile the benefits of knowledge specialisation with those of flexible 
integration. The theory is said to lack “clear specification of the role of knowledge in 
alliance formation”(Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004: 77).  
 
Robson et al (2002) argue that learning is not a key factor for many firms engaged in IJVs; 
hence, learning outcomes may have little effect on IJV business performance. They add 
that, “quantitative study on the topic has not been able to elucidate how learning processes 
unfold over time” (Robson et al, 2002: 389).  Also, Huber (1991) argues that this 
theoretical approach lacks the depth of cumulative work and fails to synthesise the work of 
different organisational learning research groups. 
 
3.3.3  Resource-Based Theory 
A third rational explanation of the IJV formation rests on the possession and development 
of firm’s resources. Resource-based theory has recently appeared as an alternative 
approach to understanding the IJV formation.  Penrose (1959) pioneered this approach, 
which views a firm as equivalent to a broad set of resources which it owns.  When 
Penrose’s book was first published in 1959, inter-firm collaboration was relatively rare, but 
interest in resource-based theory has recently been revived by Wernerfelt (1984: 172) who 
defines resources as “those (tangible and intangible) assets which are tied semi-
permanently to the firm”.  Das and Teng (2000) argue that, unlike traditional industrial 
organisation economics which draw heavily on analysis of the competitive environment, 
the resource-based view focuses on analysis of the various resources possessed by the firm.  
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Because many of these are firm-specific and not perfectly mobile or imitable, firms are 
continuously heterogeneous in terms of their resource bases.  Sustained resource 
heterogeneity thus, becomes a possible source of competitive advantage for a firm, which 
can lead to economic rents or above normal returns. 
 
Leiblein (2003) argues that resource-based theory provides two principal conceptual 
insights.  First, it recognises that factor markets exist in which firms may develop or 
acquire the resources necessary for product-market competition.  Second, resources which 
lead to persistent performance differentials are much broader in nature and more difficult 
to accumulate than the tangible assets and factors of production typically emphasised in 
neo-classical economic theories. 
 
The assumptions underlying the resource-based view fall into two broad categories.  The 
first set holds that firms are profit-maximising entities directed by ‘boundedly rational’ 
managers (Conner, 1991; Rumelt, 1984).  Consequently, managers are assumed to lack the 
knowledge, foresight, and skills to accurately predict and plan for all the various 
contingencies which may arise in their search for profitable opportunities.  The second set 
of assumptions suggests that firms must make up-front investments for the opportunity to 
engage in the process of creating new resources, whose eventual value is inherently 
ambiguous and uncertain (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982).  These assumptions lead to the 
critical concepts of resource heterogeneity and resource immobility.  The idea of resource 
heterogeneity is that competing firms possess different bundles of resources, while the 
concept of resource immobility suggests that many of these resource differences will 
persist over time. 
 
Das and Teng (2000) refer to imperfect mobility as a difficulty, involving appreciable 
costs, when attempting to move certain resources from one firm to another. According to 
Dierickx and Cool (1989), factor markets are often incomplete and imperfect, so that many 
resources are either not tradeable at all or not perfectly tradeable.  They offer as an 
example the fact that such resources as a firm’s reputation and organisational culture are 
not simply tradeable.  Many resources, such as the tacit knowledge of firms, lose much of 
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their value if moved from their current organisational context and used in conjunction with 
other resources. 
 
Whereas imperfect mobility concerns barriers to acquiring resources from their owners, 
imperfect imitability and imperfect substitutability refer to barriers to obtaining similar 
resources from elsewhere (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993).  Das and Teng (2000) cite 
Lippman and Rumelt (1982) regarding the concept of causal ambiguity, a lack of clarity 
about which resources are responsible for competitive advantage.  Causal ambiguity makes 
the connection between resources and competitive advantage less clear, and thus constrains 
a firm’s ability to imitate its competitors and/or to employ substitutes.  Reed and DeFillippi 
(1990) categorise three resource characteristics that give rise to causal ambiguity: tacitness, 
complexity, and specificity. 
Resource-based theory has been applied to IJV formation for two main reasons: 
exploitation of resources, and development of resources.  Firms have to form IJVs if they 
want to exploit the resources of their partners since these resources cannot be found in the 
market (because of the imperfect condition of the factor market mentioned above).  This 
motive is directly related to the nature of the firm as a rent-seeking institution.  The rent 
earned by a firm is defined as a return in excess of the firm’s opportunity cost (Tollison 
1982).  Harrigan and Newman (1990: 425) argue that a virtue of IJV formation is that 
“often they make use of a resource which hereto has been left dormant because it was not 
coupled with the necessary handmaiden”.  The exploitation of such ‘dormant’ resources 
creates rents because their opportunity costs are zero.  Many more IJV formations are, 
however, motivated by the desire of at least one partner to make a better use of its 
competitive advantage.  Penrose (1959) comments that firms tend to expand whenever 
profitable opportunities exist.  A firm may therefore want to exploit its competitive 
advantage in a different country and/or industry. 
Resource-based theory is concerned not only with efficient utilisation of a firm’s resources, 
but also with their efficient development.  Development of resources is another principal 
reason for forming IJVs (Tsang 2000; Das and Teng, 2000; Leiblein, 2003).  In this case, 
Tsang (2000) argues that rent generation is not an immediate objective.  Rather, the 
objective is to manage and develop the resources in a rational manner, to acquire and 
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develop resources that are needed, and to dispose of those that do not fit into a firm’s core 
competence (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990).  By so doing, a firm’s long term competitiveness 
is strengthened.  A firm’s whole portfolio of resources is taken into account when such 
IJVs are formed.  That is, within the constraint of bounded rationality, the entrepreneur has 
to consider global efficiency, and is therefore seen by resourced-based theory as having an 
important role to play (Tsang, 2000). 
 
Ohmae (1989: 145) argues that “today’s products rely on so many different critical 
technologies that most companies can no longer maintain cutting-edge sophistication in all 
of them. Tapping external sources of know-how becomes a must. Suppose a firm wants to 
obtain a specific capability possessed by another firm.  It is usually not wise for the former 
to acquire the latter just for the sake of obtaining the capability.  The very essence of 
capabilities is that they cannot be readily acquired through markets (Kogut and Zander, 
1992; Teece et al, 1997).  It makes more sense to learn the capability from its owner. 
 
An IJV is formed from resources contributed by its partners, with the result that there is 
intimate interaction and communication between the staff of the parent companies.  This 
flow of information offers a great opportunity for learning, which encompasses not only 
resources within the IJV but which also, to some degree, extends to the resources of the 
parent firms.  Tsang (2000) points out two key factors which affect how successful 
learning is.  The first is the degree of specificity of the resource to a firm.  If a resource is 
highly “firm-specific”, it is difficult to transfer it to another firm without a major loss of 
value.  It is difficult to acquire a highly firm-specific resource through learning, since the 
learner may be unable to disentangle the intricate linkages of the resource from its owner’s 
other routines.  The second factor affecting the success of learning is the learner’s ability to 
absorb, his ability to “recognise the value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to 
commercial ends”.  (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990: 128)  Mowery (1989: 26) asserts that the 
“ability of a junior firm to utilise or exploit the technological assets contributed by a 
technologically advanced firm to a collaboration depends on the development of in-house 
research and engineering capabilities that aid the firm in absorbing these assets”. 
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As can be seen, resource-based theory emphasises analysis of the resources which firms 
possess rather than analysis of the competitive environment.  Since a number of resources 
are firm-specific and non-transferable, firms can gain competitive advantage and enhance 
performance if they gain access to their partners’ unique resources by forming an IJV.  
Nevertheless, the theory assumes that a firm can be profitable in a highly competitive 
market providing it can exploit advantageous resources.  This is not necessarily the case. 
This theory ignores external factors concerning the industry as a whole.  The industry 
structure as well as other external factor analysis should also be considered.       
Furthermore, for this theory a prominent source of sustainable competitive advantage is 
causal ambiguity. While this is undeniably true, it leaves an awkward possibility that the 
firm is not able to manage a resource it does not know exists, even if a changing 
environment requires it (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982). Through such external change the 
initial sustainable competitive advantage could be nullified or even transformed into a 
weakness (Priem and Butler, 2001a; Peteraf, 1993; Rumelt, 1984).  
Furthermore, the concept ‘rare’ seems to be obsolete. Although prominently present in this 
research framework, the concept that resources need to be rare to be able to function as a 
possible source of a sustained competitive advantage is unnecessary (Hoopes et al, 2003). 
Because of the implications of the other concepts (e.g. valuable, inimitable and non-
substitutability) any resource that follows from these characteristics is inherently rare. 
Priem and Butler (2001b; 57) further crticise that the resource-based view is ‘tautological’ 
or self-verifying.  This paradigm has defined competitive advantage as a value-creating 
strategy that is based on resources that are, among other characteristics, valuable. 
However, Priem and Butler (2001a: 31) argue that this reasoning is circular and therefore 
‘operationally invalid’.  
3.3.4  Strategic Behaviour Theory 
The fourth powerful perspective for IJV formation stems from theories on how strategic 
behaviour influences the competitive positioning of the firm.  In this paradigm, the IJV 
mode has been considered as strategic alternative, which can maximise profits as well as 
improves a firm’s competitive position in relation to rivals. 
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Harrigan (1987, 1988) and Kogut (1988) argue that a number of competitive 
environmental factors (e.g., competition on a global scale, the rapid dispersion of 
technology, and resource mobility across a country) have driven the creation of IJVs.  The 
nature of these factors leads to a development of strategic behaviour theory to explain the 
establishment of IJVs. 
 
Lorange and Roos (1993) similarly argue that MNEs resort extensively to IJV formation to 
implement their strategies because of the current characteristics of the international 
business environment.  First, increasing internationalisation with heightened competitive 
pressure stems from global scale and/or scope advantages.  Firms feel a need to team up 
with partners to ameliorate resource shortages, to gain time, and so forth.  Second, despite 
this internationalisation, firms need to remain strong in national markets and adapt to local 
needs and demands.  Accordingly, they need a local partner.  Third, rapid technological 
development leads to shorter product life cycles, calling for improved price response and 
demand response.  Hence, firms need to have joint R&D, to have a sufficient resource 
base, to bring together scarce, eclectic competencies, and to leverage outputs for a broad 
commercial application.  Fourth, higher demands for systemic solutions involve several 
types of competencies, product and/or service offerings and so forth, put together into 
packages to better satisfy the customer.  Thus, firms need to bring together the best from 
several partners.  Fifth, many new competitors may emerge in otherwise relatively 
traditional businesses, which often urgently requires proactive repositioning.  Accordingly, 
firms need to build strong alliance networks, not only in order to move rapidly to the right 
position to generate business, but also as a defence. 
 
The strategic behaviour approach recognises the drive to lower transaction costs as a 
motive for forming an IJV, but this alternative view stresses how strategic behaviour 
influences a firm’s competitive positioning; it emphasises how competitive positioning 
affects the asset value of firms which adopt the IJV mode of governance.  Firms which do 
business through an IJV can maximise profit by improving their competitive position vis-à-
vis competitors (Kogut, 1988).   Similarly, Killing (1983) asserts that firms are engaged in 
IJV formation to enable them to attain strategic objectives in their market and environment, 
with an aim to improve their competitive position.  
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 Linking IJV formation to strategic positioning, a number of researchers (Vernon, 1983; 
Killing, 1983; Harrigan, 1985, 1986; Vickers, 1985; Contractor and Lorange, 1988) 
emphasise that the IJV mode is an effective choice for implementing change in a firm’s 
strategic position.  Many IJVs are motivated by strategic behaviour aimed at deterring 
entry or eroding competitors’ positions.  For example, Kogut (1988) cites the work of 
Vickers (1985) which presents the IJV as a research partnership to deter entry by 
competitors through pre-emptive patenting.  Vickers points out that in oligopolistic 
industries, the best arrangement might be for one of the firms to invest in patentable 
research in order to forestall entry by rivals.  Vernon (1983) also views IJVs as a form of 
defensive investment enabling firms to hedge against strategic uncertainty, especially in 
industries of moderate concentration where collusion is difficult, despite the benefits of 
interdependence between firms. 
 
Bleeke and Ernst (1991) suggest that, from a strategic behaviour perspective, IJV 
formation is more likely to be explained by firms’ need to expand their markets and to 
improve their competitive position.  Global strategies are a recognition that competition is 
no longer restricted by national boundaries, so a firm needs to have an approach which will 
enable it to face challenges and discover how to gain competitive advantage by integrating 
its operations in a variety of geographical locations.  Lyons (1991) interprets the strategic 
behaviour of IJV partners in terms of Porter’s models of markets and industry structures. 
The main contribution of Porter (1990) is his suggestion that any industry can be analysed 
in terms of five main forces.  These are:  the relative strength of buyers or customers;  the 
relative strength of sellers or suppliers of goods or labour;  the relative ease of market entry 
by potential new competitors;  the potential availability of substitutes;  and rivalry between 
the competing firms.  Lyon (1991: 130) suggests that these forces interact and, together, 
can change the character of an industry.  He goes on to say that the changes resulting from 
movement towards a converging global market will nevertheless leave significant 
variations between nations and that such issues as association with a locality, the logistics 
of manufacturing and distribution, population density, climate, and political and religious 
differences will continue to be of importance.  A result of this is that corporate strategies 
are gradually being modified for aggressive, defensive, or collaborative purposes.  In his 
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view, the strategic alliance underlying the formation of an IJV is the way in which many 
organisations are reacting to the pressures of globalisation, which demand structural 
changes.  From this perspective, strategic behaviour theory predicts that the main criterion 
for choosing IJV partners will be whether this will improve the competitive positioning of 
the parties, either by denying competitors potential allies or opportunities for collusion 
(Harrigan 1984, 1985; Hamel, 1991; Lyons, 1991). 
 
This view is similar to the arguments of Dunning (1993).  He asserts that the international 
business environment has dramatically changed over the past two decades.  Firms respond 
to challenges such as cost reduction pressure, rapid technology innovation, and slow 
market growth by seeking new markets for their products.  Firms are obliged to re-
formulate their business strategies and embark on strategic actions such as a strategy of 
cooperation in order to increase market power vis-à-vis their existing and/or potential 
competitors.  Dunning (1993, 1997) argues that there are two considerations which might 
logically lead to international joint venture formation: 1) how to successfully enter targeted 
markets and gain an advantage over rivals; 2) how to develop capabilities to serve difficult 
markets dispersed around the world more effectively than other international competitors. 
 
As regards the first consideration, a number of market entry barriers are identified in the 
international business literature.  These include increasing protectionism and political 
intervention by the governments of host countries; and a lack of local knowledge, market 
expertise and management discipline in the early stages of a company’s overseas market 
expansion (Killing, 1983; Glaister and Buckley, 1996).  If the foreign firm can overcome 
these entry barriers, the resultant advantage over its rivals may enable it to reap significant 
economic benefits. 
 
A number of researchers (Kogut, 1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1989) claim that international 
joint ventures help foreign firms to bypass a number of problems of entering overseas 
markets and to lower local political barriers, especially in developing host countries where 
the government is actively involved in regulating FDI by overseas firms.  Many host 
governments insist that foreign firms should form partnerships with local companies before 
being granted permission to start operating in their countries (Ahn, 1980; Higginbottom, 
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1980; Beamish, 1985, 1993; Connolly, 1984; Millin, 1984).  This is supported by previous 
studies (for example, Harrigan 1987) which showed a positive link between market entry 
difficulty and the number of IJVs formed.  Gomes-Casseres (1988) pointed out that new 
subsidiaries of MNEs are more likely to form IJVs in ‘restrictive’ countries than in ‘open’ 
countries. 
 
In addition, by forming international joint ventures, foreign firms can access local 
operating expertise and other complementary skills, enabling them to match the local 
competitive advantage of their indigenous rivals (Markino and Delios, 1996).  Connolly 
(1984) also argues that foreign firms may find it difficult to penetrate overseas markets 
without local market expertise.  The local partner may provide know-how and/or 
established local distribution channels through which to market the product, which might 
not otherwise have been available. 
 
In respect of the second consideration, of how to develop capabilities to serve difficult 
markets dispersed around the world more effectively than other international competitors,  
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) and Doz and Hamel (1995) argue that there are inevitably 
going to be limitations on the market expertise or technologies which a particular firm can 
call upon within itself.  The challenge of globalisation can only be met if a firm can learn 
to bring together learning on a global scale, responsiveness to local conditions, and 
efficiency in servicing a global market.  It is essential for a firm to find a way of adding to 
its own internal capabilities in order to gain competitive advantage and develop the skills 
needed to administer networks which are constantly expanding. 
 
IJV formation can contribute towards a solution of this issue since it is the only viable way 
for firms to access capabilities from their strategic partners (Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Lorange 
and Roos, 1993; Inkpen, 1998).  Furthermore, Barkema et al (1997) argue that IJV 
formation can be instrumental in helping firms develop the skills required by global 
networks which enable them to leverage their core competence and emerge one step ahead 
their competitors. 
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 A number of researchers (Harrigan, 1988; Lorange and Roos, 1993) have attempted to 
explain IJV formation in a more differentiated manner.  Harrigan (1988) provides a two-
by-two matrix to illustrate strategic linkages between the rate of growth of demand and the 
factor of demand uncertainty in terms of IJV formation.  This is presented in Table 3.1.  
 
     Table 3.1: Effect of demand uncertainty and growth on the IJV formation, assuming firms will  
       cooperate, Ceteris Paribus, (Source: Harrigan, 1985, 1988) 
 Rapidly growing demand Slowly growing, stagnant or 
declining demand 
Demand 
uncertainty 
 is high 
More IJVs 
Many vertical IJVs to pioneer markets, 
reduce supply bottlenecks or share 
supplying plant capacity until critical 
mass is reached. 
More IJVs 
Many horizontal IJVs to consolidate 
industry capacity  and revitalize 
players 
Demand 
uncertainty is low 
Fewer IJVs 
Many temporary non-equity sourcing 
agreements to satisfy component 
demand or reach more customers faster 
Fewer IJVs 
Few fade-out IJVs between 
horizontal competitors as a 
gradual means of divesting 
       
Harrigan (1988) explains that IJVs will be used more frequently where demand is 
uncertain or business risks are high, particularly when demand is growing rapidly or is 
declining.  The forming of IJVs may enable firms to be more responsive to variations in 
customer demand, provided parents design their alliances effectively.  Further, the IJV 
approach may be used to ease a firm out of a declining or troubled industry where excess 
capacity will plague all ongoing firms (Harrigan, 1985).  When demand is growing rapidly, 
other things being equal, Harrigan (1985, 1988) points out that IJV managers need freedom 
to subcontract production or make other accommodations to satisfy customers.  However, 
when demand is declining, IJVs must coordinate their endgame strategy closely with their 
parents’ activities in order to serve the most attractive customer niches without disrupting 
industry-wide price levels. 
 
Where demand is growing rapidly, vertical IJVs, whereby parents share the outputs of their 
IJV ‘child’, or use their child to absorb their own respective outputs, will be particularly 
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useful as a means of utilising large plants economically or of reaching target customers to 
alleviate their fears concerning the viability of a new product or process.  Firms will use 
horizontal arrangements later to consolidate excess capacity and focus competitors’ 
attention (to alleviate wasteful price cutting when demand growth slows).  Horizontal IJVs 
are embraced when firms would otherwise battle for market share at the expense of each 
other because demand has become saturated or is primarily for replacement purposes. 
 
On the other hand, where demand is growing more slowly, demand uncertainty will be 
lower, and IJVs will also be particularly appropriate in such a setting if significant 
economies of scale are available at large production volumes, particularly if cost reduction 
is becoming the key to effective competition (Harrigan, 1985, 1988).  IJVs allow firms 
which were formerly rivals to retain the most efficient parts of their assets in building a 
new, world-scale competitive entity.  The IJV approach may also be used to permit firms 
to divest their assets incrementally in situations where they face such high exit barriers that 
no buyers could afford to purchase them outright. 
 
As demand slows, stagnates, or declines, Harrigan argues that it will become necessary for 
some firms to cooperate in order to prevent destructive price wars.  IJVs are preferable to 
non-equity arrangements in such settings if businesses are of high strategic importance 
because they facilitate divestiture (as well as diversification) when firms must adapt to 
changing industry conditions.  Firms will then seek to acquire partners’ shares to increase 
their control over joint activities and destroy excess capacity, so that the assets will not be 
resurrected by new firms and continue to plague their troubled industry (Harrigan, 1985). 
 
In addition, a number of researchers have attempted to identify strategic motivation of IJV 
formation.  For instance, Contractor and Lorange (1988) point out that IJV formation can 
fulfil a number of strategic organisational goals.  These include risk reduction, economies 
of scale and/or rationalisation, complementary technologies and patents, co-opting or 
blocking of competition, overcoming government-mandated investment or trade barriers, 
initial international expansion, and vertical quasi-integration.  Harrigan (1985) classifies 
the strategic rationales for setting up an IJV entity into three categories: internal drive 
(such as risk sharing, economies of scale, and better information and practices); 
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competitive drive (such as influence over industry evolution, timing advantages, and 
globalisation); and strategic drive (such as synergies, technology or other skills transfer, 
and diversification). 
 
Lorange and Roos (1993) characterise strategic motives of IJV formation by looking at 
each prospective partner’s strategic position from two dimensions.  One dimension 
concerns the strategic importance of the particular business within which IJV formation is 
being contemplated and how it fits the overall portfolio of that partner.  The second 
dimension has regard to the firm’s relative position in the business it is in: whether it is a 
leader or more of a follower. 
 
Table 3.2 Strategic Motives for the IJV Formation (Source: Lorange and Roos, 1993)  
 Business Market Position as 
Leader 
Business Market Position as 
Follower 
Strategic Importance in 
Parent’s Portfolio as Core 
Activities 
 
Defend 
 
Catch up 
Strategic Importance in 
Parent’s Portfolio as Peripheral 
Activities 
 
Remain 
 
Restructure 
 
Table 3.2 shows the emerging strategic position framework.  Focusing on the two strategic 
positioning dimensions, four strategic motives for IJV formation emerge. 
 
First, when the strategy of IJV formation is core within the parent firm’s overall portfolio, 
and the firm enjoys relative leadership in this business, then typically the motives for 
embarking on IJV formation are defensive.  Lorange and Roos (1993) argue that two major 
rationales for IJV formation in this case are accessing new markets and/or technology, as 
well as securing resources.  Second, when the business still falls within the core area of a 
firm’s portfolio, but the firm is more of a follower in its business segment, the primary 
motive for IJV formation is often to catch up.  It may be highly critical for a firm to 
strengthen its competitive position in order to make it viable. 
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Third, when the business plays a relatively peripheral role in the overall portfolio, but the 
firm is a leader, the main rationale for forming IJVs is to remain.  In this case, the firm 
decides to form IJVs in order to get maximum efficiency out of the firm’s position.  Lastly, 
if the firm is more of a follower in the business area and if the particular business plays a 
relatively peripheral role in the parent’s portfolio, the main strategic motive for IJV 
formation is to restructure the business.  The firm’s goal might also be “to restructure the 
business with an eye toward creating some strength and value which might enable the 
parent eventually to unload this business” (Lorange and Roos, 1993: 9). 
 
Brieftly, strategic behaviour theory explains IJV formation on the basis of how it 
influences the competitive positioning of the firm (Kogut, 1988; Gomes-Casseres (1988).  
Forming IJVs with local firms, managing facilities jointly and producing the product line 
co-operatively as a fast way to achieve overseas market expansion and manage a global 
network, reflects the strategic behaviour of foreign firms building and securing their 
competitive position in the process of globalisation.  The strategic behaviour theory has, 
however, been criticised for failing to take full account of the internal constraints of firms.  
Specifically, it is said that it offers little insight into the subsequent management of IJVs.  
The implementation of IJV strategy has had little attention and most of its research is said 
to have come up with only a few abstract concepts, like the compatibility of partners, 
complementarity of capabilities, and so forth (Kogut, 1988; Hamel and Prahalad, 1989; 
Bleeke and Ernst, 1991).  
 
Moreover, its critics see this approach as being erroneous in its explicit or implicit 
assumption that the firms in a given industry are homogeneous.  In the real world, no two 
firms have identical resources and technologies (Kogut, 1988; Dyer, 1997). “Firm 
homogeneity is unrealistically assumed” (Robson et al 2002: 389).  
 
3.3.5 The Theoretical Approach of This Study 
The above four theoretical perspectives illustrate different yet ultimately reconcilable 
views of IJV formation. By integrating these cross-disciplinary analyses, understanding of 
the strategic alliance of IJV formation can be advanced. 
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The transaction cost theory rationalises that organisations tend to select the IJV as the 
mode of governance when it involves lower transaction costs compared to alternative 
modes (market or hierarchy), while the organisational knowledge and learning approach 
stresses the learning premise in IJV operations and believes that a need for knowledge 
acquisition leads to IJV formation.  Under the resource-based view, firms can gain 
competitive advantage and enhance performance if they gain access to their partners’ 
unique resources by forming an IJV.  The strategic behaviour theory places more emphasis 
on profit maximisation and takes the view that IJV formation is appropriate only if it 
improves a firm’s competitive position vis-à-vis its rivals. 
 
However, these four perspectives suffer from different weaknesses discussed in the 
previous section:  transaction cost theory concentrates on the concept of cost reduction and 
neglects the function of profit generation of firms.  Moreover, it is not able to integrate 
strategic considerations into its explanation and prescriptive or predictive assessment 
method.  The organisational knowledge and learning theory is considered too abstract and 
probably mainly applicable to firms in knowledge intensive business.  The resource-based 
view is considered “tautological” and “operationally invalid” especially in its treatment of 
the concept of competitive advantage.  Furthermore, it ignores external factors affecting 
the industry as a whole.  The strategic behaviour paradigm is accused of failing to take into 
account the internal constraints of firms, and is susceptible to all the criticism directed at 
generic strategy.  In particular, it offers little insight into the subsequent management of an 
IJV. 
 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this review.  First, each theory tries to explain 
IJV formation from a different perspective, although several of the constructs employed 
are common to some of them due to overlapping theoretical domains.  For instance, 
organisational knowledge and learning theory could be combined with the resource-based 
paradigm.  Second, the applicability of each theory depends on situation-specific factors.  
For example, the organisational knowledge and learning theory is more appropriately 
applied to IJVs in a knowledge-intensive industry.  Third, the theories should be regarded 
as complementary rather than as alternatives.  The transaction cost theory emphasises how 
firms transact in a way which will minimise the sum of production cost and transaction 
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cost, while strategic behaviour theory points out that firms transact in a way which will 
maximise profits by improving a firm’s competitive position. The organisational 
knowledge and learning theory and resource-based view, on the other hand, concentrate on 
the internal factors of the firms as the source from which competitive advantage can be 
created.  Finally, although the theoretical perspectives they provide are all relevant to 
developing a deeper understanding of IJVs, no single paradigm provides an adequate 
foundation for a general theory explaining the phenomenon of IJV formation.  A useful 
future endeavour would be an attempt to integrate these diverse theoretical approaches, but 
in the meantime strategic behaviour theory is helpful in focusing the present research on 
one of its principle objectives: determining the underlying strategic motives for firms to 
embark on IJV formation. As discussed in the previous section, a number of researchers in 
this paradigm (see, for example, Contractors and Lorangese, 1988; Porter and Fuller, 1986; 
Harrigan, 1985) provide a catalogue of motivation for IJV formation from a strategic 
positioning perspective. These directly relate and underpin the subject of this study. The 
other theories can be seen as contributing partial insights into aspects of that motivation. 
 
This research is also seeking to throw light on the extent to which companies’ strategic 
choices produce outcomes which satisfy their objectives, and for this a focus on 
companies’ strategic objectives is appropriate.  Areas of study given special attention in 
accordance with the aim and objectives of the present thesis, with its focus on the 
ASEAN4 and in particular Thailand, as being pertinent to parent companies’ strategic 
motivation in setting up IJVs are host country location factors, the parent companies’ 
contribution to IJVs and the impact it has on performance, appropriate means of assessing 
IJV performance, and determinants of success or failure.  Such a focused approach not 
only helps highlight research gaps but also pinpoints relevant theoretical constructs which 
might be useful for subsequent framework-building.  
 
A number of earlier researchers (for example Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Harrigan, 
1985) have pointed out the importance of studying the issue of the strategic motivations of 
parent companies which decide to embark on IJV formation.  As Harrigan (1985: 12) 
warns, “despite their apparent eagerness for the freedom to co-operate, however, many 
managers follow a knee-jerk approach to such strategies; they jump in without thinking 
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through their motivations or how the child will fit into their scheme for strategy 
implementation.  Integration has rarely occurred (or has occurred badly)”. 
 
Porter and Fuller (1986) similarly argue that it is essential, given the trend for international 
joint ventures, to examine the economic inducements and the motives behind IJV 
establishment from a strategic management perspective.  For a particular joint venture, of 
course, the motivations can be manifold (Porter and Fuller, 1986).  IJVs are not all the 
same, and carefully identifying the motivation of decisions to embark on an alliance is seen 
by Killing (1983) and Beamish (1987) as crucial if an understanding is to be gained of the 
functioning of international joint ventures. 
 
For companies too there are advantages in underpinning their behaviour and commercial 
decisions with a strategic behaviour theoretical approach.  If their principal aim is to 
increase their market power and competitiveness in an age of globalisation, strategic 
cooperation through IJVs is important.  To achieve global competitiveness, Rugman and 
Verbeke (1995, 2001) argue that host country specific advantages2 have become of 
increasing strategic importance to MNEs.  Similarly, Dunning (1988) asserts that MNEs 
need to seek out the strategic locations which offer the best economic and institutional 
facilities for making efficient use of their strengths.  Firms which decide to expand abroad 
often take a carefully considered strategic decision to pair with local businesses to obtain 
particular competitive advantages, such as product market access (Barringer and Harrison, 
2000).  Host country location factors, both favourable and unfavourable, are therefore one 
of the central concerns of the present study, and are best examined in the context of 
strategic behaviour theory. 
 
As far as the issue of parent companies’ contributions is concerned, strategic behaviour 
theory places emphasis on the strategic goals and objectives pursued through the IJV, 
together with the various policies, structures, and plans elaborated to achieve them (Hofer 
and Schendel, 1978).  Franko (1971) emphasises the importance of matching the strategy 
                                                 
2 The host country specific advantages refer to some benefits associated with locating certain activities in 
particular countries. These benefits may arise from (a) structural market imperfections such as government 
regulation, and (b) the potential to economise business costs by reducing risks and to benefit from local 
opportunities (Rugman and Verbeke, 1995, 2001). 
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of the parent organisations with the structures through which the venture is controlled 
during its development if successful performance is to be achieved.  The strategic 
behaviour approach also draws attention to the need to establish strategic symmetry 
between the objectives of the parent firms, in terms of company missions, resources, 
management skills, and similar attributes which is crucial if a complementary and 
equitable business relationship is to be built  (Harrigan, 1986, 2003). 
 
As regards the contribution of the parent companies, strategic behaviour theory is 
compatible with the approach of viewing IJVs as organic forms which grow and develop 
naturally.  Lorange and Roos (1993) argue that, just as in nature, an IJV must receive 
energy on an ongoing basis from its parents, so that it can grow from a dependent offspring 
into a functioning adult entity.  In its early stages, an IJV needs “stimuli” if it is to grow 
and evolve.  They suggest that comparing the birth and growth of an IJV with that of a 
child implies a need to follow how the strategic alliance’s relationship with its parents 
changes over time - from total dependence in infancy to eventually becoming an 
independent, free-standing adult.  (Lorange and Roos, 1993: 79)  The usefulness of this 
biological comparison is discussed in a later chapter. 
 
In respect of the issue of performance assessment, researchers adopting a strategic 
behaviour theory approach have considered IJV performance to be one of the key issues to 
be studied.  As already mentioned, during IJV formation and development, emphasis is 
placed on achieving success by matching the strategy of the parent organisations with the 
structure for controlling the venture (Franko, 1971).  Meyer (1991: 824) has noted that 
“true to its general management orientation, the field of strategy has consistently used firm 
level performance as the definitive dependent variable”.  One strategy researcher 
interviewed in Meyer’s study went so far as to say that “research questions are inherently 
uninteresting or trivial unless they include an explicated linkage to performance” (1991: 
825).  Accordingly, strategic behaviour theory appears a promising approach to the study 
of IJV performance assessment. 
 
The remaining issue is the matter of performance determinants.  Robson et al. (2002: 408) 
point out that, “all key background and antecedent factors reflect the development of the 
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strategic fit between the partners”.  Likewise, Lorange and Roos (1993) argue that IJV 
formation must be based on mutual cooperation between the parties involved, and that one 
of the most important issues for the success of an IJV is a strategic fit between the parent 
firms.  Reflecting the approach of the strategic behaviour theory, the present study focuses 
on performance determinants. 
 
Last but not least, the strategic behaviour theoretical explanation of IJV formation 
underpins the present study because it appears the best suited to the current international 
business environment where competition is on a global scale.  This puts pressure on firms 
to collaborate with others through the medium of IJVs.  Firms find themselves obliged to 
re-formulate their business strategies and ultilise IJV formation in order, in accordance 
with the values of strategic behaviour theory, to increase competitiveness and maximise 
profits.   
 
3.3.6 Framework of the Study 
The literature on international joint ventures has tended to focus on particular aspects of 
the entity.  For instance, Glaister and Buckley (1996) and Boateng and Glaister (2003) 
place emphasis on the strategic motives of IJV formation, while Killing (1983) and 
Beamish (1985) stress the management dominance issue.  The present IJV study is aiming, 
however, both to fulfil the objectives laid down in Chapter 1 and also to show the 
importance of the various issues of the study and how they are inter-linked.  Figure 3.1 
offers a framework for the study.  It indicates with an unbroken line those linkages (for 
example, strategic motives behind IJV formation) which have been examined by previous 
research and which this study has also investigated, and with a dotted line, possible 
linkages which are being investigated by the present study.  The separate elements of the 
overall picture which it is intended to bring together and integrate include the 
characteristics of the activities, distribution, and trends of IJV formation in ASEAN 
countries, particularly Thailand;  the strategic inducement for parent companies to form 
IJVs;  host country location factors;  parent companies’ contributions;  and IJV 
performance assessment and performance determinants. 
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Since this study has obtained the official dataset of IJV formation in Thailand from the 
BOI (Thailand Board of Investment) it has been able to provide empirically a new and 
original understanding of the patterns, distribution, and trends of IJV formation in 
Thailand.  This serves as a foundation for the thesis, fulfilling its first objective, namely 
“To ascertain the characteristics of the activities, distribution, and trends of IJV formation 
in Thailand”, and systematically present an overall picture of the activities and distribution 
of IJV formation in the Southeast Asian region. The proposed research framework of this 
study accordingly includes this issue in order to analyse the overall picture of IJV 
formation in the context of Thailand. 
 
As mentioned earlier in Section 3.2, according to Pfeffer and Nowak (1976), joint ventures 
are legally and economically separate organisational entities created by two or more parent 
organisations which collectively invest capital and other resources to pursue certain 
strategic objectives, while Harrigan gives a more organic definition of a joint venture as a 
separate entity with two or more active firms as parents, where the emphasis is on the 
“child” (Harrigan 1984: 7).  Further, a joint venture is regarded as an international joint 
venture (IJV) if at least one partner has its headquarters outside the venture’s country of 
operation, or if it has an important level of operation in more than one country (Geringer 
and Herbert, 1989).  Accordingly, as shown in Figure 3.1, at least three parties have to be 
involved in the formation of an IJV: the foreign parent company, the local parent company, 
and the IJV itself.  This study, like earlier research, is interested in investigating the 
strategic motives for establishing an IJV of both the foreign and the local parent companies 
and, as mentioned above, this is indicated in Figure 3.1 by an unbroken line. 
 
As already noted, parent companies’ strategic impetus to form IJVs is viewed as one of the 
most important issues of IJV study.  Harrigan (1984, 1988) argues that the compatible or 
conflicting motives of the parent companies have important implications for IJV survival 
and performance.  Accordingly, this study takes both parent companies’ motives in 
forming the IJVs into the research framework, so as to explore and compare the 
importance of the motives of both, and to fufil the second objective of this research:  to 
determine the strategic motives of parent companies in forming IJVs.  The present research 
goes beyond this, however, and, as indicated in Figure 3.1 by a dotted line, attempts to 
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answer the question of whether IJV performance does in fact vary with the strategic 
motives for IJV formation. 
 
The host location factor (affecting the location choice of MNEs when forming an IJV) is 
another important issue in this study.  As discussed in the previous section, firms utilise 
complex modes of inter-organisational collaboration (IJVs) in an attempt to increase 
competitiveness and maximise profits.  Hence, it is important to concentrate on this, and 
host location factors have also been taken into the framework of this study in order to 
examine the relative importance of each location factor in inducing MNEs to form IJVs in 
the ASEAN region, particularly Thailand.  Further, this will answer another research 
question of this study: which host country location factors influence the decision of foreign 
firms to invest in Thailand? 
 
Especially in the initial stages of an IJV, the “child” needs to have resources contributed by 
both parents.  As already noted, according to Lorange and Roos (1992), an IJV must 
“receive energy” on an ongoing basis from its parents if it is to be able to grow from 
dependence into fully viable adulthood.  The next section will detail a number of 
contributions which parent companies make and which have been identified in the 
literature.  While, however, the literature contains a number of studies of aspects of parent 
firms’ contributions to IJVs (for example, Blodgett, 1991b; Kamminga and Van Der Meer-
Kooistra, 2006), there are few studies into the effect of the parent companies’ contributions 
on the characteristic operation of IJVs, especially in the ASEAN4 context.  Examining the 
contributions of parent companies to IJVs and analysing the relationship between those 
contributions and the characteristics of IJV operation in the context of Thailand as a 
Southeast Asian country is accordingly undertaken in order to fulfil the third objective of 
this study.  What is of interest is not only establishing the contributions which parent 
companies make, but, again as indicated in Figure 3.1 by a dotted line, discovering what 
impact their contributions have on the operating of the IJV.  This is in order to provide new 
insight into IJV operation in the ASEAN context, and to establish a linkage between the 
characteristics of IJV operation and performance. 
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Last but not least, there has been growing interest among researchers over the past three 
decades in IJV performance assessment and determinants3  (Beamish, 1988; Dymsza, 
1988; Fey, 1995; Lassserre, 1999; Sim and Ali, 2000; Luo et al, 2001; Yan and Gray, 
2001; Luo, 2002).    However,  to  date  the  literature  indicates  that  there is no consensus 
among IJV researchers over an appropriate measure for evaluating IJV performance 
(Geringer and Hebert, 1991; Boateng and Glaister, 2002).  There is also no agreement 
about IJV performance determinants, an area which remains chaotic and largely ambiguous 
(Robson et al, 2002).  Previous studies often define, operationalise, and categorise IJV 
performance determinants in different, and sometimes contradictory, ways.   
 
To overcome the limitations of these individual approaches, this research framework has 
adopted an eclectic approach to the measurement of IJV performance in Thailand.  It 
includes both objective measurement (assessment of stability, duration, and survival), 
subjective measurement (a general assessment of the degree of perceived satisfaction), and 
composite measurement (multi-perceptual assessment of numerous aspects). The 
integration of these performance assessment approaches into this research framework will 
enable the present researcher to get a wider and clearer view of IJV performance 
evaluation in the Southeast Asian context of Thailand.  Furthermore, as previously 
discussed, since this study is underpinned by strategic behaviour theory, background and 
antecedent factors have been studied to determine their influence on IJV performance, 
particularly in the ASEAN4 country context especially Thailand.  Taken together, these 
approaches will fulfil the fourth and fifth objectives of this study:  “To assess IJV 
performance in the context of the ASEAN4 countries, particularly Thailand”; and “To 
analyse the determinants which influence IJV performance in Thailand as a developing 
country”. 
                                                 
3Examination of the international business literature reveals that IJV performance assessment and 
determinants have received focal empirical attention. These studies have been stimulated by two major 
trends. First, the proliferation of IJVs as critical elements in an organisation’s business network and as 
strategic weapons for competing within core markets (Harrigan, 1986). Second, there is substantial evidence 
reporting unsatisfactory IJV performance (e.g., Beamish, 1993; Hill and Hellriegel, 1994); in fact, Beamish 
and Delios (1997) reveal that an average of two in five IJVs are perpetual strugglers or outright failures. 
Thus, understanding IJV performance dynamics is vitally important to managers interested in developing and 
maintaining this type of cultural strategic partnership, in addition to the academic study of this subject. 
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Figure 3.1: The Conceptual Framework for the Study 
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The following section reviews the literature related to variables shown in Figure 3.1: trends 
of IJV formation, strategic motives, location factors, parents’ contributions, IJV 
performance assessment and determinants.  This provides the context of research which 
has facilitated operationalisation of concepts in the present study. 
  
3.4 The Growth, Distribution, and Trends of IJV Formation 
3.4.1 Growth and Trends of IJV Formation 
Since the early 1960s many researchers have commented on the growing popularity of IJV 
formation as a strategic mode of overseas market entry, especially among MNEs (Beamish 
1985; Hergert and Morris, 1988; Madhok, 1995; Makino and Beamish, 1998; Julian, 
2004).  With significant fluctuations, the annual proportion of IJVs in new manufacturing 
subsidiaries grew from about 10 percent in the 1910s to over 50 percent in the early 1960s.  
Just as striking as this rising trend was a sharp decline in IJV formation for most of the 
1960s.  The annual proportion of IJVs in new subsidiaries fell continuously from 55 
percent in 1961 to 31 percent in 1968 (Harrigan, 1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1989). 
 
A closer look at the post-war period reveals other surprising trends.  There appear to have 
been two and a half cycles in MNEs’ use of IJVs at entry.  From 1946 to 1951, the annual 
proportion of IJVs in new entries rose from 15 percent to over 50 percent; after that, it fell 
to 28 percent in 1955.  Then came another rise to a peak of 55 percent in 1961, followed by 
a decline to 31 percent.  A third increase began in 1969, with the share of IJVs reaching 41 
percent in 1975 (Harrigan, 1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1989).  Gomes-Casseres (1989) argues 
that one explanation for the increase in IJVs in some periods might be that foreign 
corporations were diversifying as they went abroad. 
 
According to Anderson (1990), Blodgett (1991a, 1992), Gomes-Casseres (1989), Geringer 
and Herbert (1991), and Koot (1988), there have been more IJVs and other collaborative 
ventures announced since 1981 than in all the previous years combined.  If in the past IJVs 
had been used to exploit peripheral markets or technologies, now the IJV approach is being 
seen as a crucial element of a business unit’s network, and as a strategic weapon for 
competing within a firm’s core markets and technologies (Julian, 2004). 
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Datta (1988) suggests that the increasing number of IJVs in the 1980s is partially 
attributable to changes which have taken place in the global business environment since 
the early 1970s.  These changes include, firstly, significant erosion of the bargaining power 
of MNEs, especially in terms of technological know-how.  As a result, many host 
governments insist that foreign companies form partnerships with local companies before 
they can be granted permission to set up operations in their countries (Ahn, 1980; Beamish, 
1985, 1993; Connolly, 1984; Higginbottom, 1980; Millin, 1984). 
 
Secondly, foreign corporations have begun to recognise that local firms can make a 
significant contribution to a venture through their intimate knowledge of what is often a 
complex and volatile local business environment (Hall, 1984; Beamish and Inkpen, 1995; 
Lee and Beamish, 1995; Madhok, 1995).  Finally, the recent increase in overall IJV 
activity has probably resulted from a growing awareness among organisations in developed 
countries that the continuing globalisation of their market requires them to be more cost 
effective and efficient if they are to succeed globally (Levitt, 1983; Shanks, 1985; Jain, 
1994).  This, in turn, might require that operations be set up in other countries which 
provide cheaper raw materials and/or lower processing costs. 
 
A number of studies (Datta, 1988; Oman, 1988; Goldenberg, 1989; Anderson, 1990; 
Beamish, 1993; Fey, 1995; Beamish and Delios, 1997; Makino and Beamish, 1998; 
Demirbag and Mirza, 2000; Indro and Richards, 2007) also indicate that the increasing use 
of the IJV as a market entry vehicle is likely to continue well into the twenty-first century.  
These researchers cite five main reasons for the rising popularity of IJVs.  First, the 
governments of many countries, especially developing countries, still restrict foreign 
ownership.  These restrictions play an important role in determining the establishment and 
structure of IJVs in developing countries.  Second, many firms have found that host 
country partners in an IJV can help them enter new markets quickly by providing 
management expertise and local connections.  Third, this help is particularly important 
because of intensifying global competition in many industries.  Competitors are often 
willing to settle for IJVs in host countries where foreign corporations have previously 
insisted on wholly-owned subsidiaries.  Fourth, firms from developed countries have 
become more attractive IJV partners as their technological capabilities and market 
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presence have grown.  Finally, in many industries, global scale is becoming a distinct 
advantage in R&D and production, leading all but the largest firms to consider IJVs as a 
way to achieve economies of scale and share risks. 
 
3.4.2  Activity Distribution of IJV Formation 
Many previous studies (Glaister, and Buckley, 1998; Demirbag and Mirza, 2000; 
Marangozov, 2005; Indro and Richards, 2007) have shown that foreign firms from the 
‘Triad’ countries (the EU, USA, and Japan) are the key players in IJV formation.  
Marangozov (2005), investigating the distribution of IJV formation in Bulgaria, found that 
more than 50 percent of the foreign partners come from the Triad countries, especially the 
EU on account of geographical proximity and political and economic relations.  Likewise, 
Glaister and Buckley (1998) found that more than 90 percent of IJVs established in the UK 
result from partnership between British firms and companies from the Triad countries. 
 
Regarding the distribution of IJV formation by industrial sector, it can be drawn on 
previous empirical studies by Mariti and Smiley, 1983; Reynolds, 1984; Artisien and 
Buckley, 1985; Ghemawat et al., 1986; Morris and Hergert, 1987; Osborn and Baughn, 
1990; Auster, 1992; Shenkar and Zeira, 1992; Chung et al., 1993; Schroath et al., 1993; 
UNCTAD, 1994; Lyles and Salk, 1996; Hebert and Beamish, 1997; Valdes Llaneza and 
Garcia Canal, 1998; Glaister et al., 1998; Tatoglu, 2000; and Barba Navaretti et al., 2002.  
These have shown that the dominant sectors for IJV formation between companies in the 
Triad countries are chemicals, automobiles, and electronics.  IJVs established between 
companies from the Triad countries and non-Triad countries focus mainly on the 
production of chemicals, of miscellaneous machines and equipment, of food and drink, and 
of textiles and clothing. 
 
Other studies (Ahn, 1980; Higginbottom, 1980; Beamish, 1985, 1993; Cullen et al., 1995) 
tell us that the equity participation is most often unequally distributed between IJV 
partners.  Furthermore, this inequality normally favours the host country partner, especially 
in developing countries where government legislation restricts foreign companies to 
minority equity participation.  They are further allowed to invest only in industries which 
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are not considered essential to national security, and in industries where they have access 
to the latest technology. 
3.5  Strategic Motivation for IJV Formation 
Several researchers have identified a variety of strategic motives behind IJV formation.  
Harrigan (1985, 2003) suggests there are broadly three reasons.  These are: internal 
necessity, competitive necessity, and strategic necessity.  Hennart (1988) classifies the 
strategic purposes of IJV formation as: achieving economies of scale, reducing political 
risk, pooling knowledge, overcoming entry barriers into new markets, increasing global 
scope, and allaying xenophobic reaction when entering foreign markets.  Contractor and 
Lorange (1988) identify such diverse strategic motives as risk reduction, economies of 
scale and/or rationalisation, complementary technologies and patents, co-opting or 
blocking competition, overcoming government-mandated investment or trade barriers, 
initial investment expansion, and vertical quasi-integration.  Glaister and Buckley (1996) 
lay stress on the motives of product rationalistion and economies of scale, risk sharing, 
transfer of technology/exchange of patents, enhancing competitive advantage, complying 
with government policy, facilitating international expansion, consolidating market 
position, and vertical links.  From the literature, then, it can be seen that the strategic 
motives for IJV creation identified by a number of researchers overlap and are interrelated.  
The present researcher can summarise them as detailed below. 
 
3.5.1  Risk Limitation 
Contractor and Lorange (1988: 11) point out that joint ventures can decrease the partners’ 
risk by “(1) spreading the risk of a large project over more than one firm, (2) enabling 
diversification in a product portfolio sense, (3) enabling faster entry and payback, and (4) 
reducing sub-additivity cost (the cost to the partnership is less than the cost of investment 
undertaken by each firm alone)”.  Harrigan (1985) states that if the projects involve great 
uncertainties, expensive technological innovations, and high information cost, a joint 
venture is the proper mode of operation.  Miller et al. (1996) argue that corporate managers 
from developed countries who have extensive international experience often regard 
developing country markets as naturally more risky than operations elsewhere.  These 
perceived risks are compensated for by the prospects for higher long-term returns.  Joint 
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ventures can provide a mechanism by which companies can minimise their financial 
exposure and gain experience in new markets at the same time.  Risk and cost sharing are 
thus one of the most important contributions of the local partner in their study (Miller et 
al., 1996). 
 
Mariti and Smiley (1983) and Porter and Fuller (1986) both confirm that the spreading of 
financial risk is a frequently cited fundamental motive for forming a joint venture.  It is 
probable that firms with only moderate financial resources might deal with either an 
opportunity or a defensive challenge by seeking an alliance with partners able to help with 
spreading financial risk.  Several other researchers (Friedmann and Kalmanoff, 1961; 
Mead, 1994; Glaister and Buckley, 1996) support the view that the primary motive behind 
the creation of a joint venture firm is to share out risk. 
 
A possible financial and presentational reason is suggested by Herzfeld (1989: 13), who 
cites Reklau (1977) to the effect that “the joint venture form is occasionally used for purely 
financial purposes and can have the side-effect of removing certain assets and liabilities 
from the balance sheet of the company which is ultimately responsible for them”. 
 
3.5.2  Economies of Scale  
Contractor and Lorange (1988: 12) define production rationalisation as ensuring that 
certain components or subassemblies are no longer made in two locations with unequal 
costs.  Production of items is transferred to the lower-cost location in order to optimise the 
advantage of decreasing sourcing costs.  Moreover, the volume of production is increased 
at this efficient location, and average unit cost is subsequently lowered as a result of 
economies of scale.  Contractor and Lorange (1988) cite the case of General Motors joint 
ventures at diverse locations with a number of Japanese companies such as Isuzu and 
Suzuki which exemplify this mechanism.  Harrigan (1985) elaborates that the partners of 
joint venture firms will share the output of these efficient, large-scale plants and attempt to 
further reduce production and related costs in such ways as avoiding wasteful duplication 
of facilities, utilising the full capacity of the production facilities, and sharing brands, 
distribution channels, broad product lines, and so forth. 
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3.5.3  Exchange of and Access to Technology and Management Know-How 
One of the attractions of forming a joint venture firm, Contractor and Lorange tell us, is to 
combine the complementary technologies of each partner and, by pooling know-how and 
patents, hope to provide a superior product.  They suggest that joint ventures should be 
seen as “vehicles to bring together complementary skills and talents which cover different 
aspects of the state-of-the-art know-how needed in high technology industries” (Contractor 
and Lorange, 1988: 13).  Harrigan (1985) too emphasises that firms can be strengthened 
internally by embarking on joint ventures, since this kind of collaboration encourages each 
partner to offer their foremost technologies, for example, robotics, genetic engineering or 
solar energy, for the benefit of the joint venture firm.  Joint ventures also provide 
opportunities for each partner to exchange their technical workers, avoiding costly and 
overlapping research and development projects.  This can also prevent both partners 
separately going down the same blind alley (Harrigan, 1985: 30).  Ghoshal (1987) 
contributes an argument to this motive by pointing out that, if technological needs cannot 
be supplied in-house, a company may gain from a joint venture with an overseas partner. 
 
Viewed from the perspective of the partner from a developing country, Miller et al. (1996) 
have found that access to the technology of the partner from a developed country is the 
main motive for forming a joint venture company.  In their study, Miller et al. discovered 
that more than 70% of respondents gave access to the foreign partner’s advanced 
technology as the greatest attraction for them.  In addition, joint ventures, especially with a 
partner from an industrialised country, are appreciated as a means of acquiring 
understanding of organisation, strategy formulation and implementation, marketing, 
manufacturing and other management knowledge which the developing country partner 
needs in order to update their know-how. 
 
Joint ventures can also lead to technology transfer and to innovation in the joint venture 
firm’s managerial practices.  These may be modernised through contact with another 
firm’s innovative information systems and administrative techniques when ventures bring 
together international partners.  Firms may also become more flexible strategically, since 
joint ventures can facilitate better information exchange and enhance communication 
(Harrigan, 1985, 1988; Westney, 1988; Mead, 1994). 
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 3.5.4  Local Restrictions Imposed by Governments 
In many instances, host government policy, especially in a developing country, makes a 
joint venture the most convenient way to enter a market (Contractor and Lorange, 1988).  
A restrictive policy on the part of the host country government may require overseas 
companies to undertake joint venture collaboration with local companies instead of 
conducting businesses on their own, as they might prefer (Killing, 1983; Glaister and 
Buckley, 1996; Glaister, 1996).  In some countries, investment regulations require a link 
with a local firm.  In many cases, regulations actually oblige foreign companies to limit 
their share of the joint venture to minority status. 
 
The survey by Miller et al. indicates that over 50% of companies regard government 
restrictions as an important factor in their decision to invest through a joint venture.  Such 
restrictions remain a strong incentive for companies, particularly from industrialised 
countries, to include joint ventures among their market development strategies.  The joint 
venture may represent the maturing of an existing relationship where companies have 
worked together on marketing or technology arrangements.  The overseas firm may, 
however, view the joint venture as an intermediate step in a longer term strategy of 
exploiting a market through a wholly-owned subsidiary if restrictions are relaxed at some 
future time. 
 
3.5.5  Co-opting or Binding with Rivals  
Contractor and Lorange, (1988) and Abbegglen (1982) agree that, from a defensive 
strategic perspective, it may be expedient to co-opt the existing competition by forming a 
joint venture with the firm’s competitors.  They argue that the GM-Toyota joint venture 
may partly fall into this category. 
 
Another case which has been studied is the joint venture between the US tractor company, 
Caterpillar, and the Japanese Mitsubishi conglomerate.  This collaboration is seen as 
having been motivated by seeking a competitive advantage over their principal rival, 
Komatsu.  The intention was to reduce Komatsu’s competitiveness outside Japan with the 
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Caterpillar network, and inside Japan with the channel of Mitsubishi (Hout et al., 1982; 
Vicker, 1985; Contractor and Lorange, 1988). 
 
Harrigan (1985: 31) further argues that “joint ventures could blunt the abilities of ongoing 
firms to retaliate by binding potential enemies to the firms as allies, as in Rolls Royce’s 
joint venture with Pratt & Whitney and with General Electric, respectively”.  A firm may 
thus be enabled to access new competitive capabilities (or enter a new market) faster, to 
gain market power, or stake out leadership positions in emerging industries (MacMillan, 
1980, 1982, 1983). 
 
3.5.6  Supporting Initial Overseas Expansion 
Lall (1981) and Contractor and Lorange (1988) note that the initial international expansion 
of small and medium-sized companies is often through the medium of joint ventures, since 
they lack overseas experience.  For example, initially Piper, the US aircraft manufacturer, 
formed a joint venture with Embraer, a Brazilian small jet and fighter producer, in order to 
produce small commercial aircraft serving the Brazilian market.  Embraer became a strong 
exporter and successfully penetrated the US market.  This gives a good example of a joint 
venture partner who, over time, becomes a global competitor in its own right. 
 
Contractor and Lorange (1988: 15) citing Dunning and Cantwell (1983) make the further 
point in this connection that “the lower the GDP per capita of the host nation originating a 
multinational firm, the more likely it is to use joint ventures in its initial international 
expansion”. 
 
3.5.7  Integration/Diversification 
The cooperative nature of joint ventures can also lead to a vertical quasi-integration with 
each partner contributing one or more competencies, ranging from production technology 
to knowledge of distribution channels (Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Harrigan, 1988). 
 
Harrigan (1985, 1988) observes that joint ventures are regarded as a tool for diversifying or 
enlarging the scope of firms’ ongoing activities.  The way in which a joint venture 
company is related to its parent determines its pattern of diversification.  She explains that, 
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if a joint venture company is horizontally related to a parent, this means that it performs 
the same product, market, and/or technology tasks as the parent company, but in a different 
geographic region.  ‘Vertical’ joint ventures create a company whose activities and outputs 
may supply to or distribute for their parent firms.  Diversifying joint ventures, however, 
which are neither horizontal nor vertical, are companies which do not carry out activities 
their parents perform.  Furthermore, parent companies will not consume the products or 
services of their children, the diversifying joint ventures. 
 
Parent firms might form horizontal joint venture companies in order to expand their market 
scope, fill out their product line, rationalise excess capacity, or create a barrier to entry of 
possible new rivals into the industry.  They establish vertical joint venture companies in 
order to decrease reliance on their suppliers and intermediate market agents.  This is also 
necessary in the early stages of carrying on a new business, where the infrastructure is not 
yet well developed. 
 
Together with the motive identified in the next section, other possible motives for forming 
diversifying joint venture companies are access to knowledge, technology, or other 
resources which a firm seeks, as well as entering new and unfamiliar business areas where 
entry barriers are so high that the firm could not enter alone. 
3.6  Host Country Location Factors 
There is a paucity of literature relating to the relative importance of host country location 
factors in IJV formation.  The main considerations relating to this issue are normally found 
in the context of research into foreign direct investment (FDI) in general (Vernon, 1974; 
Hymer, 1976; Kobrin, 1979; Davidson, 1980; Dunning, 1988, 1996; Tatoglu and Glaister, 
1998; Dunning and Zhang, 2008).  Accordingly, in this study the ways in which the 
location factor operates in IJV formation will be derived from the literature on FDI. 
  
Hymer (1976) was the pioneer researcher into FDI as a tool used by MNEs to transfer and 
exploit overseas proprietary resources.  He focuses on the difficulties that MNEs encounter 
in host countries, the location disadvantages.  These, for example, consist of language and 
cultural barriers, lack of knowledge of the local socio-economic and business systems, 
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expropriation risk, host country government policy, and so forth.  This implies that MNEs 
conducting business in host countries do not benefit to the same extent as indigenous firms 
from localised network spillover effects or synergies from the combination of firm level 
and host country location advantages.  MNEs have therefore to find the right overseas 
operating location to fit their competencies (Rugman, 1996, 1999).  Dunning (1998) agrees 
that MNEs will seek locations which offer the best economic and institutional facilities for 
efficient utilisation of their internal resources, and Dunning and Zhang (2008) attempt to 
quantify the influence of the various factors statistically. 
 
To date, many researchers have identified host country location factors which affect FDI 
inflows.  For example, Erdal and Tatoglu (2002) claim that the following host country 
location factors have been found to influence FDI inflows: market size, the openness of the 
host country, and the adequacy of the infrastructure.  Kobrin (1979) argues that the choice 
of a host country for FDI also includes national regulation, policy, and endowment with 
resources.  Davidson (1980) points out that foreign investment location decisions are 
influenced by a number of country specific variables, such as market size, tariff and non-
tariff barriers to trade, input costs, geographical proximity, legal, political and economic 
conditions, and similarities between the investor country and the host country.  As can be 
seen, the location factors affecting FDI identified in the literature overlap and interrelate 
with each other.  Accordingly, in the following sections the present researcher gives a 
systematisation and summary of these factors. 
 
3.6.1  Host Country Policy and Regulation 
Kobrin (1979) classifies three types of host country policies and regulation: rules and 
regulations; economic, political and social stability; and incentive schemes to encourage 
FDI from overseas firms.  He argues that these factors are important elements which 
influence MNEs in choosing their overseas investment destinations, since a change in the 
power, roles and policies of host country governments are crucial, uncontrollable factors 
which affect the operation of foreign firms.  A number of researchers (Bass et al., 1977; 
Root and Ahmed, 1978: Ohmae, 1989; Mann, 1993; Dunning and Kunda, 1995) concur in 
this view.  Host country policy and regulation can influence the operation of the MNEs in 
many respects, and these both directly and indirectly affect the location decisions of 
 68
MNEs.  For instance, host government policy, especially in developing countries, may 
pressure foreign firms into collaborating with local partners, or may exercise influence 
over the choice of suppliers and marketing.  Often, the host country government 
establishes tariffs, quotas, or non-tariff barriers to make it imperative for foreign 
companies to rely more on local production than on imports (Davidson and McFetridge, 
1985; Makino and Delios, 1996; Julian, 2001, 2003; Erdal and Tatoglu, 2002). 
 
3.6.2  Market Size 
Market size is one of the most important location factors affecting FDI inflow and has been 
identified by many researchers (Schneider and Fray, 1985; Monkiewicz, 1986, Sabi, 1988; 
Terpstra and Yu, 1988; Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992; and Singh and Jun, 1995).  
Market size can be measured by the level of GDP or per capita income (Vernon, 1966; 
Dunning, 1973, 1998; Davidson, 1980; Singh and Jun, 1995; Rugman, 1999).  This is in 
agreement with the study of Sabi (1988), since the outcomes show that there is a highly 
significant relationship between market size and GDP.  In his study, a joint ranking of both 
GDP and per capita income exhibits the strongest correlation with each country’s market 
status. 
 
Other researchers (Hymer, 1976; Sabi, 1988; Davidson, 1980; Chandprapalert, 2000; Erdal 
and Tatoglu, 2002) argue that market size together with market growth are the important 
pull factors and are theoretically positively related to the level of FDI flows, since a large 
market size is conducive to an increase in demand for the products and services provided 
by the foreign investors.  Moreover, a huge market size allows the achievement of 
economies of scale, and transaction costs are thought to be lower in countries with higher 
levels of economic development (Caves, 1971; Zhao and Zhu, 2000; Erdal and Tatoglu, 
2002). 
 
3.6.3  Resource Availability 
Dunning (1973, 1998) argues that natural resource availability is one of the most important 
host country location factors, and further points out that natural resource seeking FDI 
occurs when firms identify specific host country locations as an attractive source of natural 
resources at the lowest real cost.  In the nineteenth century, he notes, much of the FDI by 
 69
European, United States, and Japanese firms was prompted by the need to secure an 
economic and reliable source of minerals: “primary products for the (then) investing 
industrialising nations of Europe and North America” (Dunning, 1993: 57).  In addition, 
data from UNCTAD (1998: 106) also shows that more than half of the world stock of FDI 
before World War II was in natural resources, and “the availability of natural resources is 
still a determinant of FDI and continues to offer important possibilities for inward 
investment in resource-rich countries.  Natural resources still explain much of the inward 
FDI in a number of countries, developing (e.g. countries in sub-Saharan Africa), developed 
(e.g. Australia), and countries in transition (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and the Russian 
Federation)”.  Also, a number of previous studies of Southeast Asian countries (see, for 
example, Chandprapalert, 2000) show that resource seeking is one of the most important 
motives inducing MNEs to invest in this region. 
 
3.6.4  Socio-cultural Similarity 
A number of researchers (Davidson, 1980; Ulgado, 1996; Ulgado and Lee, 2004) assert 
that cultural similarity can encourage FDI.  Information can be disseminated more 
efficiently and effectively in a similar language and culture environment.  In addition, 
managerial uncertainty or ignorance of local conditions will be relatively low, permitting 
the firm to be less risk-averse in its investment behaviours.  A study of FDI by Davidson 
(1980) shows that a majority of US MNEs during 1956-65 and 1966-75 chose to invest in 
Canada and the UK compared to other countries.  He suggests that the main reason for this 
phenomenon may be the similarities between these countries and the United States.  In this 
view, the development and design of new products are responsive to economic conditions 
in the innovator’s market.  In spreading abroad, innovations will appear first in countries 
with similar economic conditions.  Demand for a product will be highest in countries with 
needs most similar to those of the home market.  Further, similarity also stimulates the 
supply of a new product.  Economies of scale can be achieved because existing pricing, 
promotion and distribution strategies, product, design, packaging and manufacturing 
technology are readily transferable to similar markets.  Firms can also more easily transfer 
their personnel to similar markets. 
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 3.6.5 Miscellaneous Other Location Factors 
Other location factors identified in the literature are as follows: the host country 
infrastructure (Dunning, 1996, 1998; Ulgado, 1996, 1997; Erdal and Tatoglu, 2002); 
geographical proximity (Davidson and McFetridge, 1985; Davidson, 1980); cost of 
transportation (Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Ulgado, 1996); the extent of economic 
development, including the balance of payments (Sabi, 1988); the level of competition in 
the industry in the host country (Harrigan, 1985); incentives for foreign investment 
(Kobrin, 1979; David, 1984; Chia and Whalley, 1995); and low wage costs (Wheeler and 
Mody, 1992; Lucas, 1993). 
 
3.6.6  Resources, Capabilities and Markets vs Institutions 
Dunning and Zhang (2008) classify most of the factors in 3.6.2-3.6.5 under the heading of 
“Resources, Capabilities and Markets”. They consider most of the factors in 3.6.1 under 
the heading of “Institutions”. Their focus is on the impact of competitiveness as a factor in 
FDI decision-making, both inward and outward and they find that “the level of 
competitiveness does, in general, encourage both inward and outward FDI” and that 
institutional factors outweigh considerations of resources, capabilities and market in terms 
of what the present study has described as location factors. They do, however, find that the 
influence of institutions is strongest in countries at the advanced stage of development 
(Dunning and Zhang, 2008: 28). 
 
Their exact definition of resources, capabilities and markets is those factors which make up 
the physical environment in which firms and other organisations create economic well-
being.  They define institutions as “the institutions (together with the values and belief 
systems underpinning them) [...] which provide the incentive structures to make up the 
human environment, and which set the rules of the game for, and determine the cognition 
and motivation of, firms and other wealth creating entities (Dunning and Zhang, 2008: 2). 
 
They summarise the main components of resources, capabilities and markets which, it is 
generally agreed, firms consider when making their locational choices as shown in Table 
3.3. 
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Table 3.3 Resources, capabilities and markets 
Resources - Natural resources, e.g., land, untrained labour. 
- Created assets, e.g., technological capacity, machines, buildings 
Capabilities - Intangible assets, skills, educated/trained labour, accumulated experience 
and wisdom. 
- Organisational capacity and governance. 
- Vision/judgement in strategic decision taking. 
- Ability to frame and execute appropriate policies. 
Markets - Information/knowledge/availability of both domestic and foreign markets; 
both product and factor markets. 
- Ability to tap into, exploit and coordinate markets; and to understand and 
cater for specific (e.g. localized) needs. 
Source: Dunning and Zhang (2008) 
 
Institutions comprise a similarly wide set of ingredients, which are shown in Table 3.4. 
These range from coercive and top-down laws and regulations, to spontaneous and bottom-
up behavioural norms or customs (Dunning, 2003). Dunning and Zhang (2008) point out 
that in the past, in assessing national competitiveness or FDI determinants, the Resources, 
Capabilities and Markets aspect and the Institutions aspect of economic activity have been 
treated separately. Partly this reflects the different disciplinary and methodological 
approaches to evaluating each. However, this dichotomy is now starting to change, 
especially from an international business perspective; institutions, they point out, have 
been “incorporated into mainstream theory only very recently” (Dunning and Zhang, 2008: 
2). 
 
Dunning and Zhang acknowledge that the power of attraction of such institutions to inward 
foreign investors is likely to be highly contextual. “For example, the content and quality of 
domestic innovatory systems and the protection of intellectual property rights is likely to 
be particularly relevant for (knowledge augmenting) FDI: while fiscal incentive might tip 
the balance of countries seeking to attract efficiency-seeking FDI” (Dunning and Zhang, 
2008: 7). Within a developing region, the quality of local social traditions and the extent of 
crime, corruption and social disfunction might be of decisive importance for choice of 
location. Institutions affecting the merger and acquisition strategies and/or performance 
constraints placed on foreign affiliates are also likely to have a major influence.  
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Table 3.4 Institutions 
A. Forms B. Areas of institutional influence (in commercial 
domain) 
Formal institutions 
- Constitutions, treaties, laws, regulations: 
provision for learning, upgrading cognition, 
knowledge, etc. 
 
- Economic adjustment and stabilisation 
- Intellectual property protection 
- Strengthening economic 
motivation/entrepreneurship 
 
Informal institutions 
- Tradition, cultural mores, trust, goodwill, 
reputation. 
 
- Rule setting and societal guidance (e.g. 
reducing crime). 
 
Enforcement mechanisms 
- Less formal. Self regulation, fear, 
retaliation, blackballing. 
- More formal. Incentives/penalties, fines, 
enforced transparency, cancellation of 
contracts, imprisonments, etc. 
- Promotion of entrepreneurship and 
competitive market structure. 
- Adequate and effective financial institutions 
- Education and training upgrading 
- Security of people and physical assets 
- Innovatory development 
- Incentives/regulation of FDI 
- Social equity and access to opportunity. 
Source: Dunning and Zhang (2008) 
 
Finally, Dunning and Zhang make a distinction between a national government’s 
institutions and its policies, and between a firm’s institutions and its strategies. They define 
government policies as decisions to pursue particular courses of action to achieve certain 
economic, social and political objectives, while government institutions are defined as 
instruments (or groups of instruments) which might both influence these actions and be 
influenced by them. “Thus, it may be a policy decision of a government to switch its 
economic system, for which it is responsible, from one of central planning to that which 
accepts the merits of capitalism. But the (macro) institutional system which implements 
that new policy is the market, albeit with the fiat of government.” Similarly, while a firm’s 
strategy represents a plan or blueprint for pursuing objectives the company sets itself, its 
institutions (and those external to the firm which affect its behaviour) represent “the means 
by which those responsible for executing the strategy are motivated or regulated to do so in 
the most acceptable way” (Dunning and Zhang, 2008: 8). 
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3.7  Parent Companies’ Contributions 
Lorange and Roos (1993) point out that IJV parent companies’ attitudes in respect of 
strategic positioning, as well as their contributions, influence the development of the IJV 
entity.  The IJV parent companies must negotiate a joint understanding of how their 
strategic positioning perspectives and contributing perspectives can be reconciled.  This 
means that there must not be too much of a mismatch between the positioning of each of 
the parties in terms of the discussed framework, either in terms of their contribution or of 
strategic positioning.  Fagre and Wells (1982) claim that the IJV agreement made between 
the parent companies must reflect the need for and the complementarities of the 
contributions offered by the parent companies. 
 
Blodgett (1991b), Julian et al. (2004), and Kamminga and Van de Meer-Kooistra (2006) 
assert that an IJV agreement needs to specify the IJV’s outputs and inputs.  The outcomes 
are generated by the activities of the IJV, while the inputs are acquired from two main 
sources: the marketplace and the parent companies.  Thus, the IJV parent companies 
contribute certain resources in return for certain benefits.  However, the contributions and 
expected benefits of the parent companies engaged in the IJV must be perceived to be fair 
in order that the parent firms remain satisfied with the venture, otherwise it is likely to be 
dissolved (Robinson, 1969; Dymsza, 1988; Blodgett, 1991b; Julian et al. 2004). 
 
A large number of researchers (see, for example, Beamish, 1988; Blodgett, 1991b; 
Dymsza, 1988; Julian, 2004)  agree that the contribution of the IJV’s parent companies can 
be an important source of bargaining power in respect of the management and control of 
the IJV.  Moreover, the characteristics of the parent companies’ contributions considerably 
affect the type of management control exercised over the IJV by its parent firms  
(Kamminga and Van Der Meer-Kooistra, 2006).  The most important contributions of 
parent companies to the IJV identified in the literature are: technology, knowledge of the 
local environment /marketing expertise, and financial capital. 
 
3.7.1  Technology 
Technology is widely considered the most powerful proprietary asset contributed to IJVs 
by one of the parent companies (Kogut, 1977; Fagre and Wells, 1982; Lecraw, 1984; Reich 
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and Mankin, 1986; Julian and O’Cass, 2004).  These researchers further argue that, before 
technical knowledge has become standardised in widely available machinery, it provides a 
parent company with strong bargaining power in its IJV contract negotiations.  Technical 
knowledge resides predominantly in the firm’s personnel rather than in its equipment or 
machinery.  It is difficult for rival firms to compete against those who have access to such 
an asset, particularly if it is protected by patents and continuous innovation.  Such 
technology can provide a significant competitive advantage and is likely to make a 
substantial contribution to IJV performance, especially in developing countries, where 
gaining access to the latest technology is one of the primary motivations for local firms to 
enter into IJVs with firms from developed countries.  Technology transfer is what most 
local firms from developing countries are seeking from an IJV agreement with a foreign 
firm from a developed country.  Failure of the foreign corporation to deliver the promised 
technology is likely to have a negative impact on IJV performance (Beamish, 1985; 
Blodgett, 1991b; Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Patricia, 1996; Thomas and Monika, 2006; Jiang, 
2006). 
 
3.7.2  Knowledge of the Local Environment/Marketing 
Knowledge of the local business environment is one of the most important contributions to 
an IJV by its parent companies, especially the local parent company.  This knowledge is an 
asset which has real value and can take many different forms.  It usually involves 
familiarity with the local economic, political and business conditions.  A number of 
researchers (Connolly, 1984; Jacque, 1978; Blodgett, 1991b; Julian and O’Cass, 2002; 
Julian et al. 2004) point out that local parent companies may help to obtain contracts, 
provide access to favourable tax treatment, make it possible to avoid various non-tariff 
barriers, and provide a means of entry into relationships with local businesses and officials.  
Such connections with the local environment are often a prerequisite for an IJV’s success.  
Related areas of expertise which belong in this category are distribution channels and 
marketing skill. 
 
3.7.3  Financial Capital 
One of the main contributions of the parent companies to the IJV is the provision of 
adequate financial capital.  This quite often occurs when one partner is from a developing 
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country which has capital controls and a weak currency and the other partner is a large 
MNE from a developed country.  Essentially, the MNE possessing large capital resources 
and/or having access to large financial borrowing facilities assumes the role of financial 
intermediary to the IJV entity and the local parent company (Berg et al., 1982; Blodgett, 
1991b).  Lecraw (1984) points out that providing access to low-cost capital is one of the 
MNE’s main potential contributions to an IJV.  
 
3.7.4  Miscellaneous Other Contributions 
A number of researchers (Beamish, 1985; Blodgett, 1991b; Calof and Beamish, 1995; 
Beamish and Inkpen, 1995) indicate that a local parent company with good connections 
with the host country government is also a noteworthy contributor to an IJV’s 
management.  Other considerable contributions are the provision of raw materials, supply 
of inexpensive labour, provision of management know-how, staff training and so forth 
(Beamish, 1987; Dunning, 1997).  
 
In addition, according to the strategic alliance evoluation paradigm of Lorange and Roos 
(1993), IJVs are viewed as organic entities which grow and develop naturally, linked to the 
contributions of their parent companies.  In other words, this paradigm points out that 
strategic alliances of IJVs tend to mature over time and take on life of their own, quite 
analogous to children growing up, and the degree of closeness to their parent firms 
gradually decreases as the IJVs ‘grow up’.   
 
In this paradigm, Lorange and Roos (1993) assert that naturally, an IJV firm has to receive 
input on an ongoing basis from its parents, so that it can grow from an offspring into a 
working adult entity.  The initial IJV organisational entity needs stimuli so that it can grow 
and evolve.  Implicit in comparing the growth and birth of an IJV firm with that of a child 
is a need to see how the strategic relationship with its parents changes over time — from 
total dependence in early childhood to eventually becoming an independent, free-standing 
adult on its own. 
 
There are several rationales for this evolutionary pattern, where the child grows up and the 
parent becomes less involved.  For example, a learning process typically takes place 
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allowing the unique traits of each parent to be picked up by the IJV itself.  Also, the IJV is 
frequently under pressure to adapt to new environmental opportunities and to respond to 
environmental threats in its competitive arena.  This often takes time, and may involve a 
great deal of effort, particularly if such adaptation is to take place through extensive 
coordination of the two parent parties. 
 
Furthermore, the IJV may also develop a need for its own organisational identity in order 
to attract, retain, and motivate human talents.  The parents may develop more and more 
confidence in each other and in the IJV as they become better acquainted and see that the 
IJV is viable.  They may then feel comfortable transferring more and more tasks to the IJV 
(child). 
 
Lorange and Roos (1993) argue that the typical evolutionary pattern for IJVs can be 
divided into three phases, which exhibit a gradual moving away from strategy and decision 
making from the parent company’s perspective until the child becomes an adult, 
independent organisation with a strategic alliance. 
 
During the first phase of the IJV’s life it can be viewed as a shared strategic alliance 
between the parents, each of whom has an active role.  Typically, these roles are 
complementary with one partner providing the technology and the other contributing the 
market contacts and customer access.  Thus, most of the IJV’s physical activities are 
carried out by one partner or the other.  The IJV itself can be seen as little more than a 
skeleton organisation at this early stage.  One might think of it as analogous to a strategic 
program being executed by different departments and divisions within a firm.  In order to 
be successful, the IJV manager must demonstrate an ability to draw on resources 
throughout the organisation.  Managers typically have few or no resources at their 
exclusive disposal at this stage. 
 
After a while, however, one parent often becomes increasingly dominant in executing the 
IJV’s tasks.  For instance, the partner providing the market input who, in a given case, may 
also happen to be physically closest to the IJV, may gradually take over a greater 
proportion of the hands-on activity.  The other partner, who is providing the technology, 
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may become relatively less active after the initial technological learning has been 
completed and the know-how transferred.  Instead of this potentially cumbersome reliance 
on a distant parent, the practical solution may be that the IJV itself is able to carry out this 
part of the activity.  It could, of course, be the other way around, with the partner who 
provides the technology becoming relatively more active over time.  Possible reasons for 
this might include an increased intensity of research with the launching of new 
technological developments.  After the IJV is able to create a specialised marketing force 
on its own, based on the other partner’s initial market support, training, and door-opening 
in the market place, this parent may be allowed to become relatively less active. 
 
According to Lorange and Roos (1993), the IJV may typically evolve into a second phase 
where one partner continues performing a set of functions on behalf of the joint venture, 
becoming relatively dominant, while the other gradually becomes more passive as the IJV 
organisation takes over more of the value-creating functions on its own.  These relative 
changes in the parents’ tasks should be anticipated in the strategic alliance agreement and 
should be seen as natural and pragmatic.  It is not a reflection of one parent being more 
important and the other being relegated to secondary status.  If the evolution of an IJV 
leads to the growth of such perceptions, the IJV is likely to be in trouble. 
 
The pace of evolution in the second stage can be slowed down, or even prevented, if both 
partners have a strong desire to remain active in delivering their contributions to the IJV’s 
activities. This might be a viable option for a while, but it should be stressed that over time 
it might require intensive, even excessive, coordination between the partners and this can 
eventually become too stressful for the parties involved.  In the end one of the partners is 
likely to gradually extract itself and transfer functions to the IJV, thereby simplifying the 
coordination required.  If both partners try to remain active, this often leads to termination 
of the IJV after a time.  This form of strategic alliance ceases to be viable. 
 
It could of course also be that an IJV is formed directly at the second stage, with one 
partner being relatively dominant and the IJV organisation performing significant tasks by 
itself from the start.  It could, for instance, be that one partner has an active interest in a 
particular business and is seeking a somewhat more passive partner to provide general 
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support as well as financing.  It could be also be that the more passive partner provides 
technology as well, particularly if the technology is of a type which is no longer core for 
the other partner. 
 
The second stage also tends to evolve, and it may still be difficult for the IJV to adapt to 
new opportunities.  This is particularly true when the challenges of adaptation have to be 
handled partly by the emerging IJV’s organisation and partly by the organisation of the 
more active parent.  Coordination can become stressful.  To cope with this, the IJV may be 
given the lion’s share of the responsibility to adapt and the independence to carry it 
through. 
 
A third phase of evolution, where the IJV becomes a more autonomous, independent 
entity, is often the natural next step but may not materialise in practice if the lead partner 
wishes to remain active.  This might lead to friction, with slow and ill-timed attempts at 
adaptation resulting.  Termination of the IJV after phase two is a possible outcome. 
 
A number of factors may affect this evolutionary path, the most important of which is the 
role the IJV is expected to play in a parent’s portfolio strategy.  If a core role is intended, 
the nature of the technology involved can be key to the evolution.  If the technology is 
likely to become a commodity type within the near future, a smooth evolution is more 
likely.  More specifically, the partner controlling the technology will be more willing to 
allow the alliance to absorb it.  On the other hand, if the technology is unique and expected 
to remain so in the near future, it is unlikely that the partner controlling it will allow the 
alliance to absorb it.  This leaves the parties with the options of accepting a ‘share’, or 
possibly a ‘dominated’ alliance, forever, or of dissolving the IJV at an early stage of 
evolution.  The implication is that the importance of the technology in the alliance needs 
careful assessment, and awareness of whether and when the partner controlling it might be 
prepared gradually to give it up. 
 
Similar considerations apply to market contacts.  If a partner is not willing to let the IJV 
establish its own market contacts eventually, the life-cycle is likely to be aborted.  It can, 
of course, be the case that an IJV is formed as a more independent ‘stage three’ type entity 
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from the start.  The partners may decide to invest their resources in a free-standing IJV 
from the outset in order to facilitate the restructuring of an over-crowded, relatively mature 
business arena.  Several partners might also decide to back a particular business idea as 
relatively passive investors from the start.  A stage three IJV can potentially continue for a 
long time, providing it remains competitive and yields a satisfactory return to the partners.  
Conversely, an IJV may be terminated if it does not function well enough as an 
independent entity, fails to document its competitive success convincingly, or does not 
yield returns satisfactory to its parents.  If the benefits the passive partners require do not 
accrue, the IJV would normally be terminated.  It is also quite normal for an IJV to be 
terminated when one of the partners buys out the other. 
 
Lorange and Roos (1993) argue that it is essential to understand the various bases on which 
IJVs are established, and to be aware of the lines along which they are likely to evolve and 
the pressures they may face. This will give an IJV a better chance of being run 
harmoniously.  If evolutionary issues are not addressed, there is a danger that avoidable 
handicaps and stresses may lead to premature termination.  
3.8 IJV Performance Evaluation and Performance 
Determinants 
3.8.1 Assessment of IJV Performance 
Previous research has produced considerable disagreement in respect of the measurement 
of IJV performance.  A number of researchers (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986; 
Chowdhury, 1992; Geringer and Hebert, 1991; Parkhe, 1993; Park and Ungson, 1997) 
point out that no consensus has yet been reached among researchers on an appropriate 
definition and measure of this.  Early studies used a variety of financial indicators such as 
profitability (Tomlinson, 1970; Artisien and Buckley, 1985; Lecraw, 1984); or growth and 
cost position (Tomlinson, 1970; Lecraw, 1984; Artisien and Buckley, 1985).  Others have 
used objective measures of performance such as the elementary survival of the IJV 
(Franko, 1971; Stopford and Wells, 1972; Killing, 1983), its duration (Harrigan, 1986; 
Kogut, 1988), instability of (significant changes in) its ownership (Franko, 1971; Gomes-
Casseres, 1987, 1989; Blodgett, 1991a; Chowdhury, 1992); renegotiation of the IJV 
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contract (Blodgett, 1991a), failure (Reynold, 1984; Simiar, 1983), and dissolution 
(Chowdhury, 1992). 
 
However, financial and objective measures have limitations which are potentially critical 
for the evaluation of IJV performance.  True financial data is often not reported for private 
firms and conglomerates (Dess and Robinson, 1984).  IJV parents commonly generate 
financial returns through mechanisms other than dividends, including supply contracts, 
management fees, technology licensing fees, royalties and transfer pricing.  If available at 
all, these figures are seldom incorporated in calculations of IJV financial performance 
(Geringer and Hebert, 1991). 
 
Financial and objective measures may also fail to adequately reflect the extent to which an 
IJV has achieved its short and long term objectives (Killing, 1983; Artisien and Buckley, 
1985).  IJVs may be formed to pursue a variety of objectives, from technology transfer and 
joint research to access to materials, new markets or economies of scale (Porter and Fuller, 
1986; Contractor and Lorange, 1988).  Many IJVs also operate in contexts where measures 
of short term financial performance might suggest that the venture is performing poorly 
and create an inaccurate picture of performance versus objectives (e.g., new technologies 
of superconductors or bio-engineered pharmaceuticals; or new markets, such as the 
People’s Republic of China). 
 
Anderson (1990) points out the limitation of using objective measures, such as duration, 
liquidation, and so forth.  If adopting duration or liquidation as a measure, one will 
implicitly regard all those IJVs which were terminated or liquidated as failures.  This 
conclusion, however, can be challenged, because termination can signal success or change, 
as well as failure.  Sometimes, the intended purpose of the joint ventures is from the outset 
temporary and short-term in scope (Fayerweather, 1981; Davidson, 1982; Porter, 1990).  
According to Harrigan (1986: 193), “Joint ventures are a transitional form of 
management—an intermediate step on the way to something else”. As soon as the IJV’s 
strategic mission has been successfully achieved (e.g., a successful transfer of technology, 
or the accomplishment of a specific joint research project), the venture is no longer needed.  
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In these cases, the dissolution of a joint venture should be recorded as a success rather than 
a failure. 
 
Killing’s (1983) use of reorganisation of the IJV as a measure of failure is also 
questionable.  Over its lifetime, an IJV is likely to encounter changes in the relative 
bargaining power of its parents and in its industry which affect its stability.  Gray and Yan 
(1994) argue that these changes may necessitate adaptations in the IJV’s structure, since 
the adjustment or redefinition of ownership, pay-off patterns, and management personnel 
may not signify failure, but rather contribute to the stability and continuing success of the 
venture. 
 
Many researchers (Killing, 1983; Schaan, 1988; Beamish, 1985) use a single perceptual 
measure of a parent’s satisfaction as the criterion for assessing an IJV’s performance.  The 
main advantage of this kind of measure is its ability to provide information regarding the 
extent to which the IJV has achieved its overall objectives.  Anderson (1990) additionally 
asserts that, for mature IJVs, performance measurement using traditional financial 
indicators (e.g., profitability or cash flow) may be appropriate.  However, other methods 
for assessing the performance of less mature IJVs, which may not generate positive 
financial outcomes in their early years, are also needed.  Hence, during the early period of 
operation, it is necessary to rely on subjective measurement of an IJV’s successful or 
unsuccessful performance.  This is particularly applicable to developing country joint 
ventures.  IJVs formed in these countries may not be able to generate financial profits for a 
long time because of the difficulty of cross-cultural management and related factors 
(Anderson, 1990).  However, subjective measures are exposed to serious limitations and 
biases.  Many research methods, such as those based on archival or other secondary data 
sources, do not permit collection of data of this kind, instead requiring the use of objective 
performance measures (Geringer and Herbert, 1991). 
 
The next approach is a composite measure, adopted by many IJV researchers (Lecraw, 
1984; Osland, 1994; Yan and Gray, 1994; Artisien and Buckley, 1985; Hu and Chen, 1996; 
Luo, 1997; Lin and Germain, 1998; Glaister and Buckley, 1998; Lasserre, 1999; Liu et 
al.,1999; Lyles and Sulaiman, 1999; Luo et al., 2001; Pangarkar and Lee, 2001; Yan and 
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Gray, 2001; Luo, 2002; Pothukuchi et al., 2002).  Such measures combine objective and 
perceptual variables.  They are customarily based on judgements where respondents are 
asked to self-rate performance and give their views on various aspects.  For instance, in 
assessing IJV performance, Sim and Ali (1998) rely on their respondents’ assessment of 
the satisfaction of the parent firms with the degree to which numerous IJV goals have been 
achieved: sales growth, market share, profits and dividends, local and foreign market 
development, training and acquisition of marketing, manufacturing and other skills. 
 
Because of the limitations of each individual method, this study has adopted an eclectic 
approach to measuring IJV performance in the context of Thailand as an ASEAN member 
country.  This includes: 
1)  objective measurement (assessment of stability, duration, and survival); 
2)  subjective measurement (a single perceptual assessment of the degree of satisfaction); 
and 
3)  composite measurement (multi-perceptual assessment). 
 
3.8.2 Determinants of IJV Performance 
The literature shows that there are many factors influencing IJV performance (see 
Demirbag et al., 2007).  Furthermore, previous studies also indicate that some factors 
impact to different degrees or even produce contrary effects on performance, depending on 
the environment in which IJV firms are operating.  This applies especially to the different 
environments found in developing and developed countries (Robson et al., 2002).  For 
instance, a number of researchers (Crutchley et al., 1991) have found that asymmetry in 
the size of the parent firms has an adverse effect on performance due to a mismatch of 
strategic priorities and influence, while Sim and Ali (1998) find no significance in these 
variables. 
 
Robson et al. (2002) argue that, while a number of performance determinants identified in 
their study encompass many different considerations in the development of an IJV, “it can 
be observed that all key background and antecedent factors reflect the development of the 
strategic fit between the partners” (Robson et al., 2002: 408).  Likewise, Lorange and Roos 
(1993) point out that IJV formation must be based on mutual cooperation between the 
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parties involved, and that one of the most important issues for the success of an IJV is a 
strategic fit between the parent firms.  Reflecting the main theoretical approach of this 
study, the strategic behaviour theory, this study focuses on background and antecedent 
factors. 
 
Since the present study concentrates on the phenomenon of IJV formation in developing 
countries, particularly in the ASEAN region, the principal background and antecedent 
factors reviewed and selected for study are those most frequently identified in the literature 
in respect of developing countries.  These include the following. 
 
3.8.2.1  IJV Age  
Certain previous research on the life cycle of IJVs has shown decay in the mutual benefit 
which partners get from their association (Franko, 1971; Kogut, 1988).  This decay can be 
explained by the exhaustion over time of the learning which partners derive from the 
partnership (Lasserre and Schutte, 1995).  A local partner looking for technology will 
progressively learn, while a foreign partner will come over time to understand local 
business practice.  The longer an IJV firm lasts, the lower the mutual interest and therefore 
the lower the degree of satisfaction.  Other research (Lin and Germain, 1998) has 
suggested, on the contrary, that IJVs are subject to “positive duration dependence”. 
 
3.8.2.2  Total Number of IJV Parent Companies  
Of the studies testing the relationship between the total number of parent firms and IJV 
performance, those using pre-1990 data indicate a positive correlation (Hu and Chen, 
1996), whereas the post-1990 research reveals either an inverse (Olk, 1997) or no 
significant (Beamish and Kachra, 1999) association.  Marangozov (2005) argues that 
internal organisational management problems are more likely to arise as the number of 
parent companies increases.  These difficulties are caused by the problem of reaching 
consensus on the objectives and strategy of the IJV (or IJVs) among the parent companies.  
Against this, a study of IJVs in Nepal and Thailand by Swierczek and Dhakal (2004) 
shows that the number of partners in IJVs has a significantly positive influence on 
learning.  In particular, IJVs with more than two partners are likely to achieve a higher 
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degree of learning than those with only two partners, leading ultimately to better IJV 
performance. 
 
 
3.8.2.3  Symmetrical Size of the IJV Parent Companies  
Symmetrical partner size is generally shown to be a fairly important influence on IJV 
performance (Pan and Chi, 1999; Smith et al., 1989; Merchant, 2000; Pan and Li, 2000).  
Some researchers have suggested that an adverse effect from asymmetry is due to a 
mismatch of strategic priorities and influence.  In the context of developing countries, size 
asymmetry might be expected to be more significant and to exert a negative influence on 
IJV performance (Crutchley et al., 1991).  Previous studies (Crutchley et al., 1991; Osland 
and Cavusgil, 1996) also show a negative link between this variable and IJV performance.  
Against that, Sim and Ali (1998) find no significance in the relationship between these two 
variables. 
 
3.8.2.4  A Business Linkage Between the IJV Firm and Its Parent Companies/ A 
Business Linkage Between the IJV Parent Companies Themselves  
As firms expand their spatial spread and become more global, it might be expected that 
business linkages between the IJV’s parent firms and the IJV would affect IJV success 
(Harrigan, 1988; Killing 1983).  Merchant and Schendal (2000), however, find an 
insignificant result between business linkages and IJV performance, while Park and Kim 
(1997) identify significance and argue that the financial performance of IJVs improves 
where their business is related to that of their local parent.  The study of Sim and Ali 
(1998) with a multidimensional IJV performance measurement approach yields 
insignificant findings, while linked IJV projects are found to be respectively more (Reuer, 
1998) or less (Park and Ungson, 1997) stable than unlinked projects.   
 
In addition, a number of previous studies (for example, Koh and Venkatraman, 1991) have 
indicated that partners should have a general business domain overlap if they want superior 
IJV performance.  However, this is disputed by the work of other researchers (for example, 
Zeira et al., 1997). 
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3.8.2.5  Collaborative Experience of the IJV’s Parent Companies  
Accumulated collaborative experience of an IJV’s parent companies will reinforce the 
ability of the IJV to deal with the uncertainties and complexities of structuring and 
negotiating agreements.  It will reinforce the degree of preparedness, and it is thus to be 
expected that experience will contribute to more satisfactory IJV performance (Lasserre, 
1999).  Makino and Delios (1996) also find a correlation between these two variables from 
their study of Japanese joint ventures in Southeast and East Asia, and postulate that 
previous IJV experience of the parent firms has a positive influence on IJV performance.  
Sim and Ali (1998) suggest that experience would lead to an accumulation of knowledge 
about doing business in host countries, with positive consequences for IJV performance. 
 
3.8.2.6  Organisational Learning by the IJVs   
A number of researchers (Probst and Buchel, 1997; Reynolds and Ablett, 1998; Buckler, 
1998) define organisational learning as a change in the behaviour of individuals or groups 
within an organisation which leads to improved performance and problem solving ability 
as well as capability for action.  Bolisani and Scarso (1999) suggest that there should be a 
continuous exchange of knowledge with external sources to facilitate learning.  IJVs can 
act as vehicles for effective learning or as a means for effective technology diffusion 
(Jones and Lall, 1998; Carayannis et al., 2000).  According to Inkpen (1998), when 
organisations with different skills and knowledge decide to forge an alliance, this provides 
each partner with an opportunity to learn.  This learning enables the firms to facilitate their 
action plans and also provides a capacity for adapting to change by improving their 
performance.  
 
Joint learning in alliances contributes to sustained performance of the alliances, and a 
transfer of knowledge will result in perceived success by the partners of those firms 
(Morrison and Mezentseff, 1997).  In a successful IJV firm, the exchange of knowledge, as 
well as individual and collective learning, together create organisational learning (Francis, 
1997).  Supporting this view, Probst and Buchel (1997) argue that while individual 
learning does not guarantee organisational learning, the latter cannot occur without it.  The 
collective insights of these individuals working together will facilitate organisational 
learning.  This suggests that group dynamics and sharing of ideas will be important if IJVs 
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are to be able to learn.  Moreover, a number of previous studies (for example, Swierczek 
and Dhakal, 2004) suggest that organisational learning has a positive impact on the 
performance of IJVs. 
 
3.8.2.7  Similarity of National and Organisational Culture  
Much research has been conducted into the influence of national culture on the transfer of 
managerial practices from one country to another (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1991; Cattaneo, 
1992).  Research indicates that culture is fundamental to individual behaviour (Cattaneo, 
1992; Hofstede, 1980, 1985; Pearce and Osmond, 1999).  Specifically, researchers find 
that culture directly influences the communication strategies which individuals employ 
(Gudykunst et al., 1996; Harris, 1979; Moon, 1996; Triandis et al., 1988).  Further, a 
number of researchers (Bandyopadhyay and Robicheaux, 1993; Bandyopadhyay et al., 
1994; and Zeybek et al., 2003) assert that perceived cultural congruence which drives 
communication strategy influences IJV performance. 
 
Pothukuchi et al. (2002) point out that underlying uncertainty due to cultural differences 
makes it costly to negotiate and transfer management practices and firm-specific 
technologies.  Since national culture is perceived as a fundamentally differentiating factor 
in an IJV, even superficial differences might result in a partner choosing national culture as 
a primary form of self-identification (Salk and Brannen, 2000). 
 
The impact of culture on IJVs has been documented by various studies in the Asia Pacific 
region.  Hoon-Halbauer (1999) find that cultural divergence is associated with difficulties 
and that the situation improves when the divergence is reduced.  Similar conclusions can 
be found in other studies dealing specifically with culture in Asia (Swierczek, 1994; 
Ahmed and Li, 1996; Lasserre, 1999).  It is anticipated that cultural divergence will be 
negatively associated with IJV performance, and especially IJV satisfaction. 
 
Hofstede et al. (1990) argue that organisations from different nations differ in fundamental 
values, while organisations from the same nation differ only in their organisational 
practices.  In other words, when both national and organisational cultures are examined, 
the former should be operationalised in terms of values, and the latter in terms of core 
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organisational practices (Pothukuchi et al., 2002).  However, although national and 
organisational cultures have been regarded as separate constructs, it is widely accepted that 
organisational culture is nested in national culture.  Newman and Nollen (1996) report that 
work units perform better when their management practices are compatible with the 
national culture.  They advocate that management practices should be adapted to national 
culture for higher performance. 
 
In addition, Hofstede et al. (1990) suggest six core organisational practices which 
differentiate organisations in their management orientation: process versus result; 
employee versus job; parochial versus professional; open versus closed system; loose 
versus tight control; and normative versus pragmatic.  If IJVs differ in these practices, the 
differences lead to conflicting behaviours, misunderstanding and problems of interaction.  
Brown et al. (1990) concur that compatibility in partners’ organisational cultures and 
practices can be a significant determinant of the performance of IJVs.  Moreover, research 
on similarity of organisational climate and performance (Fey and Beamish, 2001) indicates 
that firms selecting a partner with a similar organisational climate will enjoy superior 
performance. 
 
A study of national and organisational culture by Pothukuchi et al. (2002) indicates that the 
presumed negative effect from cultural distance on IJV performance originates more from 
differences in organisational culture than from those in national culture.  Contrary to this, a 
study of IJVs in the UK by Glaister and Buckley (1998) shows that the correlations 
between objective and subjective measures of performance in IJVs where the perception 
and effect of organisational cultural differences are not apparent, do not significantly differ 
from those where such differences are apparent. 
 
3.8.2.8  Commitment in the IJV Company and Commitment Between the IJV Parent 
Companies  
Commitment can be described as the willingness of joint ventures partners to exert effort in 
respect of their relationship with the joint venture (Mohr and Spekman, 1994).  Committed 
partners will consider long-term gains rather than short-term advantages.  In such cases the 
frequency and intensity of conflicts can be expected to be relatively low; therefore, higher 
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levels of commitment should positively affect IJV performance and partners’ satisfaction 
with IJV activities.  According to Mohr and Spekman (1994), a high level of commitment 
provides a context in which both parties can achieve individual and joint goals without 
raising the spectre of opportunistic behaviour. 
 
Lyons (1991) and Demirbag and Mirza, (2000) refer to parent companies’ commitment to 
IJVs as an important element of success.  Buckley and Casson (1988) argue that 
commitment can be higher if a distribution of rewards from the venture, when successfully 
completed, is deemed equitable by all parties.  Parent companies’ long-term commitment is 
also seen as a key factor by many researchers for the continuation of the IJV (Brown et al., 
1990; Buckley and Casson, 1988; Beamish, 1988; Hyder and Ghauri, 1993).  According to 
Turpin (1993), IJVs are very successful when partners avoid complexities, trust each other, 
and commit themselves wholeheartedly to the success of the new company. 
 
Harrigan (1986) argues that the key to successful joint ventures will be a meeting of minds.  
Effective joint ventures depend upon trust, but they are often forged as a compromise 
between two or more parent firms who would rather own the child wholly. It is necessary 
to assess the parents’ commitment to their venture’s success and their willingness to 
contribute resources (or provide a market for outputs) in a manner that accommodates the 
IJV’s needs. Moreover, the study by Demirbag and Mirza (2000) shows that there is a 
strong correlation between commitment and IJV performance. 
 
3.9  Summary and Concluding Remarks  
This chapter has reviewed four major theories, with the emphasis on conceptual and 
empirical evidence, for explaining IJV formation. These views include the transaction cost 
theory, the organisational knowledge and learning theory, the resource-based view, and the 
strategic behaviour theory.  The strategic behaviour theory is the principal approach 
informing the present study, although the other theories have valuable insights to 
contribute to particular aspects of the topic. 
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The transaction cost theory emphasises how firms transact in whichever manner minimise 
the sum of production and transaction costs via the IJV mode of governance, while 
organisational knowledge and learning theory stresses on the learning process in IJV 
operations and believes that a need for knowledge acquisition leads to IJV formation. 
Under the resource-based view, firms can gain competitive advantage and enhance 
performance if they gain access to their partners’ unique resources by forming an IJV.   
 
The strategic behaviour theory points out more generally that firms transact in a manner 
which maximises profits through improving a firm’s competitive position in relation to 
their competitors by forming IJVs.  Since the aim of this study is to examine IJV formation 
in the context of the Southeast Asian countries, it can be seen that the broader scope of 
strategic behaviour theory is most suited to the topic of the research and should enable the 
aim and objectives of the study to be fulfilled.  Strategic behaviour theory is also seen as 
the approach likely to be of greatest practical help to firms considering embarking on IJV 
formation in Thailand and the ASEAN4 region. 
 
It can be seen that strategic behaviour theory emphasises the topics of greatest interest to 
this study, namely host location choice decisions, parent companies’ contributions and 
their impact on the operation of the IJV, performance assessment, performance 
determinants, strategic fit, and, most fundamentally, the reason why companies embark on 
IJV formation in the first place. 
 
The proposed framework for the research questions explores four important aspects of IJV 
formation in the context of Thailand as an ASEAN4 country:  the characteristics of IJV 
activities, their distribution and trends; strategic motivation and location factors behind IJV 
formation; the contribution of IJV parent companies and their influence over the 
operational practices of the IJVs; and IJV performance measurement and determinants.  
This chapter has reviewed the literature relevant to each issue. 
 
The literature indicates that more IJVs have been set up since the 1980s than in all the 
previous years combined.  If in the past they were used to exploit peripheral markets or 
technologies, IJVs are currently seen as a crucial element of a business unit’s policy and as 
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a strategic weapon for competing within a firm’s core markets and technologies.  Firms 
which do business through an IJV can maximise profit by improving their competitive 
position vis-à-vis their rivals (Kogut, 1988).  The increasing use of IJVs is likely to 
continue well into the 21st century. 
 
In addition, the strategic inducements for parent companies to establish IJVs have been 
reviewed, and motives have been found to overlap and to be interrelated.  This chapter has 
accordingly grouped and summarised strategic motives identified in the literature.  These 
include risk limitation; achieving economies of scale; exchanging or gaining access to 
technology and management know-how; and supporting initial overseas expansion. 
 
The importance of the host country specific advantage has become of increasing strategic 
importance for MNEs.  Accordingly, the factors which affect location choice decisions by 
foreign firms when considering IJV formation have also been discussed in this chapter. 
The host country government’s policies and regulation, market size, resource availability, 
socio-cultural similarity, and other factors are example of strategic impetus behind the 
decision of foreign firms on where to locate IJVs.  Regarding the parent companies’ 
contributions, the literature shows that the major contributions to IJVs are technology, 
knowledge of the local environment and marketing, and financial capital. 
 
This review of the literature has shown that there is no consensus among scholars 
regarding indicators for assessing IJV performance.  This study has accordingly adopted an 
eclectic approach to measuring IJV performance.  This includes objective measurement 
(the assessment of stability, duration, and survival); subjective measurement (a single 
perceptual assessment of the degree of satisfactoriness); and composite measurement (a 
multi-perceptual assessment with numerous dimensions). 
 
Finally, previous studies have shown that a great number of factors influence IJV 
performance.  However, special attention is paid in the present study to the background and 
antecedent factors most frequently identified in the literature as being particularly relevant 
in the context of developing countries.  These include: 1) IJV age;  2) the total number of 
IJV parent companies;  3) symmetry of size of the IJV parent companies;  4)  business 
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linkages between the IJV firm and its parent companies, and between the parent companies 
themselves;  5) the IJV parent companies’ prior experience of collaboration;  6) 
organisational learning within the IJV;  7) similarity of the national and organisational 
culture of the partners;  8) commitment within the IJV itself and between the IJV’s parent 
companies.  These factors are regarded as influential determinants in developing “strategic 
fit” between the partners, one of the crucial factors for the success of IJVs. 
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Chapter 4 
Research Methodology 
4.1  Introduction 
The preceding chapter reviewed the literature relevant to the subject of this study and 
proposed a conceptual framework for exploring IJV formation in Thailand.  This chapter 
describes and discusses the research methodology used for collecting and analysing the 
data used to build on the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 3. 
 
There is general agreement that getting the methodology right is a prerequisite for 
successful research.  It is therefore important to choose appropriate research methods to 
answer the questions posed by the research in a valid and reliable manner.  The four main 
research questions on which this study focuses are: 
 
1)  What are the characteristics of the distribution, patterns and trends of IJV activity in 
Thailand? 
 
2)  What are the strategic motives of parent firms in establishing IJVs, and what host 
country location factors influence the decision of foreign firms to invest in Thailand?   
 
3)   What are the contributions parent companies provide to IJV firms in Thailand, and 
what is the relationship between those contributions and the characteristics of the IJV’s 
operation?   
 
4)   How do IJVs perform in the ASEAN4 context, specifically in Thailand, and what 
factors influence their performance? An important further issue is whether IJV 
performance varies with parent companies’ strategic motives and characteristics of IJV 
operation.  
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It is clearly necessary to collect and analyse data on the areas central to this research in 
order to address these questions successfully and achieve the aim and objectives set out in 
Chapter 1. 
 
This chapter is divided into seven sections.  Section 4.2 reviews the research methodology.  
It describes and discusses the philosophy, approach and methods of the research, and the 
appropriateness of the chosen research method.  Data collection methods for both 
secondary data and primary data are discussed in Section 4.3, while the data collection 
procedure is described in the following Section 4.4.  This presents the design and 
characteristics of the sample, the questionnaire design, covering letter, pilot study, mail 
survey and follow-up procedure, and the response rate.  The data analysis method and the 
validity and reliability of instruments are set out in Sections 4.5 and 4.6 respectively. The 
final Section 4.7 provides a summary of the chapter. 
 
4.2 The Choice of Methodology 
Downey and Ireland (1979: 630) argue that “the most relevant of the presuppositions that 
determine one’s research perspective is that methodological issues must always be 
answered within the context of a particular research setting. That is to say, methodologies 
are neither appropriate nor inappropriate until they are applied to a specific problem”.  
Mintzberg (1979) also supports this view and further asserts that when choosing 
methodology, a researcher should realised that there is no right or wrong methodology, 
only that more or less useful ones exist depending on the nature of the research project.  
The present researcher of this study is aware in this issue and attempts to choose 
methodology, which applies to the nature of this research and is able to answer the research 
questions of this study validly and reliably. 
 
Weber (2004) indicates that there are two principal research philosophies: positivism and 
interpretivism.  Positvism focuses on facts without reference to ethical judgement (Hunt, 
1991; Lee, 1999).  “Positivists supposedly believe that reality is separate from the 
individual who observes it. They apparently consider subject (the researcher) and object 
(the phenomena in the world that are their focus) to be two separate, independent things” 
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(Weber, 2004: v). In this paradigm, researchers supposedly try to build knowledge of a 
reality that exists beyond the human mind, and they apparently believe that human 
experience of the world reflects an objective, independent reality and that this reality 
provides the foundation for human knowledge (Lutz, 1989; Heath, 1992). 
 
On the other hand, interpretivists believe that reality and the individual who observe it 
cannot be separated (Weber, 2004). Knowledge of the world is intentionally constituted 
through a person’s lived experience, and the research object is interpreted in the light of 
meaning structure of person’s (researcher’s) lived experience (Laudan, 1976). 
   
According to Deshpande (1983); Dholokia (1985); Weber (2004), positivists tend to use 
quantitative method as their preferred research method. They seek large amounts of 
empirical data that they can analyse statistically to detect underlying regularities. "Very 
simply, the logical positivist view of the world is synonymous with the quantitative 
paradigm" (Deshpande 1983: 102).   Interpretivists tend to use qualitative method as their 
favoured research method since they view the social reality as a process of continual 
development of knowledge and the interpretation of the real world (Morgan and Smircich, 
1980).  
 
Downey and Ireland (1979); Mintzberg (1979) point out that the quantitative method is 
appropriate where the aim of the study is to determine how many, what, and where. Hence, 
a research which is seeking to clarify such objectives has to rely on the use of 
predetermined response categories by means of standardised data collection instruments 
such as mail survey so as to enable statistical techniques to be used to assist in the data 
interpretation.  This research method provides a number of advantages such as enhancing 
the reliability of observation, facilitating more objective measurement, permitting 
statistical analysis of data, and generalisation to large poulations (Schrag, 1992).  However, 
this research method has been critised for failing to address more complex issues and 
processes of the real world, and focusing on the social structure rather than the process 
itself (Mintzberg, 1979). 
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Van Maanen (1979: 520) describes the qualitative method as “an umbrella term covering 
an array of interpretive techniques which seek to describe, decode, translate, and otherwise 
come to terms with meaning, not the frequency, of certain more or less naturally occurring 
phenomena in the social world”. Weber (2004) asserts that the qualitative data are often 
gathered by means of open-ended narrative, that is, where responses are not directed into 
predetermined answer categories. Therefore, this method enables researchers to undertake 
an in-depth investigation of specific, small-scale samples in order to discover new 
knowledge grounded on personal experiences (Hammersley, 1996).  However, according 
to Miles (1983), the qualitative method has serious weaknesses.  He criticises it on the 
grounds that it is primitive and subjective, effectively based on intuition, and is in general 
“unmanageable”. 
4.3 The Methodology Used in This Study 
Many previous IJV studies have been conducted using the quantitative method (Beamish 
and Inkpen, 1995; Glaister and Buckley, 1996; Sim and Ali, 2000; Luo et al., 2001; 
Pangarkar and Lee, 2001; Yan and Gray, 2001; Luo, 2002; Pothukuchi et al., 2002).  Other 
scholars, however (Perks and Sanderson, 2000; Jiang, 2001; Salk and Shenkar, 2001), use 
the qualitative method to explore IJV phenomena, particularly where these relate to 
cultural issues, partner negotiation, organisational behaviour, partner interaction, and so 
forth.  As already mentioned, the choice of research methodology will depend on the 
purpose or focus of the study.  The quantitative method seems to be chosen where 
variables can be quantified and a set of their relationships are statistically analysed.  
Moreover, this method generally involves a large sample that can lead to generalisation of 
the results of the studies to the population from which the samples are drawn (Creswell, 
1994).  On the other hand, the qualitative method seems to be adopted if researchers want 
to undertake an in-depth investigation of a specific, small-scale sample in order to examine 
closely the specific phenomena of their studies. 
 
Neuman (2003) too asserts that the criteria for choosing appropriate research methods are 
greatly dependent on the goals and objectives of the study.  As regards the objectives of 
this study, the present researcher has investigated the characteristics of the activity,  
distribution, and trends of international joint ventures in Thailand and, more generally, in 
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the ASEAN4 countries.  This means there is a need to describe the pattern, distribution, 
and trends of IJV activity in Thailand statistically.  Moreover, the content of one of the 
primary sources of the study, the BOI dataset, is quantitative data obtained from a large 
number of IJV firms.  This consists of the business name of the IJVs, their mailing address 
and contact telephone number, their industrial sector, the nationality of their foreign parent 
company or companies, and the proportion of the equity shares in the IJV. Data of this kind 
calls for a method which can statistically group, combine, describe, and analyse the 
distribution of data. 
 
The same applies to other objectives of this study:  to determine the strategic motives of 
IJV parent companies in forming IJVs, and to identify factors which affect location choice 
decisions by foreign firms considering IJV formation; to examine the contributions which 
parent companies provide to IJVs and analyse the relationship between these and the 
characteristics of IJV operation in the context of Thailand; to assess IJV performance and 
analyse the determinants influencing it in Thailand as a developing country.  Here too a 
method is needed which can establish a series of relationship between variables, describe 
the trend of relationships, and quantify a set of variables to be measured; for example, the 
relationship between the determinants and IJV performance.  The method must also enable 
the researcher to generalise from the representativeness of the selected samples to the 
population of the study.  In other words, measurable and quantifiable variables are the 
fundamental topics of this research.   
 
As discussed in the previous section: the present researcher has followed the 
positivist/quantifiable approach because of the nature of this research and in order to fulfil 
the objectives identified.   
 
The approach of this study is unlikely to build theory, or to work with qualitative data and 
use a variety of data collection methods in order to provide differing perspectives on 
phenomena.  Instead, the present researcher attempts to translate theoretical concepts into 
measurable categories and variables (operationalisation) in order to gain the accuracy 
needed to enable generalisation to the characteristics of a wider population of the groups 
sampled, with the intention of testing theories.  From the present researcher’s point of 
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view, the positivist/quantifiable approach can explain social phenomena in a valid, reliable, 
and systematic manner.  Accordingly, taking account of the characteristics of the dataset 
and the need to fulfil the aim and objectives of this study, the method chosen for 
conducting this research is the quantitative method. 
 
It needs to be acknowledged that the present researcher’s approach does have limitations. 
Firstly, certain aspects of the phenomena under investigation are not objective but come 
from interpretation of social action; for example, negotiation between the IJV parent 
companies, the strategic motives of companies in forming IJVs, the contribution of the 
parent companies to the IJVs, and so forth.  Secondly, the “objective” approach, by 
following a rigorous and quantifiable research method such as a questionnaire, may seek to 
elicit opinions from which respondents are unwilling to convey.  Thirdly, by following this 
approach, the present researcher is prevented from undertaking an in-depth investigation 
into IJV activity in the ASEAN4 context of Thailand, which the qualitative method would 
enable (since the creation of IJVs comes from interaction between the IJV parent 
companies).  In this respect, the interpretivist/qualitative approach would be likely to 
provide deeper knowledge and understanding of certain aspects of the IJV phenomenon in 
Thailand. 
 
However, on balance, since this study is exploratory, and given the characteristics of the 
data of the study (the BOI dataset and survey data are quantitative), the quantitative 
approach has been preferred.  It is hoped that future research on this topic may employ a 
qualitative approach in order to get a more rounded and complete picture of IJV activity in 
Thailand and other ASEAN4 countries.  This would be a valuable supplement to the 
knowledge resulting from the present study. 
4.4  The Data Collection Method 
4.4.1  Secondary Data 
Zikmund (2000: 124) defines secondary data as the “data gathered and recorded by 
someone else prior to (and for purposes other than) the current needs of the researcher, and 
these data are usually historical, already assembled, and do not require access to 
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respondents or subjects.”  Kervin (1992) also points out that secondary data may be either 
raw data or compiled data which have received some form of selection or summarising.  
Moreover, these kinds of data, both quantitative and qualitative, can be used in both 
descriptive and explanatory research (Saunders et al., 2003).   
 
The secondary data required to provide the foundation of knowledge for this study include 
the current situation of FDI in the ASEAN4 countries, and the Thai government investment 
policies.  This information has been obtained from ASEAN statistics yearbooks, BOI 
yearbooks, the BOI annual economic reports, and reports of the Bank of Thailand. 
 
Although secondary data provided a foundation of background knowledge for this study, it 
was not sufficient on its own.  Certain necessary information was not publicly available, or 
had not been gathered.  For the present investigation it was essential, therefore, if the 
objectives were to be achieved, to obtain additional unpublished primary data. 
 
4.4.2  Primary Data 
The present researcher has been fortunate in being granted access by the Thailand Board of 
Investment (BOI) to an unpublished database of IJV companies operating in Thailand.  The 
BOI is the government institution with primary responsibility for overseeing and 
promoting FDI in Thailand.  It enjoys high national status and directly advises the Thai 
government on investment policy.  Although mention has been made of the fact that state-
provided statistics and other information can be unreliable, it is very unlikely to be the case 
in this instance.  The present researcher has already noted that it would be unusual and 
unwise for a government with a fairly free press to risk distorting raw information, not 
least because it itself needs to know what the real situation is.  
 
The BOI database has not only been crucial in supplying contact information for IJVs to be 
surveyed, but has also provided much other information not previously available to the 
scholarly community.  These data are analysed in this study in terms of the patterns of 
IJVs’ activities, distribution, and trends.  Specifically, analyses by industrial sector, 
country of origin, and the ventures’ equity participation have been conducted on this 
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database in order to fulfil the first objective of this study: to ascertain the characteristics of 
the activities, distribution, and trends of IJVs in Thailand. 
 
Despite the immense value of the BOI database, it needed to be supplemented by a survey, 
because information needed did not exist. 
 
De Chernatony (1990) identifies three techniques normally used for collecting primary 
survey data: personal interviews, telephone interviews, and self-administered 
questionnaires (mail survey).  In respect of primary data collection from IJVs, the mail 
survey was selected for this study.  The main reasons for adopting this method are as 
follows. 
 
First, a mail survey can reach a geographically dispersed sample simultaneously.  
“Respondents in isolated areas or those who are otherwise difficult to reach can more 
easily be contacted by mail” (Zikmund 2000: 201).  Since the target respondents, the IJV 
companies, were located in different locations throughout Thailand, they could all be made 
equally accessible by employing this method. 
 
Second, this method also demands the least amount of resources (Salant and Dillman, 
1994).  Mail survey is comparatively low in cost relative to personal interviews and a 
telephone survey.  Given that, in this study, the researcher had limited resources for 
primary data collection, mail survey was seen as an efficient method for accumulating 
primary data from the target respondents. 
 
Third, mail survey can be completed whenever the respondent has free time, which 
improves the likelihood that they will take time to think about the answers (Dillman, 
1978).  In addition, mail survey can provide more sense of confidentiality.  It is easier for 
most people to answer personal questions in writing than face-to-face.  It is a more 
anonymous tool for providing sensitive and private information to the researcher (Salant 
and Dillman, 1994).  In contrast, collecting primary data by telephone is concentrated in a 
brief period of time and the respondents have no prior warning.  The decision about how to 
respond must be quick, so the researcher may not get the valid information sought (Faria et 
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al., 1990).  The questionnaire of the present study included a number of questions which 
required respondents to think carefully, and some questions they might perceive as 
sensitive or confidential (for example, assessing the quality of IJV performance or IJV 
management).  Mail survey was thus the best primary data collection method for eliciting 
these data and items of information from the IJV managers who were the target 
respondents. 
 
There is also the consideration that a mail survey method is less susceptible to bias from 
interviewers’ value judgements.  This kind of error is normally only a problem with 
telephone and personal interviews (Dillman, 1978).  Finally, since this study needed to be 
finished in a restricted period of time and the researcher was conducting the research alone, 
mail survey was preferable to the personal or telephone interview, which would have 
required a great deal more time for collecting data from the target respondents. 
 
In short, time, resources, the characteristics of the research samples, and the benefits of the 
mail survey over other methods persuaded the researcher to choose mail survey for the 
collection of primary data from IJVs in Thailand.  If none of the already mentioned 
constraints of time, resources, and the working environment of the respondents had 
applied, extended personal or telephone interviews might have provided a more in-depth 
understanding through two-way communication.  Since, however, they did apply, mail 
survey was found to be the appropriate method for this study.  Nevertheless, the drawbacks 
of the mail survey method should not be ignored, and a number of earlier scholars have 
also drawn attention to them (Dillman, 1978; Jobber, 1991; Salant and Dillman, 1994; 
Zikmund, 2000). 
4.5  The Data Collection Procedure 
4.5.1  Sample Design  
As has been mentioned above, there are two fundamental types of joint ventures: equity 
joint ventures (EJVs) and non-equity joint ventures (NEJVs).  EJVs are the main form of 
IJVs in Thailand (BOI, 2005).  EJVs comprise two or more legally distinct organisations 
(the parents), each participating in the decision-making activities of the jointly owned 
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entity (Geringer, 1991).  In contrast, NEJVs are agreements between partners to 
collaborate in certain ways, but do not involve the establishment of a new corporate entity 
(Contractor and Lorange, 1988).  A joint venture is regarded as an international joint 
venture if at least one partner has its headquarters outside the venture’s country of 
operation, or if it has an important level of operation in more than one country (Geringer 
and Hebert, 1989).  Owing to the characteristics of the acquired dataset, this study 
concentrates only on EJVs.  The database registers 2,251 IEJVs (international equity joint 
ventures). 
 
Sampling methods are normally divided into two main types: the probability sampling 
method (representative or random sampling); and the non-probability sampling method, or 
judgemental sampling method (Fink, 2003).  In the probability sampling method, the 
chance or probability of each case being selected from the population is known and is 
usually equal for all cases, whereas non-probability sampling does not employ the rules of 
probability theory and does not ensure representativeness.  Babbie (1990) criticises the 
non-probability sampling method for the drawback that each case in the sample is selected 
from the total population by a method of subjective merit, and that the method is unable to 
answer research questions or address objectives which require statistical inferences in 
respect of the population in general.  Selltiz et al. (1976) argue that a valid sampling 
method must allow the sample unit to be chosen in a manner which is systematic and 
objective, easily identifiable, clearly defined, each choice being independent of each other, 
and non-interchangeable.  The sampling process must be rooted in standard criteria and 
should avoid errors, bias and any distortions. 
 
Fink (2003) defines non-probability sampling as a method which cannot depend upon the 
rationale of probability and cannot be used to infer from the sample to the general 
population.  Any generalistions obtained from this method must then be filtered through 
one’s knowledge of the topic being studied.  Some studies have no choice but to use non-
probability sampling either because, in social science research, there may be circumstances 
where it is not feasible, practical or theoretically sensible to do random sampling, or 
because of unintentional or unavoidable characteristics of the sampling method.  Neuman 
(2003) divides the non-probability sampling method into seven types: haphazard, 
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accidental or convenience sampling; quota sampling; purposive sampling; snowball 
sampling; deviant case sampling; sequential sampling; and theoretical sampling.  He 
divides the probability sampling method into four categories: simple random sampling; 
stratified sampling; systematic sampling; and cluster sampling. 
 
For this study, a probability sampling method was chosen to select the final samples since, 
with this method, it is possible to answer research questions and to achieve objectives of 
this study which require the ability to statistically establish the characteristics of the 
population from the sample.  This method is most commonly associated with survey-based 
research where the researcher needs to make inferences from a sample about a population 
(Neuman, 2003). 
   
Previous studies (Beamish, 1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1987, 1989) have indicated that it is 
necessary to establish criteria for selecting the final samples (the qualifying IJV 
companies) mainly because of the heterogeneous characteristics of the population (in this 
case, all the IJV companies in the sampling frame), here particularly in terms of the 
percentage of each parent firm’s equity in the venture.  That is, certain international joint 
ventures might cause distortion of a true picture of IJVs. 
 
For the present study, then, three criteria have provided a framework for selecting the final 
samples: 
 
1)  IJVs in which neither partner holds more than ninety percent of the venture’s equity.  
This is because a number of researchers use at least 10% shareholding by parents as the 
minimum equity criterion for defining an international joint venture in a developing 
country (Beamish, 1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1987, 1989; Chowdhury, 1992).  These 
researchers argue that a smaller percentage of equity ownership might not reflect a true 
picture of joint ventures and the nature of relations between the partners. 
 
2)  The companies in the database must still be operational (the present researcher checked 
the status of each IJV directly from the website of the Department of Business 
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Development, Ministry of Commerce of Thailand to determine their continued existence or 
termination). 
 
3) The IJVs must have existed for at least three years, because the literature (Woodcock et 
al., 1994; Pan and Chi, 1999; Pangarkar and Klein, 2004) shows that it takes 
approximately three years for each partner to devise a comprehensive plan against which to 
assess the performance of the IJV. 
 
After applying these criteria, the number of qualifying IJVs fell to 1,597 companies from 
the original 2,251 firms.  Due to resource and time constraints, this study was unable to 
conduct a mail survey of all qualifying IJVs.  Accordingly, an adequate sampling size 
needed to be determined using a statistical formula.  For this study, a formula proposed by 
Krejcie and Morgan (1970) was adopted (see Appendix A).  This method has been widely 
accepted by researchers, and is suited to studies where the exact size of the population is 
known (Cavana et al., 2001).  Krejcie and Morgan (1970) have, moreover, converted this 
formula for use as a sampling table.  In this table, the size of a population ranging from 10 
to 100,000 is converted to provide the number of units required for an adequate sampling 
size.  This provides a very convenient means for researchers to determine an adequate 
sampling size for a wide range of populations encompassed by the table.  The table is 
popularly used by many researchers from a variety of fields of study (see, for example, 
Torres and Cano, 1995; Callan, 1995). 
 
Ultimately, of the 1,597 qualifying companies 310 firms formed the sample size of this 
study.  A stratified systematic sampling technique (Skalski, 1993) was adopted for 
sampling; it was used to classify the samples for each stratum (industrial sector), and then 
each stratum was sampled by a systematic sampling method.  This method was used 
because it had a number of advantages compared to others.  First, the stratified sampling 
method is suitable for use when differing characteristics of the population in each stratum 
are likely to appear.  Second, this method is suitable for all sizes:  there is no minimum size 
requirement for the sample.  Third, it is relatively easy to explain to support workers, e.g., 
a research assistant (Saunders et al., 2003).  
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4.5.2  Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire and specific questions were designed to provide answers to the research 
questions required to fulfil the aim and objectives of this study.  They are grounded on the 
research design and methods of Dillman (2000), and Oppenheim (1992).  A number of 
questions from previous studies (e.g., Lin and Germain, 1998) also provided guidance in 
creating the questionnaire.  The questions can be divided into two categories. 
 
The first group is based on factual data, such as year of formation of the IJV, the number of 
partner companies, percentages of equity shareholdings, and type of IJV business.  These 
data are generally measured with nominal scales.  The second category measures 
respondents’ attitudes with ordinal scales.  Dillman (2000) indicates that ordinal scales are 
very common in the social sciences, especially for attitude measurement.  Oppenheim 
(1992) classifies attitude scaling into four types: social distance scaling, Guttman scaling, 
Thurstone scaling, and Likert scaling.  Complicated instructions for filling in the survey  
can normally be found from social distance scaling, whilst Guttman scaling can be used 
with items other than attitude statements (e.g. neurotic symptoms).  Thurstone scaling is 
time consuming and costly, and is rarely utilised in applied business research (Zikmund, 
2000).  Likert scaling is simple to use and popular for measuring attitudes (Likert, 1932; 
Oppenheim, 1992).  Zikmund (2000) also notes that “business researchers’ adaptation of 
the summarised ratings method, developed by Rensis Likert, is extremely popular for 
measuring attitudes because the method is simple to administer” (Zikmund, 2000: 291).  In 
addition, previous studies (for example, Oppenheim, 1992; Roberts et al, 1999) show that 
the Likert scales correlate well with Thurstone scales.  This helps to make it the most 
popular scaling procedure in use today (Roberts et al, 1999). 
 
Likewise, Allen and Seaman (2007) agree that Likert scales are the most broadly used 
method because of their easy application.  Respondents generally choose from five 
alternatives (five-point scales).  This approach has been adopted in many previous studies, 
especially in research into IJVs (for example, Lasserre, 1999; Pan and Chi, 1999).  Owing 
to the demands on the time of the target respondents, Likert scaling seems more suitable 
than complex scales since it is easy to understand and answer.  Likert scaling was 
accordingly chosen for the design of the questionnaire in this study. 
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 After the final draft of the questionnaire had been prepared, it was translated from English 
into Thai by a bi-lingual translator accredited by the TESOL Association (Teachers of 
English to Speakers of Other Language Inc, a Global Education Association).  This was 
necessary because the target respondents, IJV general managers, might be Thai or overseas 
nationals.  Thai is the official language of Thailand and only a few people would be able to 
accurately understand the meaning of the questions in the English version.  Although some 
Thai respondents might have a good command of English, it was uncertain that they would 
fully comprehend the meaning of the questions in the questionnaire.  Copies of the 
translated questionnaires were then sent to Thai researchers in the field of international 
business for final proof-reading, comments and suggestions to ensure that the Thai version 
of the questionnaire was consistent, valid, and easy to understand. 
 
4.5.3  The Covering Letter 
The covering letter is an essential part of a mail survey because it can affect whether the 
respondents choose to answer the questionnaire at all (Salant and Dillman, 1994).  The 
process of sending questionnaires to prospective respondents can be viewed as a particular 
phenomenon explained by social exchange theory (cited by Dillman, 1978).  According to 
social exchange theory, people engage in any activity because of the rewards they hope to 
receive.  All activities they perform incur certain costs, and people attempt to keep their 
costs below the rewards they expect to receive.  Basically, then, whether a given behaviour 
occurs is a function of the ratio between the perceived costs of doing that activity and the 
rewards one expects the other party to provide at a later time.  Thus there are three things 
that must be done to maximise mail survey response: minimise the cost of responding, 
maximise the rewards for doing so, and establish trust that those rewards will be delivered.  
To meet this requirement, in the covering letter this study offered target respondents the 
reward of a copy of the summary of the research findings. 
 
In summary, the content of the covering letter for this study included the following: the 
letterhead, description of the topic and purpose of the study, reference to sponsorship of the 
study by the Commission on Higher Education of the Royal Thai Government, an 
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explanation of the importance of the  target respondent’s collaboration in this study (both 
for academic and managerial reasons), the mention of the inclusion of a stamped, self-
addressed return envelope, a declaration of confidentiality and anonymity, the offering of 
the incentive of a copy of the summary of the research findings, encouragement of a 
prompt response with a suggested deadline for returning the questionnaires, an expression 
of thanks to the respondent, and the provision of the name and address of the researcher, as 
well as a signature. 
 
4.5.4  Pilot Study 
A number of researchers (for example, Oppenheim, 1992) point to the need to conduct a 
pilot study as a preliminary tool to detect errors, validate the questionnaire, and ensure that 
the questions are clear and unequivocal.  The pilot study of this research consisted of 25 
questionnaires sent to target IJV general managers in Thailand in February 2006.  Pilot 
companies were then excluded from the target respondents.  By the end of February 2006, 
three companies had completed questionnaires, while the rest declined to collaborate with 
the study on the grounds that it was contrary to their company policy.  After receiving 
feedback from the pilot study, the first question on the questionnaire, the name and address 
of the target company, was removed to demonstrate confidentiality and anonymity. In 
addition, several questions were amended to make them more succinct. For instance, in the 
following question the word in italics was removed from the final version of the 
questionnaire: 
 
1. To what extent, on the scale provided, does the IJV company practice the same procedures as the 
foreign parent company or the Thai parent company in the following aspects? 
 
 Where,    1 = the procedure is exactly the same as the foreign parent company 
2 = the procedure is likely the same as the foreign parent company 
   3 = combination of both parent companies’ procedure 
   4 = the procedure is likely the same as the Thai parent company 
   5 = the procedure is exactly the same as the Thai parent company 
 
4.5.5  Mail Survey and Follow-Up Procedure 
Fieldwork in Thailand demonstrated that a poor response to questionnaires may occur for 
reasons that have nothing to do with its content and which need to be minimised.  The 
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questionnaire may be discarded unread because it is seen as junk mail, or may not be filled 
in because the company cannot decide who should respond. 
 
In March 2006, questionnaires in Thai and English were sent to the 310 target respondents 
by registered mail with a covering letter on letterheaded paper which described the topic 
and purpose of the study, identified the sponsor of the project as the Commission on 
Higher Education of the Royal Thai Government, and enclosed a stamped, self-addressed 
envelope for returning the questionnaire.  The researcher urged a prompt response and 
emphasised to the target respondent, the general manager of the IJV, that the questionnaire 
was confidential and anonymous, could be completed in 15- 30 minutes, and that he or she 
would be sent the results of the study which would contain information of value for 
academic and managerial purposes. 
 
Fifty-six questionnaires were completed and returned.  Another 23 questionnaires were 
sent back with a note from the post office reporting closure of the business, and a further 
22 forms were returned on the grounds that the business had moved.  The researcher then 
re-checked the latest update of information on addresses and closures of businesses by 
using the online service of the Ministry of Commerce.  This had previously been checked 
in December 2005. 
 
Dillman (2000) suggests as a follow-up technique that the first reminder should be sent 
after one week.  A postcard should then be sent to every target respondent to thank them 
for responding, and as a friendly and courteous reminder to those who have yet to respond.  
A second reminder, three weeks after the initial mail and consisting of a similar package to 
the first mailing, including a duplicate questionnaire, pre-paid self addressed envelope and 
amended covering letter, should be sent only to non-respondents.  The amended covering 
letter informs non-respondents that their questionnaires have not been received, and 
appeals for their return.  A third reminder is sent by registered mail to all non-respondents, 
seven weeks after the initial mailing. 
 
To organise a postcard follow up within one week of the original mailing was not 
practicable for the present researcher because of the physical and time constraints on 
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someone working alone.  The third reminder is probably not required if an acceptable 
response rate has already been achieved. 
 
Accordingly, the survey relied on a single follow up to 231 respondents (310 - 56 who had 
already responded - 23 firms no longer in business) in April 2006 and numerous phone 
calls.  Four completed questionnaires were received in April, 13 more companies were 
found to have ceased to operate, and 46 declined to participate in the study on the grounds 
that this was contrary to their company policy.  The response rate was also no doubt 
reduced by factors beyond the researcher’s control, such as political and social unrest in 
Thailand (e.g., election-related uncertainties, a national protest to pressure Prime Minister 
Taksin to resign, and violence in the southern provinces adjacent to Malaysia), which 
preoccupied businessmen and women and left them with little enthusiasm for non-essential 
activities. 
 
The researcher’s phone calls in May 2006 revealed that forms kept in offices for a long 
time had been lost and needed to be resent.  This successfully resulted in the return of a 
further 10 questionnaires, 6 by email, 2 by interview, and 2 by fax.  A further 59 declined 
to cooperate on the grounds that they could not afford the time.  In June 2006, continuing 
phone calls resulted in the return of a further 8 completed questionnaires, 2 by post, 2 by 
fax, and 4 by email.  Another 10 were returned by email after interventions by the 
researcher’s former MBA classmates employed at targeted companies. 
 
4.5.6  The Response Rate 
It will be seen from Table 4.1 that a total of 88 IJVs collaborated with this survey, whilst 
some three quarters of the total of targeted IJVs did not cooperate and were classified as 
IJV non-respondents.  The majority of IJV non-respondents did not reply at all (81 IJVs), 
followed by non-respondents claiming a lack of time (59 IJVs), followed by non-
respondents claiming a conflict with the IJV’s policy (46 IJVs).  A further 36 IJVs 
(11.61%) proved to have ceased operations despite being listed online as still being in 
business in December 2005.  This was apparently the result of outdated information. 
 
 109
Table 4.1: Response Rate 
 Mail Survey with a Single Follow up  Number Percent 
Questionnaire sent 310 100 
1) IJV Usable Response 88 28.39 
2) Non IJV Response 222 71.61 
2.1) IJV Termination 36 11.61 
2.2) Not Comply with IJV Policy 46 14.84 
2.3) Lack of Time  59 19.03 
2.4) No reply 81 26.13 
 
To sum up, the study successfully obtained 88 completed questionnaires, a response rate of 
28.39% .  This is within the parameters found in the literature, where rates range from 10-
40% (see, for example, 35% for a study of IJVs in Ghana and Nigeria by Boateng and 
Glaister, 2003; and 10% for a study of Chinese and Taiwanese joint ventures by Chen and 
Glaister, 2005). 
 
Of the questionnaires returned in the present study, 81 were the Thai-language version 
while 7 were completed in English.  Of the IJV managers, 81 were of Thai nationality, 
three were Japanese, one was Korean, one British and two were American.  Those 
returning questionnaires were in senior management positions: 64 held the position of 
Managing Director/ Executive Director/ Deputy or Assistant Managing Director/ Deputy 
or Assistant Executive Director.  Six held the position of Deputy/ Assistant Managing 
Director in the Personnel/ Administration Section.  Five were Deputy/ Assistant Managing 
Directors in the Accounting and Finance Section.  Two were Deputy/ Assistant Managing 
Directors in the Production Section.  Eleven were Deputy/ Assistant Managing Directors in 
the Marketing and Sales Section. 
 
Both Geringer and Hebert (1991) and Boateng and Glaister (2002) point out that managers 
at this senior level should be well qualified to comment reliably on the perspectives of both 
the foreign and the local parent companies.  They are likely to have been drawn from one 
or both of the parent firms or by outsourcing and, although they work as employees of the 
IJV, they are likely to be well informed on the issue of the parents’ levels of satisfaction 
both through such formal mechanisms as the Annual General Meeting (AGM), and more 
informally through the parents’ involvement in the management of the IJV.  In addition, 
IJV parent companies, through their representation on the board of the IJV, set the overall 
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objectives to be implemented by the IJV managers (Geringer and Hebert, 1991).  Geringer 
and Hebert found that there tended to be higher correlations between the IJV general 
manager’s assessment of IJV performance and that of an individual parent company than 
among evaluations of the respective parent companies themselves. They concluded that an 
IJV general manager can provide fairly reliable data not only on each parent’s satisfaction, 
but also on how each parent perceives its partner’s satisfaction with IJV performance 
(Geringer and Hebert, 1991: 259). 
 
Thus an IJV senior manager, even if only recently appointed, should be able to comment 
on longer-term IJV performance because, having responsibility for the undertaking, they 
are likely to be aware, not only of its recent performance, but its background and some at 
least of its history, having been briefed by colleagues.  
4.6  Data Analysis 
The present study consists of a number of related analyses as well as a discussion of the 
results and their implications.  The SPSS statistical package for Windows, version 14.0.0 
has been used to analyse both data from the database and data obtained from the survey.  A 
number of statistical analysis techniques were used, as follows. 
 
In Chapter 5, descriptive statistics have been used to describe the features of the primary 
data (the IJV database).  This consists of a frequency table and distribution, cross-
tabulation, percentage and cumulative percentage, pie charts, bar charts, and graphs.  In 
addition, primary data analysis of host country location factors has also been conducted in 
this chapter, with measurement of mean central tendency and standard deviation of 
dispersion. 
 
In Chapter 6, three different sets of statistical tests have been used.  First, the measurement 
of mean central tendency and standard deviation of dispersion was conducted to measure 
the relative importance of strategic motives.  Next, the analysis of variance (ANOVA) test 
and equivalent test were used to test the significance of the mean differences of the 
individual variables in each category.  Third, the paired simple t-test was used to test the 
significant difference of the mean scores of each individual strategic motive between the 
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foreign parent company and the Thai parent company.  This method has been widely 
adopted by many researchers (for example, Tatoglu and Glaister, 2000). 
 
In addition, many researchers (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Boateng and Glaister, 2003; 
Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; Chen and Glaister, 2005; Field, 2005) argue that if the sample 
size exceeds 30, it is reasonable to assume that the sample is from a normal distribution 
and parametric tests can be employed.  However, both parametric tests (either the two-
sample t-test or ANOVA test) and equivalent non-parametric tests such as the Mann-
Whitney U test and Kruskal-Wallis H test were also conducted in this study to remove any 
doubts which might arise from the nature of the data. 
 
The preliminary data analysis indicated that there was overlapping or relatedness of the 
variables in each category in Chapters 6 and 7.  Hence, the exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA) technique of the Anderson-Rubin method was used to create a parsimonious set of 
distinct non-related variables.  A number of researchers (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; 
Field, 2005) argue that this method is a suitable option when uncorrelated scores are 
required.  After the EFA technique had derived the underlying factors from the set of 
variables, significant mean score difference tests – ANOVA and equivalent test – were 
conducted with those underlying factors in Chapter 6, while a multiple regression test was 
run with those underlying factors in Chapter 7. 
 
In Chapter 7, in addition to the measurement of the mean central tendency and standard 
deviation of dispersion, the correlation coefficients were computed to measure the 
correlations of the variables.  Further, multiple regression was conducted to ascertain the 
multivariate relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables, 
since numerous researchers state that the true relationship of the variables must be proved 
with both the bivariate relationship test and the multivariate relationship test (for example, 
Sim and Ali, 1998; Demirbag and Mirza, 2000; Boateng and Glaister, 2002). 
 
Moreover, the data were inspected for multi-collinearity and autocorrelation before the 
regression analysis was conducted.  Though autocorrelation is likely to occur with time 
series data, it might occur with cross-sectional data as well.  This problem results from the 
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fact that errors are not independent of each other.  In other words, the errors have 
correlated among themselves.  The analysis of Durbin-Watson statistics was then used to 
detect this problem.  The test statistics can vary between 0 and 4.  A value near 2 (1.5-2.5) 
means the residuals are uncorrelated.  If the value is greater than 2.5, it indicates a negative 
correlation between the adjacent residuals.  A value below 1.5 is interpreted as a positive 
correlation.  For this study, the evidence showed that no serious autocorrelation had 
emerged. The value of the Durbin-Watson can be seen in the result analysis section in each 
chapter. 
  
Multicollinearity occurs when two or more independent variables are linearly related very 
closely.  This problem was also monitored.   Muthen and Lehman (1985) argue that a 
correlation with a value above 0.70 should be considered a serious problem.  After the 
simple correlations between independent variables and standard errors of the estimated 
coefficients had been inspected, the data showed that there was no serious multicollinearity 
which would distort the efficiency of the estimation. 
 
Three different sets of statistical analysis techniques were used in Chapter 8.  First, the 
correlation coefficients were computed.  Then, the related variables were further tested 
with multiple regressions in order to study the relationship between the independent 
variables (the related factors) and the dependent variable (the overall IJV performance).  
Following the practice of previous studies (Sim and Ali, 1998; Boateng and Glaister, 
2002), the dependent variable of this study, overall IJV performance, was measured using a 
composite index (an arithmetic average score).  Respondents quantified their satisfaction 
with the IJVs in respect of five activities on a 5-point scale where ‘1’ denoted ‘much worse 
than expectation’ and ‘5’ denoted ‘much better than expectation’).  The five activities were 
marketing, finance, strategy, technology transfer and R&D, and human resource 
management. 
 
In addition, the t-test and equivalent test were conducted to test the significant difference 
of the mean scores of some variables in this chapter. 
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4.7  Validity and Reliability of the Research Method 
Sarantakos (2005) defines validity of a research method as a property of the research 
instrument which measures its relevance, precision and accuracy.  It tells the researcher 
whether an instrument measures what it is supposed to measure, and whether the 
measurement is accurate and precise.  Content validity results if the research instruments 
are able to cover all possible dimensions of the research topic, whilst face validity is 
obtained when the content is presented appropriately, using appropriate language and 
register (Mitchell, 1996).  There are three stages to ensuring that the research has both 
content and face validity in this study.  First, the researcher undertakes extensive literature 
reviews to derive the questionnaire and required measurements.  Next, the researcher 
consults extensively and discusses the questionnaire with supervisory teams and external 
scholars to ensure validity of the content of the questionnaire, appropriateness of its 
structure, and the suitability of the questions it asks.  A pilot study is then conducted with 
25 IJVs to test the validity of the research instrument and obtain feedback or comments 
from the pilot respondents. 
 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2003) define the reliability of a research method as the capacity of 
measurement to create consistent outcomes.  Methods are, accordingly, reliable if they 
generate the same results whenever they are repeated, and are uniquely sensitive to the 
researchers’s requirements, the research conditions, and the respondents.  To measure the 
reliability of research, a number of researchers (for example, Bryman, 2001; Field, 2005) 
point out that Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient has been widely adopted by 
researchers to measure reliability.  For instance, Boateng and Glaister (2003) use 
Cronbach’s alpha to measure the internally consistent reliability of the multi-item 
measurement scale of their IJV study in African countries.  This coefficient of reliability 
quantifies how well a set of items (or variables) measures a single unidimensional latent 
construct.  This study has accordingly measured the reliability of its findings against 
Cronbach’s alpha values, and these are shown in each relevant chapter of the study. 
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4.8 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has set out to explain the logic underlying the chosen, quantitative, research 
method in studying IJVs in the ASEAN4 countries, particularly Thailand.  It provides an 
overview of the characteristics, and discusses the suitability of available forms of research 
methodology in terms of research philosophy (positivism or interpretivism), and research 
method (quantitative or qualitative).  In addition, the methods used in previous research on 
IJVs are described. 
 
The chapter then discusses how the researcher collected primary and secondary data 
relating to the study of IJVs in Thailand.  As regards primary data, the researcher was 
kindly granted access by the Thailand Board of Investment (BOI) to an unpublished 
database of IJV companies operating in Thailand.  This has not only been crucial in 
providing contact information for IJVs to be surveyed, but has also provided much other 
information not previously available to the scholarly community.   
 
A major source of secondary data has been the reviews of the Bank of Thailand and 
ASEAN statistical yearbooks which have made it possible to present a picture of FDI in 
Thailand and the ASEAN4 countries. 
 
The other major component of the primary data took the form of a mail survey.  This was 
chosen as the means of collecting primary data because of time and resource constraints on 
the research, characteristics of the research samples, and the advantages of a mail survey 
which made it particularly suitable for this study. 
 
Systematic sampling methods prior to actual collection of the primary data were carefully 
designed to ensure true representativeness of the IJVs in Thailand.  After selecting the 
qualifying IJVs from the database in accordance with established practice in the field, the 
researcher chose to use the probability sampling method.  Out of a total of 2,251 IEJVs, 
310 companies ultimately formed the sample size for this study.  These samples 
subsequently provided the data for the study by means of a questionnaire. 
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The questions in the questionnaire fell into two categories: factual questions, and attitude 
questions.  The response was assessed using a five -point Likert type scale because it was 
easy for the target respondents to understand and answer.  The questionnaire was translated 
from English into an additional Thai version by a bi-lingual translator accredited by 
TESOL: Teachers of English to Speakers of Other Language Inc., since the targeted IJV 
managers might be Thai or non-Thai. 
 
A pilot study was used to check whether the questions were clear and unequivocal in order 
to ensure that the researcher had conveyed the correct meaning to the target respondents.  
The mail survey and follow-up procedure of Dillman (2000) was adopted for this study in 
order to increase the response rate.  The study ultimately achieved a 28.39% response rate, 
which is within the parameters of the literature.  
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Chapter 5 
The Patterns of Activity, Distribution, and Trends of 
International Joint Ventures in Thailand 
 
5.1  Introduction 
Chapter 2 drew attention to the fact that Thailand is the largest FDI recipient among the 
ASEAN4 countries. In addition, the literature review in Chapter 3 suggested that the 
increasing frequency and strategic importance of international joint ventures as a mode of 
overseas market entry and expansion, especially for foreign MNEs entering developing 
country markets, are likely to continue in the twenty-first century (Pekar and Allio, 1994, 
cited in Marangozov, 2005; Makino and Beamish, 1998).  Thus, one might expect an 
increase in the interest shown in the phenomena of FDI inflows in the form of IJV 
formation in the ASEAN4, particularly Thailand.  Until now, however, few studies have 
examined data which can systematically illuminate the detailed activity of IJVs over the 
past half-century, let alone in the context of the ASEAN4 countries.  This chapter, 
accordingly, provides new findings in an under-researched area of major significance. 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to present the analysis of data obtained on the 
characteristics of IJV activities in Thailand.  This will fulfil the first objective of the study, 
presented in Chapter 1:  to ascertain the characteristics of the activities, distribution, and 
trends of international joint ventures in Thailand.  The analysis is based on a database 
obtained from the Thailand Board of Investment (BOI) and, for the first time, examines the 
activities, distribution, and trends of IJV formation between Thai and overseas companies 
over more than half a century, between 1951 and 2003.  In addition to throwing light on 
IJV activity in Thailand, the chapter presents an analysis of data on host country location 
factors obtained from a specially conducted survey (Variable 14).  This analysis reveals the 
reasons why foreign MNEs choose Thailand as their host country for FDI, especially 
through the medium of IJV formation, and contributes to the presentation of a more 
rounded picture of the subject of the study. 
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 The results analysed in this chapter serve as the foundation for more detailed and 
sophisticated study in later chapters, which aim to present an overview of IJV formation in 
Thailand.  Further in-depth analysis of each issue identified in the conceptual framework in 
Chapter 3 will be found in the subsequent chapters. 
  
In the remainder of this chapter a brief discussion of the official database which was 
obtained is presented in Section 5.2.  Section 5.3 presents the analysis of outcomes and 
discussion of the pattern of activity, distribution, and trends of IJV formation in Thailand 
as well as host country location factors.  A summary and concluding remarks are provided 
in Section 5.4. 
5.2  The Official Database  
The literature indicates that there are a number of flaws in the method of attempting to 
establish an IJV database solely from information found in the economic and business 
press.  For instance, Glaister and Buckley (1994) study IJV formation in the UK by 
amassing their own database from announcements reported in the financial press because 
IJV operation data from official sources is not readily available.  They recognise the 
weaknesses of their method in that “it is likely that only major ventures—involving 
relatively large and well known firms—will be reported in the press, with perhaps many 
small ventures going unreported”.  (Glaister and Buckley, 1994: 36)  Also, Hergert and 
Morris (1988), cited in Glaister and Buckley (1994), point out that in many published 
articles the source of information is likely to be press releases by the firms involved in the 
venture.  These press releases may give biased accounts of the characteristics of IJVs.  In 
particular, participating firms may seek to mislead competitors over their motives and 
activities by deliberately misrepresenting themselves to the financial press.  While the 
reporting of deliberate falsehoods is therefore a possibility, it is very difficult to judge the 
extent of this kind of bias.  Nor is it possible to estimate the extent of IJV activity that goes 
unreported because “the firms involved maintain such strict confidentiality that there is in 
effect nothing for journalists to report”. (Glaister and Buckley, 1994: 37). 
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Accordingly, a number of researchers (for example, Morris and Hergert, 1987; Garcia 
Canal et al., 2003; Marangozov, 2005) assert that an official database obtained from 
government organisations is likely to be superior to one obtained from the economic and 
business press, since this method can overcome many shortcomings suggested by 
researchers, which may have resulted in distortion of the results of previous empirical 
studies.  These researchers summarise the possible weaknesses of using information from 
the economic press as follows: 
 
First, dependence on information about IJVs published in the press by itself causes 
distortions in the results because of the following factors: 1) the differing orientation of 
particular printed publications determines whether information on IJVs is published at all;  
2) the press usually publishes information on IJVs whose parent firms are large or well 
known or are MNEs, neglecting small and medium-sized parent companies, thus skewing 
the database in favour of large firms;  3) printed publications give more prominence to 
IJVs in which firms from their own country are involved as partners. 
 
Second, dependence on data about IJVs which is published in the press on the basis of 
information provided by the firms themselves is likely to introduce a number of distortions 
into the results because of: 1) the impossibility of encompassing all IJVs, given that the 
parents companies are often reluctant to offer information to the press; 2) the non-standard 
nature of the information which firms offer to the press, entailing difficulties in classifying 
data consistently in respect of particular characteristics of IJVs; c) deliberate 
misrepresentation of information offered for the purpose of advertising; d) deliberate 
provision of misinformation offered in order to mislead competitors. 
 
Third, the distortion of the outcomes due to researchers’ use of printed publications mostly 
from their own countries leads to over-representation in the database of IJVs in which 
firms from their own countries are involved. 
 
These considerations strongly suggest that a database prepared and updated by a 
government institution is likely to prove more reliable and to avoid some of the possible 
distortions mentioned above.  Accordingly, many researchers (for example, Lee and 
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Beamish, 1995; Choi and Beamish, 2004; Marangozov, 2005) prefer instead to use an 
official government database in their IJV studies.  This study follows their approach.  The 
IJV database has been provided for this study by the Thailand Board of Investment (BOI), 
one of the foremost government institutions overseeing inward and outward FDI in 
Thailand. 
 
That said, it needs to be added that governments too may choose to distort or be selective 
in their provision of sensitive data.  The researcher needs to be conscious of this possibility 
and to consider whether any such motivation might be present.  Nevertheless, selectivity 
and ‘spin’ are usually confined to popular presentation of policies, and it would be unusual 
and unwise for a government with a fairly free press to risk distorting actual raw 
information, not least because it needs to know itself what the real situation is.  For this 
study, the researcher has confidence in the reliability of the information provided by 
official statistics of the government of Thailand, and the same is probably true of other 
governments of the ASEAN4 countries. 
5.3  Results and Discussion  
5.3.1  The Distribution of IJV Formation 
 
Regarding the preliminary 
analysis of the characteristics 
of IJV formation, the data 
show that the overwhelming 
majority of IJVs are formed 
by firms from Japan (39.4%), 
while Taiwanese companies 
are the second most important 
(11%).  IJVs formed by US 
and Singaporean firms 
represent approximately 4.4% each of the total IJVs, followed by IJVs shared with 
Malaysian companies (4.2%).  Foreign corporations from South Korea, Hong Kong, the 
Figure 5.1: Pie chart showing nationalities of 
foreign parent companies
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UK, Germany and China all account for roughly 3.1% of the total number of IJVs.  In 
addition, countries found in the database to be providing about 2% of the total of foreign 
firms are Australia, France, India and Switzerland.  These are shown in Figure 5.1. 
 
The data are re-classified by the nationality of foreign firms, grouping them into the six 
categories presented in Table 5.1:  Japan; the NIEs (the first tier newly-industrialising 
economies of Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea); the European Union 
(EU); Asia Pacific; North America; and Others.  This regional grouping is consistent with 
previous IJV studies, especially in the context of Southeast Asian countries (see, for 
example, Julian and O’Cass, 2002), since these researchers argue that the major sources of 
FDI inflows into this region come from foreign investors from the “Triad” countries 
(Japan, EU and USA), NIEs, and Asia Pacific, particularly the ASEAN countries 
themselves. 
 
After re-classification, the data show that IJVs with NIEs parent companies are 
proportionately in second place (23%) after those with Japanese partners (39.4%).  IJVs 
with EU firms amount to 15%; while IJVs formed with Asian and Pacific parent 
companies represent 12.4%.  IJVs with a North American parent company contribute 5.6% 
of the total number. 
 
Table 5.1:  Number of IJVs by Nationality of the Foreign Parent Companies 
 
Country of Origin 
 
% of IJVs 
 
Cumulative % 
 
 Japan 39.4 39.4 
  NIEs* 23.0 62.4 
  EU** 15.0 77.4 
  Asia-Pacific 12.4 89.8 
  North America 5.6 95.4 
  Others 4.6 100.0 
                     Total 100.0  
NB: * Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea 
        ** The EU plus Switzerland and Norway. 
        Source: BOI Database 
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This preliminary data analysis is consistent with the FDI literature discussed and presented 
earlier in Chapter 2.  It shows that foreign investors, especially from Japan and the NIEs, 
are among the most important sources of FDI for the ASEAN4 countries, particularly 
Thailand.  This is because they have been relocating their production to other developing 
countries, particularly in Southeast Asia, in order to reduce the negative effect on 
competitiveness of appreciation of their domestic currencies since the 1980s (OECD, 
2004). 
 
With the BOI industrial classification, the data in Table 5.2 indicates that manufacturing is 
the main sector of IJV formation, with more than 85% of the total.  Within manufacturing, 
it can be seen that nearly a quarter (22.2%) of the total number of IJVs are in the metal 
products, machinery and transport equipment sector; followed by the light industry sector 
(19%); chemicals, paper and plastics sector (15.7%); agriculture and agricultural products 
sector (13.3%); and electronic industry and electrical appliance sector (12%).  IJVs in the 
mining, ceramics and basic metals sector account for only 5.4% of the total. 
 
Table 5.2: Number of IJVs by Industrial Sector 
 
 
Industrial Sector 
 % of total IJVs Cumulative %  
  
Agriculture and Agricultural Products 
 
13.3 13.3 
  Mining, Ceramics and Basic Metals 
 
5.4 18.7 
  Light Industry 
 
19.0 37.7 
  Metal Products, Machinery and Transport Equipment 
 
22.2 59.9 
  Electronic Industry and Electrical Appliance 
 
12.0 71.9 
  Chemicals, Paper and Plastics 
 
15.7 87.6 
  Service and Public Utilities 12.4 100.0 
  Total 100.0  
Source:  BOI Database 
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 These figures can be explained by the development of the Thai economy during the last 
two decades in switching from agricultural to industrial production.  It has recently been 
re-classified as a newly industrialised country (Bozyk, 2006). 
 
The equity participation of Thai parent companies in IJV formation is presented in Figure 
5.2.  The data indicate that almost three quarters of Thai companies (1,104 IJVs=69%) are 
majority shareholders (holding more than 49%) in the IJVs, while only 31% of the total are 
minority shareholders (holding 49% of the equity or less). From these figures it can be 
inferred that Thai partner firms have been formally in a position to play an influential role 
in IJV formation. 
 
Figure 5.2: Pie chart showing equity 
participation of the Thai parent company
69%
31%
More than 49%
49% and less
Regarding the year when IJVs 
were established, the data 
show that the highest number 
of IJVs (8.1%) were formed 
in 1995, followed by 1988 
(7.5%) and 1989 (7.3%) 
respectively.  These statistics 
are shown in Figures 5.3 and 
5.4.  The data are re-classified 
by the decade for further 
analysis.  It is apparent that 
almost half (47%) of IJVs were formed in the 1990s, followed by the 1980s (22%) and the 
2000s (16%).  These data correspond to a changing of the FDI strategy of the Thai 
government from an import substitution policy to an export promotion policy, as described 
in Chapter 2.  Also, during the 1990s, the Thai economy grew dramatically, achieving the 
world’s highest GDP growth rate (WTO, 1995; Siamwalla, 1997). 
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5.3.2  Patterns of Activity, Distribution, and Trends of IJV Formation 
5.3.2.1  Trends of IJV Formation in Thailand Over Time  
IJV formation by foreign companies in Thailand by the decade is shown in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3:  Decade and Nationality of Foreign Investors in IJV formation 
Period Japan 
North 
America EU** 
Asia 
Pacific NIEs* Others Total*** % of  total 
1960s 27 1  0  2 2 3 35 2.4% 
1970s 31 5 12 11 5 10 74 5% 
1980s 154  11 48 29 99 17 358 24.3% 
1990s 309 53 117 82 161 28 750 51% 
2000-2003 71 14 45 50 63 11 254 17.3% 
Total*** 592 84  222 174 330 69 1,471 100% 
% of  total 39.4% 5.6% 15% 12.4% 23% 4.6% 100%  
NB: * Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea 
         ** The EU plus Switzerland and Norway 
         *** 126 data are missing 
          Source: BOI Database 
 
From Table 5.3 it is possible to identify four periods of IJV formation in Thailand which 
exhibit distinctly different trends. 
 
First, before the 1980s, the total number of IJVs formed increased moderately, from 35 
IJVs in the 1960s to 74 IJVs in the 1970s.  During this period, an average of 5 IJVs were 
formed per year.  About 7% of the total number of IJVs formed, this represents a small 
percentage of the total. 
 
Second, during the 1980s, IJV formation increased markedly, with 358 IJVs being formed.  
The growth rate of IJV formation in this decade increased more than threefold over the 
previous 2 decades, and the average number of IJVs being formed was roughly 35 IJVs a 
year.  However, IJV formation in this period was still relatively moderate, representing 
approximately 24% of the total number of IJVs established.  Moreover, data from Figures 
5.3 and 5.4 indicate that the greater part of the increase in IJV formation in the 1980s 
occurred during the latter half of the decade. 
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This finding corresponds with the trends of IJV formation in the world in general, revealed 
by previous empirical studies (for example, Anderson, 1990; Blodgett, 1992; Gomes-
Casseres, 1989; Geringer and Herbert, 1991; and Koot, 1988), which observe that more 
IJVs were formed and other collaborative ventures announced in the 1980s than in all the 
previous years combined.  Dunning (1993) argues that the increase in the number of IJVs 
formed after the 1970s results from drastic change in the global business environment.  
Cost reduction pressure, slow home market growth, and rapid technology innovation 
compelled firms to seek new markets for their products.  In response to these challenges, 
firms were obliged to re-formulate their business strategy and to make a number of 
strategic changes which included a collaborative strategy through the medium of IJVs in 
order to gain market power vis-à-vis their existing and/or potential competitors (Kogut, 
1988; Harrigan, 1985, 1988). 
 
The evidence also shows that the outstanding increase in total IJV formation in Thailand 
during the 1980s (compared to previous periods) arose from IJVs being formed by 
Japanese companies, followed by NIEs and EU firms respectively.  The number of IJVs 
formed by Japanese companies increased from 58 to 154; while those with NIEs firms 
soared from only 7 to 99.  The number of IJVs formed by EU firms rose from 12 to 48. 
 
Relocating production bases abroad in order to escape the appreciation of their home 
currencies is the reason most often cited for the increase in FDI and IJV formation in 
Thailand and other ASEAN4 countries by Japanese and NIEs companies since the 1980s 
(Tran Van Tho, 1991a; OECD, 2004).  The OECD report of 2004 explained this 
phenomenon by suggesting that Japanese and NIEs companies were motivated by the need 
to find less expensive production facilities than were available at home.  Labour costs there 
were rising, and this was being made worse because their home currencies were 
appreciating as their countries industrialised.  The report suggested that they were 
primarily motivated by a desire to reduce production costs, and also to minimise search 
costs by finding production locations in their own part of the world (OECD, 2004). 
 
Another reason quoted for this expansion of Japanese FDI and IJV formation in Thailand is 
Japanese investors’ wish to break into selling into local markets.  Expansion of sales was 
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the dominant objective. (Toyo Keizai, 1989, 1993). Cultural and geographical proximity 
may explain the choice of Thailand. 
 
The desire to benefit from Thai government policies and protectionism was the next most 
important reason cited for Japanese investors investing in Thailand during the 1970s and 
1980s.  These objectives were reflected in the import-substitution orientation of Japanese 
investment in Thailand at this time. This is highlighted by other studies such as 
Tambunlertchai (1977) and Yosihara (1978).  The import substitution orientation was also 
evident in Japanese affiliates in Thailand selling the greater part of their products in the 
local (Thai) market (Japanese Chamber of Commerce, 1994). 
 
Regarding the increasing trend towards IJV formation, a number of researchers (see, for 
example, Wright and Russel, 1975; Higginbottom, 1980; Tran Van Tho, 1991b; Beamish, 
1985, 1993; Julian, 2001 ) claim that developing host countries were determined to 
surrender as little control as possible to foreign firms, while at the same time maximising 
skills acquisition.  In order to achieve this objective, they were increasingly resorting to 
IJVs, and these were the only form of foreign investment permitted in certain industries.  
Developing host countries were increasingly insisting upon local capital participation in 
foreign corporate ventures.  As was described in Chapter 2, during this period there was 
considerable political intervention and protectionism by the governments of host countries 
of the ASEAN 4.  High tariff walls protected strategic sectors from foreign competition.  In 
some sectors all foreign investment was banned, and in most others it was severely 
restricted.  In order to protect the developing domestic economy, foreign investors were 
allowed to hold only a minority share in companies, were compelled to accept more 
technology transfer than they might have wished, and might be required to divest after a set 
period of time.  Although, the switch to export promotion policies began during the late 
1980s and the 1990s in some ASEAN4 countries, domestic market protection against over-
ambitious FDI remained in most of the ASEAN4 countries (Tran Van Tho, 1991a; 
Thomsen, 1999; OECD, 2004).  IJVs thus proliferated for the reason that they were one of 
the few ways for foreign corporations to satisfy the host country governments’ 
requirements for local participation in ownership and management of enterprises within 
their borders.  This is seen as one of the most important reasons for the growth in IJV 
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formation in Thailand and other developing countries, especially the ASEAN4, during the 
1980s. 
 
Third, during the 1990s the number of IJVs formed was at its height, with 750 IJVs 
appearing in this decade.  This is more than 50% of the total number of IJVs formed 
between 1951 and 2003.  In other words, the peak period for IJV formation in Thailand 
was during the 1990s.  The average number of IJVs being formed in this decade was about 
75 IJVs a year.  This finding is consistent with previous studies.  The OECD’s 2004 report 
indicates that the 1990s saw an FDI boom in the ASEAN4 countries.  Collectively, this 
region was among the world’s largest recipients of FDI, and foreign investors were the 
driving force behind its export-led development.  
 
The main reasons for the accelerated trend of IJV formation during the 1990s in Thailand 
may be partly due to the following considerations.  Firstly, there had been a rapid rate of 
technological change (Datta, 1988).  In industries characterised by technological 
sophistication and rapid technological change, only the very largest firms can 
independently carry the risks of accelerating R&D costs.  Making matters more difficult is 
the fact that shrinking product life cycles leave them less time in which to recover these 
costs.  Accordingly, firms, especially those not the market leaders in their industry, may 
decide to cooperate in order to reduce the risks involved.  Secondly, foreign firms had 
begun to recognise that local firms could make a significant contribution to a venture 
through their intimate knowledge of what was often a complex and unfamiliar local 
business environment.  Thirdly, there was a growing awareness among firms in developed 
countries that the continuing globalisation of their markets required them to be more cost 
effective and efficient if they were to succeed in the global marketplace.  This, in turn, 
might require that operations be set up in other countries which could provide cheaper raw 
materials and/or lower processing costs.  
 
Harrigan (1986, 2003) further argues that the rapid growing of IJV formation after the 
1980s results mainly from an increased move towards strategies of globalisation.  Firms 
have made IJV formation part of their drive to develop global strategies.  Increasingly, she 
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suggests, IJVs are established as part of a network of business units to enable firms to 
compete on a global scale.  
 
The data in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 reveal that the main growth in IJV formation in the 1990s 
occurred during the second half of the decade, after a sharp decline in the early 1990s.  
These figures correspond closely to the bursting of the economic bubble in Japan at that 
time.  The decline reversed in the mid-1990s after the Japanese economy recovered, and 
1995 was the peak year for IJV formation in Thailand with 119 IJVs. 
 
Again, during this period, the number of Thai-Japanese IJVs (309 IJVs, 41.2%) was 
greatest, followed by IJVs formed by NIEs (161 IJVs, 21.5%), and the EU (117 IJVs, 
15.6%) respectively.  There was, however, also a remarkable increase in Thai-North 
American IJVs and Thai-Asian Pacific IJVs during this decade.  In the case of Thai-North 
American IJVs, while on average only 1 was formed each year in the 1980s, this number 
rose to 5 IJVs in the 1990s, a total over the decade of 53 (7.1%).  As regards Thai-Asian 
Pacific IJVs, on average 3 were formed each year in the 1980s, and this average number 
rose to 8 IJVs a year in the 1990s, a total over the decade of 82 (10.1%).   
   
One of the main reasons for the boom in FDI and IJV formation in Thailand and other 
ASEAN4 countries during the 1990s was the expansion of sales of Japanese and NIEs 
investors to third markets, using these ASEAN4 countries as low-cost offshore production 
platforms.  In addition, as mentioned in Chapter 2, a major export push by the host 
ASEAN4 countries, especially Thailand, was comprehensively implemented during this 
period. 
 
Another major reason why IJV formation peaked in Thailand during this period may be the 
rapid growth of the Thai economy, because during the 1990s Thailand was one of the 
world’s fastest-growing economies with annual average growth of around 9% (Siamwalla, 
1997).  Accordingly, Thailand was likely to offer significant business opportunities to 
foreign firms as its purchasing power increased.  Firms wishing to penetrate the Thai 
market might well decide to form IJVs with Thai companies in order to realise their global 
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market expansion strategies, and their Thai partners might be able to provide essential 
know-how or established local distribution channels with which to market their products. 
 
In short, during this period, the relaxation of host government restrictions, the switch from 
import substitution to export promotion of the Thai government, including FDI 
liberalisation, and the rapid expansion of sales by foreign firms to third markets and local 
market, and the rapid growth of the Thai economy all combined to produce dramatic FDI 
inflows and increased IJV formation in Thailand, and other ASEAN4 countries, in the 
1990s. 
 
Fourth, during the period 2000-2003, 254 IJVs were formed, representing approximately 
17% of the total number of IJVs formed between 1951 and 2003.  On average 63 IJVs 
were formed per year during this period.  If this trend should continue until the end of the 
present decade, the 2000s will be the second highest period of IJV formation in Thailand.  
At the same time, to date during this decade, a considerable decline of Thai-Japanese IJV 
formation can be observed.  If, on average, 30 Thai-Japanese IJVs were formed each year 
during the 1990s, during this latest four-year period the number decreased to 17 IJVs per 
year. 
 
This trend corresponds to the findings of Sazanami et al. (2004) who note that, after the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997, Japanese FDI to countries in ASEAN and East Asia 
declined sharply, falling from US$ 11.2 billion in 1997 to US$ 6.0 billion in 1998.  
Japanese FDI outflows to ASEAN and East Asian countries remained stagnant in 1999 and 
2000, since the currencies of these Asian countries appreciated against the yen, reflecting 
depreciation of the yen against the US dollar after the crisis.   
 
During the four years 2000-2003, against this trend of decreased Japanese IJV formation in 
Thailand, there was a substantial increase in the number of IJVs being formed by Asian 
Pacific, and especially ASEAN and Chinese, companies.    On average 8 IJVs were formed 
per year during the 1990s. This number increased to 12 a year during 2000-2003, a 50% 
increase.  During this period, the ASEAN countries embarked on progressive economic co-
operation among themselves and they aim to create a single market by 2015.  (ASEAN, 
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2005)  This closer collaboration may boost intra-regional FDI, especially in the form of 
IJVs.  There has also been a considerable increase in the FDI inflows to Thailand from 
China during this period as a result of the rapid growth of the Chinese economy.  It is 
likely that a number of Chinese firms may wish to diversify their businesses overseas, and 
may choose IJVs as their mode of strategic alliance for collaborating with Thai companies 
in fulfulling their strategy for overseas market expansion. 
 
Trends of IJV formation by companies from other countries did not vary greatly in 
comparison with the earlier period.  Overall, there was a modest increase in IJV formation 
in Thailand in the early 2000s, after a marked slump at the end of the 1990s which resulted 
mainly from a decline in Japanese FDI. 
 
Last but not least, regarding the nationality of foreign investors in this study, the results of 
this study’s analysis reveal that firms from Japan and NIE countries are the principal 
foreign partners for IJV formation in Thailand.  Although, OECD (2004) report suggests 
that Asian investors from Japan and the NIEs may be primarily motivated by rising labour 
costs, appreciating domestic currencies, and a desire to minimise search costs, it seems 
likely that cultural proximity is an important factor in the FDI boom, especially in respect 
of IJVs in Thailand formed by investors from Japan and the NIE countries. 
 
The fact of the matter is that, in every period of this study – before the 1980s, during the 
1980s, during the 1990s, and the 2000s, IJV formation in Thailand has been dominated by 
investors from Japan and the NIEs.   Interpreting this fact, Pornnavalai (1997) argues that 
the characteristics of FDI in Thailand by Japanese investors are quite unique.  Compared 
with other foreign investors, Japanese firms tend to look for a “compatible interface” with 
their partners, both in terms of tangible assets like capital and technology, but also of 
intangible assets like tacit knowledge, shared values and culture, and the Thai partners 
seem to interact with Japanese investors very well due to the similarity of culture.  He 
suggests the pattern of Japanese FDI in Thailand reflects the following preferences:  a) 
Japanese firms believe in  life-time employment and wholehearted commitment of 
employees to their company;  b) Japanese companies tend to favour the IJV mode over, for 
example, sale of patents because they favour the kind of transaction which involves a long-
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lasting relationship of trust rather than one-off deals or foreign-type opportunistic 
transactions;  c) Japanese investors prefer long-term collaboration with their partners rather 
than opportunistic alliances (Pornnavalai, 1997: 354). It is likely that this consideration is 
of no less importance than the primarily financial factors and motivations of IJV formation.  
 
On this issue, a study by Lee and Beamish (1995) indicates that Korean general managers 
of IJVs appear to perform more satisfactorily in less developed countries than Western IJV 
managers.   They suggest that Korean firms which invested in less developed countries, 
especially in those of Southeast Asia, found the cultural environment familiar.  Traditions 
and patterns of behaviour were not dissimilar from those of Korea, which they knew and 
understood.  Korean firms entering markets in less developed countries seem also not to be 
faced with as large a gap in their understanding of the economic situation as Westerners.  
They appear to be less hesitant about entering such markets because they perceive less risk 
than other foreign investors.  The explanation is probably at least in part because many 
Korean managers find socio-economic conditions in the less developed countries of 
Southeast Asia much like those they faced in earlier years in Korea.   This may explain the 
greater willingness of Japanese and NIEs investors to invest directly in Thailand and other 
ASEAN countries. 
 
5.3.2.2  IJV Formation by Industry 
The number of IJVs formed over time, classified by industrial sector, is shown in Table 
5.4.     The major industries involved in IJV formation in Thailand, representing more than 
50% of the total, were the metal products, machinery and transportation equipment sector; 
the light industry sector; and the chemicals, paper and plastics sector.  Accordingly, the 
increase in FDI in Thailand through the growth of IJV formation in these sectors is likely 
to have been a contributing factor to the FDI boom, especially during the 1980s and 1990s.  
The agriculture and agricultural products sector was the next largest beneficiary from IJV 
formation, with a 13.6% share of the total of IJVs, followed by the service and public 
utilities sector;  the electronic and electrical appliance sector;  and the mining, ceramics 
and basis metals sector respectively.  These results in respect of distribution by industry 
may reflect the impact of the FDI policy and economic development strategy of the Thai 
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government as discussed in Chapter 2.  The foremost industrial sectors above are strategic 
sectors which the Thai government targeted for aggressive promotion.  (BOI, 2005) 
 
Table 5.4: IJV Formation by Industry, 1951-2003 
Period 
 
 
 
 
 
Agriculture 
and 
Agricultural 
Products 
 
 
Mining, 
Ceramics 
and 
Basis 
Metals 
 
Light 
Industry 
 
 
 
 
Metal 
Products, 
Machinery 
and 
Transport 
Equipment 
Electronic 
Industry 
and 
Electrical 
Appliance 
 
Chemicals, 
Paper and 
Plastics 
 
 
 
Service 
and 
Public 
Utilities 
 
 
Total*** 
 
1960s 4 3 6 8 3 4 7 35 
1970s 9 6 12 19 4 12 12 74 
1980s 57 22 98 45 44 48 44 358 
1990s 91 43 123 188 81 133 91 750 
2000-2003 39 6 39 64 41 33 32 254 
Total*** 200 80 278 324 173 230 186 1,471 
% of total 13.6% 5.4% 18.9% 22% 11.8% 15.6% 12.6% 100% 
NB:  *** 126 data are missing 
         Source: BOI Database 
 
Prior to the 1980s, the metal products, machinery and transport equipment sector was the 
largest beneficiary from IJV formation in Thailand, followed by the service and public 
utilities sector; and the light industry sector.  However, during the 1980s, the metal 
products, machinery and transport equipment sector was the fourth largest beneficiary from 
IJV formation in Thailand, behind the light industry sector; the agriculture and agricultural 
products sector; and the chemicals, paper and plastics sector. 
 
In the 1990s, the metal products, machinery and transportation equipment sector, which 
greatly increased its share, was the major sector for IJV formation, followed by the light 
industry sector; and the chemicals, paper and plastics sector.  Behind these industries came 
the agriculture and agricultural products sector; the service and public utilities sector; the 
electronic industry and electrical appliance sector; and the mining, ceramics and basis 
metals sector. 
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During 2000-2003, a similar trend continued, with the metal products, machinery and 
transportation equipment sector the largest beneficiary from IJV formation.  However, 
during this four-year period, the electronic industry and electrical appliance sector was the 
second-largest recipient of IJV formation, followed by the light industry sector; the 
agriculture and agricultural products sector; and the chemicals, paper and plastics sector. 
 
Overall, the findings on IJV formation by industry in this study correlate with the trends of 
FDI in Thailand identified in the literature in Chapter 2.  Manufacturing is the most 
important source of FDI inflows into Thailand and other ASEAN4 countries (OECD, 
2004).  A report of BOI (2005) indicates that the number of projects in metal products, 
machinery and transport equipment approved by the BOI has increased considerably since 
the late 1980s, due to the expansion of investment in the automotive and related industries.  
A large number of foreign automotive manufacturers, especially from Japan, selected 
Thailand as their main offshore production site in the Asia Pacific region (Gossack, 2004).  
Also, the Thai government has applied a number of policies and incentives to support and 
develop this industry. For instance, according to a report of WTO (1999), productive 
capacity in the automotive sector has increased considerably in Thailand as new joint 
ventures with foreign MNEs have begun to supply domestic and export markets.  Among 
the investment incentives selectively provided for this sector by the Thai government are 
local content provision concessions, import and excise duty concessions, and corporate tax 
exemptions.  The aim has been to maintain Thailand’s position as a premier automotive 
manufacturing hub in Asia.  (WTO, 1999) 
 
Table 5.5 illustrates IJV formation by industrial sector and country of origin of the foreign 
parent company.  It can be seen that the dominant industry recipients of IJV formation in 
Thailand by Japanese investors were the metal products, machinery and transport 
equipment sector; the chemicals, paper and plastics sector; and the electronic and electrical 
appliance sector respectively.  Tambunlertchai (1991) and Brimble (1999) argue that 
Japanese direct investment in Thailand has spread out to various industrial sectors over 
time.  During the 1960s and up until the first half of the 1980s, Japanese FDI was 
concentrated in light industry, especially in consumer goods.               After the mid-1980s,  
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Table 5.5:  Industry Classification of IJV Formation by Foreign Investor  
Sector 
 
Japan 
 
North 
America 
EU** 
 
Asia 
Pacific 
NIEs* 
 
Others 
 
Total 
 
% of 
total 
 
Agriculture and 
Agricultural 
Products 61 15 28 57 46 6 213 13.3% 
 
Mining, 
Ceramics  
and Basis Metals 35 1 14 11 20 6 87 5.4% 
 
 
Light Industry 68 22 57 31 108 17 303 19% 
 
Metal Products, 
Machinery and 
Transport 
Equipment 233 7 35 25 51 4 355 22.2% 
 
Electronic 
Industry and 
Electrical 
Appliance 69 14 25 20 53 9 190 12% 
 
Chemicals, Paper 
and  
Plastics 104 18 38 33 49 8 250 15.7% 
 
Service and 
Public Utilities 59 14 42 21 40 23 199 12.4% 
 
 
Total 629 91 239 198 367 73 1,597 100% 
 
% of total 39.4% 5.7% 15% 12.4% 23% 4.6% 100%  
NB: * Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea 
        ** The EU plus Switzerland and Norway 
         Source:  BOI Database 
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Japanese firms invested in a wider range of industries, particularly capital goods, 
intermediate goods and parts. 
 
The light industry sector was the leading sector for IJVs formed by the NIEs, North 
American, and EU firms, while a majority of Asian Pacific firms formed their IJVs in the 
agriculture and agricultural products sector.  This result is consistent with the overall trend 
of FDI in Thailand as well.  A report of BOI (2005) indicates that light industry is one of 
the major sectors attracting FDI inflows from a variety of overseas investors, while the 
agriculture and agricultural products sector, and especially the food processing industry, 
received extensive FDI inflows from Asian investors. 
 
5.3.2.3 Equity Participation in IJV Formation 
Equity participation in IJV formation by Thai companies across the decade is shown in 
Table 5.6.  Prior to the 1980s, the main type of equity participation of the Thai parent 
company was as a majority shareholder with more than 49%.  This was true of some three 
quarters of all IJVs.  This trend continued:  in the 1980s, 70% of all IJVs were formed with 
Thai firms as the majority shareholder.  In the 1990s and also 2000-2003 the same applied 
to 68% of all IJVs.  In other words, foreign parent companies were minority equity holders 
in most IJVs formed in Thailand between 1951 and 2003. This evidence suggests that Thai 
firms may in fact have been dominant partners in IJVs. 
 
Table 5.6:  Equity Participation of Thai Company in IJV Formation 
Period More than 49% 49% and less Total 
1960s 20 15 35 
1970s 61 11 72 
1980s 252 106 358 
1990s 512 236 748 
2000-2003 172 81 253 
Total* 1,017 449 1,466 
  
NB: 131 data are missing 
Source:  BOI Database 
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These results are consistent with those found in the IJV literature.  For instance, 
Higginbottom (1980) found that of 340 Japanese firms in IJV relationships in Thailand a 
very high percentage had minority equity participation.  Host governments, especially in 
developing countries like Thailand and other ASEAN4 countries, have tended to limit 
foreign companies to minority equity participation in IJVs.  The Thai government’s Alien 
Business Law came into effect in 1972 (Baker and McKenzie, 1993) and prohibited 
majority equity participation by foreign firms in many industries.  Given that more than 
80% of the IJVs in this study were formed after the 1970s, the likely cause of the high 
proportion of foreign firms with minority equity participation is host country government 
legislation. 
 
A slight declining trend in minority equity participation of foreign firms in IJVs after the 
late 1990s may result from the fact that the foreign equity restriction in respect of IJV 
formation is no longer imposed, since the Alien Business Law was replaced by the more 
liberal Foreign Business Act in 1999. 
5.3.3 Thailand as a Host Country 
This section explores factors motivating foreign MNEs to choose Thailand as a host 
country for FDI in the form of IJV formation.  The rank of mean scores of the importance 
of host country location factors is shown in Table 5.7.  The median value of the five-point 
Likert scales is 3.  All location factors exceed this median value, except for the factor of 
access to local capital (2.95). 
 
Analysis reveals that the most important factors affecting foreign firms’ location choice are 
future market expectations in the region (4.18), lower labour costs (3.91), and favourable 
infrastructure (3.84). The data indicate that other major factors influencing MNEs’decision 
to select Thailand as host country include market size (3.67), skilled labour (3.66), political 
and economic stability (3.66), assistance and incentives of the Thai government (3.64), 
cheap raw materials (3.64), and liberal foreign exchange control and the possibility of 
remitting profits (3.64).  Below these factors come the favourable geographical location of 
Thailand (3.61), the existence of strategic Thai partners (3.59), Thai society and culture 
(3.55), matching competitors’ strategies in this country (3.35), and a means to overcome 
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trade barriers (3.23).  
 
With regard to the leading host country location factor of this study, future market 
expectations in the region: this result evidently demonstrates that MNEs have a high 
degree of confidence in ASEAN countries as markets with good future prospects because 
the ASEAN economies have grown dramatically since the 1980s (OECD, 2004).  This 
result is consistent with the findings in the literature on host country location factors for 
general FDI, which indicates that many MNEs use Thailand as their main offshore 
production location as well as a centre for distributing their products to other countries in 
the region because of Thailand’s geographical advantages.  For example, in the automotive 
industry a large number of major foreign automotive companies select Thailand as their 
main offshore production site in ASEAN as well as their exporting platform to facilitate 
and increase their sales in other foreign markets.  Because of this, Thailand has become 
known as “the Detroit of Asia” (Gossack, 2004). 
 
Table 5.7  Ranking of the Importance of Host Country Location Factors by Mean Scores  
Host Country Location Factor   Rank Mean SD 
Future market expectations in the region 1 4.18 0.72 
Lower labour cost 2 3.91 0.95 
Favourable infrastructure 3 3.84 0.73 
Market size  4 3.67 0.83 
Availability of Thai skilled labour  5 3.66 0.78 
Political and economic stability  5 3.66 0.78 
Thai government incentives and assistance 7 3.64 0.97 
Cheap raw materials 7 3.64 0.96 
Liberal foreign exchange control and possibility of remitting profits 7 3.64 0.78 
Favourable geographical location and distance 10 3.61 0.84 
Existence of suitable Thai partner  11 3.59 0.96 
Thai society and culture 12 3.55 0.76 
Matching competitors’ strategies 13 3.35 0.97 
Overcoming entry barriers 14 3.23 0.94 
Access to local capital  15 2.95 0.98 
NB: 1. N = 88; data in this table are drawn from Variable 14. 
        2. The Mean is the average rating on a scale where 1= ‘not important at all’ to 5= ‘very important’ 
        3. SD=Standard Deviation 
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The literature also indicates that countries adjacent to Thailand, especially the countries of 
Indochina, perform very well in terms of economic growth and FDI inflows.  For instance, 
in 2006 the Lao People’s Democratic Republic witnessed a sixfold growth of FDI inflows, 
while inflows to Cambodia are also rising.  In Vietnam FDI soared by 15% to reach US$ 
2.3 billion (UNCTAD, 2007).  These phenomena may also be important factors in the 
decision by MNEs’ to choose Thailand as the host country for their initial investment 
platform, offshore production hub, or head office in the region.  They may be attracted by 
the availability of relatively good infrastructure and the geographical advantages of 
Thailand as a portal to entering or expanding their investments in other countries of the 
region.  This appears to accord with the findings of previous studies of the location factors 
affecting general FDI in Thailand.  According to the Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific (1995), after a survey extending over many years of Japanese 
investors in Thailand by Toyo Keizai, a Japanese publishing company, it was found that 
the desire to increase sales of Japanese investors in third markets (i.e. non-local, non-
Japanese) was one of the most common motives for FDI in Thailand. 
 
Regarding the second and third most important factors in this study, lower labour cost and 
good infrastructure, Buurman and Rietveld (1999) also find from their studies that 
infrastructure, especially roads and ports in Thailand, have a positive impact on MNEs’ 
choice of location for FDI, and labour cost also appears to be a very important location 
factor for Thailand. 
 
As regards other important factors (e.g., market size, availability of Thai skilled labour, 
political and economic stability), the results of this study are also consistent with those 
from the FDI literature.  A study by Michener and Ramstetter (1990) which surveyed the 
FDI motives of Japanese firms operating in Thailand revealed that Japanese MNEs 
prioritised access to favourable production resources, access to the market, and the 
economic characteristics of Thailand as motives for FDI.  This also corresponds to a report 
by the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) which found that Thailand was 
a very attractive country for Japanese manufacturing firms, and was one of the five most 
attractive countries for Japanese outward FDI, especially manufacturing, due to its low 
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labour cost, good market potential, and political and social stability (Brimble and Urata, 
2006). 
 
Julian (2001) reported similar results from his study of the motives for FDI in Thailand.  
Top location motives for choosing Thailand included interest in access to the Thai market, 
size and growth of this market.  These are consistent with the results of the 1993 survey of 
Toyo Keizai, which indicated that Thailand could attract FDI inflows from Japanese firms 
whose main objective was expansion of sales in such a local market.  According to this 
survey, Japanese affiliates distributed their products mostly in Thailand and a majority of 
respondents confirmed that their major market was the local (Thai) market (Japanese 
Chamber of Commerce, 1978, 1981, 1984, 1990, 1994; Economic and Social Commission 
for Asia and the Pacific, 1995).  Responding to this notion, Runckel (2005) noted that, in 
the automotive and related sector, Thailand is currently the world’s second largest pick-up 
truck market, after the U.S.  It is also ASEAN’s largest automotive market and producer.  
This is one of the most important reasons for the boom in FDI inflows to this sector in 
Thailand. 
 
It is interesting to observe that the present study is consistent, despite the decades which 
have passed, with a 1986 survey of 105 U.S. firms undertaken by Industrial Market 
Research Services, also cited by Pornnavalai (1997). This found that Thailand attracted 
foreign investors mainly because they wanted to expand their business activities, as well as 
having confidence in Thailand’s economic and political stability and appreciating its 
investment incentives.  These manufacturers also referred to labour quality as an 
investment incentive, plus other positive factors such as the stabilising effect of the 
monarchy, the generally positive attitude of the Thai government, and the flair of the 
private sector (Industrial Market Research Services, 1986). 
 
The findings of this study, especially regarding the main host country location factors, like 
future market expectations in the region and market size, seem to indicate the “market-
seeking FDI” identified by Dunning (1996, 1998).  Market size is clearly of great 
importance here, and Indro and Richards (2007) cite the World Bank statistical report on 
the growth rate of 200 countries in the 1990s which shows the ASEAN4 among the top 15.  
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This points towards an “increasing standard of living that potentially gives these countries’ 
citizens greater purchasing power” (Indro and Richards, 2007: 178), suggesting the 
ASEAN4 are likely to offer significant business opportunities due to their increasing 
market size.  This view is supported by the UNCTAD report (2006), which notes that the 
importance of this region in the world economy and its high growth rate has made it more 
attractive to “market-seeking FDI” (UNCTAD, 2006: 50). 
 
The 1980s and 1990s saw a marked movement towards the globalisation of economic 
activity, which was made possible by, among other things, advances in transport and 
communications technologies, and a world-wide trend towards the reduction of trade 
barriers and investment barriers (UNCTAD, 1998).  This has led to more aggressive 
“market-seeking FDI” by firms, especially foreign MNEs, and has also promoted an 
international division of labour.  It has encouraged firms engaged in related activities to 
come together in particular regions so that each would benefit from the presence of the 
others and from having access to local support facilities, shared service centres, 
distribution networks, and so forth (Maskell, 1996; Rees and McLean, 1997, cited in 
Dunning, 1998; Buckley and Ghauri, 2004). 
 
This has been reflected in the current FDI situation in Thailand, most notably in the 
automotive and related support industries.  These are sectors which foreign MNEs, and in 
particular Japanese investors, choose to invest in in Thailand in order to penetrate both the 
Thai and third markets.  The report of the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation 
(JBIC, cited by Brimble and Urata, 2006), mentions that Thailand has been selected by 
Japan as its main offshore automotive production hub in Asia because of its good market 
potential, the availability of local skilled labour and related supporting local firms relevant 
to the automotive industry, and the provision of local support facilities and infrastructure 
by the Thai government.  These positive location factors have led other major automotive 
manufacturers, both from the USA and the EU, to invest in Thailand in this sector.  The 
result is that it is now one of the most competitive manufacturing sectors in Thailand.  
(Gossack, 2004) 
 
 141
The results of this study seem to confirm, not only “market-seeking FDI”, but also the 
“efficiency-seeking FDI”, “resource-seeking FDI”, and “strategic asset seeking FDI” 
identified by Dunning (1998).  In “efficiency-seeking FDI” and “resource-seeking FDI”, 
investing firms focus mainly on the production costs like labour, materials, and machinery 
of their foreign operations, as well as on the investment incentives offered by host country 
governments.  This study identifies examples of this approach.  For example, location 
factors pointing to this type of FDI include “lower labour costs”, “Thai government 
incentives and assistance”, and “cheap raw materials”.  The mean scores of these factors 
are considered high to moderate, ranging from 3.91 down to 3.64.  These factors are cited 
elsewhere in the FDI literature (see, for example, Japanese Chamber of Commerce, 1990; 
1994) as important determinants of FDI in Thailand and other ASEAN4 countries. 
 
Evidence of what Dunning describes as “strategic asset-seeking FDI” seems to be only 
indirectly and partially evident in Thailand from the results of this study.  This type of FDI 
focuses on the availability of knowledge-related assets and markets necessary to protect or 
enhance internal capabilities of investing firms at the right price.  According to this 
paradigm, assets of foreign firms will be secured by new plants and acquisitions or IJVs, to 
create synergies with their existing assets through common ownership.  For example, R&D 
performed in host countries rather than the home country will be the key location 
advantage leading to FDI.  To the extent that assets acquired in a host country are linked to 
a local innovation system, MNEs may enjoy access to at least some spillovers from it.  
Conversely, the local innovation system may benefit from its association with foreign 
MNEs. 
 
In respect of this kind of FDI, it can be seen that the automotive sector in Thailand again 
shows most evidence of this paradigm.  As already mentioned, Japanese investors, 
especially in the automotive industry, regard Thailand as a strategic location for their main 
offshore production platform in Asia.  The evidence is also there in that a number of major 
Japanese automotive manufacturers, like Toyota and Honda, have established their Asia 
Pacific regional R&D centres in Thailand in order to develop value-added activities and 
enhance their competitiveness (Gossack, 2004).  This type of foreign investment and 
strategic development by overseas firms, particularly Japanese MNEs, in Thailand 
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corresponds to Dunning’s concept of “strategic asset-seeking FDI”, undertaken in order to 
develop knowledge-related asssets and markets for enhancing “firm-specific advantages4”.  
Scott (1996) also argues that there is a growing concentration and specialisation of MNEs’ 
activities within particular regions and countries, which corresponds with this kind of FDI.   
 
Dunning (1998) also asserts that in the previous two decades three major developments in 
the global economy had impinged on both the capabilities and strategies of MNEs and the 
location attractiveness of particular countries to overseas investors.  Firstly there was the 
growing significance of firm-specific knowledge assets in the wealth-creating process, and 
the kind of customised assets, like skilled labour and public infrastructure, which needed to 
be jointly used if they were to be made the best possible use of.  Secondly, there was the 
reduction of many natural and artificial barriers to trade; and thirdly, there was the growing 
need and ease with which firms could coordinate their cross-border activities and form 
strategic alliances with foreign firms.  Some of these factors had led firms to own and 
concentrate particular types of value-added activities within a limited number of locations. 
This is close to describing the “strategic asset-seeking FDI” of foreign MNEs in Thailand, 
especially in the automotive and related supporting sectors. 
 
In brief, the results of this study reveal that future market expectations in the region, lower 
labour cost, and favourable infrastructure are the most important factors influencing 
foreign MNEs choice of Thailand as a host country for FDI through the medium of IJV 
formation.  Other important factors include market size, skilled labour, political and 
                                                 
4According to Dunning (1973; 1988), the multinational enterprise must have some advantages over its 
competitors if it wants to be profitable abroad. Advantages must be particular to the firm and readily 
transferable between countries and within the firm. These advantages are called ownership or core 
competencies or firm specific advantages (FSAs).  The firm has a monopoly over its firm specific advantages 
and can utilise them abroad, resulting in a higher marginal return or lower marginal cost than its competitors, 
and thus in more profit.  There exist three basic types of ownership advantages (or Firm Specific Advantages) 
a multinational enterprise can possess. There are:  (a) monopolistic advantages enjoyed by the multinational 
enterprise in the form of privileged access to output and input markets through ownership of scarce natural 
resources, patent rights, and the like;  (b) technology, knowledge broadly defined so as to contain all forms of 
innovation activities;  (c) economies of size, such as economies of learning, economies of scale and scope, 
broader access to financial capital throughout the multinational enterprise organisation, and advantages from 
international diversification of assets and risks. 
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economic stability, and so forth.  In general, these findings correspond to general FDI 
factors identified in the literature especially in Thailand and other ASEAN4 countries. 
5.4  Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The objective of this chapter is to present an original analysis and overview of IJV 
structural characteristics and trends in Thailand over more than half a century, from 1951 
to 2003.  This addresses the first of the four research questions presented in Chapter 4:  
what are the characteristics of the distribution, patterns and trends of IJV activity in 
Thailand?  With cooperation from the Thailand Board of Investment (BOI), a database of 
IJVs formed between Thai and foreign firms in Thailand was made available and has 
provided a hitherto unobtainable foundation for this study. 
 
The present study has empirically revealed new and original knowledge of the trends of 
IJV formation in Thailand, one of the most prominent countries in the ASEAN4.  The 
major findings indicate that four periods of IJV formation, which exhibit distinctly 
different trends, can be identified.  First, before the 1980s, the rate of IJV formation 
increased moderately.  Second, during the 1980s, IJV formation increased markedly.  The 
rate of IJV formation showed outstanding, more than threefold, growth over the whole of 
the previous 20-year period.  Third, the 1990s were the peak period for IJV formation, 
compared to other periods.  Almost half the total number of IJVs formed during the period 
from 1951 to 2003 were formed in the 1990s.  Fourth, during 2000-2003, more than ten 
percent of the total number of IJVs were formed. This period is likely to be the second 
peak period of IJV formation in Thailand, if the present rate of increase continues until the 
end of this decade. 
 
One of the main explanations of the dramatic growth of IJV formation in Thailand and 
other developing countries is undoubtedly foreign corporations’ need to satisfy host 
country governments’ regulations mandating local participation in the ownership and 
management of enterprises within their borders.  There are few other ways this can be 
achieved.  This is consistent with the explanation and discussion of the overall FDI 
situation in Thailand and other ASEAN4 countries presented in Chapter 2, since these 
countries continue the dual FDI policies of domestic protectionism and export promotion.  
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Restrictions in some strategic sectors of the national economy meant that foreign 
investment was completely banned, and in most sectors there were severe restrictions.  
Foreign investors were also allowed only a minority shareholding in companies (including 
IJV firms).  IJVs accordingly became widely used because they were one of the few ways 
foreign corporations could satisfy the host country governments’ requirements for local 
participation in ownership and management of enterprises and still carry on business 
profitable to themselves. 
 
The drastic changes in the global business environment have also been mentioned as an 
important stimulus for the increasing formation of IJVs in developing countries.  The 
pressure to reduce costs, the problem of slow growth in their home markets, and rapid 
technology innovation all compelled foreign MNEs to seek new markets and innovative 
approaches to production of their products.  Faced with these challenges, they had to re-
formulate their business strategy and change their practices in a number of ways, including 
collaborating with firms in other countries through the medium of IJVs, in order to 
strengthen their market position against existing or potential competitors. 
 
Another important factor contributing to the rapid increase in IJV formation in Thailand 
may have been the dramatic growth of the Thai economy, one of the world’s fastest 
growing economies in the 1980s and 1990s.  This no doubt attracted foreign firms, who 
saw worthwhile business opportunities as the purchasing power of consumers in Thailand 
increased.  Foreign firms wishing to penetrate the Thai market saw the formation of IJVs 
with Thai companies as a means of fulfilling their global market expansion ambitions.  
Their Thai partners could contribute knowledge or established local distribution channels 
through which to market their products.  These might otherwise have been difficult to 
acquire. 
 
In brief, it is suggested that the boom of FDI in the form of IJV formation in Thailand 
results mainly from government restrictions on foreign investment, the switch in emphasis 
from import substitution to export promotion by the Thai government, which included FDI 
liberalisation, a rapid expansion of foreign firms’ sales to the Thai and third markets, and 
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the rapid growth of the Thai economy.  In combination, these are believed to account for 
the dramatic rates of FDI inflow and IJV formation in Thailand. 
 
The results of the present study show that throughout the period under consideration the 
majority of IJVs in Thailand have been formed by firms from, in descending order, Japan, 
the NIEs, and the EU.  Japan is seen to be the most important source of FDI in the form of 
IJV formation in Thailand.  The reason most commonly cited for Japanese and NIEs firms 
relocating their production bases to Thailand and other ASEAN4 countries since the 1980s 
is the need to neutralise the appreciation of their domestic currencies.  There has, however, 
been a steady decline in Japanese FDI to Thailand since the Asian financial crisis in 1997 
and into the early 2000s.  This might reflect appreciation of the ASEAN4 countries’ 
currency against the yen, which in turn reflects depreciation of the yen against the US 
dollar since the crisis.  As regards the nationality of foreign investors, especially in 
Thailand, an OECD report of 2004 acknowledges that some of the variation may be due to 
the national preferences of investors.  Asian investors, especially those from Japan and the 
NIEs, regularly prefer overseas locations in nearby countries or in countries with which 
they have a cultural affinity.   
 
Manufacturing is the most important sector of IJV formation in Thailand.  The data reveal 
that metal products, machinery and transportation equipment sector; the light industry 
sector; and the chemicals, paper and plastics sector have been the main industries involved 
in IJV formation in Thailand, representing more than 50% of the total. The increase in FDI 
in Thailand through the growth of IJV formation in these sectors has been an important 
contributing factor to the FDI boom, especially since the 1980s. 
 
In respect of equity participation, the analysis indicates that foreign parent companies were 
mostly minority equity holders in IJVs formed in Thailand between 1951 and 2003.  This 
is because host governments, especially in developing countries like Thailand and other 
ASEAN4 countries, restricted foreign companies to minority equity participation in IJVs. 
Hence, the Thai companies may have been the dominant partners in the IJVs. A slight 
decrease in minority equity participation of foreign firms in IJVs formed after the late 
1990s has become evident, and may result from the fact that the prohibition of foreign 
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majority equity holdings in IJVs was lifted when the Alien Business Law of 1972 was 
replaced by the more liberal Foreign Business Act in 1999. 
 
In addition, the survey results in respect of host country location factors provide a clearer 
picture of the growth of IJV formation in Thailand.  The analysis reveals that future market 
expectations of the region, lower labour cost, and favourable infrastructure are the most 
important factors affecting foreign firms’ decisions to select Thailand as their host country 
for IJV formation.  Other important factors include market size, skilled labour, and 
political and economic stability.  These findings are consistent with the factors identified in 
the literature on FDI in general, and are also consistent with the “market-seeking FDI”, 
“resource-seeking FDI”, “efficiency-seeking FDI” and “strategic asset-seeking FDI” of 
Dunning’s paradigm (Dunning, 1998). 
 
The results analysed in this chapter serve to provide a foundation for the present study’s 
overview of IJV formation in Thailand. The chapter provides new empirical insights into 
the trends of IJV formation there.  This is an important area, but it has been under-
researched because most previous IJV empirical studies have focused primarily on China, 
India, and NIEs.  That is despite the fact that the economic development and IJV formation 
in the region have grown dramatically in the past three decades.  Analysis of a unique 
dataset, the official database of the BOI (Thailand Board of Investment) has been 
undertaken for first time in order to further the study of IJVs in the ASEAN region. 
 
Further in-depth analysis of each issue presented in the conceptual framework outlined in 
Chapter 3 will be provided in the subsequent chapters.  The issue of the strategic impetus 
behind IJV formation by parent companies in the context of the ASEAN4 country, 
particularly Thailand, is explored in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Strategic Motivation for International Joint Venture 
Formation in Thailand 
6.1  Introduction 
The preceding chapter presented the trends of IJV formation in Thailand on the basis of an 
IJV database provided by the Thailand Board of Investment. In order to fulfil all the 
objectives of this study, however, in-depth analysis of the survey data described in Chapter 
4 must be conducted.  That survey obtained data on the basis of 88 questionnaires 
completed and returned by IJV general managers in Thailand.  This and the following 
chapters present an analysis of the data. 
 
Data from eleven questions in the questionnaire were not used.  Since the characteristics of 
the 88 IJVs from which responses were obtained do not differ from those presented in 
Chapter 5 as typical of the larger IJV population in the BOI database (in terms of 
nationality of foreign parent firms, industrial sector, and so forth), the information has not 
been repeated. For instance, Question 5 in the questionnaire asked respondents about the 
nationality of the foreign parent companies, and Question 13 asked about the industrial 
sector of the IJVs.  In addition, after careful discussion with the supervisory team, it was 
decided not to explore the following aspects: government incentives, for example, 
Questions 15 and 16, and management (for example, Questions 19, 20, 21, and 24).   
 
This chapter will accordingly investigate the factors which motivate parent companies to 
form IJVs on the basis of replies to Questions 17 and 18 in the present study’s 
questionnaire.  This is identified in the literature as one of the most important issues in the 
study of IJVs.  For instance, Garcia-Canal (1996) suggests that understanding the strategic 
rationales of both partners in forming IJVs can contribute significantly to the analysis of 
the context in which firms compete and collaborate.  Similarly, carefully identifying the 
strategic motivations on which alliance decisions are based is perceived as the most crucial 
step in gaining an understanding of international joint ventures (Killing, 1983; Beamish, 
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1987). 
 
In addition, the relationship between strategic motives, nationalities of the foreign partners, 
and industrial sector is examined in this chapter. Collectively, the analyses of these factors 
will answer the second research question presented in Chapter 4: What are the strategic 
motives of parent firms in establishing IJVs?  The existing literature indicates a gap in the 
knowledge in respect of the principal strategic motives for international joint venture 
formation in Thailand and other ASEAN4 countries.  This chapter accordingly presents 
new data and new empirical insights into the strategic motivation of IJV formation in 
Thailand, one of the spearhead countries of the ASEAN4. 
6.2  Results and Discussion 
6.2.1: Strategic Motives of IJV Parent Companies 
Consideration of the strategic motives of IJV parent companies is based on an extensive 
review of the relevant literature, as presented in Chapter 3.  Guidance has also been taken 
from previous studies of strategic motives, especially in respect of the questions asked of 
respondents in this study (for example, Tatoglu and Glaister, 2000). Respondents, 
especially IJV managers, were asked to rank a wide range of suggested strategic motives of 
their parent companies in forming IJVs on a five-point Likert scale, where 1 stood for “not 
important at all”, and 5 meant “very important”. These data are drawn from Questions 17 
and 18 of the questionnaire. 
 
The findings of this study show that the strategic motives of the Thai parent firms in 
forming IJVs differ from those of foreign parent companies.  Table 6.1 illustrates the mean 
score rank order of strategic motives of foreign parent companies in forming IJVs; these 
data are drawn from Question17.  It reveals that more than three quarters of the individual 
strategic motives have higher mean scores than the median value of the five-point scales of 
3. 
  
Analysis reveals that gaining presence in new markets, enabling faster entry to market, and 
competing against common competitors are the most important strategic motives of foreign 
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parent firms for IJV formation in Thailand.  The data show that the motive of gaining 
presence in new markets has the greatest value with a mean score of 3.83 and small 
standard deviation of 0.76.  (Small standard deviation means small variation of the mean 
score value from the ranking of all 88 respondents in this study of this motive.)  This is 
followed by the motives of enabling faster entry to market (3.77), competing against 
common competitors (3.68), facilitating international expansion (3.66), transferring to 
lowest cost production location (3.64), finding an export base for a foreign market (3.52), 
and maintaining position in an existing market (3.49) respectively.  
  
It can be seen that the leading strategic motives (ranked 1- 7) relate to strategic positioning 
perspectives. As discussed in Chapter 3, a number of researchers (Harrigan, 1985; Kogut, 
1988) argue that strategic behaviour treats IJVs as enhancing market power and gaining 
maximum profits through improving a firm’s competitive position.  The highest ranked 
strategic motive of foreign partners in this study is closely linked to market and 
geographical expansion.  IJV mode is seen as a strategic weapon for gaining a significant 
presence in a new market, enabling faster entry to the market, facilitating international 
expansion, and finding an export base for foreign markets.  The driving force behind these 
motives may reflect the fact that the ASEAN market, particularly Thailand, has been 
viewed by foreign partners as a lucrative growing market (a good emerging market). As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the economy of this region has grown dramatically and 
reached the highest GDP growth rate in the world, especially during the 1990s.  (WTO, 
1995)  Hence, for foreign partners the IJV mode may be a strategic choice for entering 
these fast-growing emerging markets. 
 
It has been claimed that IJVs are often designed to create entities with a critical mass 
sufficient for seeing off challenges from a competitor common to both partners and for 
retaining local and global market shares (Harrigan, 1985).  This suggests that analysis of 
the competitive implications of IJVs is a high priority. 
 
In addition, transferring production to lowest cost location ranks as one of the most 
important strategic reasons of foreign partners in forming IJVs (it is ranked fifth) since the 
foreign partners may place a high priority on cost reduction relative to their rivals.  They 
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may aim to improve their relative competitive position in the international market by 
accessing the comparatively low cost facilities of their local partners through an IJV. 
 
The second group of strategic motives with moderately high mean scores comprises eleven 
considerations (ranked 8-18).  The highest mean score in this group is gained by the motive 
of sharing the cost of investment (3.45), followed by obtaining faster reimbursement of the 
investment (3.42), and, with equal mean scores of 3.33, spreading the risk of the project 
and gaining economies of scale.  The motive of concentrating on more profitable business 
shows a mean score of 3.29, while the motive of obtaining a local identity yields a 3.16 
mean score.  There are also the motives of accessing Thai skilled labour (3.14), accessing 
Thai low cost labour (3.09), and reducing competition (3.06), enabling product 
diversification (3.03), and sharing the cost of R&D (3.00). 
 
Sharing the cost of investment is the leading motive in this group. This is not surprising, 
given the rapid change, including technological change, in the international business 
environment as discussed in the preceding chapter. By forming IJVs in which they have 
only a minority equity stake, foreign companies can share the risk of investment with their 
partners.  Other strategic components of this motive include spreading project risk, 
achieving economies of scale, and sharing the cost of R&D.  Motives relating to obtaining 
human resources from local partners are also included in this group: accessing both skilled 
and low cost labour. Since, in running businesses in new and overseas environments, 
foreign firms need local human resources, both blue and white collar labour forces to run 
their business operation abroad, the mode of IJVs can provide a means of accessing them 
through local partners.  This, rather than attempting to do so by themselves, is cost 
effective for foreign companies.  The latter approach is risky, as is seen in the case of 
wholly owned subsidiaries where foreign firms have to do all this themselves.  Here the 
cost of human resource management is often regarded as one of the major expenses.  When 
entering a new market where the foreign firm is not yet used to the environment, it may be 
wiser to access human resources through their partners if their sunk cost has already been 
paid and they do not yet know whether their business will succeed.  The mode of IJV can 
provide a safety net in this respect. 
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Among other important motives in this group are the motives of enabling product 
diversification and obtaining a local identity.  Local firms are likely to have indigenous 
knowledge and expertise in such areas as marketing and distribution channels, which 
foreign companies need.  Foreign firms are thus likely to form IJVs in order to benefit 
from complementary resources of their local partners to enable product diversification of 
their core business. They will then be able to sell a variety of new products in the local 
market of Thailand and in third overseas markets. 
 
Table 6.1  Strategic Motivation of Foreign Parent Companies for IJV Formation 
Strategic Motives Rank Mean SD 
Gain presence in a new market 1 3.83 0.76 
Enable faster entry to market 2 3.77 0.90 
Compete against common competitors 3 3.68 0.90 
Facilitate international expansion 4 3.66 0.84 
Transfer production to lowest cost location 5 3.64 1.01 
Find export base for foreign market 6 3.52 1.10 
Maintain position in existing market 7 3.49 0.98 
Share cost of investment 8 3.45 0.99 
Obtain faster reimbursement of the investment 9 3.42 0.87 
Spread risk of project 10= 3.33 1.08 
Gain economies of scale 10= 3.33 1.07 
Concentrate on more profitable business 12 3.29 0.99 
Obtain local identity 13 3.16 0.92 
Gain access through Thai partner to human resources (skilled labour) 14 3.14 0.98 
Gain access to low cost labour of Thai partner  15 3.09 1.07 
Reduce competition by forming IJV with existing or potential competitors 16 3.06 1.10 
Enable product diversification    17 3.03 1.06 
Share cost of R&D 18 3.00 1.07 
Exchange technology 19= 2.95 1.08 
Gain access through Thai partner to natural resources 19= 2.95 1.11 
Avoid difficulties with agents or licensees 21 2.84 0.96 
Conform to Thai government policies 22 2.76 0.99 
Exchange patents or territories 23 2.60 0.90 
NB: 1.  N=88; data in this table are drawn from Variable 17. 
        2.  The Mean is the average on  a scale raging from 1 = ‘not important at all’  to  5 = ‘very important’ 
        3.  SD = Standard Deviation 
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The second most important motive in this group relates to the strategic choice of using 
IJVs to obtain faster reimbursement of the investment, since companies do not need to 
invest in all the aspects of running the business.  They are able to access some resources 
from their local partners.  They can use IJVs as a strategic tool enabling them to 
concentrate on more profitable business, as well as reducing competition by forming IJVs 
with existing or potential competitors. 
 
The group of strategic motives of foreign parent companies for embarking on IJV 
formation which receives the lowest mean scores includes exchanging technology (2.95), 
gaining access through the Thai partner to natural resources (2.95), avoiding difficulties 
with agents or licensees (2.84), conforming to Thai government policies (2.76), and 
exchanging patents or territories (2.60).  
 
It is not surprising to find that “exchange of technology” and “exchange of 
patents/territories” is found to be a relatively unimportant IJV motive for foreign firms 
from developed countries when forming IJVs with partners from developing countries.  
This is consistent with the literature (Chen and Glaister, 2005).  In general, IJV researchers 
presented in the literature review in Chapter 3 expect that firms from developed countries 
will have better access to superior technology than those from developing countries. 
 
It might, however, seem very surprising to find that “conforming to Thai government 
policies” is ranked as low as 22.  As has been seen in earlier chapters, the governments of 
many developing countries, including Thailand, allow foreign firms access to local markets 
only on condition that they cooperate with a local partner (Beamish, 1985; 1988).  This 
suggests that the true strategic impetus behind IJV formation in Thailand of foreign firms 
is rooted mainly in strategic behaviour:  most foreign partners appear to see IJVs mainly as 
a means of enhancing market power and gaining maximum profits through improving their 
competitive position.  This is confirmed by the fact that they place strategic motives in the 
higher ranks despite the Thai government’s reasons for pressuring foreign firms to form 
IJVs with local firms.  A further explanation might be that most of the companies sampled 
in this study (88 firms) are export orientated rather than aiming to sell into the local market 
of Thailand.  They may not find themselves under so much pressure from the Thai 
 153
government because the greater part of their final output is exported.  This is known also to 
result in a more relaxed attitude towards equity share holding of the foreign partners in 
IJVs (Pornnavalai, 1997). This might explain why this is not a prime motive for them to 
form IJVs, and why the foreign companies in the survey ranked it so low. 
 
Other strategic motives in this lower ranked group include gaining access through the local 
partner to natural resources.  The distribution analysis in the previous chapter indicates that 
there is a very small proportion of firms in the IJV database in such natural resource related 
business as mining.  This confirms the finding that they do not regard this as an important 
motive.  Also, the motive of avoiding difficulties with agents or licensees gets a low 
ranking.  This may not be one of the main strategic reasons for foreign firms to form IJVs 
because, in general, Thai law relating to international trade and patent protection is 
relatively good, that is, more liberal and fair when compared with other developing 
countries.  Thailand is a member of the World Trade Organisation and operates within its 
guidelines (Pornnavalai, 1997). This may accordingly not be so great an issue for foreign 
firms considering forming an IJV. 
 
Table 6.2 indicates strategic motives of Thai parent companies for IJV formation, on the 
basis of data obtained from Question 18 of the questionnaire. The findings show that 
gaining access to foreign partners’ technology, sharing the cost of R&D, and sharing the 
cost of investment are the strongest motivations.  The motive of gaining access to foreign 
partners’ technology has the highest mean score of 4.11.  The second and third most 
important motives, sharing the cost of R&D and sharing the cost of investment, show a 
mean score of 3.83 and of 3.82 respectively.  Moreover, it can be seen that, overall, each 
motive has a low standard deviation value, indicating a small variation (higher or lower 
than the mean  value) in each motive. This means that the ranking of each motive is 
properly representative and close to the mean score value. 
 
It can be seen that the most important strategic inducement for IJV formation for the Thai 
companies relates to technology transfer and sharing the cost of investment.  This outcome 
is not surprising, since the literature (for example, Miller et al., 1996) also indicates that 
accessing technology from a partner from a developed country is one of the most important 
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motives of firms in developing countries entering into IJVs.  This suggests that the learning 
and growth benefits of the process of co-operation are crucial. 
Sharing the cost of R&D and of investment, and spreading project risk are ranked among 
the principal motives of Thai firms in forming IJVs with their partners.  Since they may 
have limited capital and technological resources, it makes good sense for them to join IJVs 
with partners, especially from developed countries, who have abundant resources of this 
kind. 
 
The analysis further reveals that IJVs can be viewed from a strategic behaviour perspective 
to the extent that the Thai firms regard IJVs as enhancing their market power and 
maximising profits through improving a firm’s competitive position.  These show high to 
moderately high mean scores, and are ranked 4 to 14. The motives in this group include 
gaining access to foreign markets, competing against common competitors, enabling faster 
entry to the market, facilitating international expansion, obtaining faster reimbursement of 
the investment, maintaining position in the existing market, concentrating on more 
profitable business, finding an export base for foreign markets, and enabling product 
diversification.  In other words, the IJV mode is seen as a strategic weapon for Thai firms 
wishing to gain access to foreign markets, competing against common competitors, 
enabling faster entry to the market, facilitating international expansion, obtaining faster 
reimbursement of their investment, maintaining their position in the existing market, 
concentrating on more profitable business, finding an export base for foreign markets, and 
enabling product diversification. 
 
The fifteenth to seventeenth ranks of the mean scores are as follows:  to gain economies of 
scale, to gain access to foreign skilled labour, and to reduce competition by forming an IJV 
with existing or potential competitors.  These can be taken to indicate that the mode of 
IJVs can provide a means for Thai firms to reduce their production cost by gaining 
economies of scale through greater mass production with their foreign partners. Also IJVs 
can provide Thai firms with an opportunity to access resources, especially human 
resources (knowledgeable workers), of foreign partners since they can gain access not only 
to the foreign workforce but also to business networks, especially overseas business 
networks.  This is often regarded as a success factor.  Last in this group, in terms of 
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strategic choice IJVs can be used by Thai firms to reduce competition by forming IJVs 
with existing or potential competitors. 
 
The last group of strategic motives, showing lower mean scores than the median of the 
five-point scale, ranges in descending order as follows:  avoiding difficulties with agents or 
licensees, exchanging patents or territories, conforming to Thai government policies, 
transferring production to the lowest cost location, gaining access through a foreign partner 
to natural resources, and gaining access to low cost labour through the foreign partner.  It is 
not surprising that these motives have a low ranking, since their main benefits are for the 
foreign rather than the Thai partner. 
 
It is, however, somewhat surprising that the motive of exchanging patents or territories is 
given such a low ranking  by Thai firms, since this motive seems similar to “gaining access 
to the technology of the foreign firm”, which has a high ranking.  In general, Thai firms 
may be expected to need access to technology and patents of their foreign partners, but the 
explanation of the low ranking in this case may simply be that Thai firms have in general a 
lower level of technological development than their foreign partner, and hence have little 
or nothing to exchange. 
 
The low ranking of the motives of conforming to Thai government policies, transferring 
production to lowest cost location, gaining access through foreign partners to natural 
resources, and gaining access to low cost labour of the foreign partner is also not 
surprising.  Thai government regulation and policy is targeted more at constraining foreign 
rather than Thai firms, so this is unlikely to be a major strategic reason for Thai firms to 
form IJVs with foreign partners.  The motive of transferring production to lowest cost 
location tends to be one of the important strategic motives for foreign firms deciding to 
form an IJV with Thai partners, but is not highly rated by Thai firms.  Although this might 
be an important motive where Thai firms were considering forming IJVs with other 
developing or neighbouring countries with a comparatively lower cost of production than 
Thailand, most of their foreign partners in this study came from Japan, the NIEs, and 
Western countries.  In the main they did not come from ASEAN or other Asian countries. 
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Gaining access through the foreign partner to natural resources is also considered relatively 
unimportant by Thai firms, and as has been seen in the previous chapter there is a very 
small percentage of firms operating in natural resource sectors like mining in the IJV 
database. 
 
Table 6.2  Strategic Motivation of the Thai Parent Companies for IJV Formation  
Strategic Motives Rank Mean SD 
Gain access to technology of foreign partner 1 4.11 0.90 
Share cost of R&D 2 3.83 1.05 
Share cost of investment 3 3.82 0.94 
Gain access to foreign markets 4 3.77 0.81 
Compete against common competitors 5= 3.74 0.82 
Gain access to management know-how 5= 3.74 0.88 
Spread risk of project 7 3.61 0.95 
Enable faster entry to market 8 3.57 0.85 
Facilitate international expansion 9 3.56 0.92 
Obtain faster reimbursement of the investment 10 3.50 0.95 
Maintain position in existing market 11 3.45 0.91 
Concentrate on a more profitable business 12 3.44 0.93 
Find export base for foreign market 13 3.41 1.02 
Enable product diversification 14 3.39 0.93 
Achieve economies of scale 15 3.38 1.02 
Gain access through foreign partner to human resources 
(skilled labour) 16 3.30 0.95 
Reduce competition by forming IJV with existing  
or potential competitors 17 3.16 1.02 
Avoid difficulties with agents or licensees 18 2.94 1.02 
Exchange patents or territories 19 2.89 0.98 
Conform to Thai government policies 20= 2.84 1.06 
Transfer production to lowest cost location 20= 2.84 1.14 
Gain access through foreign partner to natural resources 22 2.83 1.01 
Gain access to low cost labour of foreign partner  23 2.43 1.15 
NB:  1.  N = 88; data in this table are drawn from Variable 18. 
         2.  The Mean is the average on  a scale raging from 1 = ‘not important at all’  to  5 = ‘very important’ 
         3.  SD = Standard Deviation 
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Gaining access to low cost labour through the foreign partner is also not surprisingly given 
a low ranking by Thai firms.  The situation would be different only if Thai firms decided to 
form IJVs with companies from other developing or neigbouring countries with 
comparatively lower cost of production.  In most instances, however, this has been seen 
not to be the case, and hence the low ranking of this motive.  
 
Table 6.3 compares the ranked mean scores of foreign and the Thai parent companies.  The 
data show that the five leading strategic motives of foreign parent companies are in order:  
gaining presence in new markets, enabling faster entry to market, competing against 
common competitors, facilitating international expansion, and transferring production to 
the lowest cost location.  Meanwhile, the access to/exchange of technology from partners 
is the foremost strategic motive of the Thai parent companies for embarking on IJV 
formation, followed by these motives:  sharing cost of R&D, sharing cost of investment, 
gaining presence in new markets, and competing against common competitors. 
 
The analysis reveals that the following seven strategic motives have significant mean score 
differences between foreign parent companies and the Thai parent companies at 0.01 
significance level:  transferring production to lowest cost location, sharing cost of 
investment, gaining access to low cost labour of partner, enabling product diversification, 
sharing cost of R&D, gaining access to/exchanging technology with partners, and 
exchanging patents or territories.  In addition, the t-test outcome further suggests that the 
motive of spreading risk of the project has a significant mean score difference between the 
two parent companies at 0.05 significance level. 
 
These findings provide some consistence with those of the study of Miller et al. (1996).  
After conducting interviews with managers and related executives in several industrial 
countries, namely Germany, Japan, Great Britain and the United States, Miller et al. (1996) 
conclude that the main strategic reasons for companies from developed countries forming 
IJVs with local firms included sharing cost and risk, lacking familiarity with the country, 
lacking relevant contacts within the government and elsewhere, and accessing existing 
facilities.  On the other hand, the principal strategic motives for IJV creation from the 
perspective of partners from developing countries (after Miller and his team elicited 
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information from less-developed country partners in six economies: Argentina, Brazil, 
India, Mexico, the Philippines and Turkey) consist of gaining access to technology, 
obtaining management know-how, and gaining access to an export market. 
Table 6.3:  Comparison of the Strategic Motivation of Foreign Parent Companies and Thai Parent 
Companies for IJV Formation  
Strategic Motives Foreign Parent Company Thai Parent Company t-value 
  Rank Mean SD Rank Mean SD   
Gain presence in new markets 1 3.83 0.76 4 3.77 0.81 0.57 
Enable faster entry to market 2 3.77 0.90 8 3.57 0.85 1.60 
Compete against common competitors 3 3.68 0.90 5= 3.74 0.82 -0.51 
Facilitate international expansion 4 3.66 0.84 9 3.56 0.92 0.96 
Transfer production to lowest cost location 5 3.64 1.01 20= 2.84 1.14 5.92** 
Find export base for foreign market 6 3.52 1.10 13 3.41 1.02 1.20 
Maintain position in existing market 7 3.49 0.98 11 3.45 0.91 0.31 
Share cost of investment 8 3.45 0.99 3 3.82 0.94 -3.00** 
Obtain faster reimbursement of the investment 9 3.42 0.87 10 3.50 0.95 -0.77 
Spread risk of project 10= 3.33 1.08 7 3.61 0.95 -2.39* 
Gain economies of scale 10= 3.33 1.07 15 3.38 1.02 -0.42 
Concentrate on a more profitable business 12 3.29 0.99 12 3.44 0.93 -1.07 
Gain access through partner to human 
resources (skilled labour) 14 3.14 0.98 16 3.30 0.95 -1.37 
Gain access through partner  to low cost 
labour  15 3.09 1.07 23 2.43 1.15 5.06** 
Reduce competition by forming an IJV with 
existing or potential competitors 16 3.06 1.10 17 3.16 1.02 -1.17 
Enable product diversification    17 3.03 1.06 14 3.39 0.93 -3.21** 
Share cost of R&D 18 3.00 1.07 2 3.83 1.05 -5.88** 
Exchange technology 19= 2.95 1.08 1 4.11 0.90 -9.96** 
Gain access through partner to natural 
resources 19= 2.95 1.11 22 2.83 1.01 0.85 
Avoid difficulties with agents or licensees 21 2.84 0.96 18 2.94 1.02 -0.96 
Conform to Thai government policies 22 2.76 0.99 20= 2.84 1.06 -0.80 
Exchange patents or territories 23 2.60 0.90 19 2.89 0.98 -3.23** 
NB:  1.  N = 88; data in this table are drawn from Variables 17 and  18. 
         2.  The Mean is the average on  a scale raging from 1 = ‘not important at all’  to  5 = ‘very important’ 
         3.  SD = Standard Deviation 
        **p<0.01; *p<0.05 
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Tables 6.4 and 6.5 present a comparison of the results regarding strategic motives for IJV 
formation between the present study and previous empirical studies.  Table 6.4 indicates 
that, overall, the most important reasons for foreign parent companies to form IJVs, based 
on the outcome of this study and of previous studies, are the motives of gaining presence in 
new markets and enabling faster entry to markets.  In particular, a study of IJV formation 
in China by Dong and Glaister (2006) shows that the most important strategic motive of 
foreign firms embarking on IJV formation was enabling faster entry to markets, followed 
by  gaining  presence  in  new  markets,  obtaining a local identity, facilitating international 
expansion, and gaining economies of scale respectively.  The first and second ranked 
strategic motives of foreign companies in a study of IJVs in Turkey by Tatoglu and 
Glaister (2000) yield exactly the same results as this study, while maintaining adequate 
quality control ranked third.  Spreading the risks of the project and achieving economies of 
scale were ranked fourth and fifth in their study respectively. 
 
The study of Chen and Glaister (2005) on the motives of Taiwanese partners forming IJVs 
in China produces moderately different outcomes.  Achieving economies of scale is the 
major reason for Taiwanese partners to establish IJVs in China, followed by transferring 
production to the lowest cost location, enabling faster entry to markets, competing with 
common competitors, and obtaining faster reimbursement of the investment respectively. 
 
The strategic motives of local firms to form IJVs are shown in Table 6.5, and these differ 
from the findings of previous research in respect of different countries.  The principal 
strategic reason local partners form IJVs in China, according to the study of Chinese-
Taiwanese IJVs undertaken by Dong and Glaister (2006), is to compete with common 
competitors, followed by maintaining position in existing markets, achieving economies of 
scale, facilitating international expansion, and accessing/exchanging technology through 
partners.  Enabling high quality production (not shown in the Table) is the foremost 
strategic motivation of home country partners in the study of Turkish IJV formation by 
Tatoglu and Glaister (2000), and they also find that the second most important motivation 
of Turkish partners for forming IJVs is to access/exchange technology from overseas 
partners.  Ranked third in their study is the motive of competing with common 
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competitors, followed by the motive of enabling faster entry to markets, and in fifth place 
is the motive of enhancing the company’s image. 
  Table 6.4:  A Comparison of Studies of the Strategic Motivations of Foreign  Parent Companies  
  Embarking on IJV Formation 
Strategic Motives 
 
 
 
Rank in 
this 
study* 
 
Dong 
and 
Glaister 
(2006)1 
Chen 
and 
Glaister 
(2005)2 
Tatoglu 
and 
Glaister 
(2000)3 
Gain presence in new markets 1 2 N/A 1 
Enable faster entry to markets 2 1 3 2 
Compete with common competitors 3 7 4 N/A 
Facilitate international expansion 4 4 12 N/A 
Transfer production to lowest cost location 5 6 2 N/A 
Find export base for foreign markets 6 N/A 8 N/A 
Maintain position in existing markets 7 10 N/A N/A 
Share cost of investment 8 9= 14 N/A 
Obtain faster reimbursement of the investment 9 N/A 5 6 
Spread risks of project 10= 9= 6 4 
Achieve economies of scale 10= 5 1 5 
Concentrate on a more profitable business 12 N/A 16 N/A 
Obtain local identity 13 3 10= N/A 
Gain access through local partner to human resources 
(skilled labour) 14 N/A N/A 9= 
Gain access through local partner to low cost labour  15 N/A N/A 9= 
Reduce competition by forming IJV with existing or 
potential competitors 16 15 13 N/A 
Enable product diversification    17 8 9 N/A 
Share cost of R&D 18 13 17 N/A 
Exchange technology 19= 11 18= N/A 
Gain access through local partner to natural resources 19= 14 N/A 9= 
Avoid difficulties with agents or licensees 21 N/A 10 10 
Conform to government policies 22 12 15 8 
Exchange patents or territories 23 N/A 18= N/A 
     NB:  *Data are drawn from Variable 17  
               1.  Strategic motivation for IJV formation in China by foreign firms. 
               2.  Strategic motivation for IJV formation in China by Taiwanese firms. 
               3.  Strategic motivation for IJV formation in Turkey by foreign firms. 
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Table 6.5:  A Comparison of Studies of the Strategic Motivation of Local Parent Companies for IJV 
Formation 
Strategic Motive 
 
 
 
Rank in this 
study* 
 
 
Dong   
and 
Glaister 
(2006)1 
Tatoglu 
and 
Glaister 
(2000)2 
Access technology from foreign partner 1 5 2 
Share cost of R&D 2 10 N/A 
Share cost of investment 3 9= 10 
Access foreign market 4 8 N/A 
Compete against common competitors 5= 1 3 
Access management know-how 5= N/A 6 
Spread risk of project 7 9= 11= 
Enable faster entry to market 8 6 4 
Facilitate international expansion 9 4 N/A 
Obtain faster reimbursement of the investment 10 N/A N/A 
Maintain position in existing market 11 2 N/A 
Concentrate on a more profitable business 12 N/A N/A 
Export base for foreign market 13 N/A N/A 
Enable product diversification    14 7 N/A 
Achieve economies of scale 15 3 8 
Access foreign partner’s human resource (skilled 
labour) 16 N/A 7= 
Reduce competition by forming IJV with existing or 
potential competitors 17 12 N/A 
Avoid difficulties with agents or licensees 18 N/A 15 
Exchange patents or territories 19 N/A N/A 
Conform with government policy 20= 14 16 
Transfer production to lowest cost location 20= 13 N/A 
Access foreign partner’s natural resources 22 15 11= 
Access low cost labour of foreign partner   23 N/A 7= 
  NB:  *Data are drawn from Variable 18 
            1.  Strategic motivation for IJV formation in China of Chinese firms. 
            2.  Strategic motivation for IJV formation in Turkey of Turkish firms. 
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Significantly, the findings of the present study indicate that gaining presence in new 
markets, enabling faster entry to markets, competing with common competitors, 
facilitating international expansion, and transferring production to the lowest cost location 
are the leading motives inducing foreign parent companies to form IJVs.  These findings 
are consistent with the literature.  Harrigan (1985; 1987) and Contractor and Lorange 
(1988) argue that these strategic motives are generally the principal motives of MNEs from 
developed countries embarking on IJV formation with local firms in order to expand their 
business, particularly into emerging markets.  Schlosstein (1991) and Indro and Richards 
(2007) also point out that the development of the ASEAN economy might present business 
opportunities for MNEs to enter this region and provide their products and services to the 
population of a region with considerable purchasing power. 
 
Tesco, for example, a giant British supermarket chain, expands its business to overseas 
markets, especially in the ASEAN region, via the IJV mode.  Tesco Lotus was formed in 
Thailand in 1998.  It was an IJV company formed from a partnership between Charoen 
Pokphand Group (CP), the largest conglomerate in Thailand, and Tesco.  Due to the rapid 
growth of the market, the number of Tesco stores in Thailand is currently second only to 
the number of those in the UK (Bangkok Post, 2002).  
 
Overall, however, compared with previous empirical studies, this study has found the 
strategic motives of local parent firms in different countries are more diverse than those of 
foreign companies.  This diversity may result from the very different regional features of 
these various countries in terms of social and cultural characteristics, market structure, 
industrial development, and so forth.  These may explain the diversity in the relative 
importance of particular strategic motives for local parent companies in different countries. 
 
To sum up, the findings of this study are in general consistent with those of previous 
empirical studies.  Tallman and Shenkar (1990);  Demirbag et al. (1995);  Dacin et al. 
(1997) all found that the strategic motives for developing country partners to enter IJVs 
differ from those of developed country partners.  They point out that technology transfer 
and access to new product lines are likely to be more important strategic motives, 
encouraging developing country partners to form IJVs with MNEs from industrial 
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economies.  The developing country partners are able to purchase materials and equipment 
from their overseas partners, expand their international markets, and gain access to 
advanced technology and management know-how through the foreign partners.  At the 
same time, the overseas partners can use the distribution channels and domestic marketing 
expertise and other domestic resources of local partners to enter the host country markets 
by means of IJVs.  Although the motives of the respective IJV parent firms may be 
different, they are complementary. 
 
This study suggests, firstly, that foreign firms should embark on the strategic alliance of 
IJVs in a developing country only after they have obtained a good understanding of their 
intended partners’ strategic motives which, in developing countries, are likely to be 
different from those of companies in industrial countries.  The regulatory environment 
confronting local firms in a developing economy will also play an important part in 
establishing their priorities in seeking an IJV partner.  Foreign firms embarking on IJV 
formation in developing countries need to give careful consideration to the strategic 
motives and requirements of their local partners if the IJV is to be successful. 
 
Secondly, it is important to remember that in the context of partnership with companies in 
developing countries, the strategic motives of foreign firms to form IJVs are likely to be  
expansion of their presence in local markets, and competing and maintaining their 
competitive position in the global market.  Strategic IJV alliances are being seen as a 
means of competing for global market share. 
 
Thirdly, the principal motives of Thai firms in entering IJVs are not only to gain access to 
the foreign partner’s technology and investment capital, but also, from a strategic 
behaviour perspective, to increase their market power and maximise profits by improving 
their competitive position.  MNEs need to be fully aware of both these principal motives 
when forming IJVs with Thai firms. 
 
Finally, since the foreign and local partners forming IJVs have differing, if 
complementary, strategic motives, it is essential that IJV managers should be fully aware 
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of the differing strategic motives of their parent companies if they are to manage IJVs 
effectively and fulfil the objectives of their parent companies on both sides. 
6.2.2:  Strategic Motives and Industrial Sector 
The present study has found that the relative importance of strategic motives of parent 
companies for IJV formation varies according to industrial sector.   This variation is more 
apparent in the case of foreign firms than of Thai companies.  After conducting 
preliminary analysis with a correlation test, the outcomes indicate that a great number of 
individual strategic motives correlate among themselves.  Accordingly, factor analysis has 
been used to group these correlated variables into categories and to produce a 
parsimonious set of distinct non-overlapping variables from the full set of 23 motives.  
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using varimax rotation initially produces six factors.  A 
content analysis is conducted to purify the uncovered factors, since items measuring the 
same factor must have consistent substantive meanings.  Thus, items which have 
inconsistent substantive meanings with the factor or have low factor loadings are removed 
from further analysis.  This application of exploratory factor analyses (EFAs) using 
varimax rotation has been used by a number of researchers in studies similar to the present 
one, such as Deshpande (1982);  Cavusgil and Zou (1994);  Lysonski et al. (1996);  Zou et 
al. (1997);  and Tatoglu and Glaister (2000).  These researchers argue that a “blind” EFA 
can create factors which lack substantive meanings and are inappropriate for theory 
development.  This purification process leads to the elimination of two motives of the 
foreign parent company: achieving economies of scale and conforming to Thai government 
policies. 
 
The remaining 21 motives are again factor analysed and produce six underlying factors 
explain a total of 69.89 percent of observed variance as shown in Table 6.6.  An internal 
reliability test indicates strong Cronbach alphas for the purified multi-item factors, ranging 
from 0.52 to 0.84, suggesting adequate reliability for an exploratory study of this        
nature.  These are reported in detail below.  Indicated by the value items which load on 
them, the six factors are labeled as follows: low cost sourcing and market development; 
resource accessing; market power and cost and risk sharing; technology transfer; marketing 
strategy; and reducing competition. 
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 Table 6.7 shows the factor analysis result, producing a set of parsimonious distinct non-
overlapping strategic motives of Thai parent companies from the full set of 23 motives.  
Following the content analysis process, four motives, namely sharing cost of R&D, 
conforming to local government policies and regulation, maintaining position in existing 
market, and reducing competition by forming IJVs with existing or potential competitors, 
are dropped from the analysis.  The remaining 19 motives are again factor analysed and 
produce five factors which explain a total of 71.27 percent of the observed variance as 
shown in Table 6.7.  Cronbach alphas for underlying factors range from 0.79 to 0.86, 
which show high reliability.  These factors are labeled resource and technology accessing, 
market power and market development, overseas market expansion, cost and risk sharing, 
and low cost sourcing. 
 
The results of the present study in respect of the relative importance of strategic motives of 
foreign firms in the context of industrial sector are shown in Tables 6.8 to 6.11.  Table 6.8 
reveals that two underlying strategic motives of the foreign parent company – the low cost 
sourcing and market development factor, and the resource accessing factor – have 
significantly different mean scores in the context of industrial sectors.  The parametric test 
shows 5.10 F-values at 0.001 significance level and 3.13 F-values at 0.05 significance 
level.  Further, these significant values have also been confirmed with the non-parametric 
test of the chi-square values of 11 and 11.54 of the Kruskal Wallis test at 0.05 significance 
levels respectively. 
 
Table 6.8 shows mean scores comparison of two significant underlying strategic motive 
factors.  It shows that the mean scores of the underlying low cost sourcing and market 
development factors in the metal products, machinery and transport equipment industry as 
well as in the chemicals, paper and plastics industry are the greatest, with 3.61 mean scores 
compared to those in other industry sectors.  In other words, low cost sourcing and market 
development is the leading motivation to form IJVs in the metal products, machinery and 
transport equipment industry and chemicals, paper and plastics industry.  Moreover, it has 
also been found that the highest mean score of the underlying resource accessing factor 
falls in the chemicals, paper, and plastics sector (mean = 3.33), followed by the light 
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industry sector (mean = 3.20), and agriculture and agricultural products sector (mean = 
2.93).  
Table 6.6  Factor Analysis of Strategic Motivation of Foreign Parent Companies for IJV Formation 
NB:  Principal component factor analysis with varimax rotation; data are drawn from Variable 17. 
Factors 
 
 
Factor 
Load 
 
Eigen 
Value 
 
% 
Variance 
Explain 
Cum 
Percent
 
Cronbach 
Alpha 
 
Factor 1: Low Cost Sourcing and Market Development   3.40 16.18 16.18 0.84 
Transfer production to lowest cost location 0.83        
Export base for foreign markets 0.77        
Facilitate international expansion 0.72        
Concentrate on a more profitable business 0.60        
Maintain position in existing markets 0.55        
Enable product diversification    0.54        
Factor 2: Resource Accessing   3.10 14.77 30.96 0.84 
Gain access to Thai partner’s human resources (skilled 
labour) 0.79        
Gain access to Thai partner’s natural resources 0.71        
Gain access to Thai partner’s low cost labour 0.64        
Avoid difficulties with agents or licensees 0.63        
Exchange patents or territories 0.60        
Factor 3: Market Power and Cost and Risk Sharing   2.59 12.31 43.27 0.78 
Gain presence in new markets 0.70        
Compete against common competitors 0.70        
Obtain faster reimbursement of the investment 0.64        
Spread risk of project 0.56        
Share cost of investment 0.51        
Factor 4: Technology Transfer   2.00 9.51 52.78 0.73 
Exchange technology 0.74        
Share cost of R&D 0.77        
Factor 5: Marketing Strategy   1.95 9.27 62.05 0.52 
Enable faster entry to market 0.75        
Obtain local identity 0.63        
Factor 6: Reducing Competition   1.65 7.84 69.89 - 
Reduce competition by forming IJV with existing or 
potential competitors 0.80        
K-M-O Measure of Sampling Adequacy = 0.81; Bartlett’s Test of  Sphericity = 865.57, p<0.000) 
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Table 6.7  Factor Analysis of Strategic Motivation of Thai Parent Company for IJV Formation 
NB:  Principal component factor analysis with varimax rotation; data are drawn from Variable 18. 
Factors 
Factor 
Load 
Eigen 
Value 
% 
Variance 
Explain 
Cum 
Percent
Cronbach 
Alpha 
Factor 1: Resource and Technology Accessing   3.37 17.73 17.73 0.86 
Access foreign partner’s human resources (skilled labour) 0.81        
Access foreign partner’s natural resources 0.74       
Exchange patents or territories 0.71       
Access foreign partner’s technology 0.68        
Avoid difficulties with agents or licensees 0.56        
Access management know-how 0.54       
Factor 2: Market Power and Market Development   3.07 16.15 33.88 0.86 
Compete against common competitors 0.81       
Enable faster entry to market 0.73       
Gain presence in new market 0.72       
Concentrate on a more profitable business 0.57       
Obtain faster reimbursement of the investment 0.55       
Enable product diversification 0.46       
Factor 3: Overseas Market Expansion   2.47 13.00 46.88 0.79 
Export base for foreign market 0.85       
Facilitate international expansion 0.67       
Factor 4: Cost and Risk Sharing   2.38 12.51 59.39 0.79 
Achieve economies of scale 0.80       
Share cost of investment 0.79       
Spread risk of project 0.76       
Factor 5: Low Cost Sourcing   2.26 11.88 71.27 0.83 
Transfer production to lowest cost location 0.83       
Access foreign partner’s low cost labour 0.79        
K-M-O Measure of Sampling Adequacy = 0.81 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity = 928.14, p<0.000 
 
 
Further explanation of the mean score difference of the significant underlying factors in 
each industrial sector can be found in Tables 6.9 and 6.10.  Table 6.9 indicates that mean 
scores of the underlying low cost sourcing and market development factor of the service 
and public utilities sector significantly differs from those in the following sectors:  
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agriculture and agricultural products sector; light industry sector; metal products, 
machinery and transport equipment sector; and chemicals, paper and plastics sector.  These 
differences emerge at 0.001 significance level.  Furthermore, the data further demonstrate 
that the mean score difference of the underlying low cost sourcing and market 
development factor at 0.01 significance level can be found in the service and public 
utilities sector and the electronic and electrical appliance sector. 
 
Table 6.10 illustrates the mean score difference comparison of the underlying resource 
accessing factor in each industrial sector.  It indicates that the mean scores of this type of 
underlying factor are significantly different from those in the following two sectors at 
0.001 significance level: the light industry sector; and the chemicals, paper and plastics 
sector.  The outcomes also show that the mean scores of the underlying resource accessing 
factors in the service and public utilities sector are significantly different from those in the 
agriculture and agricultural products sector, as well as in the metal products, machinery, 
and transport equipment sector at 0.01 significance level. 
 
It appears that five individual strategic motives show significant mean score differences 
according to industrial sectors, as shown in Table 6.11.  These significant differences are 
confirmed by significant F-value and chi-square value:  the motive of transferring 
production to lowest cost location (5.71 at 0.001 significance level/ 15.95 at 0.01 
significance level), exporting base for foreign markets (6.27 at 0.001 significance level/ 
15.01 at 0.01 significance level), accessing Thai partner’s skilled labour (4.30 at 0.01 
significance level/ 17.23 at 0.01 significance level), accessing Thai partner’s natural 
resources (2.75 at 0.05 significance level/13.88 at 0.05 significance level) and the motive 
of accessing Thai partner’s low cost labour (3.56 at 0.01 significance level/ 12.11 at 0.05 
significance level). 
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Table 6.8:  Mean Scores Comparison of the Significant Underlying Factors of Strategic Motives of 
Foreign Companies by IJV Industrial Sector 
Underlying Factor Industrial Sector Mean S.D. 
F-Value/Chi-
Square a 
Factor 1: Low Cost 
Sourcing and Market 
Development 
Agriculture and Agricultural 
Products 3.42 0.87  
  Light Industry 3.33 0.70  
  
Metal Products, Machinery 
and Transport Equipment 3.61 0.57  
  
Electronic Industry and 
Electrical Appliance 3.19 1.01  
  Chemicals, Paper and Plastics 3.61 0.41  
  Service and Public Utilities 1.92 0.88  
  Total 3.43 0.75 5.10***/11* 
Factor 2: Resource 
Accessing 
Agriculture and Agricultural 
Products 2.93 0.97  
  Light Industry 3.20 0.75  
  
Metal Products, Machinery 
and Transport Equipment 2.89 0.69  
  
Electronic Industry and 
Electrical Appliance 2.82 0.85  
  Chemicals, Paper and Plastics 3.33 0.72  
  Service and Public Utilities 1.70 0.58  
  Total 2.93 0.79 3.13*/11.54* 
NB:     (a) Chi-Square, Kruskal Wallis Test 
             SD =  Standard Deviation 
            ***p<0.001,  * p<0.05; data are drawn from Variable 17. 
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Table 6.9:  Multiple Comparisons of the Significant Underlying Low Cost Sourcing and Market 
Development Factor of Foreign Parent Company by Industrial Sector 
Underlying Factor 
 
Industrial Sector 
 
Industrial 
Sector 
Mean 
Difference 
Factor 1: Low Cost Sourcing and 
Market Development 
Agriculture and 
Agricultural Products Light  0.08 
    Metal Products -0.2 
    Electronic 0.23 
    Chemicals -0.19 
    Service 1.50*** 
  Light Industry Agriculture -0.08 
    Metal Products -0.28 
    Electronic 0.15 
    Chemicals -0.28 
    Service 1.42*** 
  
Metal Products, 
Machinery and 
Transport Equipment Agriculture 0.2 
    Light  0.28 
    Electronic 0.43 
    Chemicals 0 
    Service 1.70*** 
NB:  ***p<0.001, **p<0.01; data are drawn from Variable 17. 
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Table 6.9:  Multiple Comparisons of the Significant Underlying Low Cost Sourcing and Market 
Development Factor of Foreign Parent Company by Industrial Sector (cont) 
Underlying Factor 
 
Industrial Sector 
 Industrial Sector 
Mean 
Difference
 
Electronic Industry 
and Electrical 
Appliance Agriculture -0.23 
    Light  -0.15 
    Metal Products -0.43 
    Chemicals -0.43 
    Service 1.27** 
  
Chemicals, Paper and 
Plastics Agriculture 0.19 
    Light  0.28 
    Metal Products 0 
    Electronic 0.43 
    Service 1.69*** 
  
Service and Public 
Utilities Agriculture -1.50*** 
    Light  -1.42*** 
    Metal Products -1.70*** 
    Electronic -1.27** 
    Chemicals -1.69*** 
NB:  ***p<0.001, **p<0.01; data are drawn from Variable 17. 
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Table 6.10:  Multiple Comparisons of the Significant Underlying Resource Accessing Factor of Foreign 
Parent Company by Industrial Sector 
Underlying Factor Industrial Sector Industrial Sector Mean Difference 
Factor 2: Resource 
Accessing 
Agriculture and Agricultural 
Products Light  -0.28 
    Metal Products 0.03 
    Electronic 0.10 
    Chemicals -0.41 
    Service 1.23** 
  Light Industry Agriculture 0.28 
    Metal Products 0.31 
    Electronic 0.38 
    Chemicals -0.13 
    Service 1.50*** 
  
Metal Products, Machinery and 
Transport Equipment Agriculture -0.03 
    Light  -0.31 
    Electronic 0.07 
    Chemicals -0.44 
    Service 1.19** 
  
Electronic Industry and Electrical 
Appliance Agriculture -0.10 
    Light  -0.38 
    Metal Products -0.07 
    Chemicals -0.51 
    Service 1.12 
  Chemicals, Paper and Plastics Agriculture 0.41 
    Light  0.13 
    Metal Products 0.44 
    Electronic 0.51 
    Service 1.63*** 
  Service and Public Utilities Agriculture -1.23** 
    Light  -1.50*** 
    Metal Products -1.19** 
    Electronic -1.12 
    Chemicals -1.63*** 
NB:  ***p<0.001, **p<0.01; data are drawn from Variable 17. 
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Table 6.11 further indicates that the mean scores of the following individual motives are of 
the greatest value in the chemicals, paper and plastics industrial sector compared to other 
sectors: transfer production to lowest cost location; export base for foreign markets; and 
access to Thai partner’s skilled labour, with mean scores of 4.00, 3.89, and 3.78 
respectively.  From this it might be inferred that the individual motive of production 
transference to the lowest cost location, export base for foreign markets, and access to Thai 
 
Table 6.11:  Mean Scores Comparisons of Selected Individual Strategic Motives of Foreign Parent 
Company by Industrial Sector 
Individual Strategic Motive 
 
Industrial 
Sector 
Mean 
 
S.D. 
 
F-Value/Chi-
Square a 
Transfer production to lowest cost location Agriculture 3.38 1.06   
  Light 3.46 0.88   
  Metal  3.93 0.78   
  Electronic  3.11 1.36   
  Chemicals 4.00 0.71   
  Services 1.75 0.96   
  Total 3.64 1.01 5.71***/15.95**
Export base for foreign market Agriculture 3.75 1.16   
  Light 3.23 1.17   
  Metal  3.80 0.81   
  Electronic  3.00 1.32   
  Chemicals 3.89 0.93   
  Services 1.25 0.50   
  Total 3.52 1.10 6.27***/15.01**
Access Thai partner’s human resources 
(skilled labour) Agriculture 3.25 1.39   
  Light 3.54 0.97   
  Metal  3.00 0.83   
  Electronic  3.22 0.97   
  Chemicals 3.78 0.67   
  Services 1.50 0.58   
  Total 3.14 0.98 4.30**/17.23** 
NB:     (a) Chi-Square, Kruskal Wallis Test     
             SD =  Standard Deviation     
            ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, * p<0.05     
               The data in this table are drawn from Variable 17. 
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Table 6.11:  Mean Scores Comparisons of Selected Individual Strategic Motives of Foreign Parent 
Company by Industrial Sector (cont) 
Individual Strategic Motive 
 
Industrial 
Sector 
Mean 
 
S.D. 
 
F-Value/Chi-
Square a 
Access Thai partner’s natural resource Agriculture 3.38 1.19   
  Light 3.46 0.88   
  Metal  2.89 1.01   
  Electronic  2.56 1.01   
  Chemicals 3.22 1.56   
  Services 1.50 0.58   
  Total 2.95 1.11 2.75*/13.88* 
Access Thai partner’s low cost labour Agriculture 2.75 1.39   
  Light 3.54 0.78   
  Metal  3.20 0.97   
  Electronic  3.00 1.22   
  Chemicals 3.11 0.93   
  Services 1.25 0.50   
  Total 3.09 1.07 3.56**/12.11* 
NB:     (a) Chi-Square, Kruskal Wallis Test     
             SD =  Standard Deviation     
            ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, * p<0.05     
              The data in this table are drawn from Variable 17. 
partner’s skilled labour are the major motives for forming a joint venture entity among 
IJVs in the chemicals, paper and plastics industry.  In addition, the data also reveal that the 
mean scores of IJVs in the metal products, machinery and transport equipment sector are 
the second highest for the following individual strategic motives: transfer production to the 
lowest cost location (3.93), and export base for foreign markets (3.80). 
 
The second greatest mean scores of the individual motive of accessing the Thai partner’s 
skilled labour are found in IJVs in the light industry sector, with 3.54 mean scores and 0.97 
standard deviation.  The evidence further indicates that the individual motive of accessing 
the Thai partner’s natural resources and accessing the Thai partner’s low cost labour are 
the most influential motives for IJVs in the light industry sector, with mean scores of 3.46 
and 3.54 respectively. 
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Table 6.12 shows that two underlying strategic motive factors of Thai parent companies – 
the overseas market expansion factor and the low cost sourcing factor – have significantly 
different mean scores.  The data in Table 6.12 indicate the significance of the mean score 
difference of the underlying overseas market expansion factor with a chi-square value of 
12.96 at 0.05 significance level and 3.67 F-value of the parametric test  at 0.01 significance 
level.  The mean score difference of the low cost sourcing factor has a significance at 95% 
confidence interval with 12.20 chi-square value, and 2.55 F-value of the parametric test. 
 
Table 6.12:  Mean Scores Comparison of the Significant Underlying Factors of Strategic Motives of 
Thai Parent Company by IJV Industrial Sector 
Underlying Factor Industrial Sector Mean S.D. F-Value/Chi-Square a 
Factor 3: Overseas Market 
Expansion 
Agriculture and 
Agricultural Products 3.44 1.05  
  Light Industry 3.27 1.07  
  
Metal Products, 
Machinery and Transport 
Equipment 3.66 0.64  
  
Electronic Industry and 
Electrical Appliance 3.11 0.89  
  
Chemicals, Paper and 
Plastics 3.94 0.98  
  
Service and Public 
Utilities 2.13 0.85  
  Total 3.48 0.89 3.67**/12.96* 
NB:     (a) Chi-Square, Kruskal Wallis Test   
             SD =  Standard Deviation   
             **p<0.01, * p<0.05   
The data in this table are drawn from Variable 18. 
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Table 6.12:  Mean Scores Comparison of the Significant Underlying Factors of Strategic Motives of 
Thai Parent Company by IJV Industrial Sector (cont) 
Underlying Factor Industrial Sector Mean S.D. F-Value/Chi-Square a 
Factor 5: Low Cost Sourcing 
Agriculture and 
Agricultural Products 2.00 1.10  
  Light Industry 2.50 1.04  
  
Metal Products, 
Machinery and Transport 
Equipment 2.94 1.00  
  
Electronic Industry and 
Electrical Appliance 2.50 1.17  
  
Chemicals, Paper and 
Plastics 2.50 0.94  
  
Service and Public 
Utilities 1.50 0.71  
  Total 2.64 1.06 2.55*/12.20* 
NB:     (a) Chi-Square, Kruskal Wallis Test   
             SD =  Standard Deviation   
             **p<0.01, * p<0.05   
               The data in this table are drawn from Variable 18. 
 
Table 6.12 presents a mean score comparison of two significant underlying strategic 
motive factors of the Thai parent companies.  The data indicate that the mean scores of the 
overseas market expansion factors in the chemicals, paper and plastics sector is the highest 
(3.94) compared with other sectors, followed by those in the metal products, machinery 
and transport equipment sector, and those in the agriculture and agricultural products 
industry with mean scores of 3.66 and 3.44 respectively.  Considering the mean scores of 
the underlying low cost sourcing factor, it can be seen that the greatest mean scores of this 
underlying factor fall in the metal products, machinery and transport equipment sector with 
a mean score of 2.94, while the lowest appears in the service and public utilities sector with 
a mere 1.50 mean score. 
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 Table 6.13:  Multiple Comparison of the Significant Underlying Factor of Overseas Market Expansion 
of Thai Parent Company by Industrial Sector 
Underlying Factor Industrial Sector Industrial Sector Mean Difference  
Factor 3: Overseas 
Market Expansion 
Agriculture and Agricultural 
Products Light  0.17 
    Metal Products -0.22 
    Electronic 0.33 
    Chemicals -0.51 
    Service 1.31* 
  Light Industry Agriculture -0.17 
    Metal Products -0.39 
    Electronic 0.16 
    Chemicals -0.68 
    Service 1.14* 
  
Metal Products, Machinery and 
Transport Equipment Agriculture 0.22 
    Light  0.39 
    Electronic 0.54 
    Chemicals -0.29 
    Service 1.53*** 
  
Electronic Industry and Electrical 
Appliance Agriculture -0.33 
    Light  -0.16 
    Metal Products -0.54 
    Chemicals -0.83* 
    Service 0.98* 
  Chemicals, Paper and Plastics Agriculture 0.51 
    Light  0.68 
    Metal Products 0.29 
    Electronic 0.83* 
    Service 1.82*** 
  Service and Public Utilities Agriculture -1.31* 
    Light  -1.14* 
    Metal Products -1.53*** 
    Electronic -0.98* 
    Chemicals -1.82*** 
NB:  ***p<0.001, *p<0.05; data are drawn from Variable 18. 
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Multiple comparisons of the significant underlying strategic motive factors are shown in 
Tables 6.13 and 6.14.  The data in table 6.13 show that the mean scores of the underlying 
factor of overseas market expansion in the service and public utilities sector significantly 
vary from the sectors of agriculture and agricultural products, light industry, and electronic 
and electrical appliance.  These show a significant difference with 95% of confidence 
interval.  Meanwhile, the variation of the mean scores between the service and public 
utilities sector and the sectors of metal products, machinery and transport equipment and of 
chemicals, paper and plastics, show significance at 99.90% confidence interval.  In 
addition, the data reveal that a significant mean score difference can be found between the 
chemicals, paper and plastics sector and the electronic and electrical appliance sector with 
a chi-square value of 0.83 at 95% confidence interval. 
 
Table 6.14:  Multiple Comparison of the Significant Underlying Factor of Low Cost Sourcing of Thai 
Parent Company by Industrial Sector 
Underlying Factor Industrial Sector Industrial Sector Mean Difference  
Factor 5: Low Cost 
Sourcing 
Agriculture and Agricultural 
Products Light  -0.50 
    Metal Products -0.94* 
    Electronic -0.50 
    Chemicals -0.50 
    Service 0.50 
  Light Industry Agriculture 0.50 
    Metal Products -0.44 
    Electronic 0.00 
    Chemicals 0.00 
    Service 1.00 
  
Metal Products, Machinery 
and Transport Equipment Agriculture 0.94* 
    Light  0.44 
    Electronic 0.44 
    Chemicals 0.44 
    Service 1.44** 
 NB:   **p<0.01, *p<0.05   
            The data in this table are drawn from Variable 18. 
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Table 6.14:  Multiple Comparison of the Significant Underlying Factor of Low Cost Sourcing of Thai 
Parent Company by Industrial Sector (cont) 
Underlying Factor Industrial Sector Industrial Sector Mean Difference  
 Factor 5: Low Cost 
Sourcing 
Electronic Industry and 
Electrical Appliance Agriculture 0.50 
    Light  0.00 
    Metal Products -0.44 
    Chemicals 0.00 
    Service 1.00 
  
Chemicals, Paper and 
Plastics Agriculture 0.50 
    Light  0.00 
    Metal Products -0.44 
    Electronic 0.00 
    Service 1.00 
  Service and Public Utilities Agriculture -0.50 
    Light  -1.00 
    Metal Products -1.44** 
    Electronic -1.00 
    Chemicals -1.00 
 NB:   **p<0.01, *p<0.05   
               The data in this table are drawn from Variable 18. 
 
Table 6.14 provides multiple comparisons of the mean scores of the underlying low cost 
sourcing factors in relation to industrial sectors, and it shows that the mean scores in the 
agriculture and agricultural products sector significantly differ from those in the metal 
products, machinery and transport equipment sector with 0.94 mean differences at 0.05 
significance levels. Moreover, a significant mean score difference can also be found 
between the metal products, machinery and transport equipment sector, and the service and 
public utilities sector with 1.44 mean difference at 0.01 significance levels. 
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Table 6.15: Mean Scores Comparison of Selected Individual Strategic Motives of Thai Parent 
Company by Industrial Sector 
Individual Strategic Motive Sector Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
F Value/Chi-
Square a 
Exchange of patents or territories Agriculture 2.5 1.07   
  Light 2.42 0.9   
  Metal 2.98 0.92   
  Electronic 3 0.5   
  Chemicals 3.78 0.97   
  Services 1.75 0.96   
  Total 2.89 0.98 4.08**/16.35**
Avoid difficulties with agents or licensees Agriculture 2.25 0.89   
  Light 3 1.08   
  Metal 3.09 0.92   
  Electronic 3.33 0.87   
  Chemicals 3 1.22   
  Services 1.5 0.58   
  Total 2.94 1.02 3.14*/13.01* 
Maintain position in existing market Agriculture 2.5 1.07   
  Light 3.54 0.97   
  Metal 3.71 0.69   
  Electronic 3.11 0.6   
  Chemicals 3.56 1.13   
  Services 2.75 1.26   
  Total 3.45 0.91 3.79**/13.26* 
Conform to Thai government policies Agriculture 2.63 1.06   
  Light 2.85 1.34   
  Metal 3.09 0.86   
  Electronic 2.89 1.05   
  Chemicals 2.33 1.22   
  Services 1.5 0.58   
  Total 2.84 1.06 2.47*/13.40* 
NB:     (a) Chi-Square, Kruskal Wallis Test  
             * p<0.05,  **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
             The data in this table are drawn from Variable 18. 
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Table 6.15: Mean Scores Comparison of Selected Individual Strategic Motives of Thai Parent 
Company by Industrial Sector (cont) 
Individual Strategic Motive Sector Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
F Value/Chi-
Square a 
Share cost of R&D Agriculture 3.13 1.81   
  Light 3.92 0.76   
  Metal 3.98 0.78   
  Electronic 4.11 0.6   
  Chemicals 4.22 1.09   
  Services 1.75 0.96   
  Total 3.83 1.05 5.58***/12.43* 
Transfer production to lowest cost location Agriculture 2.13 1.13   
  Light 2.62 1.04   
  Metal 3.18 1.09   
  Electronic 2.56 1.13   
  Chemicals 3 1.12   
  Services 1.5 0.58   
  Total 2.84 1.14 3.09*/14.53* 
Export base for foreign market Agriculture 3.5 1.07   
  Light 3.08 1.19   
  Metal 3.64 0.77   
  Electronic 3 1.12   
  Chemicals 3.89 0.93   
  Services 1.5 0.58   
  Total 3.41 1.02 5.26***/15.61**
NB:     (a) Chi-Square, Kruskal Wallis Test  
             * p<0.05,  **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
             The data in this table are drawn from Variable 18. 
Table 6.15 shows selected significant individual strategic motives to form IJVs of Thai 
parent companies, and it reveals that the following seven individual motives have 
significant mean score differences between industrial sectors.  These include motives of 
exchanging patents or territories, avoiding difficulties with agents or licensees, maintaining 
position in existing markets, conforming to Thai government policies, sharing cost of 
R&D, transferring production to the lowest cost location, and finding an exporting base for 
foreign markets where the significant F-value and chi-square values are respectively as 
follows: 4.08/16.35, 3.14/13.01, 3.79/13.26, 2.47/13.40, 5.58/12.43, 3.09/14.53, and 
5.26/15.61. 
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 Overall, the findings of the study are consistent with those which use the same 
methodology in the literature (Selassie, 1995; Glaister and Buckley, 1996; Afriyie, 1988; 
Boateng and Glaister, 2003).  These researchers argue that it is likely that strategic motives 
for firms to form IJVs will vary depending on the industry they wish to enter.  For 
instance, Glaister and Buckley (1996) study IJV formation in the UK and find that a 
number of strategic motives are relatively more important for firms in the manufacturing 
sector than firms in the tertiary sector.  In their study, the underlying factor of technology 
development and the individual motives of exchanging complementary technology, sharing 
R&D costs, producing at the lowest cost location, and exchanging patents/ territories 
appear in principle to be a set of motivating forces more pertinent to the manufacturing 
than to the tertiary sector.  Other motives which vary by industrial sector include the 
market power factor and the individual motives of competing against a common 
competitor, maintaining position in existing markets, concentrating on higher margin 
business, and reducing competition.  This set of motives is relatively more important for 
IJVs in the manufacturing than in the tertiary sector.  It may be conjectured that IJV 
formation in the manufacturing sector is more a reactive response to competitive pressure 
than is the case for IJV formation in the tertiary sector (Glaister and Buckley, 1996).  
Moreover, Glaister and Buckley (1996) and Boateng and Glaister (2003) also find that the 
relative importance of strategic motives varies most with the sector of IJV activity, 
compared with other characteristics. 
6.2.3:  Strategic Motives and the Nationality of the Foreign Company 
The analysis conducted by this study indicates that the relative importance of strategic 
motives of parent companies for IJV formation does not vary by the nationality of foreign 
firms.  None of the six underlying strategic motive factors of foreign parent companies and 
five underlying strategic motive factors of Thai parent companies has a significant mean 
score difference by the nationality of foreign firms.  A further examination also shows that 
no significant mean score differences of all individual strategic motives of IJV parent 
companies can be found by country of origin of foreign companies. 
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Non-significant variation of the relative importance of strategic motives by nationality of 
IJV foreign parent firms shown in this study confirms the results of Glaister and Buckley 
(1996), which indicate that the relative importance of strategic motives does not vary with 
the nationality of the foreign partner firm.  Their study clearly suggests that the driving 
force of  IJV strategic motivation is substantially the same irrespective of the nationality of 
the foreign partner.  
 
In addition, Boateng and Glaister (2003) hypothesise in their study that a Ghanaian partner 
may trust and choose a foreign partner from a specific country which is able to provide 
particular resources, such as access to finance or a type of technology, in order to enable 
the venture to achieve its tasks or meet its motives.  When forming IJVs, it would be 
expected that such partners would be chosen in preference to potential partners of other 
nationalities.  They do not, however, find these variations in the relative importance of 
strategic motives by nationality of foreign partners. 
6.3  Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The aim of this chapter has been to fufil the second objective of the study: to determine the 
strategic motives of parent companies in forming IJVs.  It is a first attempt to identify and 
explain the key strategic motives for international joint venture formation between foreign 
partner firms and local partner firms in Thailand.  The relative importance of strategic 
motives for forming IJVs is found to be different between foreign and local partner firms. 
 
The findings show that the major strategic motives inducing foreign firms to embark on 
IJV formation in Thailand are intrinsically linked with market and geographical expansion 
and the firms’ strategic position.  The two most prominent strategic motives for foreign 
firms are gaining presence in new markets, and enabling faster entry to markets.  Behind 
these come the motives of competing with common competitors, facilitating international 
expansion, transferring to the lowest cost production location, and finding an export base 
for foreign markets. Clearly they are strongly motivated by considerations of maintaining 
and improving their global competitiveness. 
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Meanwhile, the principal strategic motivations encouraging Thai firms to form IJVs relate 
to technology transfer and sharing cost of investment.  Their most important strategic 
motive is accessing technology through the foreign partner.  This suggests that the learning 
and growth benefits of co-operation are central.  The motive of sharing the cost of R&D is 
ranked second, and sharing cost of investment is ranked third. 
 
A number of previous empirical studies on the strategic motives for IJV formation in other 
regions have shown that there is a significant difference in the relative importance of the 
strategic motives of foreign and local companies.  The finding of this study is consistent 
with the literature.  The analysis indicates that eight motives have significant mean score 
differences.  Such motives consist of transferring production to the lowest cost location, 
sharing investment costs, accessing low cost labour of partners, enabling product 
diversification, sharing cost of R&D, accessing/ exchanging technology through partner, 
exchanging patents or territories, and spreading risks of the project. 
 
When comparing the relative importance of strategic motives of foreign parent firms, the 
findings of this study correspond with those of previous studies.  For instance, the first and 
the second ranked strategic motives in a study of their relative importance for foreign 
partners in IJV formation in Turkey (Tatoglu and Glaister, 2000), gaining presence in new 
markets and enabling faster entry to markets, are exactly the same as in this study. Their 
third ranked motive, however, was maintaining adequate quality control.  To spread risks 
of the project and to achieve economies of scale are ranked fourth and fifth in their study 
respectively. 
 
It emerges from this study, when its findings are compared with those of previous 
empirical studies of different countries, that the strategic motives of local parent firms are 
more diverse than those of foreign companies.  These differences may result from the 
diverse regional features of these various countries in terms of social and cultural 
characteristics, market structure, industrial development, and so forth.  These seem likely 
to account for the variation in the results of the relative importance of particular strategic 
motives for local parent companies in different countries. 
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 This study has considerable implications for the conduct of global corporate strategy.  It 
suggests that foreign firms might be well advised to embark on forming IJVs in a 
developing country only after obtaining a good understanding of their intended partners’ 
strategic motives, which are likely to differ from those of companies in industrial 
countries, if the IJV is to be successful. 
 
The strategic motives of foreign firms to form IJVs with firms in developing countries are 
likely to be expansion of their presence in local markets, and competing and maintaining 
their competitive position in the global market.  IJVs are seen as a means of competing for 
global market share. 
 
The principal motives of Thai firms in entering IJVs are to gain access to the foreign 
partner’s technology and investment capital, but also to increase their market power and 
maximise profits by improving their competitive position. 
 
Since the foreign and local partners forming IJVs have differing, if complementary, 
strategic motives, IJV managers need to be fully aware of these differing strategic motives 
if they are to manage IJVs effectively and fulfil the objectives of their parent companies on 
both sides. 
 
Owing to the potential for statistical overlap among the strategic motives identified, factor 
analysis was conducted to produce a parsimonious set of distinct, non-overlapping strategic 
motives.  The analysis yielded six non-overlapping factors of strategic motives of foreign 
firms, while five underlying factors of strategic motives of the Thai companies were 
produced.  To investigate the fundamental nature and pattern of strategic motives for the 
sample of IJVs, this study analysed strategic motives against two characteristics of the 
samples: industrial sector and national origin of foreign firms. 
  
The findings indicate that the relative importance of different strategic motives varies with 
the sector of the IJV activity, while no variations of strategic motive could be found by 
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national origin of foreign firms.  These findings are consistent with previous empirical 
studies. 
 
The findings in this chapter in respect of the strategic motivation of both local and foreign 
parent companies in forming IJVs contribute both to academic and management 
knowledge as this is an original study of the issue in the context of the ASEAN4 countries. 
It the future, it would be useful to study this issue in other ASEAN4 countries to confirm 
and compare IJV activity in the Southeast Asian region, a unique area which differs from 
other developing countries.  This study also offers a basis for future study of partner 
selection criteria, which is an issue closely associated with strategic motives. 
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Chapter 7 
Parent Companies’ Contributions and Characteristics of 
International Joint Venture Operations in Thailand 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the strategic impetus behind IJV formation of the IJV 
parent companies.  This chapter attempts, by drawing on data obtained in response to 
Questions 22, 23 and 25 in the questionnaire, to answer the third research question posed 
in Chapter 4: what are the contributions parent companies make to IJV firms in Thailand, 
and what is the relationship between those contributions and the characteristics of IJV 
operations?  The literature suggests that these characteristics have an important impact on 
the development of IJVs  (Ouchi, 1979; Kumar and Seth, 1988). 
 
IJV researchers have long been aware of the importance of the contributions which parent 
companies bring to the IJV entity.  A more successful IJV results from synergies achieved 
when the parents pool their resources, capabilities and strengths.  These synergies lead to 
the establishment of an operation in which the total results are greater than the sum of the 
contributions of the partners (Harrigan, 1985; 1986).   Harrigan (1986) comments that it is 
important for there to be symmetry between the objectives of the parent firms, in terms of 
company missions, and of the resources, management skills, and other contributions they 
bring, if a complementary and equitable business relationship is to result.  
 
This chapter presents new data and new empirical insights into the issue of parent firms’ 
contributions.  To date, very few studies have examined this issue in the context of the 
ASEAN4, and the tendency has been to investigate the effect of the parent companies’ 
contributions in specific aspects.  For instance, Blodgett (1991b) examines the relationship 
between the IJV parent firms’ contributions and their equity participation, while 
Kamminga and Van Der Meer-Kooistra (2006) investigate the relationship between the 
IJV parents’ contributions and management control. 
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7.2  Results and Discussion 
The questions in the questionnaire for this study are derived from the extensive review of 
the literature on IJV parent contributions presented in Chapter 3, and from the guidance of 
previous research relating to the issue of partner contributions (for example, Blodgett, 
1991b).  In Questions 22 and 23 the target respondents, and especially IJV managers, were 
asked to rank the extent of their parent companies’ contributions in different areas to the 
IJV on a five-point Likert scale (where 1 stands for “not at all”, and 5 means “maximal”). 
 
The findings of the present study reveal that the contributions of the Thai parent company 
to IJVs are mainly linked to the provision of knowledge of the local environment and 
marketing, while the main contributions of the foreign parent firm relate to technology and 
know-how transfer.  Table 7.1 shows, on the basis of responses to Question 23, the mean 
score rank order of the contributions of Thai parent companies’ activities to IJVs.  The data 
indicate that six types of contributions have mean scores higher than the median value of 3 
of the five-point scales, and that the leading contribution of Thai parent companies to IJVs 
is facilitating business opportunities and targeting market identification.  This has the 
highest mean score of 3.39.  The second equal most important contribution of Thai parent 
companies is workforce training together with facilitating government support and 
permissions with equal mean scores of 3.34.  The contribution of plant design, technology 
and construction is ranked fourth (3.23), followed by domestic financing (3.22), and 
providing advice on business strategy (3.21) respectively.  
 
It is not surprising that the main contribution of the Thai parent firms to IJVs is in terms of 
local market knowledge and marketing, human resource management, and knowledge of 
local government regulation and law.  This is the kind of knowledge and resources 
supplied by local parent firms indentified in the literature (for example, by Julian, 2004).   
 
More surprising is the fact that plant design, technology and construction ranks relatively 
high among the contributions of Thai parent firms, since the literature indicates that this 
tends to be the kind of contribution made by parents from a developed country, which may 
be expected to have technology superior to that of local parents in developing countries 
(Beamish and Bank, 1987).  A possible explanation of this result may be that plant design 
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and building technology are less complex than the technologies which are the subject of 
research and development of a new product, so that a Thai company can contribute this 
type of technology to the IJV.  The construction industry is one of the fastest growing 
industrial sectors in Thailand (Bank of Thailand, 2000), so Thai parent companies may 
well have business links enabling them to provide the expertise for efficient plant 
construction. 
 
The following individual contribution areas have lower mean scores than the median value, 
although their values are still higher than the mean of the five-point scale (2.5).  These 
consist of improvement and adaptation of new management techniques (2.95), continuous 
technological knowledge inflow (2.78), exporting (2.75), obtaining foreign financing 
(2.70), importing capital equipment (2.67), importing intermediates (2.64), improvement 
and adaptation of new production techniques (2.64), and conducting research and 
development of the product (2.61).   This means that Thai parent firms are less likely to 
provide contributions in these areas to IJVs, especially technology transfer, conducting of 
R&D, and technology development, and is consistent with the literature discussed earlier. 
 
The mean score rank order of the foreign parent companies’ contributions to the IJVs is 
shown in Table 7.2, which draws on responses to Question 22.  The results reveal that most 
of the individual contributions have mean scores above the median value of 3 of the five-
point scales.  The most prominent contribution of the foreign parent companies to the IJVs 
is continuous supply of technological knowledge, which has the highest mean score of 
3.86; followed by plant design, technology and construction (3.84); improvement and 
adaptation of new production techniques (3.63); conducting research, and development of 
the product (3.59); and importing capital equipment (3.52).  This indicates that foreign 
parent firms are most likely to contribute in Thailand through technology transfer, product 
and technology development, and R&D.  
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Table 7.1:  Thai Parent Companies’ Contributions to IJVs. 
Contribution Area Rank Mean S.D. 
Facilitating opportunity and market identification 1 3.39 1.00 
Workforce training 2= 3.34 1.15 
Facilitating government support and permits 2= 3.34 1.25 
Plant design, technology and construction 4 3.23 1.15 
Obtaining domestic financing 5 3.22 1.20 
Advice on business strategy 6 3.21 1.06 
Improvement and adaptation of new management techniques 7 2.95 1.09 
Continuous technological knowledge inflow 8 2.78 1.19 
Exporting 9 2.75 1.18 
Obtaining foreign financing 10 2.70 1.12 
Importing capital equipment 11 2.67 1.15 
Importing intermediates 12= 2.64 1.18 
Improvement and adaptation of new production techniques 12= 2.64 1.06 
Conducting research and development of the product 14 2.61 1.14 
NB:  1.  The Mean is the average on a scale raging from 1 = ‘not at all’ to 5 = ‘most’ 
        2.  SD = Standard Deviation; data in this table are drawn from Variable 23. 
 
In sixth place in the ranking of mean scores of the foreign parent companies’ contributions 
to IJVs are two contributions – exporting, and obtaining foreign financing – with an equal 
mean score of 3.51.  Ranked eighth is advice on business strategy (3.31).  The ninth to 
fourteenth ranks are as follows: improvement and adaptation of new management 
techniques (3.35); perceiving business opportunity and target market identification (3.27); 
workforce training (3.16), importing intermediates (3.15); obtaining domestic financing 
(2.83); and getting government support and permits (2.59) respectively. 
 
These findings are consistent with those from previous studies, especially in respect of IJV 
formation between firms in developing countries and those in developed countries.  For 
instance, Beamish and Banks (1987) argue that foreign parent companies from 
industrialised countries generally provide firm-specific knowledge regarding technology, 
management and capital markets to IJV firms, while local IJV parent firms provide 
location-specific knowledge regarding the host country markets, marketing infrastructure 
and political conditions.  From the sharing of knowledge and pooling of resources through 
the IJV mode, the foreign parent companies are able to reduce their uncertainty associated 
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with market entry to a lower long term average cost than through traditional hierarchical 
and market approaches.  From this perspective, Beamish and Banks (1987) point out that 
the IJV parent firms have very little incentive to behave opportunistically, and the derived 
condition of information matching due to uncertainty and opportunism would not arise. 
 
   Table 7.2:  Foreign Parent Companies’ Contributions to IJVs 
Contribution Area Rank Mean S.D. 
Continuous technological knowledge inflow 1 3.86 0.99 
Plant design, technology and construction 2 3.84 1.05 
Improvement and adaptation of new production techniques 3 3.63 1.10 
Conducting research, and development of the product 4 3.59 1.13 
Importing capital equipment 5 3.52 1.14 
Exporting 6= 3.51 1.12 
Obtaining foreign financing 6= 3.51 1.14 
Advice on business strategy 8 3.31 1.12 
Improvement and adaptation of new management techniques 9 3.35 1.09 
Facilitating opportunity and market identification 10 3.27 1.01 
Workforce training 11 3.16 1.02 
Importing intermediates 12 3.15 1.19 
Obtaining domestic financing 13 2.83 1.19 
Getting government support and permits 14 2.59 1.08 
 
  NB:  1.  The Mean is the average on a scale raging from 1 = ‘not at all’ to 5 = ‘most’ 
           2.  SD = Standard Deviation; data in this table are drawn from Variable 22. 
In addition, the study of the firm-specific advantages of overseas firms in Thailand by 
Sibunruang (1986), which observes parent contributions to subsidiaries and the 
characteristics and performance of subsidiaries, indicates that substantial important 
contributions are made by foreign firms in respect of the following functions: machinery, 
production techniques, and international marketing.  Less important, but still substantial, 
contributions are equity and management know-how.  The findings of Sibunruang (1986) 
also reveal that contributions are likely to be similar even when firms are differentiated by 
marketing orientation or by industry.  When tested across the nationality of the foreign 
firms, there are significant differences in the provision of financial resources and foreign 
marketing and management know-how between foreign firms from developing countries 
and those from developed countries.  It is believed that this aspect of the contribution of 
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parent companies to IJVs, especially in the ASEAN4 context, would merit further study in 
the future. 
Table 7.3:  Factor Analysis of the Thai Parent Companies’ Contributions to IJVs 
Factors 
 
 
Factor 
Load 
 
Eigen 
Value 
 
% 
Variance 
Explain 
Cum 
Percent 
 
Cronbach 
Alpha 
 
Factor 1:  Knowledge of Local 
Environment and Marketing Contribution   4.22 38.33 38.33 0.91 
Facilitating opportunity and market 
identification 0.66       
Obtaining domestic financing 0.82       
Getting government support and permits 0.76       
Exporting 0.67       
Importing intermediates 0.71       
Importing capital equipment 0.60       
Advice on business strategy 0.55       
Factor 2:  Technology Transfer and 
Management Know-How Contribution   3.76 34.22 72.55 0.94 
Continuous technological knowledge inflow 0.87       
Improvement and adaptation of new 
management techniques 0.76       
Improvement and adaptation of new 
production techniques 0.87       
Conducting research and development of the 
product 0.89       
NB: Principal component factor analysis with  
        varimax rotation             
        K-M-O Measure of  Sampling Adequacy = 0.89    
        Bartlett's Test of Sphericity = 822.608, p<0.000    
         The data in this table are drawn from Variable 23. 
 
 
The preliminary analysis indicates that a number of the individual contribution variables of 
Thai parent companies correlate among themselves.  Accordingly, exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) with varimax rotation is then used to eliminate the relatedness of the 
variables.  Content analysis was conducted to purify the uncovered factors because the 
items measuring the same factor must have consistently substantive meanings.  Items 
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which have inconsistently substantive meanings with the factor or which have low factor 
loadings are therefore removed from further analyses.  The content analysis process results 
in the elimination of three individual contributions: plant design, technology, and 
construction; workforce training; and obtaining foreign financing. 
 
The remaining 11 individual contributions are again factor analysed and produce two 
underlying factors which explain a total of 72.55 percent of observed variances as shown 
in Table 7.3.  An internal reliability test indicates strong Cronbach alpha value (more than 
 
Table 7.4: Factor Analysis of Foreign Parent Companies’ Contributions to IJVs 
Factors 
 
 
Factor 
Load 
 
Eigen 
Value 
 
% 
Variance 
Explain 
Cum 
Percent 
 
Cronbach 
Alpha 
 
Factor 1:  Technology Transfer and 
Marketing Strategy Contribution   3.52 39.07 39.07 0.89 
Conducting research and development of the 
product 0.78        
Advice on business strategy 0.77        
Improvement and adaptation of new 
management techniques 0.76        
Continuous technological knowledge inflow 0.75        
Improvement and adaptation of new production 
techniques 0.72        
Facilitation of opportunity and market 
identification 0.72        
           
Factor 2:  Outsourcing and Business 
Facilitating Contribution   2.66 29.51 68.58 0.83 
Importing intermediates 0.88        
Exporting 0.81        
Importing capital equipment 0.77         
NB:  Principal component factor analysis with varimax rotation. 
K-M-O Measure of Sampling Adequacy = 0.87, Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity= 437.35, p<0.000 
The data in this table are drawn from Variable 22. 
 
0.90) for the purified multi-item factors, identifying high reliability for an exploratory 
study of this nature.  Two underlying factors are labelled as knowledge of local 
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environment and marketing contribution; and technology transfer and management know-
how contribution. 
 
Table 7.4 shows factor analysis outcomes of foreign parent companies’ contributions to the 
IJVs, and factor analysis is undertaken to produce a set of parsimoniously distinct non-
overlapping factors.  Following the purification stage, five individual contributions were 
removed from the analysis.  These consist of workforce training; getting government 
support and permits; obtaining domestic financing; plant design, technology and 
construction; and obtaining foreign financing.  The existing nine individual contributions 
are again factor analysed and produce two factors which explain a total of 68.58 percent of 
the observed variances.  Cronbach alphas of the two underlying factors with the values of 
0.89 and 0.83 indicate high reliability.  Indicated by the value items that load on them, the 
two factors are labeled as technology transfer and market strategy contribution; and 
outsourcing and business facilitating contribution. 
 
Table 7.5:  Characteristics of IJV Operation  
Aspect Mean S.D. 
Human resource management and recruitment 3.49 0.99 
Compensation policy and practices 3.47 1.04 
Accounting system and practice 3.39 1.10 
Costing management and costing system 3.34 1.06 
Budgeting 3.27 0.99 
Training and development 3.24 1.01 
Management information system 3.23 1.01 
Strategy formulation 3.06 1.04 
Price setting system 2.94 1.13 
Marketing 2.86 1.08 
Quality control 2.67 1.10 
Production process 2.65 1.17 
Product research and development 2.47 1.13 
  NB:  1.  The mean is the average on a scale raging from:  1 = ‘exactly the same as the foreign parent company’; 
              2 = ‘likely the same as the foreign parent company’; 3 = ‘combination of both parent companies’ procedure’; 
              4 = ‘likely the same as the Thai parent company’, 5 = ‘exactly the same as the Thai parent company’ 
  2.  SD = Standard Deviation 
The data in this table are drawn from Variable 25. 
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Table 7.5 shows the mean scores of the characteristics of IJV operation, on the basis of 
responses to Question 25.  It indicates that the three highest mean scores include human 
resource management and recruitment (3.49); compensation policy and practices (3.47); 
and accounting system and practice (3.39).  It can be inferred that these three functional 
practices are likely similar to those of the Thai parent companies, since the respondents 
assess their perception on the similarity of the characteristics of the IJV operation based on 
the 5-point Likert scales where 1 means ‘exactly the same as the foreign parent company’; 
2 means ‘likely the same as the foreign parent company’; 3 means ‘combination of both 
parent companies’ procedures’; 4 means ‘likely the same as the Thai parent company’; 5 
means ‘exactly the same as the Thai parent company’.  The higher the mean scores, the 
more similar IJV operation is to the Thai parent companies. 
 
On the other hand, the data show that the group of practices which have the lower mean 
scores are product research and development (2.47); production process (2.65); and quality 
control (2.67).  This group of practices is similar to that of the foreign parent companies. 
 
 
Table 7.6:  Pearson Correlation Matrix Between Underlying Contribution Factors (Independent 
Variable)  and Characteristics of IJV Operation (Dependent Variable) 
Variable A B C D E 
A.   Characteristics of IJV Operation 1         
B. Underlying Factor  of  Knowledge of Local 
Environment and Marketing Contribution (Thai parent 
firm)  0.38** 1      
C. Underlying Factor of Technology Transfer and 
Management Know-How Contribution (Thai parent firm) 0.40** 0.00 1     
D. Underlying Factor of Technology Transfer and 
Marketing Strategy Contribution (foreign parent firm) -0.20* 0.00 0.02 1   
E. Underlying Factor of Outsourcing and Business 
Facilitating Contribution (foreign parent firm) -0.11 0.19 0.00 0.00 1 
NB: **p<0.01, *p<0.05; data in this table are drawn from Variables 22, 23, 
and 25)    
 
Since this study attempts to investigate the relationship between the underlying 
contribution factors and the characteristics of IJV operations, correlation coefficients have 
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been computed to study the relationship between them.  Table 7.6 presents the correlation 
matrix between the underlying factors of parent company contributions and the 
characteristics of IJV operations, and it indicates that both underlying factors of the Thai 
parent company contribution, namely the underlying factor of knowledge of local 
environment and marketing contribution; and the underlying factor of technology transfer 
and management know-how contribution, correlate positively with the characteristics of 
IJV operation.  These are shown to have 0.38 and 0.40 Pearson coefficient correlation 
values at 0.01 significance levels.   
 
Table 7.7:   Multiple Regression Result Between the Underlying Contribution Factors and  
Characteristics of IJV Operation 
Variable 
 
 
Unstandardised 
Coefficients 
 
      Beta 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
T-Statistic 
 
 
Constant 39.9   42.85*** 
 
Underlying Factor  of  Knowledge of 
Local Environment and Marketing 
Contribution (Thai parent firm) 3.88 0.36 3.95*** 
  
Underlying Factor of Technology Transfer 
and Management Know-How Contribution 
(Thai parent firm) 4.24 0.42 4.57*** 
  
Underlying Factor of Technology Transfer 
and Marketing Strategy Contribution 
(foreign parent  firm) -2.46 -0.23 2.55* 
  
R Squared  0.33     
  
Adjusted R Squared 0.31     
  
F-Value 13.51***     
 
NB: ***p<0.001, *p<0.05;   Dependent Variable: Characteristics of IJV Operation,  Durbin- 
              Watson=1.95; data in this table are drawn from Variables 22, 23, and 25. 
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 Similarly, the analysis indicates that one of the underlying factors of foreign parent 
company contribution, the underlying factor of technology transfer and marketing strategy 
contribution, correlates negatively with the characteristics of IJV operation.  It shows -0.20 
Pearson coefficient correlation values at 0.05 significance levels in Table 7.6.  This 
outcome means the bivariate relationship of foreign parent companies’ contributions and 
the characteristics of IJV operation yields a positive trend, since respondents assessed the 
characteristics of the IJV operational practices they perceived by ranking on a 5-point 
Likert   scale   ranging   from   1 to 5.     1 stands for ‘exactly the same as the foreign parent 
company’ at one end of the scale and 5 means ‘exactly the same as the Thai parent 
company’ at the other end.  The lower the mean scores, the higher the similarity of the 
characteristics of the IJV operation to those of the foreign parent companies.  In this 
respect, when the mean scores of the foreign parent companies’ contributions are higher, 
the mean scores of the characteristics of IJV operation will be lower.  This means that the 
greater the contribution of the foreign parent company in the IJVs, the more similar the 
characteristics of the IJV operation will be to those of the foreign parent companies. 
 
In addition to studying the relationship of the variables with the correlation analysis,  
multiple regression was conducted to ascertain the multivariate relationship between the 
independent variables and the dependent variables as shown in Table 7.7.  This is because 
numerous IJV researchers argue that the true relationship of the variables must be proved 
with both the bivariate relationship test and the multivariate relationship test (for example, 
Sim and Ali, 1998; Demirbag and Mirza, 2000; and Boateng and Glaister, 2002). 
 
The multiple regression analysis indicates that an F-value of 13.51 is significant (p<0.001), 
meaning that at least one independent variable has an influence over the dependent 
variable.  The regression can explain 31% of the variation of the dependent variable: the 
characteristics of IJV operation.  The results indicate that the independent variables (three 
underlying factors) have an influence over the dependent variable (the characteristics of 
IJV operation).  
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Two underlying factors of the Thai parent firm, the underlying factor of knowledge of 
local environment and marketing contribution; and the underlying factor of technology 
transfer and management know-how contribution, have a positive effect on the 
characteristics of IJV operation at 0.01 significance levels (beta=0.36 and beta=0.42). 
Meanwhile, the foreign parent company’s contribution has a negative impact on the 
characteristics of IJV operation at 0.05 significant levels (Beta= -0.23).  However, in fact, 
this is a positive relationship as explained above. 
 
These outcomes confirm the earlier findings through the bivariate relationship (Table 7.6) 
and make it possible to conclude that the IJV parent companies’ contributions affect the 
characteristics of IJVs’ operation.  That is, the greater the extent of the contribution, i.e. 
resources, made by the parent companies on IJVs’ operations, the closer the similarity of 
the characteristics of IJVs’ operations will be to those of their parents.  This provides a 
new empirical insight, especially in the context of the ASEAN4 countries, and provides 
support for the literature, especially the strategic alliance evolution paradigm of Lorange 
and Roos (1993) as presented earlier in Chapter 3, since they view IJVs as organic entities 
which grow and develop naturally, influenced by the contributions of their parent 
companies.  They suggest that the closeness of the relationship, together with the similarity 
between the IJVs’ operational practices, to those of their parent firms, gradually decreases 
as IJVs “grow up”. 
 
In this paradigm, Lorange and Roos (1993) suggest that an IJV firm needs to receive 
ongoing input from its “parents” to enable it to develop from being a dependent child into a 
functioning adult entity.  In its early stages the IJV entity needs to be stimulated if it is to 
grow and evolve.  Comparing the birth and growth of an IJV firm with development of a 
child implies that the strategic relationship with its parents will change over time from total 
dependence to complete, or almost complete, independence, and that this process needs to 
be studied. 
 
There are several reasons why the IJV firm is likely to follow this evolutionary pattern.  A 
learning process typically allows unique traits of each parent to be picked up by the IJV 
and incorporated into its organisation.  The IJV will often find itself under pressure to 
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adapt to new opportunities and threats in its competitive arena.  This often takes time and 
effort, and may be held back if extensive consultation and coordination with both “parents” 
is required. 
 
The IJV may in any case need to develop an identity of its own in order to attract, retain, 
and motivate a high quality work force.  As the parents become more confident of their 
relationship with each other and the IJV they may feel able to allow it greater autonomy. 
 
As described in Chapter 3, Lorange and Roos (1993) argue that IJVs typically evolve 
through three phases, gradually moving away from the situation where their strategy and 
decision making are based on a parent company’s perspective until it becomes an “adult” 
independent organisation with a strategic alliance. 
 
During the first phase the IJV can be seen as little more than a vehicle for a strategic 
alliance between the parents, each of whom plays an active role.  Typically, these are 
complementary, with one partner providing technology and the other contributing market 
contacts and distribution channels.  At this stage, most of the IJV’s activities are carried 
out by one partner or the other and it can be seen as little more than a framework for 
cooperation at this early stage. 
 
After a while the IJV will typically evolve into a second phase where one partner becomes 
more dominant, while the IJV takes over more of the value-creating functions on its own.   
A third phase of evolution will often see the IJV becoming a more autonomous, 
independent unit. 
 
Lorange and Roos (1993) argue that it is very important to understand the basis on which a 
particular IJV has been established, and to have some knowledge of the ways in which it is 
likely to evolve and the pressures it may face.  If the need to allow it to evolve is ignored, 
avoidable stresses and strains may lead to its being needlessly terminated. 
 
The preliminary analysis of this study indicates that the average age of the IJV samples 
involved is 13 years.  A positive correlation has been revealed between the contribution of 
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IJV parent firms and the characteristics of the IJV operation.  That is, the greater the 
contribution made by parent companies to the IJVs’ operations, the greater is the similarity 
between the characteristics of the IJVs’ operations and those of their parents.  It can be 
inferred that most of the IJV samples in this study are likely to be “second phase”, where 
after a while one parent is likely to become increasingly dominant.  Possibly the local 
partner, assisting with marketing and physically located closer, may become more directly 
involved.  Alternatively, the foreign partner who provides the technology may become 
dominant if new technological developments increase its role.  In either case, in the 
interests of efficiency the IJV is likely to become increasingly independent of one of its 
parents at least. 
 
In the case of Thailand, it seems more likely that the Thai firm will become dominant, and 
Chapter 5 has shown that the majority of Thai partners are active and major shareholders in 
IJVs due to government regulations.  However, it needs to be borne in mind that the 
evolution of each stage of each firm is unique.  Where one firm may take a long time to 
pass to the next stage, another might do so rapidly.  This depends on such factors as the 
IJV’s industrial sector, the intensity of competition in the market, state of technological 
development, the relationship with each parent, and the policy and strategy of the IJV 
parent firms. 
 
Certain implications for managers emerge from this study.  During the second phase of the 
IJV’s evolution its manager needs the ability not only to draw on the resources 
(contributions) of each parent company, but also to know which of them is dominant, 
which functions they are dominant in, and to satisfactorily co-ordinate the work of the IJV 
with both parents.  In other words, he/she needs in this second phase to know how to 
combine and complement the contributions received from the parent firms and to avoid or 
resolve conflict with both sides at the same time if it occurs.  Ability to co-ordinate is a 
crucial skill for IJV managers in this phase. 
7.3  Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The main objective of this chapter has been to identify the principal contributions of Thai 
and foreign parent companies to IJV firms operating in Thailand, and to examine the 
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relationship between those contributions and the characteristics of IJV operation in the 
context of the ASEAN4 countries, and especially Thailand.  This will fulfil the third 
objective of this study presented in Chapter 1. This chapter presents new data and new 
empirical insights into the nature of parent firms’ contributions.  To date, very few studies 
have been conducted into this issue in the context of the ASEAN4, and there is a need to 
investigate whether the effect of parent companies’ contributions in these countries differs 
from what has been found in this study. 
 
The findings show the main contributions of Thai parent companies to be in providing 
knowledge of the local business environment and marketing.  The most important 
contributions are facilitation and market identification; workforce training; and assisting 
with the obtaining of government support and permits.  The main contributions of the 
foreign parent companies are in the areas of technology and transfer of know-how.  The 
findings show continuous technological knowledge inflow to be the most valuable 
contribution of foreign parent companies, followed by plant design, technology and 
construction; and the improvement and adaptation of new production techniques 
respectively. 
 
These results are consistent with the literature, with a number of researchers finding that 
foreign parent companies from industrialised countries tend to contribute “firm-specific” 
knowledge of technology, management and capital markets, while local parent companies 
provide “location-specific” knowledge of the host country markets, marketing 
infrastructure and political conditions.  The present study also confirms the study of firm-
specific benefits contributed by overseas firms in Thailand by Sibunruang (1986), which 
indicated that foreign firms made important contributions in terms of machinery, 
production techniques, and international marketing.  Less important, but still significant, 
were contributions of equity and management know-how. 
 
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using varimax rotation was used to group correlated 
independent variables into a single category.  This method resulted in the identification of 
two underlying factors in the contribution of the Thai parent firms: knowledge of local 
environment and marketing contribution; and technology transfer and management know-
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how contribution.  The EFA technique also created the following two underlying 
contribution factors of the foreign parent companies: technology transfer and market 
strategy contribution; and outsourcing and business facilitating contribution. 
 
This study seeks to discover the relationship between the independent variables created by 
the factor analysis (the underlying factors) and the dependent variable of the characteristics 
of the IJV operation.  After analysis with the bivariate and multivariate test via the 
correlation analysis and the regression analysis respectively, the outcomes indicate that the 
underlying factors positively correlate with the characteristics of IJV operation.  In other 
words, the IJV parent companies’ contributions affect the characteristics of IJV operation.  
The greater the contribution (resources) provided by the parent companies to an IJV’s 
operations, the greater the similarity of the characteristics of its operations to those of its 
parents.  This provides a new insight in the context of the ASEAN4 countries.  It is 
consistent with the literature, especially the strategic alliance evaluation perspective of 
Lorange and Roos (1993) which views IJVs as organic entities greatly influenced by the 
contributions of their parent companies but also liable to grow and develop like a human 
child 
 
They propose that the growth of IJVs from infancy to adulthood can be divided into three 
phases, of which the first, childhood, sees the IJV dependent on the equal but 
complementary contributions of its parents.  In the second stage one partner make be 
expected to become more dominant, while the IJV becomes more independent.  A third 
phase of evolution, where the IJV becomes a more autonomous, independent entity, is 
often the natural next step. 
 
Most of the IJV samples in this study appear to be “second stage”.  The implications for 
managers is that they have to demonstrate considerable ability in coordinating the different 
but complementary contributions and aims of the parent companies, bearing in mind their 
aims, their changing weight and influence in the IJV.  An ability to avoid, or resolve, 
conflict situations is essential. 
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This study is an original attempt to establish the contribution of foreign and host country 
IJV parent companies to IJVs in Thailand and also to establish whether there is a 
relationship between those contributions and the characteristics of IJV operations in 
Southeast Asian countries.  In general, the present findings are consistent with the 
evolutionary paradigm. 
There is scope for further comparative research into this issue in respect of Thailand and 
the other ASEAN4 countries, investigating IJVs in particular sectors (especially the service 
sector), or in more highly competitive business environments (since most of the IJVs in 
this study were in manufacturing).  These factors and the personal characteristics of IJV 
managers may stimulate IJVs to “mature” more rapidly, to assimilate expertise from their 
parents, and to show more individual operational characteristics at any early stage. 
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Chapter 8 
Performance Assessment and Performance Determinants 
of International Joint Ventures in Thailand 
8.1  Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present IJV performance assessment in the context of the 
ASEAN4 countries, especially Thailand, and to analyse the determinants which affect IJV 
performance. This will fufil the fourth and fifth objectives of this study, as presented in 
Chapter 1.  In addition, this chapter attempts to investigate whether IJV performance varies 
with the strategic motives of parent companies as presented in Chapter 6, and the 
characteristics of IJV operation shown in Chapter 7.  The present chapter draws on 
responses to Questions 6, 7, and 8 (IJV survival); Questions 9, 10, and 11 (IJV stability);  
Questions 3 and 26 (IJV duration);  Questions 30 and 31 (subjective measurement of IJV 
performance).  As regards performance determinants, the data are drawn from the 
following variables:  Question 3 (IJV age);  Questions 33 and 34 (IJV parent companies’ 
collaborative experience);  Question 29 (size symmetry of the IJV parent companies);  
Question 35 (IJV organisational learning);  Question 4 (number of IJV parent companies;  
Question 13 (business linkage between the IJV and parent companies, and between the 
parent companies themselves);  Question 36 (IJV commitment);  Question 37 
(commitment of the IJV parent companies);  Question 28.2 (similarity of national culture);  
and Question 28.1 (similarity of organisational culture). 
 
The literature contains many studies of IJV performance in developing countries, including 
the Asia Pacific region.  There are, however, relatively few studies of IJV performance and 
its determinants in the context of Southeast Asia, although IJV formation in this region has 
increased considerably during the last three decades (Julian and O’Cass, 2004). 
 
To date, there has been continuing disagreement among IJV researchers about the criteria 
appropriate for assessing IJV performance.  In order to overcome the limitations of the 
various IJV performance measurement approaches, an eclectic approach, using a variety of 
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indicators to measure IJV performance, has been adopted in this study.   One of the 
premises mentioned at the outset was that ASEAN countries are different in a number of 
respects which set them apart from other developing countries.  These differences included 
the background to economic development, the growth of foreign direct investment, social 
and cultural characteristics of the region, and the various political systems.  The view was 
taken that the results and implications of IJV performance determinants in studies of other 
developing countries might not be wholly applicable or relevant to the current situation in 
the ASEAN4 countries, and that has been the approach to this study of IJV performance 
determinants in Thailand, 
 
This chapter, accordingly, presents new data and empirical insights into IJV performance 
assessment and determinants in the context of the ASEAN4 countries, and in particular of 
Thailand. 
8.2 Results and Discussion 
8.2.1 IJV Performance Assessment 
The questions in the questionnaire used in this study were derived from the review of 
literature on IJV performance assessment presented in Chapter 3, and from the insights 
provided by such previous research as Geringer and Hebert (1991); Sim and Ali (1998); 
Glaister and Buckley (1998); and Boateng and Glaister (2002).  As mentioned in Chapter 4 
on research methodology, subjective IJV performance assessment was measured using a 
five-point Likert scale, following the practice of such IJV researchers as Geringer and 
Hebert (1991);  and Glaister and Buckley (1998), where 1 stands for “very dissatisfied”, 
and 5 means “very satisfied”.  The data are drawn from Question 31. 
 
Following the practice of such previous studies as Sim and Ali (1998); and Boateng and 
Glaister (2002), IJV performance was also measured using a composite index (an 
arithmetic average).  Respondents assessed performance of five IJV activities on a five-
point Likert scale, where 1 denoted “much worse than expected” and 5 denoted “much 
better than expected”.  The five activities were marketing; finance; strategy; technology 
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transfer and R&D; and human resource management. These data are drawn from Question  
30. 
 
While the objective performance assessment of survival, stability, and duration follows the 
practice adopted by Geringer and Hebert (1991), and Glaister and Buckley (1998), survival 
has been measured using a dichotomous variable based on the survival or non-survival 
(termination) of the IJV from the time of its formation until the data collection point in 
2006. These data are derived from Questions 6, 7, and 8. For stability, it was measured 
with a dichotomous variable based on whether changes in the IJV’s equity shareholding 
had occurred since its formation. The data are obtained from Questions 9, 10, and 11. 
Duration was measured by the number of years between the IJV’s formation and either its 
termination or the collection of performance data, whichever came first.  Also, respondents 
were asked whether their IJV had a dissolution plan or not, and this was measured with a 
dichotomous variable to provide more detailed information on the duration of IJVs.  The 
data are drawn from Questions 3 and 26. 
 
The findings relating to IJV performance assessment in this study follow. 
 
8.2.1.1  Objective and Subjective Measures of Performance Assessment 
The findings of this study reveal that there is a positive relationship between objective and 
subjective IJV performance assessment.  The results show that the relationship between the 
subjective measure of satisfaction (Question 31) and the objective measure of survival 
(Question 6) is strongest compared with the correlation between other objective and 
subjective criteria. The outcomes in Table 8.1 indicate that the survival measure has a 
positive correlation with the subjective measure of the foreign parent companies’ 
satisfaction measured by IJV managers, with a Spearman correlation coefficient of 0.31 
and Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.33 at 0.01 significance levels.  It also has a positive 
correlation with the subjective measure of the satisfaction of IJV managers, which gives a 
Spearman coefficient value of 0.24 (Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.23) at 0.05 
significance levels. 
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These results suggest that the higher the IJV survival rate, the greater the IJV satisfaction.  
Since the questionnaire asks respondents, “Has the IJV been terminated?”, the prospective 
answer can be only yes or no.  These answers have been coded as: 1 stands for ‘yes’ and 2 
equals ‘no’ (this is a dichotomous variable).  While the coding of the subjective measure of 
IJV satisfaction is based on a 5-point Likert scale, where the lowest number of 1 stands for 
‘very dissatisfied’, and the highest number of 5 means ‘very satisfied’.   
 
Table 8.1:  Spearman Correlations Between Objective and Subjective IJV Performance Evaluation 
Subjective Performance Evaluation Objective Performance Evaluation 
 Survival Stability Duration 
Satisfaction View        
Foreign parent’s satisfaction measured by IJV Manager **0.31(**0.33) 0.07 (0.08) -0.02 (-0.04) 
Thai parent’s satisfaction measured by IJV Manager 0.14 (0.16) 0.07 (0.08) 0.07 (0.10) 
Satisfaction measure of IJV Manager *0.24 (*0.23) 0.11 (0.08) 0.04 (0.03) 
NB:  ** p< 0.01, *p< 0.05, Pearson Correlation in parenthesis 
The data in this table are drawn from Variables 3, 6, 10, and 31. 
 
However, the outcomes show that there is no significant correlation between the subjective 
measure of IJV satisfaction and the objective measure of IJV stability and IJV duration.  
  
These findings are consistent with those of previous studies which find a significant 
positive relationship between the objective measure and subjective measure of IJV 
performance assessment.  Of the objective performance measures identified, only survival 
has been found to have a significant set of correlations with overall subjective performance 
assessment.  In broad terms, this supports the findings of Geringer and Hebert (1991) and 
Glaister and Buckley (1998) who report that the survival-based measure shows the 
strongest correlations with subjective performance measures.  This suggests that the IJVs 
perceived to be more satisfactory are more likely to remain in operation than those IJVs 
assessed as less satisfactory.  In comparison, the objective performance measures of 
stability and duration cannot be found to have significant relationships with the subjective 
measure in this study and also in the study of Glaister and Buckley (1998).  This contrasts 
considerably with the findings of Geringer and Hebert (1991) as they report a number of 
relatively strong and significant correlations between the objectively based measures of 
stability and duration and the subjective performance measures. 
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 Geringer and Hebert (1991) examine the relationship between objective and subjective 
performance measures in the context of IJVs whose parent firms are from developed 
countries.  In contrast, this study, like that of Glaister and Buckley (1998), investigates the 
relationship of these two measures of IJV performance assessment in the context of IJVs 
whose parent firms are from both developed and developing countries.  This may explain 
the different outcome of the other study. 
 
Further, Geringer and Hebert (1991) focus on the manufacturing sector only, while this 
study (like Glaister and Buckley, 1998) includes both the manufacturing and the tertiary 
sectors.  These differences should be borne in mind when assessing the findings.  Clearly, 
it is difficult to come to a settled view on the empirical relationship of these two 
approaches to performance assessment because very few studies have so far been 
undertaken on this issue, especially in the context of developing countries of the ASEAN4. 
Hence, this study has made a contribution to the field of IJV research with new findings on 
an under-researched geographical area. 
 
 
8.2.1.2  The Perspective of IJV Performance Assessment 
The outcome of the study shows that there are positive relationships between IJV 
managers’ assessment of their IJV’s performance and IJV managers’ perception of the IJV 
parent companies’ assessment of the IJV’s performance.  Table 8.2 illustrates Spearman 
correlation coefficient values between each view of IJV performance assessment. The data 
are drawn from Question 31.  The results show strong, positive correlations between the 
IJV managers’ own assessment of satisfaction with the IJV’s performance, the IJV 
managers’ assessment of satisfaction of the foreign parent companies, and the IJV 
managers’ assessment of satisfaction of the Thai parent companies. 
 
The evidence shows that the positive correlation between the IJV managers’ own 
assessment of satisfaction with the IJV’s performance and the IJV managers’ assessment of 
satisfaction of the foreign parent companies is the strongest correlation (0.81 Spearman 
and 0.83 Pearson coefficient values) among the three pairs of the relationships.  It is 
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followed by the correlation between the IJV managers’ own assessment of satisfaction with 
the IJV’s performance and the IJV managers’ assessment of satisfaction of the Thai parent 
companies with 0.75 Spearman correlation coefficient values (and 0.77 Pearson coefficient 
values) at 0.01 significance levels.  Further, the relationship between the IJV managers’ 
assessment of satisfaction of the Thai parent companies and the IJV managers’ assessment 
of satisfaction of the foreign parent company illustrates a moderate positive correlation 
with a Spearman correlation value of 0.69 and 0.68 Pearson correlation coefficient values 
at 0.01 significance levels.  
Table 8.2:  Spearman Correlation Matrix of the IJV Managers’ Subjective Performance Evaluation 
 
Foreign Parent’s 
Satisfaction Measured 
by IJV Manager 
Thai  Parent’s 
Satisfaction Measured 
by the  IJV Manager 
Satisfaction of the 
IJV Manager 
 
Foreign Parent’s Satisfaction 
Measured by  the IJV Manager 1     
Thai Parent’s Satisfaction 
Measured by the  IJV Manager 0.69** (0.68**) 1   
Satisfaction of the IJV 
Manager 0.81** (0.83**) 0.75** (0.77**) 1 
NB: **p< 0.01, Pearson Correlation in parenthesis; data in this table are drawn from Variable 31. 
 
Boateng and Glaister (2002) argue that the study of this issue is very important and should 
be tested before other issues of IJV study if researchers collect data from the perception of 
IJV managers.  This is because it is essential to examine whether or not IJV managers’ 
assessments correlate with those of the IJV parents.  Geringer and Hebert (1991) and 
Boateng and Glaister (2002) rationalise that these managers may have been drawn from 
one or both of the parent firms or by outsourcing, but work as employees of the IJV.  They 
are likely to be informed of the parents’ levels of satisfaction through formal disclosure 
such as the Annual General Meeting (AGM), and more informal disclosure in the course of 
the parents’ involvement in the management of the IJVs.  Moreover, IJV parent companies, 
through their representatives at board level, set up the overall objectives of the IJV to be 
carried out by the IJV managers (Geringer and Hebert, 1991).  
 
The outcomes of this study show a significant correlation between the IJV managers’ 
assessment of IJV performance and IJV managers’ perception of the IJV parent 
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companies’ assessment of IJV performance.  Statistically, there are positive and strong 
correlations between all three elements (p<0.01), which therefore support the findings of 
Geringer and Hebert (1991) and of Boateng and Glaister (2002).  Glaister and Buckley 
(1998) also find strong positive correlations between these three elements of their 
correlation examinations between the UK partners’ satisfaction with IJV performance, the 
UK partners’ perception of the foreign partners’ satisfaction, and the UK partners’ 
perception of the IJV general managers’ satisfaction. 
 
In addition, the findings of this study indicate that the relationship between the IJV 
managers’ own assessment of satisfaction with IJV performance, and the IJV managers’ 
assessment of satisfaction of the foreign parent companies is stronger than the correlations 
between the other relationships.  This figure is fully consistent with the outcomes of the 
study of Boateng and Glaister (2002).  In short, this study suggests that the IJV manager 
can provide a reliable source of data about each parent’s performance assessment of 
satisfaction.    
 
8.2.1.3  IJV Performance in the ASEAN4 Context 
This study is to assess IJV performance in the ASEAN4 context by taking Thailand as an 
example.  The findings show that IJV performance in Thailand has been assessed to be 
moderately high. 
 
Table 8.3:  Mean Score Comparison of IJV Subjective Performance Evaluation Measured by IJV 
Managers 
Performance View 
 
Rank 
 
Mean 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
Satisfaction of the IJV Manager 1 3.66 0.78 
Foreign Parent’s Satisfaction 
Measured by the IJV Manager 2 3.65 0.84 
Thai  Parent’s Satisfaction 
Measured by the IJV Manager 3 3.61 0.75 
NB: The data in this table are drawn from Variable 31. 
Table 8.3 presents the rank order of mean scores of the subjective measure of IJV 
satisfaction from the three perspectives: 1) the IJV managers’ own assessment of 
satisfaction with IJV performance; 2) the IJV managers’ assessment of satisfaction of the 
 211
foreign parent companies, and 3) the IJV managers’ assessment of satisfaction of the Thai 
parent companies. These data are drawn from Question 31. The median value of the five-
point scale is 3, and all the subjective measures exceed this value.   Generally, the data 
shows that the satisfaction of IJV managers and their perception of IJV parent companies’ 
satisfaction with IJV performance are moderately high.  However, the results show slight 
differences of the mean scores among the three views of satisfaction.  The IJV managers’ 
satisfaction has the highest mean scores among the three views; it demonstrates 3.66 mean 
scores with a standard deviation of 0.78.  It is followed by the IJV managers’ assessment of 
satisfaction of the foreign parent companies with a mere difference of a correlation 
coefficient of 3.65 and a standard deviation of 0.84.  The least mean scores of 3.61 with a 
standard deviation of 0.75 relates to the IJV managers’ assessment of satisfaction of the 
Thai parent company. 
 
In addition, the frequency of IJV performance evaluation, especially the satisfaction of the 
IJV managers and other views, is presented in Table 8.4 (Variable 31).    The data indicate  
 
Table 8.4:  Frequency of IJV Subjective Performance Evaluation Measured by IJV Managers 
Performance View     Satisfaction Level   
  1 2 3 4 5 
Foreign Parent’s Satisfaction 
Measured by  the IJV Manager           
 Number - 8 28 39 13 
 Percentage - (9.09) (31.82) (44.32) (14.77) 
          
Thai  Parent’s Satisfaction 
Measured by the  IJV Manager          
 Number - 5 33 40 9 
 Percentage - (5.75) (37.93) (45.98) (10.34) 
          
Satisfaction of the IJV Manager          
 Number - 5 31 40 11 
 Percentage - (5.75) (35.63) (45.98) (12.64) 
NB: The data in this table are drawn from Variable 31. 
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that the highest frequency of the satisfaction ranking among the three views from IJV 
managers falls on the scale of 4 which stands for ‘satisfied’. The second most frequently 
ranked among the three views is 3, followed by ranking of 5 which means ‘very satisfied’. 
 
The comparison of the mean scores of multi-perceptual assessment of performance is 
shown in Table 8.5. These data are drawn from Variable 30. Again, all values of the mean 
scores exceed the median value of 3.  The individual dimension of the performance 
measurement of sales level achievement has the greatest mean score among all individual 
dimensions with a value of 3.63 and a standard deviation of 1.02.  On the other hand, the 
individual dimension of the compensation management achievement shows the least mean 
score of 3.14 with a small standard deviation of 0.75.  Moreover, the evidence also shows 
that the individual dimensions of performance measurement in the categories of financial 
achievement and marketing achievement are among the top 7 rankings of the individual 
performance measurement compared to other categories.  The second and third rankings of 
the individual dimension of performance measurement fall on the financial achievement 
category, which consists of the profitability achievement and the ROI achievement, with 
mean scores of 3.56 and 3.53 respectively. 
 
The highest scores of the individual performance measurement dimension ranked fourth to 
seventh come from the marketing achievement category.  In this category, the results show 
a mean score of 3.44 for the dimension of market share achievement, followed by 
reputation and distribution achievement, and customer service achievement with mean 
scores of 3.40, 3.36, and 3.33 respectively. 
 
The highest mean score in the strategic achievement category is 3.31, in respect of inter-
partner cooperation achievement, and R&D partner involvement achievement gains the 
highest mean score of 3.16 in the category of R&D, technology transfer achievement.  In 
the final category of human resource management achievement, it can be seen that 
employee performance achievement has the highest mean score of 3.17 with a standard 
deviation of 0.68. 
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Table 8.5:   Comparison of the Mean Scores of Multi-Perceptual Assessment of Performance 
Activity 
 
Category 
Ranking 
Total 
Ranking 
Mean 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
Marketing Achievement         
Market  Share Achievement 1 4 3.44 0.91 
Reputation Achievement 2 5 3.40 0.87 
Distribution Achievement 3 6 3.36 0.65 
Customer Services Achievement 4 7 3.33 0.81 
Advertising/PR Achievement 5 14 3.18 0.60 
Financial Achievement         
Sales Level Achievement 1 1 3.63 1.02 
Profitability Achievement 2 2 3.56 1.05 
ROI Achievement 3 3 3.53 1.00 
Pay Back Period Achievement 4 8= 3.31 0.81 
Cost Control Achievement 5 13 3.22 0.88 
Strategic Achievement         
Inter-Partner Cooperation Achievement 1 8= 3.31 0.94 
Strategic Objective Achievement 2 10 3.29 0.86 
Inter-Partner Trust Achievement 3 11 3.28 0.82 
IJV Autonomy Achievement 4 12 3.27 0.83 
R&D, Technology Transfer Achievement         
R&D Partner Involvement Achievement 1 16 3.16 0.80 
Technology Transfer Achievement 2 17= 3.15 0.78 
Manufacturing and Control Achievement 3 17= 3.15 0.65 
Product Design Achievement 4 21 3.10 0.76 
Human Resource Management 
Achievement         
Employee Performance Achievement 1 15 3.17 0.68 
Employees’ Skill Improvement Achievement 2 17= 3.15 0.77 
Compensation Management Achievement 3 20 3.14 0.75 
NB: The data in this table are drawn from Variable 30. 
 
Table 8.6 indicates the results of IJV performance in terms of IJV survival (Variables 6, 7, 
and 8), stability (Variables 9, 10, and 11), and duration (Variables 3 and 26).  The data 
show that only 7 IJVs (8%) have already been terminated.  This represents a high survival 
rate.  Two IJVs were terminated in 2003 and 2004, and another firm ended IJV cooperation 
in 2005.  Another two IJVs did not give their year of termination.  The most common 
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reason for termination (57%) is being taken over by foreign parent companies, followed by 
being taken over by a third party (29%), and being bought by Thai parent companies 
(14%).  The main reason for termination is a change of partners’ strategy (57%), while the 
least common reason (14%) is fulfilment of the IJV’s purposes. 
 
        Table 8.6:  Objective Assessment:  Survival, Stability, and Duration 
    Number Percent 
IJV Termination/ Survival 88 100 
No Termination 81 92.05 
Termination 7 7.95 
Year of Termination  7 100 
2003 2 29.57 
2004 2 29.57 
2005 1 14.29 
 Data Missing  2 29.57 
Type of Termination 7 100 
Bought by Thai Parent Company 1 14.29 
Bought by Foreign Parent Company  4 57.14 
Bought by Third Party 2 29.58 
Reason for Termination 7 100 
IJV Had Fulfilled Its Purpose 1 14.29 
IJV Poor Performance 2 29.57 
Change of Partners’ Strategy Towards IJVs 4 57.14 
Shared Equity Change (Stability) Number (N=88) Percent  
No Shared Equity Change 62   70.45  
Shared Equity Change 26   29.54  
Duration: 
Average age of IJVs=13.31 
IJV Dissolution Plan  Number   Percent  
No Dissolution Plan 80   95.24  
Has Dissolution Plan 4   4.76  
Year: 2010 1   1.19  
Year: 2011 1   1.19  
Year: 2013 1   1.19  
Year: 2017 1   1.19  
      NB:  SD = Standard Deviation 
 The data in this table are drawn from Variables 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 26. 
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The majority of IJVs (62 IJVs) state that the proportion of equity shareholding in the IJV 
has never changed since the ventures were first established, with an average equity holding 
of 48% (mean = 48.23%) for foreign parent companies and 52% (mean=51.52%) for Thai 
parent companies.  Against that, 26 IJVs indicate that the proportion of equity shareholding 
has changed, with an average of 66% (mean=65.87%) held by foreign parent companies 
and 34% (mean=34.13%) held by Thai parent companies.  These figures indicate a high 
stability rate for IJVs.  The lower the change in the proportion of equity share, the higher 
the stability rate.  In addition, the data indicate that 95 % of all IJVs have no dissolution 
plans, while only 4 plan to end their IJV cooperation at dates between 2010 and 2017.  The 
average age of the IJVs is 13 years, which shows that they tend to last for a medium to 
long period of time. 
 
In short, the findings of this study show that IJV performance in Thailand has been 
assessed by the respondents as ‘moderate-high’.  This corresponds with those of previous 
empirical studies, which show that IJVs in developing countries, especially in the Asia 
Pacific region, display high performance levels.  Julian and O’Cass (2004) examine IJV 
marketing performance in Thailand and find that more than 70% of their respondents rate 
IJV performance in Thailand as moderate-high, while only 41 from a total of 148 
respondents rate their performance in Thailand as low.  Beamish and Delios (1997) also 
find that IJVs established in developing countries yield performance levels higher than 
those of IJVs formed in developed countries.  In addition, Delios and Beamish (2004) find 
evidence that IJVs formed in Asia have moderately better performance than those formed 
in North America and Europe.  
 
One of the factors which may explain this general tendency is the Asian, and in particular 
the Japanese, focus on long-term, stable relationships between companies and their 
workers, and between business partners.  Pornnavalai (1997) notes that Japanese investors 
prefer long-term collaboration with their partners rather than opportunistic alliances and 
they seem to interface with the Thai partners very well due to the similarity of culture.  It is 
likely that this is of no less importance than the primarily performance factors and 
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motivations of the IJV formation. A study of Hofstede (1980, 1985)5 also points out that 
national culture of Thailand is closer to that of Japan and the NIEs than to those of Western 
countries.  This may be an important factor contributing to the “moderate-high” rating of 
IJV performance in this study, since the majority of foreign partners came from Japan and 
the NIEs. 
 
More specific research into IJV performance assessment in other ASEAN4 countries and 
in developing countries, would be useful to complement the outcomes of this study, since 
IJV performance in each of them may be differently influenced by social and cultural 
factors 
 
8.2.1.4  Foreign Parent Companies from Developed and Developing Countries and 
IJV  Performance 
This study finds that IJVs in Thailand with parent companies from developed countries are 
no different from those with parent companies from developing countries in terms of IJV 
performance.  To study this issue, using the definition of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ 
countries of the United Nations (United Nations, 2007) together with the classification of 
advanced economies and other emerging market and developing economies of the IMF 
(IMF, 2007), Table 8.7 shows the parametric test of t-test, and nonparametric test of the 
Mann-Whitney U of overall IJV performance (Variable 30) made comparable between the 
IJVs with developed country parent companies and those with developing country parent 
companies (Variable 5). 
                                                 
5In the study of Hofstede (1980, 1985), four value dimensions of national culture have been identified for 
classifying and grouping national culture characteristics of 53 countries in his study.  The four dimensions 
were named: 
(1) Power Distance,  that is the extent to which the members of a society accept that power in institutions 
and organisations is distributed unequally. 
(2) Uncertainty Avoidance, that is the degree to which the members of a society feel uncomfortable with 
uncertainty and ambiguity, which leads them to support promising certainty and to maintain 
institution protecting conformity. 
(3) Individualism, which stands for a preference for a loosely knit social framework in society in which 
individuals are supposed to take care of themselves and their immediate families only; as opposed to 
Collectivism, which stands for a preference for a tightly knit social framework in which individuals 
can expect their relatives, clan, or other in-group to look after them, in exchange for unquestioning 
loyalty. 
(4) Masculinity, which stands for a preference for achievement, heronism, assertiveness, and material 
success; as  opposed to Femininity, which stands for a preference for relationships, modesty, caring 
for the weak, and the quality of life. In a masculine society even the women prefer assertiveness (at 
least in men); in a feminine society, even the men prefer modesty. 
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 The table indicates that the overall IJV satisfaction of IJVs with developed country 
partners has a higher mean score than that of IJVs with developing country partners, with a 
1.26 mean difference value.  However, this difference is not statistically significant in 
terms of the t-test, and Mann-Whitney U test.   The result accordingly shows that, in terms 
of performance, IJV firms with developed country parent companies are no different from 
IJV firms with developing country parent companies. 
 
Table 8.7:  Comparison of Overall IJV Satisfaction Between IJVs with Developed Country Partners 
and IJVs with Developing Country Partners 
  
Partner 
country Mean SD* 
  Mean 
Difference t-Value 
Mann- 
Whitney U** 
Overall IJV Satisfaction Developed 11.06 2.08 1.26 1.30 151.50 
  Developing 9.80 2.49       
NB: * = Standard Deviation 
       ** = Nonparametric test; data in this table are drawn from Variables 5 and 30 
 
This is consistent with the findings of Sim and Ali (1998), which reveal that IJVs with 
parent companies from developed and developing countries rate IJV performance not to be 
significantly different.  This study does, however, have a larger sample size than that of 
Sim and Ali.   
 
Against that, this finding differs from the outcome of a study by Lee and Beamish (1995) 
which found Korean joint ventures are more satisfactory in LDCs (less developed 
countries) than are developed country joint ventures in LDCs. Lee and Beamish (1995) 
argue that Korean firms that first invested in LDCs especially Southeast Asian countries 
found the cultural environment, traditions and behaviour patterns to be similar to Korea, 
about which Korean firms possessed information and understanding. The Korean firms 
entering LDC markets also do not confront as large a foreign knowledge gap regarding the 
economic situation. They may not have the same level of hesitancy in entering such 
markets as has been observed elsewhere because they do not perceive as much risk as other 
foreign investors do. This is due in part to the fact that many Korean managers feel that 
socioeconomic conditions of Southeast Asian developing countries are similar to those that 
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they had faced in Korea in earlier periods.  Hence, these backgrounds may positively 
influence performance perception of Korean managers in LDCs.  
 
Regarding the result of this study, it can be seen that IJVs with parent companies from 
developed countries are concentrated in higher technology sectors (e.g. metal products, 
machinery and transport equipment sector) catering for both the domestic and overseas 
markets, while IJVs with foreign parent firms from developing countries especially Asian 
Pacific firms are in traditional mature sectors (e.g. agriculture and agricultural products 
sector) which could take advantage of low labour costs in Thailand for the export markets. 
This factor could have equalised the performance rating of the two groups in this study. 
That is, IJVs with parent companies from developed and developing countries rate IJV 
performance not to be significantly different.  
 
8.2.1.5  IJV Performance and Strategic Motivation 
The outcome of this study indicates that IJV performance varies with the strategic motives 
for IJV formation.  Table 8.8 presents Pearson correlation coefficient values between 
overall IJV performance (Variable 30) and the underlying strategic motives of foreign 
parent companies for IJV formation.  These underlying strategic motives are derived from 
the Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) presented in Chapter 6.  The bi-variate relationship 
analysis indicates that three of six underlying strategic motives have positive correlations 
significantly with IJV performance.  The strongest correlation can be found in the 
relationship between IJV performance with the underlying strategic motive of marketing 
strategy with 0.32 Pearson correlation coefficient values at 0.01 significance levels.  It is 
followed by the correlations between IJV performance and two underlying strategic 
motives:  the underlying strategic motive of low cost sourcing and market development 
and the underlying strategic motive of market power and cost & risk sharing with 0.27 and 
0.25 Pearson correlation coefficient values at 0.05 significance levels. 
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Table 8.8:  Pearson Correlations between Overall IJV Performance and the Underlying Strategic 
Motives of the Foreign Parent Company for IJV Formation  
Underlying Factor 
Overall IJV 
Performance 
Underlying Strategic Motive of Low Cost Sourcing and Market Development 0.27* 
Underlying Strategic Motive of Resource Accessing 0.21 
Underlying Strategic Motive of Market Power and Cost & Risk Sharing 0.25* 
Underlying Strategic Motive of Transfer of Technology 0.20 
Underlying Strategic Motive of  Marketing Strategy 0.32** 
Underlying Strategic Motive of  Reducing Competition 0.19 
NB: *p<0.05, **p<0.01; data in this table are drawn from Variables 17 and 30.  
 
To further test the relationships between IJV performance and the underlying strategic 
motive for IJV formation of the foreign parent company, multiple regression has been 
conducted as shown in Table 8.9.  The stepwise regression began with all independent 
variables (the underlying strategic motives of the foreign parent firm), however, only 
one was found to be statistically significant.  The multivariate relationship analysis 
indicates that an F-value of 8.25 is significant (p<0.001), meaning that at least one 
independent variable has an influence over the dependent variable:  the overall IJV 
performance. The regression can explain 8% of the variation of the dependent 
variable.  Only the underlying strategic motive of marketing strategy has been found 
to have a positive influence on IJV performance at 0.01 significance levels 
(beta=0.31).  This outcome partially confirms the findings through the bivariate 
relationship test in Table 8.8. 
 
To sum up, the results reveal that IJV performance varies with the strategic motives 
for IJV formation of the foreign parent company.  IJV performance is significantly 
influenced by the underlying strategic motive of marketing strategy, while two 
underlying strategic motives (the underlying strategic motive of low cost sourcing and 
market development and the underlying strategic motive of market power and cost & 
risk sharing) do not significantly influence IJV performance, but they show significant 
positive correlations with IJV performance. 
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 Table 8.9:  Multiple Regression Result of the Underlying Strategic Motives of the Foreign Parent 
Company (Independent Variables) and IJV Satisfaction (Dependent Variable) 
 
Variable 
Unstandardised 
Coefficients 
Beta 
Standardised 
Coefficients T-Statistic 
Constant 8.11  7.92*** 
Underlying Strategic Motive of 
Marketing Strategy 0.83 0.31 2.87** 
R Square 0.09   
Adjusted R Square 0.08   
F-Value 8.25**   
NB: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01    
Dependent Variable: Overall IJV 
Performance, Durbin-Watson=1.91    
The data in this table are drawn from Variables 17 and 30. 
 
Table 8.10: Pearson Correlations between Overall IJV Performance and the Underlying Strategic 
Motives of the Thai Parent Company for IJV Formation 
Underlying Factor 
Overall IJV 
Performance 
Underlying Strategic Motive of Resource and Technology Accessing 0.24* 
Underlying Strategic Motive of Market Power and Market Development 0.41** 
Underlying Strategic Motive of  Overseas Market Expansion 0.28* 
Underlying Strategic Motive of Cost & Risk Sharing 0.21* 
Underlying Strategic Motive of Low Cost Sourcing 0.34* 
NB: *p<0.05, **p<0.01  
The data in this table are drawn from Variables 18 and 30. 
 
The Pearson correlation coefficient values between overall IJV performance (Variable 30)  
and the underlying strategic motives of the Thai parent company for IJV formation can be 
found in Table 8.10.  The independent variables, the underlying strategic motives, are 
taken from the Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) presented in Chapter 6.  The evidence 
shows that all five underlying strategic motives of the Thai parent company have 
significant positive correlations with IJV performance.  The underlying strategic motive of 
market power and market development has the strongest correlation with IJV performance, 
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representing 0.41 Pearson correlation coefficient values at 0.01 significance levels.  The 
second strongest correlation with a Pearson correlation value of 0.34 at 0.05 significance 
levels is the relationship between IJV performance and the underlying strategic motive of 
low cost sourcing.  It is followed by the correlations of IJV performance with the following 
underlying motives:  the underlying strategic motive of overseas market expansion;   the 
underlying strategic motive of resource and technology accessing; and the underlying 
strategic motive of cost & risk sharing with 0.28, 0.24, and 0.21 Pearson correlation 
coefficient values at 0.05 significance levels respectively. 
 
As mentioned earlier, previous IJV studies by Sim and Ali (1998), and Boateng and 
Glaister (2002) claim that the real relationship of the variables must be tested with both the 
bivariate and multivariate relationship tests; accordingly, multiple regression (stepwise) 
has been conducted to confirm the relationships of the dependent and independent 
variables as shown in Table 8.11.   
 
The multivariate relationship analysis indicates that an F-value of 13.32 is significant 
(p<0.001), meaning that at least one independent variable has an influence over the 
dependent variable: the overall IJV performance.  The regression can explain 13% of the 
variation of the dependent variable.  After all independent variables have been entered, it 
can be seen that the underlying strategic motive of market power and market development 
has a significant positive influence on IJV performance with a beta standardised coefficient 
value of 0.38 at 0.01 significance levels, whilst other underlying motives do not show 
significant influence on IJV performance. 
 
In short, the analysis reveals that IJV performance varies with the strategic motives for IJV 
formation of the Thai parent company.  IJV performance is influenced significantly by the 
underlying strategic motive of market power and market development, while other 
underlying strategic motives of the Thai parent company do not have a significant 
influence on IJV performance.  However, they have been found to be correlated with IJV 
performance positively and significantly. 
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Table 8.11: Multiple Regression Result Between the Underlying Strategic Motives of the Thai Parent 
Company and IJV Performance  
Variable 
Unstandardised 
Coefficients 
Beta 
Standardised 
Coefficients T-Statistic 
Constant 6.67  5.60*** 
Underlying Strategic Motive of 
Market Power and Market 
Development 1.20 0.38 3.65** 
R Square 0.14   
Adjusted R Square 0.13   
F-Value 13.32***   
NB: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01    
Dependent Variable: Overall  
IJV Performance, Durbin-   
Watson= 1.85    
 The data in this table are drawn from Variables 18 and 30. 
 
To elaborate, this study confirms the view that IJVs are seen as a strategic mode for 
enhancing market power and gaining maximum profits through improving a firm’s 
competitive position.  Firms choose to collaborate in the form of IJVs because this enables 
them to maximise profits through improving their competitive position vis-à-vis rivals, 
particularly in an international business context (Kogut, 1988).  With a closer look at the 
underlying strategic motives which have significant influence on IJV performance, the 
underlying strategic motive of marketing strategy of foreign parent companies, as 
presented in Chapter 6, consists of two individual strategic motives: “enable faster entry to 
market” and “obtain local identity”, while the underlying market power and market 
development of Thai parent companies includes six individual strategic motives: “compete 
against common competitors”, “enable faster entry to market”, “gain presence in a  new 
market”, “concentrate on more profitable business”, “obtain faster reimbursement of the 
investment”, and “enable product diversification”.  These are all related to the strategic 
behaviour perspective, and lead to the conclusion of the study that IJV performance varies 
with strategic motive for IJV formation. 
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This study has the following managerial implications: (a) strategic motives which 
influence IJV performance are likely to relate to growth and to be contingent on a variety 
of such strategy and environment factors as market and geographical expansion, firms’ 
competitive position, and the nature and intensity of competition in the market.  This  
suggests that the competitive aspects of IJV formation are central;  (b) IJV managers in the 
fast-changing environment of ASEAN4 countries, particularly Thailand, need to be 
dynamic, effective, possess many skills, be good at cooperation, good at motivating 
employees to work wholeheartedly for the IJV, and capable of responding rapidly to 
competition from both local and overseas rivals in order to compete effectively with 
existing competitors and to maintain competitive position in the market. 
 
8.2.1.6  IJV Performance and Characteristics of IJV Operations 
The results of this study reveal that IJV performance varies with the characteristics of IJV 
operations.  Chapter 7 asked respondents to assess the similarity of their IJV’s operation to 
the practice of their parent companies (Variable 25).  Later, each functional practice was 
grouped into three categories: a) IJV operation is similar to the Thai parent company (this 
group consists of human resource management and recruitment, and compensation policy 
and practices; b) IJV operation is a combination of the practice of both parent companies 
(this group consists of accounting system and practice, costing management and costing 
system,  budgeting, training and development, management information system, strategy 
formulation, price setting system, and marketing); c) 3) IJV operation is similar to the 
foreign parent company (this group incudes quality control, production process, and 
product research and development). 
 
To study the bivariate relationship between IJV performance and the characteristics of IJV 
operation, the Pearson correlation coefficient values have been computed as shown in 
Table 8.12.  The result reveals that only the characteristics of IJV operation of type 2 (a 
combination of the practice of both parent companies) have a significant positive 
correlation with overall IJV performance (Variable 30) with Pearson correlation coefficient 
value of 0.23 at 0.05 significance level. 
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Table 8.12: Pearson Correlations Between the Characteristics of IJV Operation and Overall IJV 
Performance. 
The Characteristics of IJV Operation 
Overall IJV 
Performance 
IJV operation is similar to the Thai parent company 0.20 
IJV operation is a combination of both parent companies’ practice 0.23* 
IJV operation is similar to the foreign parent company 0.07 
NB: *p<0.05; data in this table are drawn from Variables 25 and 30. 
  
Table 8.13: Multiple Regression Result between the Independent Variables of Characteristics of IJV 
Operation and the Dependent Variable of Overall IJV Performance. 
   
Variable 
Unstandardised 
Coefficients 
Beta 
Standardised 
Coefficients T-Statistic 
Constant 9.20  10.63*** 
IJV operation is a combination 
of both parent 
companies’practice 0.08 0.23 2.14* 
R Square 0.05    
Adjusted R Square 0.04    
F-Value 4.60*    
NB: ***p<0.001,  *p<0.05    
Dependent Variable: Overall  
IJV Performance,  Durbin-
Watson=1.71    
  The data in this table are drawn from Variables 25 and 30. 
Multiple regression (stepwise) was conducted to confirm the relationships of the dependent 
and independent variables as shown in Table 8.13.  The multivariate relationship analysis 
indicates that an F-value of 4.60 is significant (p<0.001), meaning that at least one 
independent variable has an influence over the dependent variable:  overall IJV 
performance.  The regression can explain 4% of the variation of the dependent variable.  
After all independent variables are entered, it can be seen that where IJV operation is a 
combination of both parent companies’ practice it has a significant positive influence on 
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IJV performance, with a beta standardised coefficient value of 0.23 at 0.05 significance 
levels, while other underlying motives do not show significant influence on IJV 
performance.   
 
These can infer that the characteristics of IJV operation where there is a combination of 
both parent companies’ practice have a positive influence over IJV performance and lead 
to the conclusion that IJV performance varies with the characteristics of IJV operations.  
This finding supports the strategic behaviour perspective of this study, since this paradigm 
also emphasises synergy.  As discussed in the previous chapter, it focuses on establishing 
strategic symmetry between the parent firms to build complementarity and synergy for the 
success of the IJV.  According to Lynch (1989), synergy is defined as the sum of the parts 
being greater than their simple addition.  In other words, synergy refers to the ability of 
two or more units or companies to generate more value by working together than they 
would by working apart.  This can be seen in that only those characteristics of IJV 
operation which reflect a combination of both parent companies’ practice show significant 
influence on IJV performance.  Other kinds of operational practice (similar only to the 
foreign or to the Thai parent company’s practice) might also be expected to have a positive 
influence on IJV performance, and it would be good if this finding encouraged further 
research in the context of the ASEAN4 countries. 
   
This study suggests that IJV general managers, as well as each functional manager (e.g., 
marketing manager) need to have good learning skills and to be able to adapt the best 
operational practices from both their parent companies to the extent that these can be 
adapted and are appropriate to the environment in which the IJV is located.  In the present 
dynamic business environment, especially in an emerging market like that of Thailand and 
other ASEAN4 countries, the skills of learning and adapting best practice, skills and 
knowledge from each parent and combining them for the benefit of the IJV is crucial. 
8.2.2 IJV Performance Determinants 
The findings of this study indicate that the following factors positively influence IJV 
performance: IJV age, organisational learning, similarity of organisational culture,  
commitment of the IJVs, and  commitment among IJV parent companies. 
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 Table 8.14 shows the correlation between IJV satisfaction and the related factors.  The 
outcomes indicate that IJV age (Variable 3) is positively correlated with overall IJV 
performance (Variable 30).  The relationship of these two variables shows a significantly 
positive correlation with a  Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.25 at 0.05 significance 
level. 
 
This finding is consistent with the study of Lin and Germain (1998) who find such a 
positive relationship between the IJV age and satisfaction in their study of 96 US-Chinese 
joint ventures.  Lin and Germain (1998) argue that IJV age gives rise to satisfaction in two 
manners. First, the longer an IJV has existed, the greater the length of time that the partners 
have had at their disposal to understand each other’s uniqueness, develop smooth personal 
relations, and coordinate joint actions more comfortably (Anderson and Weitz, 1989). 
Second, partners in enduring IJVs often become more patient and comfortable in day-to-
day interaction. Long-term partners are more tolerant of short-term imbalances, since they 
know that ample time exists for restoration (Hatfield et al, 1979). For this reason, the 
longer an IJV has existed, the more likely it is to have passed through a critical exploration 
period. 
 
Regarding this notion, IJV managers as well as IJV parent companies should thus 
understand that the longer an IJV has lasted, the better the IJV performance will be. 
Obviously, selection is occurring in that only successful IJVs are allowed to continue, 
while unsuccessful IJVs are selected out by parent companies. But the mediating role of a 
conflict resolution strategy hints at a deeper underlying process.    First, the longer an IJV 
relationship has existed, the more likely it is that problem-solving behaviour will be relied 
upon.  IJV age breeds familiarity, which seemingly translates into an open style of solving 
problems.    Second, the familiarity that derives from IJV age seemingly produces not only 
an open, problem-solving approach to conflict resolution, but also a greater willingness to 
push for a partner’s desired course of action.     Third, IJV age inversely predicts a 
legalistic approach to resolving conflicts. The longer an IJV has existed, the less likely 
partners are to rely on written agreements in conflict resolution. The legalistic dimension to 
conflict resolution inversely predicted performance. Hence, IJV managers should 
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understand that age fosters an IJV characterised by more problem-solving and by less 
legalism (both of which associate with better performance). 
 
However, the outcome of this study is also different from that of Hennart and Zeng (1997); 
they do not find a relationship between IJV age and performance in 74 US-Japanese joint 
ventures.   Lasserre (1999) argues that the effect of age on joint venture survival is still 
ambiguous.  Future study into the relationship between IJV age and IJV performance in 
other developing countries, particularly in other ASEAN4 countries, is to be encouraged in 
order to compare the results with this study. 
 
Table 8.14:  Pearson Correlations between IJV Satisfaction and Related Factors 
Factor Pearson Correlation 
  Overall IJV Performance 
Age of the IJV Company 0.25* 
Collaborative Experience of Foreign Parent Company 0.04 
Collaborative Experience of Thai Parent Company 0.20 
Size Symmetry of the IJV Parent Companies -0.17 
IJV Organisational Learning 0.42*** 
Number of IJV Parent Companies -0.10 
Business Linkage between IJV and Parent Companies 0.00 
Business Linkage between IJV Parent Companies -0.18 
IJV Commitment 0.44*** 
Commitment of IJV Parent Companies 0.38*** 
National Culture Similarity 0.16 
Organisational Culture Similarity 0.25* 
NB:  ***p<0.001,  *p<0.05;  data in this table are 
drawn from Variables 3, 4, 13, 28.1, 28.2, 29, 33, 
34, 35, 36, and 37 
 
 
 
 
In addition, the results of this study reveal that there are no significant correlations between 
overall IJV performance (Variable 30) and the following factors: IJV parent companies’ 
collaborative experience (Variables 33 and 34), and size symmetry of the IJV parent 
companies (Variable 29).  These findings agree with some previous studies but contradict 
others.  For instance, Barkema et al (1997) find no significant association between JV 
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parent companies’ collaborative experience and IJV performance, whilst a study of Sim 
and Ali (1998) show that this background factor is linked positively to IJV performance.  
Confusion has arisen over the importance of size symmetry of parent companies. A 
number of previous studies (for example, Kogut, 1988) show that size symmetry of parent 
companies is relatively unimportant to managers concerned with partnership options. Sim 
and Ali (1998) also find no significance in the relationship between these two variables. 
Against that, Crutchley et al. (1991); Osland and Cavusgil (1996) find a negative link 
between this variable and IJV performance. 
 
Therefore, there is a need to replicate the studies of these determinants in the context of 
other developing countries, especially in the ASEAN4 region, to confirm the significant 
correlations of these factors with IJV performance.  
 
A significantly positive relationship between the IJV’s organisational learning (Variable 
35) and overall IJV performance (Variable 30) has emerged.  The results in Table 8.14 
show a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.42 at 0.001 significance levels.  This finding 
confirms the importance of organisational learning which has a positive influence on IJV 
performance.  IJVs can act as vehicles for effective learning or as a means for effective 
technology transfer diffusion (Jones and Lall, 1998; Carayannis et al., 2000).  This 
outcome is consistent with previous studies (for example, Swierczek and Dhakal, 2004).  
According to Inkpen (1998), when organisations with different skills and knowledge 
decide to forge an alliance, this provides each partner with an opportunity to learn.  This 
learning enables the firms to facilitate their action plans and also provides a capacity for 
adapting to change by improving their performance.  
  
Furthermore, Table 8.15 shows the order of the ranked mean scores of the individual 
variables of IJV organisational learning ability (Variable 35). All variables have higher 
mean scores than the median value of 3 on the five-point scale.  The data show that IJV 
organisational learning ability in serving the IJV’s goals has the greatest mean score (3.66) 
compared with the other individual organisational learning ability variables.  What follow 
are the individual variables for sustaining and increasing the parents’ mutual benefits, and 
serving each parent’s goal respectively, each with a mean score of 3.62.  The individual 
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learning abilities of choosing a suitable strategy, avoiding national culture conflict, 
designing an appropriate organisational structure, and managing human resources 
efficiently and effectively have mean scores ranking fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh 
respectively.  The lowest mean score is the individual learning ability of avoiding cultural 
conflict within the organisation with a mean score of 3.36. 
 
Table 8.15:  Rank of the Mean Scores of IJV Organisational Learning Ability 
IJV Organisational Learning Ability Rank Mean S.D. 
To serve IJV's goal 1 3.66 0.70 
To sustain and increase parents’ mutual benefits 2= 3.62 0.82 
To serve each parent’s goal 2= 3.62 0.71 
To choose a suitable strategy 4 3.47 0.74 
To avoid national culture conflict 5 3.44 0.80 
To design an appropriate organisational structure 6 3.41 0.71 
To manage human resources efficiently and effectively 7 3.37 0.82 
To avoid cultural conflicts within the organisation 8 3.36 0.81 
NB:  SD = Standard Deviation; data in this table are drawn from Variable 35. 
 
In addition, the outcome from Table 8.14 shows that there are no significant relationships 
between overall IJV performance (Variable 30) and the number of IJV parent companies 
(Variable 4).  That is, the number of IJV parent companies does not significantly correlate 
with IJV performance.  This finding partially corresponds with those in previous studies.  
For instance, the study of Hu and Chen (1996), which uses pre-1990 data, shows a positive 
association.  In contrast, post-1990 investigations reveal either an inverse (Olk, 1997) or no 
significant (Beamish and Kachra, 2004) association. 
 
The findings in Table 8.14 also show that there are no significant relationships between 
overall IJV performance (Variable 30) and the following related factors: business linkage 
between the IJV and its parent companies, business linkage between the IJV parent 
companies themselves (Variable 13).  The outcomes of this study moderately correspond 
with those in previous studies.  For instance, Sim and Ali (1998), and Merchant and 
Schendal (2000) find that relationships between the business linkage of IJVs and their 
parent companies with IJV performance are statistically non-significant.  The non-
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significant relationship between business linkages among the IJV parent companies and 
IJV performance can also be found in previous studies (for example, Zeira et al., 1997). 
 
In contrast, Park and Kim (1997) find a significant result between business linkages 
between the IJV and its parent companies with IJV performance, and argue that the 
financial performance of IJVs improves where their business is related to that of their 
parents.  While a significant relationship between business linkages among the IJV parent 
companies and IJV performance can also be found from the study of Koh and 
Venkatraman (1991). 
 
In addition, the findings in Table 8.14 show no significant correlation between similarity of 
national culture (Variable 28.2) and overall IJV performance (Variable 30).  This finding is 
inconsistent with those who find positive relationship (for example, Lin and German, 1998; 
Lasserre, 1999).   However, it is consistent with the results of Mjoen and Tallman (1997), 
who also find no association.  In respect of this inconsistency, a number of researchers (for 
example, Robson et al., 2002) have commented that the impact of sociocultural distance on 
IJV performance is still unclear. 
 
Conversely, the findings in Table 8.14 reveal that similarity of organisational culture 
(Variable 28.1) does positively correlate with overall IJV performance (Variable 30), 
showing 0.25 Pearson correlation coefficients at 0.05 significance levels.  This supports the 
result of Glaister and Buckley (1998), which find a significantly strong positive correlation 
between these two variables. 
 
The findings of cultural factors in this study are similar to those of Pothukuchi et al (2002) 
that examines the effect of dimensions of national and organisational culture differences on 
IJV performance. Based on data from a survey of executives from IJVs between Indian 
partners and partners from other countries, Pothukuchi and his team find that the presumed 
negative effect from culture dissimilarity on IJV performance originates more from 
differences in organisational culture than from differences in national culture. While 
national culture dissimilarity more significantly affects the efficiency and competitiveness 
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measures of IJV performance, organisational culture difference is a better predictor of the 
satisfaction measure (Pothukuchi et al, 2002). 
 
In view of the findings of this study and previous research, organisational culture similarity 
generally has a positive effect on organisational outcomes but national culture similarity 
can have either a positive or a negative effect. The overwhelmingly positive effects of 
organisational culture similarity may arise from the fact that organisational culture 
similarity captures the on-going operational similarities in the norms of organisational 
practices and behaviours. Such similarities result in congruent expectations, 
understandings, and agreements that are crucial and functional to the IJV operation. 
 
On the contrary, national culture similarity between partners can potentially generate 
positive or negative effects because similarities in fundamental beliefs and values as 
reflected in the national cultures may turn out to reinforce or undermine partners’ 
collaborative efforts (Shenkar and Zeira, 1992). While some researchers find national 
culture differences causing conflicts and barriers (for example, Lane and Beamish, 1990), 
others have found national culture differences a source of admiration and challenge, 
leading to higher level of communication and more sustained collaboration (Park and 
Ungson, 1997; Shenkar and Zeira, 1992).  Pothukuchi et al (2002) argue that the challenge 
for future research is to identify the conditions under which national culture differences 
between partners are or can become complementary. 
 
Shenkar (2001) argues that the inconsistent findings in the relationship between culture 
dissimilarity and performance are due to conceptual and/or methodological properties of 
the cultural dissimilarity construct.  The findings suggest that levels of cultural 
dissimilarity, i.e., national vs. organisational, and the types of performance, i.e. subjective 
vs. objective, are additional sources of confusion in studying the effects of cultural 
difference.  It is critical to make a distinction across different measures of performance and 
different levels of analysis to draw reliable conclusions on the relationship between 
cultural difference and performance.  
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Furthermore, this study has tested the direct influence of cultural dissimilarities on IJV 
performance but has not examined their indirect influence through behavioural  processes 
such as partnership trust. A number of studies underscore the importance of partnership 
trust in inter-organisational relationships (for example, McKnight et al, 1998; Mohr and 
Spekman, 1994). It is still unknown, however, how the different dimensions of national 
and organisational culture affect partnership trust and, in turn, IJV performance.  Hence, 
future research into partnership trust in cross-cultural joint ventures, especially in the 
ASEAN4 context, is encouraged. 
 
In spite of these limitations, this study is among the very few that simultaneously examine 
the influences of national and organisational cultures in response to IJV performance in the 
context of the ASEAN4 countries. As such it provides interesting results that have 
important research and practical implications for understanding and managing IJVs. 
 
Table 8.14 also reveals that there are positive correlations between overall IJV 
performance (Variable 30) and commitment within the IJV (Variable 36) as well as 
commitment in the IJV parent companies (Variable 37).  That is, the commitment within 
IJVs and commitment in IJV parent companies are positively associated with IJV 
performance.  The results indicate that commitment within the IJV positively correlates 
with IJV performance, with support of the Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.44 at 0.001 
significance levels.  The commitment in IJV parent companies also shows a significantly 
positive correlation with IJV satisfaction, with the Pearson correlation value of 0.38 at 
0.001 significance levels respectively.  These outcomes correspond with the findings of 
previous studies (for example, Lyons, 1991; Demirbag and Mirza, 2000).   
 
Mohr and Spekman (1994) argue that commitment can be described as the willingness of 
IJV partners to exert effort in respect of their relationship with the IJVs.  Committed 
partners will consider long-term gains rather than short-term advantages.  In such cases the 
frequency and intensity of conflicts can be expected to be relatively low; therefore, higher 
levels of commitment positively affect IJV performance and partners’ satisfaction with IJV 
activities. 
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The results in Table 8.16 indicate the rank order of the mean scores of the individual 
organisational commitments (Variable 36).  It will be seen that all individual commitment 
variables have higher mean scores than the median value of 3 of the five-point scale.  The 
evidence shows that individual commitment by the IJV top management has the greatest 
mean score of 4, while individual commitment by human resource divisions has the least 
mean score of 3.28.  Individual commitment by the production division has the second 
highest mean score (3.58), followed by commitment by the marketing division (3.57), 
finance division (3.51), and research and development division (3.45) respectively. 
 
Table 8.16:  Ranking of the Mean Scores of Organisational Commitment 
Degree of Organisational Commitment Rank Mean S.D. 
Commitment by IJV top management 1 4.00 0.86 
Commitment by production division 2 3.58 0.75 
Commitment by marketing division 3 3.57 0.73 
Commitment by finance division 4 3.51 0.66 
Commitment by research and development division 5 3.45 0.82 
Commitment by human resource division 6 3.28 0.74 
NB:  SD = Standard Deviation; data in this table are drawn from Variable 36. 
 
A number of researchers (for example, Sim and Ali, 1998; Boateng and Glaister, 2000) 
argue in favour of further testing the relationships between the independent variables by 
multiple regression analysis.  They argue that this method is used to ascertain the 
multivariate relationships of the variables in addition to their bivariate relationships and 
accordingly the real relationships of the variables need to be proved using both methods.  
The present study has also adopted this approach by selecting factors which have already 
proved to have significant correlations with IJV satisfaction to conduct a multiple 
regression for predicting their influence on the dependent variable of this study, overall IJV 
satisfaction. 
 
Table 8.17 shows that the F-value of 9.58 is significant (p<0.001) and that the regression 
explains approximately 30 percent of the variation in satisfaction with the IJV’s 
performance.  The total amount of variation explained by the model is substantial and 
compares favourably with other studies of IJVs (see, for example, Sim and Ali, 1998; 
Boateng and Glaister, 2002).  The regression procedure suggests that IJV age (p<0.05), the 
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similarity of IJVs’ organisational culture (p<0.05), commitment within the IJV (p<0.01), 
and commitment between the IJV parent companies (p<0.05) have positive effects on IJV 
performance (perceived IJV satisfaction).  These findings are consistent with those from 
the bivariate correlation analysis in Table 8.14. 
 
However, high multicollinearity (the independent variables being interrelated in their 
effects) is found among the following pairs of variables: IJV commitment and IJV 
organisational learning; and commitment between the IJV parent companies and IJV 
organisational learning.  The rule of dropping all multicollinear variables except one is 
adopted (Mason and Perrault, 1991; Sim and Ali, 1998).  Thus, overall IJV organisational 
learning is removed from the multiple regression. 
 
Since the focus of this study is to investigate the influence of the related factors on IJV 
performance, specifically IJV satisfaction (the relationships between the independent 
variables are beyond the scope of this study), simple regression analysis of organisational 
learning and IJV satisfaction has also been conducted to prove their multivariate 
relationships in addition to the bivariate relationship analysis, as shown in Table 8.14.  The 
data in Table 8.18 indicate that the simple regression moderately explains about 17 percent 
of the variation in the satisfaction with IJV performance with the F-Value of 17.37 at 0.001 
significance levels.  The data reveal that IJV organisational learning has a positive effect 
on IJV performance.  Again, this confirms the result of the bivariate correlation analysis in 
Table 8.14. 
 
As noted at the beginning of this section (8.2.2) on performance determinants, the findings 
of this study show that IJV performance is positively influenced by the factors of (in order 
of priority) IJV commitment, organisational learning, commitment of the parent 
companies, similarity of organisational culture, and IJV age.  It is also noteworthy that, 
when compared with the outcomes in the literature, the findings relating to the significance 
of the relationships of these factors with IJV performance agrees with some but not with 
others. 
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Table 8.17:  Multiple Regression Results of the Related Factors and IJV Satisfaction 
Variable 
 
 
Unstandardised 
Coefficients 
 
Beta 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
T-Statistic 
 
 
Constant 3.32  2.52* 
Overall commitment within the IJV 1.03 0.28 2.65** 
Commitment between the parent companies 0.62 0.24 2.34* 
Age of the IJV Company 0.06 0.23 2.45* 
Similarity of Organisational Culture  0.38 0.19 2.00* 
R Squared 0.32   
Adjusted R Squared 0.29   
F-Value 9.58***   
NB:  Dependent Variable: Overall IJV Performance 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, p*<0.05, Durbin-Watson=1.71 
The data in this table are drawn from Variables 3, 28.1, 30, 36, and 37. 
 
Table 8.18:  Simple Regression Results of Organisational Learning and IJV Satisfaction 
Variable 
 
 
Unstandardised 
Coefficients 
 
Beta 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
T-Statistic 
 
 
Constant 6.55  6.08*** 
Overall IJV organisational learning 1.27 0.42 4.17*** 
R Squared 0.18   
Adjusted R Squared 0.17   
F-Value 17.37***   
NB:  Dependent Variable: Overall IJV Performance 
***p<0.001, Durbin-Watson=1.69 
The data in this table are drawn from Variables 30 and 35. 
 
The literature indicates that there are several points of disagreement between different 
studies on the subject of IJV performance determinants.  Robson et al. (2002) suggest a 
number of methodological flaws which might explain some of these.  Some researchers 
might: 1) lack a sound framework which would yield a comprehensive set of determinants 
of IJV performance; 2) define, operationalise, and categorise the IJV performance 
determinants in different ways; 3) conduct their research in isolation, leading to a 
fragmented body of knowledge; 4) fall short of connecting empirical findings to a rigorous 
future research program.  Bearing these dangers in mind, the present researcher has taken 
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great care to systematically study and analyse the empirical results, with full and extensive 
awareness of previous work in this area.  Since this study focuses on IJV formation in 
developing countries, especially in the ASEAN4 region, all identified IJV performance 
determinants in the context of developing countries have been reviewed.  Finally, a number 
of important and frequently identified determinants in the literature were chosen for 
detailed study. 
Therefore, there is a need to continue the study of IJV performance determinants in the 
context of other developing countries, especially in other ASEAN4 countries, to illuminate 
the reasons for the differences in the significant correlations of these factors with IJV 
performance.   
 
As regards managerial suggestions, recommendations encountered have included: 
 
a) “meet often, both formally and informally”.  Frequent meetings are likely to create more 
understanding between the two parent companies, and improve interaction by creating co-
operation in dealing with important isssues of the IJV.  This will also strengthen the 
commitment of both parents jointly to support the IJV.  The practice will be beneficial 
within the IJV itself, with meetings between the general IJV manager and functional 
department managers; between functional managers and operational employees.  This will 
encourage effective cooperation and mutual understanding throughout the IJV and create 
commitment.  The Japanese management style tends to favour having many meetings 
between managers to create a culture of cooperation in the organisation. These meetings, 
both formal and informal, are not only beneficial in terms of working place harmony, but  
also on an inter-personal level.   
 
b) “create a winning culture”.  The IJV has been created from at least two parent 
companies with two different organisational cultures, values, and beliefs.  The IJV firm has 
to combine, complement and manage these differences and balance two cultures in order to 
produce a workable culture within the IJV.  This will impact on business culture, product 
development culture, beliefs and values in order to achieve excellence in managing the IJV 
firm.  In the end, IJVs must, after combining different cultures, strive to create a distinctive 
organisational culture of their own. 
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 c) “develop a learning organisation”.  It can also be seen that, in the present, highly 
competitive environment, an organisation which is able to study the ever-changing 
business environment and to adapt to that change rapidly and effectively will be able to 
retain and develop its long-term competitiveness.   A learning organisation must, therefore, 
be created in the IJV and supported by the management team and parent companies.  
Strategic training and development should be initiated by the human resources department 
for IJV employees, and a culture of life-long learning and self-improvement must be 
encouraged throughout the IJV. 
 
In short, assessing IJV performance as well as identifying IJV performance determinants 
constitutes a difficult challenge.  The debate over the appropriate measures to use to 
evaluate IJV performance and the functioning of IJV performance determinants continues, 
although the present study has further demonstrated a possible methodology.  Such issues 
can best be addressed through further investigations using other databases.  The present 
study has served to confirm or contradict previously reported research, and has also 
provided additional insights into the issues examined.  It has extended the field of IJV 
research with new findings in a geographical area not fully examined in the past. 
8.3 Summary and Concluding Remarks    
The principal purpose of this chapter is to assess the IJV performance and analyse IJV 
performance determinants in the context of Thailand as a Southeast Asian country. These 
will fufil the fourth and fifth objectives of this study.  Given that the context of this study is 
different from most previous studies of IJV performance and determinants, the study 
provides new findings in an under-researched geographical area. 
 
To date, the literature indicates that there is no agreement among IJV researchers on the 
appropriate method for measuring IJV performance. Due to the limitations of each IJV 
performance measurement approach, this study has adopted an eclectic approach to the 
measurement of IJV performance in Thailand.  This includes objective measurement 
(assessment of stability, duration, and survival), subjective measurement (a general 
assessment of the degree of perceived satisfactoriness), and composite measurement 
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(multi-perceptual assessment with numerous aspects). This is a pioneering attempt to 
evaluate IJV performance in the ASEAN4 context by using a variety of indicators. 
 
The outcomes of this study indicate that there is a relationship between the objective and 
subjective measurement of IJV performance.  The findings reveal that there is a positive 
relationship between these two measures.  This is consistent with the findings from 
previous studies.  Of the objective performance measurements identified, survival has been 
found to have the strongest and most significant set of correlations with overall subjective 
performance measurement. 
 
In addition, the findings also suggest that there is a significant positive correlation between 
IJV managers’ assessment of IJV performance and the IJV managers’ perception of the 
IJV parent companies’ assessment of IJVs’ performance.  This  corresponds with the 
findings of previous studies (for example, Geringer and Hebert, 1991; Boateng and 
Glaister,  2002) since these researchers argue that this issue is very important and should 
be tested before other issues of IJV study where researchers are collecting data from the 
perception of the IJV managers.  This is because it is essential to examine whether or not 
IJV managers’ assessments correlate with those of the IJV parents. 
 
The outcome of this study also shows that IJV performance in Thailand has been assessed 
as ‘moderate-high’.  This outcome corresponds with the literature since a number of IJV 
researchers (for, example, Beamish and Delios, 1997) argue that the IJVs established in 
developing countries yield high performance, and indeed performance which is higher than 
that of IJVs formed in developed countries.  Also, the IJVs formed in Asia have 
moderately better performance than those formed in North America and Europe.  Future 
research of IJV performance assessment in other developing countries, especially in other 
ASEAN4 countries, might be useful to confirm the outcomes of this study.  Since IJV 
performance in each developing country might be differently influenced by a number of 
related factors (e.g., social and cultural factors), these might affect IJV performance and 
result in different outcomes compared with this study. 
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Furthermore, this study finds that the IJVs with developed country parent companies are 
not different from those with developing country parent companies in terms of IJV 
performance.  This outcome is consistent with some, but contradicts other, previous 
studies. This may be because, in this study, IJVs with parent companies from developed 
countries are concentrated in higher technology sectors (e.g. metal products, machinery 
and transport equipment sector) catering for both the domestic and overseas markets, while 
IJVs with foreign parent firms from developing countries, especially Asian Pacific firms, 
are in traditional mature sectors (e.g. agriculture and agricultural products sector) which 
can take advantage of low labour costs in Thailand for the export markets. This factor may 
have equalised the performance rating of the two groups in this study. That is, IJVs with 
parent companies from developed and developing countries do not consider IJV 
performance to be significantly different. 
 
This study also indicates that IJV performance varies with the strategic motives for IJV 
formation.  The evidence shows that the underlying motives linked to strategic positioning 
have a significant influence on IJV performance.  This supports the perspective of this 
study, which views IJVs as a strategic mode of enhancing market power and maximising 
profits by improving a firm’s competitive position. 
 
 The present research has the following implications for managers:  a)  competitive aspects 
of IJV formation are central;  (b) IJV managers in the intensely competitive environment of 
ASEAN4 countries, particularly Thailand, need to be good at cooperation, motivating IJV 
employees to work wholeheartedly for the IJV, and capable of responding rapidly to 
competition from both local and overseas rivals;  (c)  IJV general managers, as well as 
each functional manager (e.g., marketing manager) need to have good learning skills and to 
be able to adapt the best operational practices from both their parent companies.  
Adaptability is essential. 
 
The finding shows that the characteristics of IJV operation where there is a combination of 
both parent companies’ practice have a positive influence on IJV performance and leads to 
the conclusion that IJV performance varies with the characteristics of IJV operations. This 
finding supports the concept of ‘synergy’ of strategic behaviour perspective. 
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Regarding IJV performance determinants, the findings of this study show that there are 
positive correlations between IJV performance (IJV satisfaction) and the following factors 
(in order of priority): commitment within the IJV, organisational learning, commitment of 
the parent companies, organisational culture similarity, and IJV age.  However, when 
compared with the outcomes in the literature, the significant relationships of these factors 
with IJV performance in this study are in some cases consistent and in others 
contradictory.  Hence, there is a need to replicate the studies of IJV performance 
determinants in the context of other developing countries, especially in other ASEAN4 
countries, to confirm the significant relationships of these factors with IJV performance.  
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Chapter 9 
Conclusions 
 
9.1 Introduction 
The topic of international joint venture (IJV) formation is an aspect of the larger issue of 
strategic alliances between companies, in which there was great interest in the 1980s.  That 
period saw a surge in the formation of IJVs.  Writing in the 1980s and 1990s, many 
researchers (for example, Harrigan, 1988; Lee and Beamish, 1995; Glaister and Buckley, 
1998) commented that the study of IJVs was one of the fastest growing research areas in 
international business literature.  They also pointed out that IJV formation was the mode 
used by nearly half of all multi-national enterprises (MNEs) from developed countries to 
enter developing countries.  Despite this remarkable growth in both the incidence of IJVs 
and of academic interest in them, to date relatively few studies have been undertaken in the 
context of the high-performing economies of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 
Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia (the ASEAN4 countries).  This is 
despite the fact that IJV formation in this region has grown significantly, along with the 
region’s economies, in the past three decades (Julian et al., 2004; OECD, 2004; Julian and 
O’Cass, 2004; UNCTAD, 2007). 
 
A recent report (UNCTAD, 2007) identifies Thailand as the major recipient among the 
ASEAN4 countries of foreign direct investment (FDI).   FDI inflows to Thailand in 
particular have increased substantially since the second half of the 1980s, after the 
currency appreciation in Japan and the first tier newly-industrialising economies (NIEs) of 
Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea.  During the late 1980s, Thailand 
attracted on average US$ 1 billion per year of net FDI inflows, and these reached US$ 2 
billion per year during the first half of the 1990s.  This trend jumped to around US$ 5 
billion in the second half of the 1990s, and increased dramatically after 2000, with average 
FDI of US$ 11 billion per annum, rising to US$ 20 billion in 2006, an all-time record for 
Thailand.  (Bank of Thailand, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2007) 
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On the basis of such evidence, study of the phenomenon of IJV formation, a subset of FDI, 
in the ASEAN4 clearly deserves priority.  This study takes Thailand as a representative 
example for studying IJV formation in the ASEAN4 because Thailand’s foreign 
investment policies and regulation in response to FDI, especially to IJV formation, and the 
country’s economic situation are similar to those of the other members of the ASEAN4.  
 
In brief, the justification for carrying out this research is the growing importance of IJV 
formation, a form of strategic alliance, together with the under-researching of the topic of 
IJV formation in the ASEAN4 region, which contains some of the fastest growing 
economies in the world.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a summary of the research findings of the present 
study and to offer the conclusions which can be drawn from them.  It discusses the findings 
as well as the implications of the results of the study for IJV formation in the ASEAN 
context.   The chapter consists of six sections: a re-statement of the aim and objectives of 
the study; the main findings of the research; the contribution made by the research; the 
policy implications; limitations of the study; and a future research agenda.  
9.2 The Purpose of the Study 
This study set out to examine a number of aspects of IJV activity in the context of the 
ASEAN4 countries, and more particularly, of Thailand.  The main topics identified for 
investigation were as follows: 
 
1) To ascertain the characteristics of the activities, distribution, and trends of international 
joint ventures in Thailand; 
2) To determine the strategic motives of IJV parent companies in forming IJVs, and to 
identify factors which affect location choice decisions by foreign firms when considering 
IJV formation; 
3) To examine the contributions which parent companies make to IJVs and analyse the 
relationship between those contributions and the characteristics of IJV operation in the 
context of Thailand as an ASEAN4 country; 
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4) To assess IJV performance in the context of the ASEAN4 countries, particularly 
Thailand, and to analyse the determinants which influence IJV performance in Thailand as 
a developing country. 
9.3  Summary of the Main Research Findings 
The research framework presented schematically in Figure 3.1 (Chapter 3) provides the 
link between the scholarly part of the investigation, giving an overview of the subject areas 
of the research and the contributions of the leading studies in the field, and the empirical 
part of the original research undertaken to provide answers to the research objectives 
identified in Chapter 1 (specifically through obtaining and analysing data from the BOI 
database and survey of IJV general managers).   
  
The framework also helps to identify concepts which need to be operationalised 
subsequently and clarified by means of the questionnaire  
9.3.1 The Patterns of Activities, Distribution, and Trends of IJV 
Formation in Thailand 
The findings of this research show that four periods of IJV formation in Thailand can be 
identified, and these exhibit distinctly different trends.  The first period relates to the years 
before the 1980s, when IJV formation increased but only at a moderate rate.  The second 
distinct period is the 1980s, when the rate of IJV formation increased markedly.  Indeed 
the increase was quite remarkable, and during this decade the number of IJVs formed was 
over three times the number established during the entire previous 20-year period.  The 
third period is the decade of the 1990s which is the peak period for IJV formation in 
Thailand.  This ten-year period saw the establishment of almost half the total number of 
IJVs formed in the half-century and more between 1951 and 2003.  The fourth and most 
recent period for which data have been available, the four years of 2000-2003, has seen 
more than ten percent of the total number of IJVs formed.  If the same rate of IJV 
formation continues until the end of the decade, it seems likely to be the second most 
active period of IJV formation in the history of Thailand. 
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Several explanations have been offered by researchers for this dramatic increase in the 
number of IJVs formed in Thailand and other developing countries.  It has been suggested 
that host government restrictions leave foreign corporations with few choices as to how to 
satisfy government demands for local participations in ownership and management of 
enterprises within the borders of the host country.  IJVs are seen as a way, perhaps not the 
best from the viewpoint of foreign companies, of gaining access to markets and resources 
from which they would otherwise simply be excluded for protectionist reasons.  Another 
explanation offered is that the drastic change in the business environment resulting from 
the process of globalisation and the emergence of a ‘world economy’ has been an 
important reason for the upsurge in IJV formation in developing countries.  In the new 
economy, cost reduction pressures, slow growth in their home market, and rapid 
technology innovation have forced multi-national enterprises to seek new markets for their 
products.  As global competition has increased, they have had to revise their business 
strategy and to undertake a number of strategic moves, including embarking on a 
collaborative strategy which might not be traditional for them by setting up IJVs in order to 
gain market power vis-à-vis their existing and/or potential competitors. 
   
The analysis has shown that, in fact, the large increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in Thailand making use of the medium of IJVs does indeed result from business 
restrictions imposed by the Thai government, but has also been greatly influenced by a 
dramatic switch on the part of the Thai government away from import substitution and in 
favour of export promotion.  Under the impact of the financial crisis of 1997 there has been 
a marked liberalisation by the government of the conditions governing FDI, and allowing 
foreign firms to sell into local and third markets has brought about a rapid expansion of 
sales for foreign businesses.  These specific factors have combined to account for the 
dramatic FDI inflows and growth in IJV formation in Thailand since the 1990s. 
 
The present study has demonstrated that in recent decades the vast majority of IJVs in 
Thailand have been formed by companies from Japan, followed at a considerable distance 
by the Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs), and the European Union respectively.  
Japan has been by far the most important source of FDI through the medium of IJV 
formation in Thailand.  This study has found no reason to doubt the reason most often cited 
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for the increase in FDI in Thailand and other ASEAN4 countries by Japanese and NIEs 
companies since the 1980s.  This holds that they have been motivated to relocate 
production bases abroad in order to escape the appreciation of their home currencies.  It 
has been shown in this study, however, that Japanese FDI in Thailand has declined 
consistently since the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and that this has continued into the 
early 2000s.  This trend may be partly due to currency appreciation of the ASEAN4 
countries against the yen, reflecting the depreciation of the yen against the US dollar since 
the crisis. 
 
The present research has found that manufacturing is the most important sector in terms of 
IJV formation in Thailand.  The findings of this study have shown that the industries most 
involved in IJV formation in Thailand are, in descending order, the metal products, 
machinery and transportation equipment sector; the light industry sector; and the 
chemicals, paper and plastics sector.  These three sectors are shown to represent more than 
50% of the total of IJVs formed.  The increase in IJV formation in these sectors has been 
an important contributor to the FDI boom in Thailand, especially since the 1980s. 
 
Looking more closely at the structure of IJVs, it has been shown that, in respect of equity 
participation, foreign parent companies were mostly minority equity holders in IJVs 
formed in Thailand throughout the past fifty years.  This is clearly because the Thai 
government, like the governments of other developing countries and in particular of the 
other ASEAN4 countries, has restricted foreign companies to minority equity participation 
in IJVs in order to avoid ‘economic colonisation’.  A slight decrease in minority equity 
participation of foreign firms in IJVs formed after the late 1990s has been demonstrated, 
resulting no doubt from the fact that the prohibition of foreign majority equity holdings in 
IJVs was lifted when Thailand’s Alien Business Law of 1972 was replaced by the more 
liberal Foreign Business Act in 1999 in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis. 
 
A survey conducted in the course of the present study has revealed the most important host 
country location factors favouring the phenomenal increase in IJV formation in Thailand.  
It has been shown that future market expectations of the region, lower labour cost, and 
favourable infrastructure are respectively the most important factors affecting foreign 
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firms’ decisions to select Thailand as their host country for IJV formation.  Other 
important factors are, in descending order, market size, skilled labour, and political and 
economic stability.  These findings in respect of Thailand are by and large consistent with 
the factors identified in the literature on FDI in general. 
 
9.3.2 Strategic Motives for IJV Formation 
It has been found in this study that the most important strategic motives which make 
foreign firms decide to form IJVs in Thailand are to do with the firms’ own market and 
geographical expansion plans.  The two most prominent strategic motives of foreign 
companies have been found to be, gaining presence in new markets, and enabling faster 
entry to markets.  Behind these come the motives of competing with common competitors, 
facilitating international expansion, transferring to the lowest cost production location, and 
finding an export base for foreign markets. 
 
The principal strategic motivations which this study’s survey showed to be encouraging 
Thai firms to form IJVs were more to do with technology transfer and risk reduction.  The 
most important strategic motive of all for Thai companies is gaining access to technology 
through the foreign partner.  This suggests that if an IJV in Thailand is to be successful, 
then the learning and dynamic benefits of the process of co-operation are crucial.  The 
motive of sharing the cost of R&D was ranked second by the firms surveyed, and other 
motives, in descending order of importance, were sharing the cost of investment, gaining 
access to foreign markets, competing with common competitors, and, finally, gaining 
access to management know-how. 
 
This study has confirmed what a number of previous empirical studies of the strategic 
motives for IJV formation in other regions have found, namely that there is a significant 
difference in the relative importance of particular strategic motives for foreign and local 
companies.  The present analysis discovered eight motives which had significant mean 
score differences.  These motives were: transferring production to the lowest cost location, 
sharing investment costs, accessing low cost labour of partners, enabling product 
diversification, sharing cost of R&D, accessing/ exchanging technology through partner, 
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exchanging patents or territories, and spreading risks of the project.  It is clearly important 
for companies to be aware of these differing priorities if needless friction is to be avoided. 
 
When comparing the relative importance of strategic motives of foreign parent firms 
revealed by this study in the context of Thailand with the findings of studies carried out in 
other national contexts, moderate consistency is found.  For instance, the first and second 
ranked strategic motives of foreign partners in IJV formation in Turkey (Tatoglu and 
Glaister, 2000) are exactly the same as in the present study, namely, gaining presence in 
new markets and enabling faster entry to markets.  Unlike the findings of this study, 
however, their third ranking motive was maintaining adequate quality control.  Spreading 
risks of the project and achieving economies of scale were ranked fourth and fifth by 
Tatoglu and Glaister. 
 
In the case of Thailand, this study has shown that there is a considerable difference 
between the strategic motives of local parent firms and what has been found in studies of 
local parent firms’ motives in other countries.  These differences may result from the 
striking dissimilarity of local firms in different geographical locations in terms of social 
and cultural characteristics, market structure, industrial development, and so forth. 
 
To investigate the fundamental nature and pattern of strategic motives for the sample of 
IJVs, this study analysed strategic motives against two characteristics: industrial sector and 
national origin of foreign firms.  
 
The findings of the present study show that for Thailand the relative importance of 
different strategic motives varies with the sector of IJV activity, but not with the national 
origin of foreign firms.  This is similar to what has been found in other national contexts. 
 
9.3.3 Parent Companies’ Contributions and Operational Practices of 
IJVs in Thailand 
The findings of this study reveal that the principal contributions of Thai parent companies 
to IJVs relates mainly to providing knowledge of the local environment and marketing.  
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Otherwise, their contributions, in descending order of importance, are: facilitating 
opportunity and market identification; workforce training; and facilitating government 
support and permits.  Against that, the main contributions of foreign parent companies to 
IJVs relate to technology and know-how transfer.  The findings show that continuous 
technological knowledge inflow is the most valuable contribution of the foreign parent 
company, followed by plant design, technology and construction; and improvement and 
adaptation of new production techniques respectively. 
 
These findings are consistent with the literature, so that these results can be generalised to 
assert that foreign parent companies from industrialised countries usually provide firm-
specific knowledge in respect of technology, management and capital markets to their IJV 
firms, while the local parent companies provide location-specific knowledge regarding the 
host country markets, marketing infrastructure, and political conditions.  It can also be 
generalised that what holds true of IJVs has in the past been true also of subsidiaries of 
overseas firms in Thailand.  The present findings in respect of IJVs are consistent with the 
results which Sibunruang (1986) obtained when observing parents’ contributions to 
subsidiaries and the characteristics and performance of the subsidiaries.  He noted that 
important contributions were made by foreign firms in the spheres of machinery, 
production techniques, and international marketing.  Less important but nevertheless 
considerable contributions were equity and management know-how.  
 
The results of this study also show that IJV parent companies’ contributions do indeed 
affect the characteristics of IJV operation.  The greater the input of the parent companies to 
an IJV’s operations, the greater the similarity of the characteristics of its operations to 
those of its parents.  This provides a new insight into this issue in the context of Thailand.  
It is consistent with the literature, especially from the strategic behaviour perspective, since 
this paradigm regards IJVs as organic entities which grow and develop in nature, linked to 
the contribution of their parent companies.   The degree of closeness to their parent firms 
gradually decreases as IJVs ‘grow up’.  The development of the IJV firm is an evolutionary 
process. 
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In the context of Thailand, and more generally of the other ASEAN4 countries, there is 
scope for further comparative research into this issue, investigating IJVs in particular 
sectors (especially the service sector), or in more highly competitive business environment 
(since most of the IJVs in the study were in manufacturing).  These factors might stimulate 
IJVs to ‘mature’ more rapidly, and to show more individual operational characteristics.  
Such IJVs with strong management might be expected to develop their own style of 
operation after having received contributions (resources) from their parent companies for a 
time.  They might succeed in blending the resources together to create a unique blend of 
strategies.  The knowledge and skills of their managers may make some IJVs largely 
autonomous from the outset and, since each location presents a different working 
environment, the characteristics of management and operation will not always be able to 
adhere rigidly to patterns established within the parents.  The operational or working 
characteristics of IJVs need to respond quickly to the ever-changing environments and 
markets in which they find themselves.  In practice, an IJV’s operational characteristics 
have been found to depend very much on the management skills and styles of IJVs’ 
managing directors, as well, of course, as of other functional, e.g., marketing or 
production, managers. 
9.3.4  Performance Measurement and Performance Determinants of IJVs 
in Thailand 
This study is an original attempt to examine IJV performance in the ASEAN context and, 
more generally, to explore the vitally important question of IJV performance determinants.  
The geographical and economic context of the study is unique in the literature on IJV 
performance, hence it is contributing new findings in an under-researched area. 
 
The literature to date indicates a lack of agreement among IJV researchers on something so 
fundamental as the appropriate method by which to measure IJV performance.  Due to the 
limitations of each individual IJV performance criterion, this study, after careful 
consideration, has adopted an eclectic approach to the measurement of IJV performance in 
Thailand.  This includes objective measurement (assessment of stability, duration, and 
survival), subjective measurement (a general assessment of the degree of perceived 
satisfactoriness), and composite measurement (multi-perceptual assessment with numerous 
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aspects). This is a pioneering attempt to evaluate IJV performance in Thailand and, more 
generally, in the ASEAN4 context by using a variety of indicators. 
 
The outcomes of this study indicate that there is indeed a relationship between the findings 
resulting from objective and subjective measurement of IJV performance.  They reveal a 
positive relationship between these two measures.  This is consistent with the findings 
from previous studies.  Of the objective performance criteria examined, survival has been 
found to have the strongest and most significant set of correlations with overall subjective 
performance measurements. 
 
Further, the findings suggest that there is a significant positive correlation between IJV 
managers’ assessment of IJV performance and their perception of parent companies’ 
assessment of IJV performance.  This outcome corresponds to the findings of such earlier 
studies as Geringer and Hebert (1991) and Boateng and Glaister (2002).  These researchers 
have argued that this is an important issue which should be tested as a matter of priority 
over other IJV study issues where researchers collect data based on the perception of IJV 
managers. It remains a topic for the future especially in the ASEAN4 context to examine 
the extent to which IJV managers’ assessment of the satisfaction or otherwise of parent 
companies with IJVs correlates with the directly expressed perceptions of the IJV parents 
themselves. 
 
A further outcome of this study is to show that IJV performance in Thailand has been 
assessed as ‘moderately high’.  This outcome corresponds with the literature, where a 
number of IJV researchers (for example, Beamish and Delios, 1997) argue that IJVs 
established in developing countries yield higher performance than those formed in 
developed countries.  Also, IJVs formed in Asia have moderately better performance than 
those formed in North America and Europe.  Future research into IJV performance in other 
developing countries, especially in other ASEAN4 countries, would be useful to confirm 
the outcomes of this study.  Since IJV performance in each developing country appears to 
be differently influenced by a number of related, for example, social and cultural, factors, 
these may produce instructive variations on the outcomes found in this study. 
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A further finding of the present study has been that, in Thailand, IJVs with developed 
country parent companies are no different in terms of performance from those with 
developing country parent companies.  This outcome is consistent with previous research 
into IJVs in certain countries, but contradicts the findings of research into other countries. 
This interesting difference may also result from cultural factors. 
 
This study also indicates that IJV performance varies with the strategic motives for IJV 
formation and the characteristics of IJV operation.  The evidence shows that the underlying 
motives linked to strategic positioning have a significant influence on IJV performance.  
This supports the perspective of this study, which views IJVs as a strategic mode of 
enhancing market power and maximising profits by improving a firm’s competitive 
position.  This research also indicates that the characteristics of IJV operation where there 
is a combination of both parent companies’ practices have a positive influence on IJV 
performance, and leads to the conclusion that IJV performance varies with the 
characteristics of IJV operation. 
 
Regarding IJV performance determinants, the findings of this study show that, for 
Thailand, there are positive correlations between IJV performance/ IJV satisfaction and the 
following factors (in order of priority):  the commitment within the IJV, organisational 
learning, the commitment of the parent companies, similarity of organisational culture, and 
IJV age. Again, when compared with outcomes in the literature, it can be seen that the 
significant relationships of these factors with IJV performance agree with some previous 
studies but contradict others.  There is a need to continue the study of IJV performance 
determinants in the context of other developing countries, especially in the ASEAN region, 
to illuminate the reasons for the differences in the significant correlations of these factors 
with IJV performance. 
9.4  The Contribution of the Research 
This study focuses on IJV formation in Thailand, and more generally in the context of an 
ASEAN4 country.  It has made a number of valuable contributions to the IJV literature and 
has achieved its objectives.  Firstly, it has for the first time systematically shown the 
distribution of IJV formation in Thailand, from an official dataset which makes it possible 
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to follow the activities, distribution, and trends of IJV establishment in Thailand over a 
period of half a century.  Secondly, it has revealed the location factors which influence the 
decision of MNEs to embark on IJV formation in Thailand and the ASEAN4 region.  
Thirdly, it has identified the principal strategic motives of parent companies in forming 
IJVs in Thailand.  Fourthly, it has shown the contributions IJV parent companies provide 
to IJV firms operating in Thailand and shown the relationship between their contributions 
and the characteristics of IJVs’ operation.  Fifthly, it has evaluated IJV performance using 
an eclectic approach in the context of Thailand as a developing country in Southeast Asia. 
Finally, the study has identified those factors which influence IJV performance in the 
ASEAN4 context.  These six contributions to the IJV literature are significant. 
 
Firstly, the present research has provided new empirical insights into the pattern and trends 
of IJV formation in the Southeast Asian countries by analysing a unique dataset, the 
official database of the BOI (Thailand Board of Investment).  This is the first time the 
official database has been made available for the study of IJVs in Thailand and the 
ASEAN region in general. 
 
Secondly, this study has made a major contribution to the IJV literature by identifying the 
location factors affecting IJV formation in Thailand.  There is a gap in the literature in 
respect of the factors which influence MNEs to choose Thailand as the host country for 
FDI through the medium of IJV formation. This study adds to our knowledge of this 
important area. 
 
Thirdly, the study’s findings have provided new knowledge of the principal strategic 
motives behind the decision of foreign parent companies and local parent companies to 
form IJV firms in Thailand and the ASEAN countries.  Few studies have been undertaken 
on this issue in respect of developing countries, especially those in the ASEAN4.  This 
study has thus contributed original findings to the literature on IJVs by providing new 
results on an under-researched area. 
 
Fourthly, this study has provided new data and empirical insights into the contributions 
provided by parent companies to IJVs in Thailand, and has investigated the effect of those 
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contributions on the characteristics of the IJVs’ operation.  Very few studies investigate  
the effects of the parents’ contributions on the characteristics of IJV operation in the 
ASEAN4 context, although it is accepted that such characteristics have an impact on the 
development of IJVs (Ouchi, 1979; Kumar and Seth, 1988).  This study is accordingly the 
first attempt to fill the knowledge gap in the literature in respect of this issue. 
 
The present study has made a further major contribution to the literature by assessing IJV 
performance in Thailand.  In international business literature there are few studies of IJV 
performance and its determinants in the context of the Southeast Asian region. 
 
This is also the first study to use an eclectic approach to evaluate IJV performance in the 
ASEAN4 context in order to overcome the limitation of the individual IJV performance 
measurement approaches. 
 
Lastly, this study has made a further major contribution to the IJV literature by identifying 
the factors which influence IJV performance in Thailand.  It has tested the results of 
previous studies to see whether factors shown to affect IJV performance elsewhere are also 
applicable to Thailand as a developing country in Southeast Asia.  The commitment within 
the IJV, organisational learning, the commitment of the parent companies, similarity of 
organisational culture, and IJV age have been shown to be dominant factors influencing 
IJV performance in Thailand.  
9.5 Managerial and Policy Implications of the Study 
1. Since Japanese investors are known to be the main source of FDI through the medium of 
IJV formation in Thailand, i.e., they are strategic customers for Thailand, the Thai 
government may wish to provide more infrastructure specifically targeted at them.  These 
might include facilities, targeted investment promotion, and support to encourage them to 
increase inward investment.  Not only might the government do well to go out of its way to 
co-operate with them more, but it might wish to try to encourage them to consider 
investing in other strategic sectors than the automotive sector, which has already proved 
very successful with close operation between Thailand and Japan.  For Thailand, five 
priority target industries have been identified by the government for aggressive promotion: 
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agro-industry, fashion, automotive assembly, information communication technology 
including electronics, and high value-added services (BOI, 2005).  These are areas where it 
would be rational to concentrate efforts to encourage Japanese FDI through the formation 
of IJVs. 
 
2.  In terms of technology transfer, this has been shown to be an area where foreign firms 
have disappointed the hopes of the Thai government.  The Thai government may wish to 
consider giving higher priority to targeted education policy in order to improve this 
situation, supporting links and collaboration between Thai higher education institutions 
and Japanese business.  Such Japanese companies as Toyota might be encouraged to send 
specialists from Japan to teach and collaborate with Thai students and scholars, or to set up 
courses for, for example, final-year engineering students.  These students, with a Japanese 
language capability, would then be of great value directly to their companies or as key 
players in Japanese-Thai IJV firms.  Thai universities could act as intermediaries in 
promoting such links between Japanese and Thai business, and also collaboration between 
Thai and Japanese or other foreign universities with the aim of expanding the supply of 
highly qualified and compatible managers and workers for IJVs in the future. 
 
3.  With the likelihood that China will play an increasingly important role in the Asia 
Pacific region, government initiatives to encourage IJVs between Thailand and China 
might prove highly rewarding. 
 
4.  As well as policy implications, the findings of this study have important implications 
also for IJV managerial practice.  Competitive motivations underly IJV formation and in 
the intensely competitive environment of the ASEAN4 countries IJV managers need to be 
highly skilled at promoting cooperation, motivating their employees to work 
wholeheartedly for the IJV, and capable of responding rapidly to competitive challenges 
both from local and from overseas rivals.  General managers, as well as each functional 
manager, need outstanding learning skills and have to be able to adapt the best operational 
practices of both their parent companies to the local conditions in which they are operating.  
Adaptability is essential.  Frequent meetings create better understanding between the two 
parent companies about the important isssues of the IJV and strengthen their commitment 
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to it.  Frequent meetings between the general IJV manager and functional department 
managers, and between functional managers and operational employees encourage 
effective cooperation, mutual understanding, and commitment.  The IJV firm has to 
combine, complement and manage the differences between the parent companies and 
produce a workable culture within the IJV.  An organisation which is able to observe the 
ever-changing business environment and adapt to change rapidly and effectively will retain 
and develop its long-term competitiveness.  A learning organisation could be created in the 
IJV and supported by the human resources department.  
9.6  Limitations of the Study 
This study has operated under a number of constraints which need to be considered when 
seeking to identify options for future research on IJVs in developing countries and more 
specifically in the ASEAN region.  The main limitations are discussed below. 
 
With considerable persistance, it proved possible to obtain a very good response rate from 
a target sample of 310 IJVs of 88 usable responses.  At 28 percent this is towards the 
higher end of response rates found in the literature.  For example, a study of IJVs in Ghana 
and Nigeria by Boateng and Glaister (2003) was based on 57 usable questionnaires, a very 
commendable response rate of 35%.  Groves (1990), indeed, argues that a response rate of 
10 percent or higher is entirely acceptable for a self-administered mail survey.  A much 
larger sample size might, however, have generated different results when using such 
multivariate data analysis techniques as factor analysis and regression analysis.  Ideally, 
future research would be conducted on a larger scale by a research team. 
 
A further difficulty affecting this study was related to the primary data of the IJV database 
itself. This database was kindly provided by the Thailand Board of Investment.  The 
official statistical data provided the business name of the IJVs, their mailing address and 
contact telephone number, the IJV’s industrial sector, the nationality of its foreign parent 
company or companies, and the proportions of the equity shares in the IJV.  The data did 
not, however, include the year the IJV was established or a clear indication of the IJV’s 
operational status which would make clear whether it was continuing to exist or had been 
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terminated.  The present researcher was obliged to obtain this information directly from the 
website of the Department of Business Development at the Ministry of Commerce. 
 
Even so, there were still problems with information about IJVs’ operational status.  After 
questionnaires were mailed to the qualified operational IJV samples as amended, a number 
of questionnaires were returned on the grounds that IJVs had terminated or because of 
wrong addresses.  The information obtained from the government website had not been 
updated, which made it impossible to send questionnaires to all the target respondents.  It 
would be helpful if the Thai government, specifically the Department of Business 
Development at the Ministry of Commerce, would modify their information more 
frequently. 
 
One final limitation of the study relates to the source of the data.  Since the database used 
registers only IJVs created through the BOI’s investment promotion schemes, IJVs formed 
without government support are not included.  Hence, this pioneering study has been 
unable to target all IJVs in Thailand.  However, since the BOI is the main government 
organisation overseeing and supporting inward and outward FDI in Thailand, it may be 
assumed that its IJV database includes the overwhelming majority of IJV firms in 
Thailand. 
9.7  Future Research Agenda 
The results of this study have significantly advanced understanding of important aspects of 
IJV formation in Thailand and, more generally, in the ASEAN context.  The study has 
attempted a broad approach, and future research might do well to focus on in-depth study 
of some of the trends which have been identified.  The following are a number of 
interesting areas recommended for follow-up research. 
 
First, similar research could be conducted on the crucial aspects of IJV formation: the 
characteristics of the activities, distribution, and trends of IJV formation; the strategic 
motives and the host country location factors influencing IJV formation; the parent 
companies’ contributions and the relationship between those contributions and the 
characteristics of the IJV’s operation; and IJV performance assessment and performance 
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determinants in other ASEAN4 countries.  Comparing those results with this study would 
provide a valuable complement to the present findings and would give a more 
comprehensive understanding of IJV formation in the ASEAN region.  If the outcomes 
proved similar to the present findings, that would indicate that the outcomes of this study 
are stable across those countries and would support a claim of generalisability of its results. 
 
Second, the survey conducted in the course of this study elicited primary data from a single 
group of respondents, IJV general managers, on the assumption that they were 
knowledgeable about all aspects of IJVs on which the study was focused.  Future research 
might provide more comprehensive results if it proved possible to obtain data from all 
management perspectives: from IJV general managers, local parent companies, and foreign 
parent companies. 
 
The findings of this study have indicated that organisational learning, the commitment of 
those working within IJVs, the commitment to the IJV of its parent companies, similarity 
of organisational culture, and IJV age are dominant factors influencing IJV performance in 
Thailand.  The statistically significant relationships, however, between these factors and 
IJV performance are in some cases consistent and in others contrast with the outcomes of 
earlier studies conducted in other regions.  At this point, there is a need to replicate a study 
of these IJV performance determinants in other developing countries, especially in the 
ASEAN4 context, to refine understanding of the significant influences of these factors on 
IJV performance.  
 
The present research has shown that the contributions of IJV parent companies affect the 
characteristics of how the IJV operates.  It has been shown that, the greater the 
contributions, i.e. resources, made by the parent companies, the closer the similarity of the 
IJV’s operations to the characteristic operation of its parents. 
 
There is scope, however, for further comparative research into this issue, investigating 
IJVs in other ASEAN4 countries, in particular sectors (especially the service sector), 
and/or in a highly competitive business environment (since most of the IJVs in this study 
are in manufacturing).  These factors might stimulate IJVs to ‘mature’ more rapidly, and to 
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develop their own specific operational characteristics.  In the mature stage of their 
evolution, IJVs with strong management might be expected to develop their own style of 
operation after having received contributions (resources) from their parent companies for a 
time.  They might succeed in blending those resources in an original way to create a unique 
blend of strategies.  The knowledge and skills of their managers may make some IJVs 
largely autonomous from the outset and, moreover, since each location presents a different 
working environment, the characteristics of management and operation will not always be 
able to adhere rigidly to patterns established within the parents.  The operational or 
working characteristics of IJVs need to respond quickly to the ever-changing environments 
and markets in which they find themselves.  In practice, an IJV’s operational 
characteristics have been found to depend very much on the characteristics of their own 
managers, that is, on the management skills and styles of the IJV managers directly 
overseeing them, the managing directors of the IJV firms.  They depend also on the talents 
of such other managers within the IJV as marketing or production managers.  Further 
research into this area should be conducted, especially with reference to other developing 
countries in the ASEAN4 region. 
 
Given that the sample IJVs were almost entirely firms doing business in the manufacturing 
sector (only 10 percent of the total samples were from the service sector), the findings and 
conclusions can only be applied with confidence to firms working in the manufacturing 
sector.  It would provide a helpful contribution to the IJV literature if a similar study was 
conducted on a sample of IJVs engaging only in the service sector, and across a number of 
different ASEAN countries. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1: The Krejcie and Morgan Sampling Size Formula     
n =          λ2NP (1-P)  
  ∝2(N-1) + λ2 P (1-P)  
 
where: n  = target sample size 
            N = number of population 
            λ2 =  3.841 
            P = proportion of population (equals 0.5 that set up by Krejcie and Morgan) 
           ∝ = accepted error (equals 0.05) 
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Appendix B 
FDI Incentives and Criteria of the Thailand Board of Investment (BOI) 
A. Summary of Incentives under the Investment Promotion Act B.E. 2520 (1977), as 
amended by the Investment Promotion Act (Revision 2) B.E. 2534 (1991) and the 
Investment Promotion Act (Revision 3) B.E. 2544 (2001)  
1. Guarantees 
- Against nationalization 
- Against competition from status enterprises  
- Against state monopolization of the sale of products similar to those produced by the 
   promoted project 
- Against price controls 
- Against tax-exempt import by government agencies or state enterprises  
- Permission to export  
2. Protection Measures (Subject to justifications and needs) 
- Imposition of a surcharge on imports at a rate not exceeding 50 percent of the CIF  
   value for a period not more than one year at a time  
- Import ban on competitive products 
- Authority by the Chairman to order helpful actions or tax relief measures for the  
   benefit of promoted projects. 
3. Permissions 
- To bring in foreign nationals to undertake investment feasibility studies 
- To bring in foreign technicians and experts to work on promoted projects 
- To own land to carry out promoted activities  
- To take or remit foreign currency abroad  
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4. Tax Incentives 
- Exemption or reduction of import duties on imported machinery  
- Exemption or reduction of import duties on imported materials and components 
- Exemption of corporate income taxes for three to eight years, with permission to  
   carry forward losses and deduct them as expenses for up to five years 
- Exclusion of dividends derived from promoted enterprises from taxable income tax  
   holiday 
5. Additional Incentives for Enterprises in the Special Investment Promotion Zones 
- Reduction of corporate income tax by 50 percent for five years after the exemption  
   period  
- Double deduction from taxable income of water electricity and transport costs for 10  
   years from the date of first sales  
- Deduction from net profit of 25 percent of the projects infrastructure installation or  
   construction cost. 
B. Policies and Criteria for Investment Promotion 
 This Board of Investment Announcement No. 1/2543 (August 1, 2000) should be 
read in conjunction with BOI Announcement No. 2/2543, the List of Activities Eligible for 
Investment Promotion.  For all applications submitted on or after August 1, 2000 the Board 
of the Investment prescribes the following policies and criteria for investment promotion. 
1. Policies for Investment Promotion  
 To relieve the fiscal burden of the government and to respond to current and future 
economic situation, the Board of Investment prescribes new policies as follows:  
1.1 The efficiency and effectiveness of tax privileges given shall be enhanced. Privileges 
shall be grated to project that actually benefit the economy and good governance shall 
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be used for managing and supervising the application of tax and duty privileges. 
Promoted entities shall report the operating results of the their promoted projects to the 
Board of Investment for review prior to the application of tax and duty privileges for 
that year. 
1.2 Every promoted project that has investment capital of 10 million bath and upwards 
(excluding cost of land and working capital) must obtain ISO 9000 certification or 
similar international certification within 2 year from its start-up date, otherwise the 
corporate income tax exemption will be reduced by 1 year. This is to promote 
development of quality and production standards in Thai industries and, thereby, to 
enhance the competitiveness of Thai industry in the world market. 
1.3 Previous conditions on exports and use of local material are repealed so that the 
criteria for promotion will be in line with international trade and investment 
agreements. 
1.4 Special promotion shall be given to regions or areas with low income and inadequate 
investment facilities. Maximum tax and duty privileges shall be to these regions or 
areas. 
1.5 Importance is given to small and medium industries by applying a minimum level of 
investment capital of 1 million baht (excluding cost of land working capital) for 
projects eligible for promotion. 
1.6 Priority is given to activities in agriculture and agricultural products, projects related 
to technological and human resource development, public utilities and infrastructure, 
environmental protection and conservation and targeted industries. 
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2. Criteria for Project Approval 
 In determining the suitability of a project for which investment promotion 
privileges are requested, the Board of Investment applies the following criteria:  
2.1 For a project with investment capital (excluding cost of land and working capital) not 
exceeding 500 million baht, the following criteria are used: 
2.1.1 The value added is not less than 20percent of sales revenue, except projects that 
manufacture electronic products and part or processed agricultural product, and 
projects granted special approval by the Board; 
2.1.2 Ratio of liabilities to registered capital should not exceed 3 to 1 for a newly 
established project. Expansion projects shall be considered on a case by case 
basis; 
2.1.3 Modern production processes and new machinery are used. In cases where old 
machinery will be used, its efficiency must be certified by reliable institutions 
and the Board’s approval must be obtained; 
2.1.4 Adequate environmental protection systems are installed. For projects with a 
potential environmental threat, the Board shall prescribe special conditions on 
both the location of the project and the manner of pollution treatment. 
2.2 For a project with investment capital (excluding cost of land and working capital) 
exceeding 500 million baht, criteria under 2.1 shall be used and a feasibility study of 
the project, as prescribed by the Board, must be submitted. 
2.3 For a concession project or privatization of a state enterprise project, the criteria shall 
be based on the Cabinets decision dated 25 May 1998, as follows:  
2.3.1 Projects of state enterprises shall not be granted promotion; 
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2.3.2 For a Build Transfer Operate or Build Operate Transfer concession project by 
the private sector the state agency that owns the project must submit its project 
must submit its project to the Board for consideration prior to any invitation to 
bid, and bidders shall be informed of any promotional privilege entitled to 
them, prior to the bidding. In principle, the Board will not consider a project 
where the private sector pays for a concession, unless such payment is deemed 
to represent a reasonable investment for the state; 
2.3.3 For a Build Operate project, including a lease by the private sector or rental 
payment to the state, normal criteria are used; 
2.3.4 For privatization of state enterprises, only expansions after the privatization 
shall be considered for promotion. 
3. Criteria for Shareholding by Foreign Investors 
 To relax limitation of foreign shareholding in manufacturing activities and to 
facilitate investors on their investment, the following criteria are used; 
3.1 For a project in agriculture, animal husbandry, fishery, mineral exploration and mining, 
and service businesses under List One of the Foreign Business Act B.E. 2542, Thai 
nationals must hold shares totaling not less than 51 percent of the registered capital; 
3.2 For Manufacturing projects, in all zones, foreign investors may hold a majority or all 
shares in promoted projects; 
3.3 The Board may fix the shareholding of foreign investment on some promoted projects 
when it is deemed appropriate. 
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4. Investment Zones  
4.1 There are three Investment Zones based on economic factors, i.e., the level of income 
and the availability of infrastructure in each province, (See map on the inside front 
cover)  
Zone 1 6 Central provinces with high income and good infrastructure: Bangkok, 
Nakhon Pathom, Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, Samut Prakan, and Samut Sakhon.  
Zone 2 12 provinced : Ang Thong, Ayutthaya, Chachoengsao, Chon Buri, 
Kanchanaburi, Nakhon Nayok, Ratchabusi, Samut Songkhram, Sareburi, Suphanburi, 
and Rayong, 
Zone 3 The remaining 58 provinces with low income and less developed infrastructure.    
4.2 All areas in the Zone 3 provinces are designated as Investment Promotion Zones. 
5. Criteria for Granting Tax and Duty Privileges 
5.1 Zone 1 – Approved project located in six provinces in this zone shall be granted: 
5.1.1 50 percent reduction of import duty on machinery that is subject to import duty 
of not less than 10 percent: 
5.1.2 Corporate income tax exemption for 3 years for project located within industrial 
estates or promoted industrial zones, provided that a project with capital 
investment of 10 million baht or more (excluding cost of land and working 
capital) obtains ISO 9000 or similar international standard certification with in 
2 years from its start-up date, other wise the corporate income tax exemption 
will be reduced by 1 year; 
5.1.3 Exemption of import duty on raw or essential materials used in the 
manufacturing of export products for 1 year 
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Note: The maximum value of a projects corporate income tax exemption is 100 
percent of its investment capital. 
5.2 Zone 2 – approved projects located in 12 provinces in this zone shall be granted: 
5.2.1 50 percent reduction of import duty on machinery that is subject to import duty 
of not less than 10 percent;  
5.2.2 Corporate income tax exemption for 3 years, increased to 5 years for projects 
located within industrial estates or promoted industrial zones, provided that 
such a project with capital investment of 10 million baht or more (excluding 
cost of land and working capital) obtains ISO 9000 or similar international 
standard certification within 2 years from its start-up date, otherwise the 
corporate income tax exemption will be reduced by 1 year: 
5.2.3 Exemption of import duty on raw or essential materials used in the 
manufacturing of export products for 1 year. 
Note : The maximum value of a project’s corporate income tax exemption is 100 
percent of its investment capital. 
5.3 Zone 3 - Approved projects located in the remaining 58 provinces shall be granted: 
5.3.1 Exemption of import duty on machinery; 
5.3.2 Corporate income tax exemption for 8 years provided that a project with capital 
investment of 10 million baht or more (excluding cost of land and working 
capital) obtains ISO 9000 or similar international standard certification within 2 
years from its start-up date, other wise the corporate income tax exemption will 
be reduced by 1 year; 
5.3.3 Exemption of import duty on raw or essential materials used in the 
manufacturing of export products for 5 years; 
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5.3.4 A project located in one of the following 36 provinces: Chai Nat, Chanthaburi, 
Chiang Mai, Chian Rai, Chumphon, Kamphaeng Phet, Khon Kaen, Krabi, 
Lamphang, Lamphun, Loei, Lop Buri, Mae Hong Son, Mukdahan, Nakhon 
Ratchasima, Nakhon Sawan, Nakhon Si Thammarat< Phangnga, Phattalung, 
Phetchabun, Phetchaburi, Phisanulok, Pichit, Prachin Buri, Prachuab Khiri 
Khan, Ranong, Sa Kaew, Sing Buri, Songkhla, Sukhothai, Surat Than, Tak, 
Trang, Trat, Uthai Thani and Uttaradit, 
Shall be granted tax and duty privileges under 5.3.1, 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 and and 
further privileges, as follows:   
(1) A project located within industrial estates or promoted industrial Zones is 
entitled to the following privileges: 
(1.1) 50 percent reduction of corporate income tax for 5 years after the 
exemption period; 
(1.2) Double deduction from taxable income of transportation, electricity 
and water costs for 10 years from the date of first revenue derived 
from promoted activity; 
(2) For a project located outside industrial estates or promoted industrial zones, 
a deduction can be made from net profit of 25 percent of the project’s 
infrastructure installation or construction cost for 10 years from the date of 
first revenue derived from promoted activity, and net profit for one or more 
years of any year can be chosen for such deduction.  
* Amended by Announcement of the Board of Investment No.7/2547 
  The deduction is additional to normal depreciation. 
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5.3.5 A project located in one of the following 22 provinces: Amnat, Charoen,  
BuriRam, Kalasin, Maha Sarakham, Nakhon Phanom, Nan, Narathiwat, Nong 
Bua Lamphu, Pattani, Phayao, Phrae, Roi Et, Sakhon Nakhon, Sathun, Si Sa 
Ket,Surin, Yasothon, Yala, Chaiaphum, Nong Khai, Ubon Ratchani and Udon 
Thani Shall be granted tax and duty privileges under 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.3 and 
further privileges as follows:  
(1) 50 percent reduction of corporate income tax for 5 years after the exemption 
period; 
(2) Double deduction from taxable income of transportation, electricity and 
water costs for 10 years from the date of first revenue from promoted 
activities: 
(3) Deduction can be made from net profit of 25 percent of the project’s 
infrastructure installation or construction cost for 10 years from the date of 
first revenue from promoted activities, and net profit for one or more years 
of any year can be chosen for such deduction. The deduction is in addition 
to depreciation. 
Note: The maximum value of a project’s corporate income tax exemption is 100 
percent of its in investment capital. 
6. Priority Activities 
6.1 The Board places priority on promoting the following types of projects:  
6.1.1 Agriculture and agricultural products  
6.1.2 Direct involvement in technological and human resource development  
6.1.3 Public utilities and infrastructure  
6.1.4 Environmental protection and conservation  
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6.1.5 Targeted industries 
The Board shall announce the list of priority activities or industries. 
6.2 Such projects will be entitled entitle to the following privileges: 
6.2.1 Exemption of import duty on machinery regardless of location  
6.2.2 Corporate income tax exempting for eight years, regardless of location  
6.2.3 Other privileges entitled for each Zone  
* Amended by Announcement of the Board of Investment No. 7/2547 
7. Criteria for Factory Relocation  
To encourage industrial decentralization, the Board will grant promotion status to existing 
in the Central area, whether being promoted or not, if they relocate to the other regions. 
The following criteria are used: 
7.1 The operation must relocate from Zone 1 to Zone 2 or from Zone 1 or Zone 2 to Zone 
3; 
7.2 The operation must relocate to industrial estates or promoted industrial zones; 
7.3 The type of activity must be one that is included in the List of Activities Eligible for 
Promotion and the size of the investment must be in accordance with that specified the 
Board; 
7.4 The existing operation must be closed down and the operation at the relocated location 
must start within 2 years from the date of receiving the promotion certificate; 
7.5 The relocated project is granted tax and non-tax privileges as follows: 
7.5.1 A project relocated to an industrial estate or promoted industrial zone in Zone 2, 
will be granted corporate income tax exemption for a period of 5 years, provided 
that such a project with capital investment of 10 million baht or more (excluding 
cost of land and working capital) obtains ISO 9000 or similar international 
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certification within 2 years from the start-up date of its new plant, otherwise the 
corporate income tax exemption will be reduced by 1 year: 
7.5.2 A project in an industrial estate or promoted industrial zone in 40 provinces in Zone 
3 will be granted the following:  
(1) Corporate income tax exemption for a period of 8 years, provided that such a 
project with capital investment of 10 million baht or more (excluding cost of 
land and working capital) obtain ISO 9000 or similar international standard 
certification within 2 years from its start-up date, or else the corporate income 
tax exemption will be reduced by one year: 
(2) 50 percent reduction of corporate income tax for 5 years after the exemption 
period: 
(3) Double deduction from taxable income of transport, electricity and water costs 
for 10 years from the date of first revenue derived from the promoted activity. 
7.5.3 A project relocated to an industrial estate or  promoted industry zone in the 18 
least-developed provinces in Zone 3 will be granted: 
(1) Corporate income tax exemption for a period of 8 years, provided that such a 
project with capital investment of 10 million baht or more (excluding cost of 
land and working capital) obtain ISO 9000 or similar international standard 
certification within 2 years from the start-up date of its new plant, otherwise the 
corporate income tax exemption will be reduced by 1 year. 
(2) 50 percent reduction of corporate income tax for 5 years after the exemption 
period; 
(3) Double deduction from taxable income of transportation, electricity and water 
cost for 10 years from the date of first revenue from promoted activity: 
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(4) Deduction from net profit of 25 percent of the project’s infrastructure 
installation or construction cost for 10 years from the date of first sales, and net 
profit for one or more years of any year can be chosen for such deduction is in 
addition to normal depreciation. 
7.5.4 Activities that are included on the List of Activities Eligible for Promotion, but 
which are nit eligible for corporate income tax exemption, will not be grated such 
exemption when operations are relocated. 
7.6 The corporate income tax exemption shall be granted from the day the firth revenue is 
received from the relocated activities. 
7.7 Application for relocation must be submitted to the Office of the Board of Investment. 
8. Requirement to Report Operating Results 
To ensure the effectiveness of the tax and duty privileges, to ensure that the use of the 
privileges granted is correct and in line with the policies for promotion, and to encourage 
the good governance of promoted projects, all promoted projects must report their annual 
operating results to the Board for review prior to using tax and duty privileges for that 
year. 
9. Exemptions 
The Board shall follow the above general criteria in considering and approving investment 
promotion and granting tax and duty privileges, except the following: 
9.1 When different tax and duty privileges have been specified to particular activities on 
the List of Activities Eligible for Promotion: 
9.2 When the Board considers that special reasons apply to certain activities; 
9.3 To allow projects located in Laem Chabang Industrial Estate or industrial estates or 
promoted industrial zones in Rayong Province to be granted privileges under the 
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previous criteria as well as privileges of an Investment Promotion Zone, granted in 
accordance with Section 35, industrial estates or promoted industrial zones in Rayong 
Province, which have applied for investment promotion privileges prior to the effective 
date of this Announcement, and lame Chabang Industrial Estate shall be designated as 
an Investment Promotion Zone until 30th December 2004;  
9.4 A project located in an industrial estate or promoted industrial Zone 2 and Zone 3 
(whose promotion application is submitted prior to the effective date of this 
Announcement) shall be granted the tax and duty privileges under the original criteria 
under the previous Board of Investment Announcement No.1/2536 , as Follows:  
9.4.1 A project whose operation is located in an industrial estate or promoted industrial 
zone in Zone 2, except in Laem Chabang Industrial Estate or in an industrial 
estate or promoted industrial zone in Rayong Province shall be granted the 
following privileges: 
(1) 50 percent reduction of import duty on machinery that is subject to import 
duty of not less than 10%;  
(2) Corporate income tax exemption for years provided that such a project with 
capital investment of 10 million baht or more (excluding cost of land and 
working capital) obtains ISO 9000 or similar international standard 
certification within 2 years from its start-up date, otherwise the corporate 
income tax exemption will be reduced by 1 year: 
(3) Exemption of import duty on raw or essential materials used in the 
manufacturing of export products for 1 year. 
* Amended by Announcement of the Board of Investment No. 7/2547  
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9.4.2 A project located in an industrial estate or promoted industrial zone in zone 3, 
Laem Chabang Industrial Estate or in an industrial estate or promoted industrial 
zone in Rayong Province shall be granted the following privileges: 
(1) Import duty exemption on machinery; 
(2) Corporate income tax exemption for 8 years, provided that such a project with 
capital investment of 10 million baht or more (excluding cost of land and 
working capital) obtains ISO 9000 or similar international standard certification 
within 2 years from its start-up date, or else the corporate income tax exemption 
will be reduced by 1 year; 
(3) Exemption of import duty on raw or essential materials for manufacturing of 
export products for 5 years; 
(4) 75 percent import duty reduction on raw or essential materials used in 
manufacturing for domestic sales for 5 years, with year-by-year approval. Such 
raw or essential materials shall not be those that are produced or originated in 
the Kingdom with similar quality and sufficient supply. This does not apply to 
projects located in Laem Chabang Industrial Estate: 
(5) 50 percent reduction of corporate income tax for 5 years after the exemption 
period: 
(6) Double deduction from taxable income of transportation , electricity and water 
costs for 10 years from date of first revenue derived from promoted activity; 
(7) Deduction from net profit 25 percent of project’s infrastructure installation or 
construction cost for 10 years from the date of first revenue derived from 
promoted activity. This amount can be deducted from net profits for one or 
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more years, and any year can be chosen for this deduction. Deduction is 
additional to normal depreciation. 
9.5 A project relocated into an industrial estate or promoted industrial zone (whose 
promotion application is submitted prior to the effective date of this Announcement) 
shall be granted the tax and privileges under the previous criteria under the Board of 
Investment Announcement No. 1/2536 as follows:  
9.5.1 A project relocated into an industrial  
*Amended by Announcement of the Board of Investment No. 7/2547 estate or 
promoted industrial zone in Zone 2, except in Laem chabang Industrial Estate 
or in an industrial estate or promoted industrial zone in Rayong Province shall 
be grated corporate income tax exemption for 7 years provided that such a 
project with capital investment of 10 million baht or more (excluding cost of 
land and working capital) obtains ISO 9000 or similar international standard 
certification within 2 years from its start-up date, otherwise the corporate 
income tae exemption will be reduced by 1 year; 
9.5.2 A project relocated into an industrial estate or promoted industrial zone in Zone 
3, Laem Chabang Industrial Estate or an estate or promoted industrial zone in 
Rayong shall be granted  
(1) Corporate income tax exemption for 8 years that such a project with capital 
investment of 10 million baht or more (excluding cost of land and working 
capital) obtains ISO 9000 or similar international standard certification within 2 
years from the start-up date of its new plant, otherwise the corporate income tax 
exemption will be reduced by 1 year; 
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(2) 50 percent reduction of corporate income tax for 5 years after the exemption 
period; 
(3) Double deduction from taxable income of transportation, electricity and 
water costs for 10 years from date of first revenue derived from promoted 
activity; 
(4) Deduction from net profit of 25% of the project’s infrastructure installation 
or construction cost for 10 years from the date of first revenue derived from 
promoted activity, and net profit for one or more years of any year can be 
chosen for the deduction, which is extra to normal depreciation. 
Any application for the above privileges under 9.4 and 9.5 must be submitted by December 
30,2004 
- This Announcement is effective for applications submitted from August 1, 2000 
onward. 
- For companies that have already received investment promotion privileges, who are 
engaging in activities now classified as priority activities (Section 6, 
Announcement 2/2543), if they had not yet used their tax privileges as of August 1, 
2000, they can reapply under the new Investment Promotion List and follow the 
new condition specified therein. Applications must be submitted no later than 
Thursday, December 29, 2000. 
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Appendix C 
10th March, 2006 
 
Subject : Please be so kind and fill in the questionnaire for the research. 
 
Dear Sir/ Madame, 
 
My name is Pornlapas Suwannarat, a PhD student at Nottingham Business School, Nottingham 
Trent University, UK.    Currently, I am undertaking a PhD research project in the field of 
international business funded by the Commission on Higher Education, Ministry of Education, 
Thailand.   My PhD thesis topic is “The Characteristics and Performance of International Joint 
Ventures in Thailand”. The aim of this study is to investigate the strategic motives for 
international joint venture formation, host country location factor and government policy, 
management and performance, as well as the critical factors that influence the performance of 
international joint ventures in Thailand. The findings of this study will be useful to academics, as 
well as the managers and policy makers in each firm.  
 
Please find attached a questionnaire which I hope you will take time to complete and return to me 
in a stamped and self- addressed return envelope provided. It will take approximately 15 – 30 
minutes to complete this questionnaire, but your participation will be a vital resource for this 
study.  Moreover, I would like to confirm that all information you provide will be kept in 
confidence and in the report findings, no individual person or company will be identified.     If you 
do not wish to answer to some questions, please answer to the rest of questions. However, if you 
are unable to respond, please forward this questionnaire to a relevant person.  Should you are 
interested in the result of this study, I shall be pleased to send you a summary of the research 
findings after the analysis of this study is completed. Please note that this questionnaire is still 
applicable, even if the international joint venture has already been terminated. 
 
I shall very much appreciate your cooperation and look forward to receiving your completed 
questionnaire by 31st March 2006. If you have any queries towards this study, please feel free to 
contact me at the following addresses: 
 
Mr. Pornlapas Suwannarat                              or  Mr. Pornlapas Suwannarat  
378/1 Soi Phungmi 14, Postgraduate Research Office,   
Sukhumvit 93, Bangchak,  Chaucer 496,  
Phrakanong, Bangkok 10260, Thailand Nottingham Business School 
Tel 02-730-3060 Nottingham Trent University 
Fax 02-730-3060 Burton Street, Nottingham NG1 4BU 
E-Mail: pornlapasss@yahoo.com United Kingdom 
                                                                          Tel +44 (0) 115 941 8418  
 Fax+44 (0) 115 848 2999 
    E-Mail: paul.suwannarat@ntu.ac.uk 
 
Yours truly, 
Pornlapas Suwannarat 
PhD Candidate 
Nottingham Business School 
 
P.S. You can complete either English or Thai version of the questionnaire. 
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  FFFF 
 
Questionnaire Survey of International Joint Venture (IJVs) in Thailand 
 
I would like to confirm that all information provided will be kept confidential, and no individual person or 
company will be identified in the findings of the report. 
 
Please answer each question in the appropriate space or tick in the box provided only, and omit the box at the 
end of each question ( e.g.  v3 FFFFF ), which will be filled by the researcher. 
 
This questionnaire uses abbreviation IJVs as international joint ventures, which are defined as organisations 
are created from two or more parent companies, that at least one parent company has its headquarters outside 
the venture’s country of operation (or if it has an important level of operation in more than one country), join 
forces to establish a newly corporate entity in which each has an equity position, thereby each expects a 
proportional share of dividend as compensation and representation on the board of directors.  
 
Section 1: Background 
 
1     Your job title ___________________________________________________________________ v1F 
2. Number of employees in IJV company in Thailand_______________________  v2FFFFF 
3. When was the IJV company formed? Year___________________  v3 FFFF 
4. How many parent companies created the IJV company?_________________        v4 FF 
Number of the foreign parent company ______________________ v4.1 FF 
 Number of the Thai parent company    _______________________ v4.2 FF 
 
5. Please list the nationalities of the foreign parent companies. If you have more than one foreign parent 
company, please start with the biggest equity shareholder.  
 Nationality  1. ___________________________  2. ___________________________ v5.1 F v5.2 F 
  3. ___________________________  4. ___________________________ v5.3 F v5.4 F 
  5. ___________________________  6. ___________________________ v5.5 F v5.6 F 
 
NB. In the remainder of this questionnaire, for IJV companies with more than one foreign parent company, 
where relevant, please answer questions with respect to the first foreign parent company in question 5. 
 
6. Has the IJV been terminated? ( please tick)  
F  No   (go to question 9) v6.1 F 
F  Yes When was the IJV terminated? Year___________ (go to question 7)  v6.2 FFFF 
 
 
If IJV has been terminated please answer the rest of the questions as the situation was when the IJV was in 
operation. 
 
7. What happened to the IJV? ( please tick) 
F  1)  Bought by the Thai parent company  v7 F 
F  2)  Bought by the foreign parent company  
F  3)  Bought by the third party  
F  4)  Liquidated  
F  5)  Other, please specify 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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8. Why was the IJV terminated? ( please tick) 
F  1)  IJV had fulfilled its purpose v8 F 
F  2)  IJV poor performance      
F  3)  Change of partners’ strategy towards IJVs     
F  4)  Other, please specify 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. What was the value of the original investment made in the IJV by: 
   
             Foreign parent company: _________________________________Baht     v9.1 (M฿) FFFF  
             Thai parent company: ____________________________________Baht    v9.2 (M฿) FFFF 
 
              Proportion: Foreign ____________ % Thai  ____________ %  v9.3.1 FF.FF  
 v9.3.2 FF.FF 
 
10. Has the IJV company’s equity shareholding changed since the venture was first established? ( please 
tick) 
 
F  No  (go to question 12) v10 F 
F  Yes  (go to question 11) 
 
11. If the proportion of the IJV company’s equity shareholding has changed, what is the current  new value 
of the investment  by: 
 
            Foreign parent company: _________________________________Baht     v11.1 (M฿) FFFF  
            Thai parent company: ___________________________________Baht     v12.2 (M฿)  FFFF 
     
            Proportion: Foreign ____________ % Thai  ____________ %   v11.3.1 FF.FF  
                                                                                                                   v11.3.2 FF.FF 
 
12. How would you classify the foreign parent company and the Thai parent company? ( please tick) 
 
Foreign parent companyF  1)  Private companyF  2)  Government
 v12.1 F 
 F  3)  Other, please specify __________________________________   
 
Thai parent company F  1)  Private company F  2)  Government v12..2 F 
 F  3)  Other, please specify __________________________________   
 
13. Please identify the principal business activity of the IJV company, the foreign parent company, and the 
Thai parent company ( please tick for each company) 
 
IJV company Foreign parent company  
Thai parent 
company  Type of Business 
v13.1 FF v13.2 FF v13.3 FF 
1) Electronics and electrical machinery    
2) Computers and software    
3) Food and Drink manufacturing    
4) Textile, wearing apparel and leather    
5) Automobiles and related equipments    
6) Plastics product    
7) Metal and minerals    
8) Chemical     
9) Pharmaceuticals    
10) Biotechnology    
11) Agro industry    
12) Other manufacturing    
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(please 
specify)____________________ 
13) Export and Import trading    
14) Tourism and accommodation    
15) Transport and distribution    
16) Telecommunications    
17) Construction and estate agent    
18) Financial and banking services     
19) Other services   
(please 
specify)____________________ 
   
 
Section 2: Location Factor and Government 
Incentives 
 
14. How important do you think were the following factors for the foreign parent company to make 
decision to invest in Thailand? (Where 1 = is not important at all, 5 = is very important, please tick) 
 
Importance Factor 1 2 3 4 5  
1) Lower labour cost      v14.1 
2) Thai government incentives and assistance      v14.2 
3) Existence of suitable Thai partner       v14.3 
4) Future market expectations in the region      v14.4 
5) Favorable infrastructure      v14.5 
6) Availability of Thai skill labour       v14.6 
7) Liberal foreign exchange control and possibility of 
remitting profits 
     v14.7 
8) Political and economic stability       v14.8 
9) Thai society and culture       v14.9 
10) Cheap raw material      v14.10 
11) Access to local capital      v14.11 
12) Favorable geographical location and distance      v14.12 
13) To overcome entry barriers      v14.13 
14) To develop new market       v14.14 
15) Matching competitors’ strategies      v14.15 
16) Others (please 
specify)_______________________________ 
     v14.16 
  
 
15. In your opinion, what is the importance of the following types of government incentives in 
contributing to the success of your IJV company? (1= is not important at all   5= is very important, 
please tick) 
 
Importance Type of Government Assistance 1 2 3 4 5  
1) Exclusive privilege grants (in each investment 
promotion zone) 
     v15.1 
2) Financial assistance (e.g. low interest loan)      v15.2 
3) Exemption or reduction of import duties on machinery
  
     v15.3 
4) Exemption or reduction of import duties on raw 
materials 
     v15.4 
5) Corporate income tax exemption      v15.5 
6) Permission to own land  and factory site      v15.6 
7) Permission to get the working permit  license      v15.7 
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8) Permission to bring in the foreign workers      v15.8 
9) Permission to remit foreign currency abroad      v15.9 
10) Others (please 
specify)_______________________________ 
      v15.10 
 
 
16. In your opinion, how satisfied are the foreign parent company, the Thai parent company, and the IJV 
managers with the Thai government incentive schemes?  (where; 1 = very dissatisfied,  5 = very 
satisfied) ( please tick) 
 
Satisfaction Type of Company 1 2 3 4 5  
1) Foreign parent company      v17.1 
2) Thai parent company      v17.2 
3)  IJV managers      v17.3 
 
Section 3: Strategic Motives for IJV Formation 
 
17. In your opinion, how important were the following motives for the foreign parent company 
establishing the IJV company? (1= is not important at all   5= is very important, please tick) 
 
Importance Motive 1 2 3 4 5  
1) To spread risk of project       V18.1 
2) To gain economies of scales      V18.2 
3) Exchange of technology       V18.3 
4) To gain presence in new market       V18.4 
5) Sharing cost of R&D       V18.5 
6) Sharing cost of investment      V18.6 
7) Faster reimbursement on the investment      V18.7 
8) To compete against common competitors      V18.8 
9) To reduce competition by forming IJV with existing or 
potential competitors 
     V18.9 
10) Enabling faster entry to market       V18.10 
11) To conform to Thai government policy and regulation      V18.11 
12) Enabling product diversification         V18.12 
13) Export base for foreign market      V18.13 
14) To concentrate on a more profitable business      V18.14 
15) Production transferred to lowest cost location      V18.15 
16) To maintain position in existing market      V18.16 
17) To facilitate international expansion      V18.17 
18) To obtain local identity       V18.18 
19) Exchange of patents or territories      V18.19 
20) To access Thai partner’s natural resource      V18.20 
21) To access Thai partner’s human resource (skilled 
labours) 
     V18.21 
22) To access Thai partner’s low cost labours        V18.22 
23) Difficulties with agents or licensees      V18.23 
24) Others (please 
specify)_______________________________ 
     V18.24 
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18. In your opinion, how important were the following motives for the Thai parent company establishing 
the IJV company? 
        (1=is not important at all   5= is very important, please tick) 
 
 
Importance Motive 1 2 3 4 5  
1) To spread risk of project      V19.1 
2) To gain economies of scales      V19.2 
3) To access foreign partner’s technology      V19.3 
4) To access foreign market       V19.4 
5) Sharing cost of R&D       V19.5 
6) Sharing cost of investment      V19.6 
7) Faster reimbursement on the investment      V19.7 
8) To compete against common competitors      V19.8 
9) To reduce competition by forming IJV with existing or 
potential competitors 
     V19.9 
10) Enabling faster entry to market       V19.10 
11) To conform to Thai government policy and regulation      V19.11 
12) Enabling product diversification         V19.12 
13) Export base for foreign market      V19.13 
14) To concentrate on a more profitable business      V19.14 
15) Production transferred to lowest cost location      V19.15 
16) To maintain position in existing market      V19.16 
17) To facilitate international expansion      V19.17 
18) To access management know-how      V19.18 
19) Exchange of patents or territories      V19.19 
20) To access foreign partner’s natural resource      V19.20 
21) To access foreign partner’s human resource (skilled 
labours) 
     V19.21 
22) To access foreign partner’s low cost labours        V19.22 
23) Difficulties with agents or licensees      V19.23 
24) Others (please 
specify)_______________________________ 
     V19.24 
 
 
Section 4: Management 
 
19. How many of the executives on the board of directors of the IJV company? 
_________________ persons                  v20    FF       
By come from:  Foreign parent company _______________persons   v20.1 FF 
                   Thai parent company __________________  persons v20.2 FF 
                          Other (please specify)  __________________: _______________ persons v20.3 FF 
 
 
20. Who appointed the first general manager of the IJV company? (please tick) 
F  1)  Foreign parent company  F  2)  Thai parent company   v21 F 
F  3)  Other (please specify)  _____________________ 
 
 
21. Who was responsible for the subsequent appointment of the general manager of the IJV company? 
       (please tick) 
F  1)  Foreign parent company   F  2)  Thai parent company   v22 F 
F  3)  Other (please specify)  _____________________ 
 
 
 282
22. In your opinion, what is the extent of the foreign parent company’s contribution to the IJV company 
in the following areas? (1= not at all  5= most, please tick) 
 
Contribution Contribution Area 1 2 3 4 5  
1) Plant design, technology and construction           v24.1 
2) Workforce training      v24.2 
3) Perception of opportunity and market identification      v24.3 
4) Obtaining foreign financing      v24.4 
5) Obtaining domestic financing      V4.5 
6) Getting government support and permit      v24.6 
7) Exporting       v24.7 
8) Importing intermediates       v24.8 
9) Importing capital equipments      v24.9 
10) Continuous technological knowledge inflow      v24.10 
11) Improvement and adaptation of new management 
techniques 
     v24.11 
12) Improvement and adaptation of new production 
techniques 
     v24.12 
13) Conducting research, and development of the product      v24.13 
14) Advice about business strategy       v24.14 
15) Others (please 
specify)_______________________________ 
     v24.15 
 
 
 
 
 
23. In your opinion, what extent was the Thai parent company’s contribution to the IJV company in the 
following areas? (1= not at all  5= most, please tick) 
 
 
Contribution Contribution Area 1 2 3 4 5  
1) Plant design, technology and construction          v25.1 
2) Workforce training      v25.2 
3) Perception of opportunity and market identification      v25.3 
4) Obtaining foreign financing       v25.4 
5) Obtaining domestic financing      v25.5 
6) Getting government support and permit       v25.6 
7) Exporting      v25.7 
8) Importing intermediates        v25.8 
9) Importing capital equipments       v25.9 
10) Continuous technological knowledge inflow      v25.10 
11) Improvement and adaptation of new management 
techniques 
     v25.11 
12) Improvement and adaptation of new production 
techniques 
     v25.12 
13) Conducting research, and development of the product      v25.13 
14) Advice about business strategy        v25.14 
15) Others (please 
specify)_______________________________ 
     v25.15 
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24. What do you think is your IJV company’s dependence on the foreign parent company and on the Thai 
parent company in the following activities? (please rate in the appropriate column the extent of 
dependence from 1 to 5, where         1=no dependence at all,  2=to a small extent,  3=to a considerable 
extent,  4= to a great extent,  5=to a very great extent) 
 
 
Activity Thai parent company Foreign parent company 
1) Financing  v26.1.2  v26.1.3 
2) Marketing activities   v26.2.2  v26.2.3 
3) Product research and development  v26.3.2  v26.3.3 
4) Human resources management, and 
recruitment,  v26.4.2  v26.4.3 
5) Compensation policy and practice  v26.5.2  v26.5.3 
6) Training and  development  v26.6.2  v26.6.3 
7) Production process  v26.7.2  v26.7.3 
8) Technical know-how  v26.8.2  v26.8.3 
9) Management know- how  v26.9.2  v26.9.3 
10) Raw material  v26.10.2  v26.10.3 
11) Quality control activities    v26.11.2  v26.11.3 
12) Exporting   v26.12.2  v26.12.3 
13) Importing  v26.13.2  v26.13.3 
 
 
 
25. To what extent, on the scale provided, does the IJV company practice the same procedures as the 
foreign parent company or the Thai parent company in the following aspects? 
 
 Where,    1 = exactly the same as the foreign parent company 
2 = likely the same as the foreign parent company 
   3 = combination of both parent companies’ procedure 
   4 = likely the same as the Thai parent company 
   5 = exactly the same as the Thai parent company 
 
 
Level Aspect 1 2 3 4 5  
1) Compensation policy and practices       v27.1 
2) Human resources management and recruitment      v27.2 
3) Training and development       v27.3 
4) Production process        v27.4 
5) Product research and development       v27.5 
6) Strategy Formulation      v27.6 
7) Budgeting        v27.7 
8) Accounting system and practice       v27.8 
9) Costing Management and costing system      v27.9 
10) Management information system      v27.10 
11) Pricing setting system       v27.11 
12) Marketing      v27.12 
13) Quality control       v27.13 
14) Others (please 
specify)_______________________________ 
     v27.14 
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Section 5: Performance, Learning Capability, and 
Commitment of   IJVs 
 
26. When the IJV company  was established, was it only expected to last a certain period of time?  
F  No  v28.1 FF 
F  Yes    How many years?____________.  and when will it end?__________________  v28.2 
FFFF 
 
27. How does the IJV company measure its performance? (please tick any which are appropriate)  
 
F  1)  Level of turnover          F  2)   Level of profitability v29.1 F v29.2 F 
F  3)  Reputation F  4)   Labor productivity  v29.3 F v29.4 F 
F  5)  Share price   F  6)   Extent of technology transfer  v29.5 F v29.6 F 
F  7)  Market share F  8)   Level of cost control  v29.7 F v29.8 F 
F  9)  Quality control F  10) Other (please specify)_______________    v29.9 F v29.10 F 
 
28. Please tick the answers that best describe your view in each statement, where: 1= strongly disagree; 
2=disagree; 3=neutral; 4=agree; 5= strongly agree. 
 
Opinion Statement 1 2 3 4 5  
1) Overall, organisational culture of the foreign parent 
company is similar to the Thai parent company’s 
organisational culture. 
 
    v30.1 
2) Overall, national culture of the foreign parent company 
is similar to the Thai parent company’s national culture. 
     v30.2 
 
29. Before forming the IJV company, relatively, the size of the foreign parent company and the size of the 
Thai parent company (based on the net asset value) are: 
 
F    1)  Similar   F   2)  Different                                v31 F 
 
30. How would you evaluate the following activities of the IJV company as compared with your initial 
expectations at the time the IJV was formed? 
 
 
Opinion 
Activity Much 
Better 
Somewhat 
Better 
About 
Expected 
Somewhat 
Worse 
Much 
Worse 
 
Marketing       
1) Market share       v32.1.1 
2) Advertisement and promotion      v32.1.2 
3) Distribution      v32.1.3 
4) Reputation      v32.1.4 
5) Customer services      v32.1.5 
Finance       
1) Sales Level      v32.2.1 
2) Profitability        v32.2.2 
3) ROI        v32.2.3 
4) Cost control       v32.2.4 
5) Pay-back period      v32.2.5 
Strategy       
1) Autonomy of the IJV company      v32.3.1 
2) Inter-partner trust      v32.3.2 
3) Inter-partner cooperation      v32.3.3 
4) Achieve strategic objectives       v32.3.4 
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Technology – R&D       
1) Technology transfer and 
development 
     v32.4.1 
2) Partner involvement in  R&D      v32.4.2 
3) Product design      v32.4.3 
4) Manufacturing and control      v32.4.4 
Human Resource Management       
1) Compensation management      v32.5.1 
2) Employee performance      v32.5.2 
3) Employees’ skill improvement      v32.5.3 
 
31. In your opinion, how satisfied are the foreign parent company, the Thai parent company and the IJV 
managers with the level of the IJV performance?    (where; 1 = very dissatisfied,  5 =   very satisfied,  
please tick) 
Satisfaction Type of company 1 2 3 4 5  
1) Foreign parent company      v33.1 
2) Thai parent company       v33.2 
3) IJV managers       v33.3 
 
32. How long did each parent company run its business before establishing IJV company? 
 
       Foreign parent company 
F  1)  less than 5 years                  F   2)  5-10 years                           v34.1 F 
F  3)  11-20 years F   4)  longer than 20 years 
    
       Thai parent company 
F  1)  less than 5 years                  F   2)  5-10 years                           v34.2 F 
F  3)  11-20 years F   4)  longer than 20 years 
 
33. Has the foreign parent company had collaborative experience with international companies before the 
IJV company was formed? 
 
F  No  v35 F 
F  1)  Yes, less than 5 years                  F   2)  Yes, 5-10 years                    
F  3)  Yes, 11-20 years F   4)  Yes, longer than 20 years 
  
34. Has the Thai parent company had collaborative experience with the international companies before the 
IJV was formed? 
 
F  No  v36 F 
F  1)  Yes, less than 5 years                  F   2)  Yes, 5-10 years                    
F  3)  Yes, 11-20 years F   4)  Yes, longer than 20 years 
 
35. In your opinion, what is the level of learning ability of the IJV company in the following?  
        (where; 1 = lowest,          5 = highest) 
 
Ability Factor 1 2 3 4 5  
1) To avoid the national culture conflict      v37.1 
2) To avoid the organisational culture conflict         v37.2 
3) To serve IJV’s goal      v37.3 
4) To serve each parent’s goal       v37.4 
5) To choose the suitable strategy      v37.5 
6) To design appropriate organizational structure      v37.6 
7) To sustain and increase parents’ mutual benefits      v37.7 
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8) To manage human resources efficiently and effectively      v37.8 
9) Overall IJV learning      v37.9 
 
36. In your opinion, what is the level of the organisational commitment in the following divisions in the 
IJV company toward to the success of the IJV company?  (where; 1 = lowest, 5 = highest) 
 
Ability Factor 1 2 3 4 5  
1) Commitment by IJV top management       V38.1 
2) Commitment by the marketing division       V38.2 
3) Commitment by production division      V38.3 
4) Commitment by human resource division       V38.4 
5) Commitment by finance division      V38.5 
6) Commitment by research and development division
  
     V38.6 
7) Overall commitment of the IJV company      V38.7 
 
37. In your opinion, what is the level of commitment between the parent companies  toward to the 
success of the IJV  company? (where; 1 = lowest, 5 = highest) 
 
 
Ability Factor 1 2 3 4 5 
         Commitment between the foreign and Thai parent  
         companies 
     V39 
 
38. Do you want a summary of the research findings?    V40 F  
        F  1) No F  2) Yes, please provide your name and address 
 __________________________________________________ 
 __________________________________________________ 
 __________________________________________________ 
 __________________________________________________ 
 __________________________________________________  
 
39.  Other suggestions and comments toward to this research (e.g. comments on question in questionnaire or 
additional IJV information provided), please specify. 
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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            10 มีนาคม 2549 
 
เรื่อง  ขอความรวมมือในการกรอกแบบสอบถามเพื่องานวิจัย 
เรียน  ทานผูจัดการทั่วไป  บริษัท __________________________ 
สิ่งที่สงมาดวย  แบบสอบถามและซองจดหมายเปลาผนึกแสตมป 
 
ดวยกระผม นายพรลภัส  สุวรรณรัตน นักศึกษาหลักสูตรบริหารธุรกิจดุษฎีบัณฑิต สาขาวิชา ธุรกิจระหวางประเทศ (International 
Business), Nottingham Business School, Nottingham Trent University ประเทศ สหราชอาณาจักร  
ไดรับอนุมัติใหทําการวิจัยเพื่อวิทยานิพนธ  เร่ือง “The Characteristics and Performance of International Joint Ventures in 
Thailand” หรือ “ลักษณะและการดําเนินงานของบริษัทรวมทุนระหวางประเทศในประเทศไทย” 
โดยไดรับเงินทุนสนับสนุนในการดําเนินการวิจัยในคร้ังนี้ จากสํานักงานคณะกรรมการการอุดมศึกษา กระทรวงศึกษาธิการ 
ซ่ึงวัตถุประสงคของการวิจัยในคร้ังนี้เพื่อศึกษาถึงลักษณะโดยรวมของบริษัทรวมทุนระหวางประเทศในประเทศไทยในเชิงบูรณาการ 
โดยศึกษาในหลายมิติ  อาทิ มูลเหตุในการเปดบริษัทรวมทุนฯ  นโยบายของรัฐบาลที่มีผลกระทบตอการดําเนินงานของบริษัทรวมทุนฯ  
การบริหารงานของบริษัทรวมทุนฯ  ตลอดจนศึกษาปญหาและอุปสรรคที่เกิดข้ึนจากการดําเนินงานของบริษัทรวมทุนฯดังกลาว ฯลฯ  
เพื่อเสนอแนะแนวทางในการบริหารงานของบริษัทรวมทุนฯใหมีประสิทธิภาพและประสิทธิผลมากย่ิงข้ึน ซ่ึงผลของการศึกษาดังกลาวนี้ 
จะเปนประโยชนไมเพียงแตในเชิงวิชาการเทานั้น  แตยังจะเปนประโยชนตอบริษัทรวมทุนฯเองอีกดวย  โดยเฉพาะผูเก่ียวของ ตางๆ อาทิ 
ผูจัดการของบริษัทรวมทุนฯ  หรือทีมผูบริหารของบริษัทรวมทุนฯ เปนตน 
 
กระผมจึงใครขอความรวมมือจากหนวยงานของทาน ในการกรอกแบบสอบถามที่แนบมาใหนี้  ซ่ึงจะรบกวนเวลาของทานประมาณ 15-
30 นาที และหลังจากทานกรอกแบบสอบถามเปนที่เรียบรอยแลว กรุณานําแบบสอบถามใสในซองจดหมายผนึกแสตมปที่เตรียมไวให    
ความรวมมือของทาน เปนสิ่งที่มีความสําคัญอยางยิ่งยวดตอการศึกษาในคร้ังนี้เพื่อกระผมจะไดนําขอมูลที่ไดไปประมวลผล 
เพื่อประกอบการทําวิจัยเพื่อวิทยานิพนธ อันจะเปนประโยชนตอการศึกษาตอไป ในกรณทีี่บางคําถามในแบบสอบถาม 
ทานไมประสงคที่จะตอบ  ก็ขอใหขามไปตอบคําถามในขออื่น ๆ ตอไป      อยางไรก็ตามถาหากทานไมสามารถตอบแบบสอบถามหรือ 
ไมมีความรูในเรื่องดังกลาว กรุณาชวยสงแบบสอบถามไปใหผูที่เก่ียวของ จักเปนพระคุณอยางยิ่ง 
นอกจากน้ีกระผมขอแจงใหทราบวาขอมูลทั้งหมดที่ทานตอบในแบบสอบถามจะเก็บเปนความลับ และในการรายงานผลการศึกษาในคร้ังนี ้
จะไมมีการแสดงรายช่ือบุคคลหรือช่ือบริษัทใด ๆ ทั้งสิ้น         และถาหากการรวมทุนฯของบริษัทของทานไดมีการยกเลิกหรือสิ้นสุด 
ไปแลว ทานก็ยงัคงสามารถตอบคําถามในแบบสอบถามนี้ไดเชนเดียวกัน 
 
สุดทายนี้กระผมหวังเปนอยางยิ่งวาจะไดรับความอนุเคราะหขอมูลโดยการตอบคําถามในแบบสอบถามที่แนบมาใหนี้จากหนวยงานของทา
นและขอความกรุณาสงกลับมาภายในวันที่  31 มีนาคม 2549        กระผมกราบขอบพระคุณทาน มา ณ โอกาสนี้      
ทั้งนี้หากทางทานสนใจผลของการศึกษาในคร้ังนี้ กระผมยินดีที่จะมอบสําเนาสรุปผลการศึกษามาใหทานในภายหลัง หรือ 
ถาหากทานมีคําถามหรือขอเสนอแนะใดๆ เก่ียวกับการวิจัยในคร้ังนี้  สามารถติดตอกระผมไดตามท่ีอยูขางลางนี้  
 
นายพรลภัส  สุวรรณรตัน  ที่อยู : 378/1 ซอยพ่ึงมี 14 ถ.สุขุมวิท 93 แขวงบางจาก  เขตพระโขนง  กรงุเทพฯ 10260  
โทรศัพท/ โทรสาร 02-730-3060 E-Mail: pornlapasss@yahoo.com 
หรือ 
Mr. Pornlapas Suwannarat  Address : Postgraduate Research Office, Chaucer 496, Nottingham Business School, 
Nottingham Trent University, Burton Street, Nottingham NG1 4BU, United Kingdom  
Tel +44 (0) 115 941 8418, Fax+44 (0) 115 848 2999, E-Mail: paul.suwannarat@ntu.ac.uk 
 
     จึงเรียนมาเพื่อโปรดอนุเคราะห   
       ขอแสดงความนับถือ 
            (นายพรลภัส สุวรรณรัตน) 
หมายเหตุ: ทานสามารถเลือกตอบแบบสอบถาม เปนชุดภาษาไทย หรือ ชุดภาษาอังกฤษ อยางใดอยางหนึ่ง 
สุดแลวแตทางทานจะเห็นสมควร 
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FFFF 
 
แบบสอบถามเก่ียวกับบริษัทรวมทุนระหวางประเทศในประเทศไทย 
 
ผูสํารวจขอแจงใหทราบวาขอมูลทั้งหมดนี้จะเก็บเปนความลับ 
และในการรายงานผลการสํารวจในครั้งนี้จะไมมีการแสดงรายช่ือบุคคลหรือช่ือบริษัทใด ๆ ทั้งสิ้น     
กรุณาตอบคําถามโดยเติมคําในชองวาง และ กรุณาใสเคร่ืองหมาย 9 ในชองที่กําหนดไวให     ในสวนของตารางที่อยูทายในแตละคําถาม 
เชน  V3 FFFFF  ใหเวนวางไว  เนื่องจากเปนสวนของผูสํารวจ 
 
ในแบบสอบถาม ตอไปนี้ จะใชช่ือยอ “บริษัทรวมทุนฯ”  ซ่ึงจะหมายถึง “บริษัทรวมทนุระหวางประเทศ”  โดยหมายถึง  
“องคกรที่เกิดจากการรวมทุน ระหวางบริษัทแมอยางนอยสองบริษัท   ซ่ึงภายในองคกรนั้น ๆ มีลักษณะโครงสรางของผูถือหุนหลายสวน  
ซ่ึงอาจจะเปนสองสวนหรือมากกวา  โดยที่หุนสวน (บริษัทแม) แตละราย จะมีสวนรวมในการลงทุน การบริหาร   
การแลกเปล่ียนทักษะและทรัพยากร  ตลอดจนถึงการตัดสินใจในกิจการตาง ๆของบริษัทรวมทุนฯ และ ตองมีอยางนอยหุนสวนหนึ่งราย 
มีสํานักงานใหญต้ังอยูนอกประเทศ ที่บริษัทรวมทุนฯดําเนินธุรกิจอยู    โดยหุนสวนแตละรายจะไดรับผลตอบแทน 
จากการดําเนินงานของบริษัทรวมทุนฯ ในรูปของเงินปนผลตามสัดสวนของหุนที่ตนเองถืออยู”  
 
สวนที ่1: รายละเอียดพ้ืนฐาน    
 
1. ตําแหนงงานของทาน _____________________________________________________________________ v1 F 
2. จํานวนพนักงานในบริษัทรวมทุนฯของทาน ____________________________________ คน   v2 FFFFF 
3. บริษัทรวมทุนฯของทาน (ซ่ึงเกิดมาจากการรวมทุนระหวาง หุนสวน(บริษัทแม)ฝายไทย  กับ หุนสวน(บริษัทแม) 
        ฝายตางประเทศ )   ไดเร่ิมดําเนินกิจการเมื่อไร? พ.ศ.__________________  v3 FFFF 
4. เมื่อเร่ิมกอต้ังบริษัทรวมทุนฯ มีจํานวนหุนสวน (จํานวนบริษัทแม ) ที่เขามารวมทุน 
       จํานวนเทาใด?__________ราย                                                     V4 FF                              
โดยจําแนกเปน:1. หุนสวนฝายตางประเทศ (บริษัทแมฝายตางประเทศ) _________ราย  v4.1 FF 
                        2.  หุนสวนฝายไทย (บริษัทแมฝายไทย) _________ราย v4.2 FF 
5. กรุณาระบุสัญชาติของหุนสวน(บริษัทแม)ฝายตางประเทศ 
หากบริษัทรวมทุนฯของทานมีหุนสวน(บริษัทแม)ฝายตางประเทศที่เขามารวมทุนมากกวาหนึ่งรายกรุณาเรียงลําดับสัญชาติ 
โดยเริ่มจากหุนสวน(บริษัทแม)ที่มีสัดสวนหุนในบรษิัทรวมทนุฯมากที่สุด เปนรายแรก 
 สัญชาติ 1. ___________________________  2. ___________________________  v5.1 F v5.2 F 
  3. ___________________________  4. ___________________________ v5.3 F v5.4 F 
  5. ___________________________  6. ___________________________  v5.5 F v5.6 F 
 
หมายเหตุ:สําหรับบริษัทรวมทุนฯที่มีหุนสวน(บริษัทแม)ฝายตางประเทศที่เขามารวมทุนมากกวาหนึ่งรายคําถามทั้งหมดตอจากนี้ 
ขอความกรุณาทานใหขอมูลที่เก่ียวกับหุนสวนฝายตางประเทศ  เฉพาะรายที่หนึ่ง  เทานั้นจากคําถามในขอ  5 
 
 
6. บริษัทรวมทุนฯของทานยกเลิกการรวมทุนนั้นแลวหรือยัง? 
กรุณาใสเคร่ืองหมาย 9  
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F  ยังไมยกเลิก   (ขามไปขอ 9) v6.1 F 
F  ยกเลิกแลว การรวมทุนนั้นยกเลิกไปแลวเมื่อใด? _พ.ศ.___________ (ตอขอ 7)  v6.2 FFFF 
หากบริษัทรวมทุนฯของทานมีการยกเลิกการรวมทุนไปแลวกรุณาตอบคําถามทั้งหมดตอจากนี้ตามสภาพการณที่ปรากฏ  
เม่ือการรวมทุนดงักลาวยังคงดําเนินอยู 
7. เกิดอะไรข้ึนกับบริษัทรวมทุนฯของทาน? (กรุณาใสเคร่ืองหมาย 9) 
F  1)  ถูกซ้ือหุนโดยหุนสวนฝายไทย (บริษัทแมฝายไทยซ้ือหุนทั้งหมดของบริษัทรวมทุนฯ) v7 F 
F  2)  ถูกซ้ือหุนโดยหุนสวนฝายตางประเทศ (บริษัทแมฝายตางประเทศซ้ือหุนทั้งหมดของบริษัทรวมทุนฯ)  
F  3)  ถูกซ้ือหุนโดยบริษัทอื่นจากภายนอก  
F  4)  ขายหุนเพื่อชําระหนี้ ของบริษัทรวมทุนฯที่เกิดข้ึน  
F  5)  อื่น ๆ (โปรดระบุ) ____________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. ทําไมบริษัทรวมทุนฯของทานจึงถูกยกเลิกการรวมทุน? (กรุณาใสเคร่ืองหมาย 9) 
F  1)  บริษัทรวมทุนฯบรรลุวัตถุประสงคตามท่ีตองการแลว                   v8 F 
บริษัทรวมทุนฯ มีผลประกอบการไมดี F  2)  
มีการเปล่ียนแปลงกลยุทธของหุนสวนเกี่ยวกับการรวมทุน   F  3)  
F  4)  อื่น ๆ (โปรดระบุ) ____________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. มูลคาการลงทุน เม่ือแรกเริ่ม การกอต้ังบริษัทรวมทุนฯ มีมูลคา หรือ มีสัดสวนเทาใด ระหวาง: 
       หุนสวนฝายตางประเทศ: __________________________________บาท     v9.1 (M฿) FFFF  
หุนสวนฝายไทย: _________________________________________บาท v9.2 (M฿) FFFF 
หรือ 
คิดเปนสัดสวน  ตางประเทศ ____________ % ไทย  ____________ %  v9.3.1 FF.FF  
 V9.3.2 FF.FF 
10. ต้ังแตเร่ิมการกอต้ังบริษัทรวมทุนฯครั้งแรก จนถึงปจจุบัน  สัดสวนของผูถือหุนมีการเปล่ียนแปลงหรือไม?  
F  ไมมีการเปล่ียนแปลง (ขามไปขอ 12) v10 F 
F  มีการเปล่ียนแปลง (ตอขอ 11) 
 
11. หากสัดสวนของผูถือหุนของบริษัทรวมทุนฯมีการเปล่ียนแปลง มูลคาการลงทุนในปจจุบันมมีลูคา หรือ มีสัดสวนการลงทุนเทาใด 
ระหวาง :   
บริษัทแมฝายตางประเทศ: __________________________________บาท   v11.1 (M฿) FFFF  
บริษัทแมฝายไทย: _________________________________________บาท v11.2 (M฿) FFFF 
หรือ 
คิดเปนสัดสวน  ตางประเทศ ____________ % ไทย  ____________ %  v11.3.1 FF.FF  
 v11.3.2 FF.FF 
 
12. ทานจัดประเภทของหุนสวนฝายตางประเทศและหุนสวนฝายไทยดังกลาวอยางไร?(กรุณาใสเคร่ืองหมาย 9) 
หุนสวนฝายตางประเทศ (บริษัทแมฝายตางประเทศ ) 
   F  1)  บริษัทเอกชน   F  2)  หนวยงานของรัฐบาล   v12.1 F 
   F  3)  อื่นๆ (ระบุ) __________________________________   
หุนสวนฝายไทย (บริษัทแมฝายไทย)   
 290
  F  1)  บริษัทเอกชน   F  2)  หนวยงานของรัฐบาล   v12.2 F 
  F  3)  อื่นๆ (ระบุ) __________________________________   
 
13. กรุณาระบุประเภทธุรกิจของบริษัทรวมทุนฯของทาน ธุรกิจของหุนสวนฝายไทย (บริษัทแมฝายไทย) และ 
ธุรกิจของหุนสวนฝายตางประเทศ (บริษัทแมฝายตางประเทศ) โดยใสเคร่ืองหมาย 9ในประเภทของธุรกิจของแตละบริษัท 
บริษัทแม 
บริษัทรวมทนุฯ 
ฝายไทย บริษัทแมฝายตางประเทศ ประเภทธุรกิจ 
v13.1 FF v13.2 FF v13.3 FF 
เคร่ืองจักรอิเล็กทรอนิกสและไฟฟา    
คอมพิวเตอรและซอฟทแวร    
การผลิตอาหารและเครื่องด่ืม    
สิ่งทอ เส้ือผา และเครื่องหนัง    
รถยนตและอุปกรณที่เก่ียวของ    
ผลิตภัณฑพลาสติก    
โลหะและสินแร    
เคมีภัณฑ    
เภสัชภัณฑ    
เทคโนโลยีชีวภาพ    
อุตสาหกรรมการเกษตร    
อุตสาหกรรมการผลิตอื่น ๆ    
โปรดระบุ) _______________________ (
ธุรกิจนําเขาสงออก    
การทองเที่ยวและท่ีพักอาศัย    
การขนสงและการกระจายสินคา    
โทรคมนาคม    
การกอสรางและตัวแทนอสังหาริมทรัพย    
การบริการทางการเงินและการธนาคาร    
การบริการอื่น ๆ    
(โปรดระบุ) _______________________ 
 
สวนที ่2: ปจจัยเก่ียวกับตําแหนงที่ตั้งและนโยบายของรัฐ 
 
14. ในความเห็นของทาน ทานคิดวาปจจัยดังตอไปนี้มีความสําคัญตอ หุนสวนฝายตางประเทศ (บริษัทแมฝายตางประเทศ) 
มากนอยเพียงใด ในการตัดสินใจเลือกเขามาลงทุนในประเทศไทย  (โดยที่ 1 = ไมมีความสําคัญเลย   2 = สําคัญนอย   3 = 
สําคัญปานกลาง    4 = สําคัญมาก   5 = สําคัญมากที่สุด  กรุณาใสเคร่ืองหมาย 9) 
 
ความสําคัญ 
ปจจัย 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
ตนทุนคาแรงถูกกวา       v14.1 
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การสงเสริมและความชวยเหลือจากรัฐบาลไทย      v14.2 
มีบริษัทรวมทุนฝายไทยที่เหมาะสมอยูในธุรกิจอยูแลว      v14.3 
การคาดการณการเติบโตของตลาดในภูมิภาคนี้       v14.4 
การมีสิ่งอํานวยความสะดวกพื้นฐานที่เอื้ออํานวย      v14.5 
จํานวนแรงงานที่มีฝมือชาวไทย       v14.6 
เสรีภาพในการควบคุมการแลกเปล่ียนเงินตราตางประเทศ 
และโอกาสในการสงผลกําไรกลับประเทศ 
 
    v14.7 
เสถียรภาพทางการเมืองและเศรษฐกิจ       v14.8 
สภาพสังคมและวัฒนธรรมไทย:       v14.9 
วัตถุดิบมีราคาถูก       v14.10 
การเขาถึงแหลงทุนภายในประเทศ       v14.11 
ทําเลที่ต้ังและระยะทางเปนที่เอื้ออํานวย       v14.12 
เปนการลดอุปสรรคในการกีดกันทางการคา       v14.13 
เปนการพัฒนาตลาดใหมๆ      v14.14 
เพื่อใหทัดเทียมกับกลยุทธของบริษัทคูแขง      v14.15 
อื่น ๆ  (โปรดระบุ) __________________________________      v14.16 
 
 
15. กรุณา ประเมินความสําคัญ ของความชวยเหลือประเภทตางๆ ที่รัฐบาลจัดสรรใหกับบริษัทรวมทุนฯของทาน ดังตอไปนี้  (โดยที่ 1 = 
ไมมีความสําคัญเลย   2 = สําคัญนอย  3 = สําคัญปานกลาง    4 = สําคัญมาก         5 = สําคัญมากที่สุด  กรุณาใสเคร่ืองหมาย 
9) 
 
ความสําคัญ 
ประเภทความชวยเหลือ 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
สิทธิพิเศษตางๆ ของการต้ังอยูของกิจการในเขตสงเสริมการลงทุนในเขตตาง 
ๆ (เขต 1, 2 และ 3) 
 
    v15.1 
ความชวยเหลือทางดานการเงิน (เชน 
โครงการเงินกูดอกเบ้ียตํ่าสําหรับอุตสาหกรรมที่รัฐบาลสงเสริม) 
 
    v15.2 
การยกเวนหรือลดอากรขาเขาสําหรับเคร่ืองจักร      v15.3 
การยกเวนหรือลดอากรขาเขาสําหรับวัตถุดิบ      v15.4 
การยกเวนภาษีเงินไดนิติบุคคล       v15.5 
การไดรับกรรมสิทธิในการถือครองที่ดินสําหรับบริษัทตางประเทศ      v15.6 
การไดรับใบอนุญาตทํางาน(แรงงานตางชาติ)      v15.7 
การไดรับอนุญาตในการนําเขาแรงงานตางชาติ      v15.8 
การไดรับอนุญาตการสงผลกําไรและรายไดกลับตางประเทศ      v15.9 
อื่น ๆ  (โปรดระบุ) ___________________________________      v15.10 
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16. ในความเห็นของทาน หุนสวนฝายตางประเทศ (บริษัทแมฝายตางประเทศ)    หุนสวนฝายไทย (บริษัทแมฝายไทย)  และ 
ผูจัดการของบริษัทรวมทุนฯ มีความพึงพอใจในความชวยเหลือของรัฐบาลไทยมากนอยเพียงใด? (โดยที่ 1 = ไมพอใจมาก  2 = 
ไมพอใจ  3 = พอใจปานกลาง  4 = พอใจมาก  5 = พอใจมากอยางยิ่ง  กรุณาใสเคร่ืองหมาย 9) 
 
ระดับความพึงพอใจ 
ประเภท 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
หุนสวน(บริษัทแม)ฝายตางประเทศ         v17.1 
หุนสวน(บริษัทแม)ฝายไทย        v17.2 
ผูจัดการของบริษัทรวมทุนฯ      v17.3 
 
 
สวนที ่3: มูลเหตเุชิงกลยุทธในการกอตั้งบริษัทรวมทุนระหวางประเทศ 
 
17. ในความเห็นของทาน มูลเหตุดังตอไปนี้มีความสําคัญมากนอยเพียงใดกบั หุนสวนฝายตางประเทศ (บริษัทแมฝายตางประเทศ) 
ที่เขามารวมกอต้ังบริษัทรวมทุนฯนี้ข้ึนมา? (โดยที่ 1 = ไมมีความสําคัญเลย   2 = สําคัญนอย  
สําคัญปานกลาง    4 = สําคัญมาก   5 = สําคัญมากที่สุด  กรุณาใสเคร่ืองหมาย 9)       3 = 
ความสําคัญ 
ประเภท 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
เพื่อเปนการกระจายความเสี่ยงทางธุรกิจ       v18.1 
เพื่อใหไดการประหยัดจากขนาดการผลิต      v18.2 
เปนการแลกเปลี่ยนเทคโนโลยี       v18.3 
เพื่อใหไดสวนแบงในตลาดใหม       v18.4 
เปนการลดภาระตนทุนการวิจัยและพัฒนา       v18.5 
เปนการลดภาระตนทุนการลงทุน       v18.6 
เพื่อใหไดผลตอบแทนจากการลงทุนที่เร็วข้ึน      v18.7 
เพื่อแขงขันกับบริษัทคูแขงรายอื่น       v18.8 
เพื่อลดภาวะการแขงขันโดยจัดต้ังบริษัทรวมทุนกับบริษัทคูแขงหรือ  
    v18.9          บริษัทที่มีแนวโนมเปนคูแขง 
สามารถเขาถึงตลาดไดรวดเร็วข้ึน       v18.10 
เพื่อดําเนินตามนโยบายของรัฐบาลไทย       v18.11 
เพื่อใหเกิดความหลากหลายของผลิตภัณฑ       v18.12 
เปนฐานการสงออกสําหรับตลาดตางประเทศ       v18.13 
เพื่อมุงเนนเฉพาะธรุกิจที่ทํากําไรไดมากกวา       v18.14 
เปนการยายฐานการผลิตไปยังทําเลที่ตนทุนตํ่า      v18.15 
เพื่อรักษาสวนแบงทางการตลาด       v18.16 
เพื่อเอื้อตอการขยายธุรกิจไปยังตางประเทศ       v18.17 
เพื่อใหมีภาพลักษณหรือเอกลักษณของบริษัทในตลาดทองถิ่น      v18.18 
เปนการแลกเปลี่ยนสิทธิบัตรหรือพรมแดนทางธุรกิจ       v18.19 
เพื่อสามารถเขาถึงทรัพยากรธรรมชาติของหุนสวนฝายไทย      v18.20 
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เพื่อสามารถเขาถึงทรัพยากรมนุษยของหุนสวนฝายไทย (แรงงานมีฝมือ)      v18.21 
เพื่อสามารถเขาถึงแรงงานคาแรงตํ่าของหุนสวนฝายไทย   
    v18.22 (แรงงานไรฝมือ) 
เพื่อลดอุปสรรคตางๆ เก่ียวกับบริษัทตัวแทนหรือลิขสิทธิ์      v18.23 
อื่น ๆ  (โปรดระบุ) ___________________________________      v18.24 
 
18. ในความเห็นของทาน มูลเหตุดังตอไปนี้มีความสําคัญมากนอยเพียงใดกับ หุนสวนฝายไทย (บริษัทแมฝายไทย) 
ที่เขามารวมกอต้ังบริษัทรวมทุนฯนี้ข้ึนมา? (โดยที่ 1 = ไมมีความสําคัญเลย   2 = สําคัญนอย  3 = สําคัญปานกลาง         4 = 
สําคัญมาก   5 = สําคัญมากที่สุด  กรุณาใสเคร่ืองหมาย 9) 
ความสําคัญ 
ประเภท 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
เพื่อเปนการกระจายความเสี่ยงทางธุรกิจ       v19.1 
เพื่อใหไดการประหยัดจากขนาดการผลิต      v19.2 
เพื่อสามารถเขาถึงเทคโนโลยีของหุนสวนฝายตางประเทศ      v19.3 
เพื่อใหไดสวนแบงในตลาดใหม       v19.4 
เปนการลดภาระตนทุนการวิจัยและพัฒนา       v19.5 
เปนการลดภาระตนทุนการลงทุน       v19.6 
เพื่อใหไดผลตอบแทนจากการลงทุนที่เร็วข้ึน      v19.7 
เพื่อแขงขันกับบริษัทคูแขงรายอื่น       v19.8 
เพื่อลดภาวะการแขงขันโดยจัดต้ังบริษัทรวมทุนกับบริษัทคูแขงหรือบริษัทที่มีแ
นวโนมเปนคูแขง  
 
    v19.9 
สามารถเขาตลาดไดรวดเร็วข้ึน       v19.10 
เพื่อดําเนินตามนโยบายของรัฐบาลไทย       v19.11 
เพื่อใหเกิดความหลากหลายของผลิตภัณฑ       v19.12 
เปนฐานการสงออกสําหรับตลาดตางประเทศ       v19.13 
เพื่อมุงเนนเฉพาะธรุกิจที่ทํากําไรไดมากกวา       v19.14 
เปนการยายฐานการผลิตไปยังทําเลที่ตนทุนตํ่า      v19.15 
เพื่อรักษาสวนแบงทางการตลาด       v19.16 
เพื่อเอื้อตอการขยายธุรกิจไปยังตางประเทศ      v19.17 
เพื่อสามารถเขาถึงเทคนิคในการบริหารจัดการที่ทันสมัยจากหุนสวนฝายตาง
ประเทศ 
 
    v19.18 
เปนการแลกเปลี่ยนสิทธิบัตรหรือพรมแดนทางธุรกิจ      v19.19 
เพื่อสามารถเขาถึงทรัพยากรธรรมชาติของหุนสวนฝายตางประเทศ      v19.20 
เพื่อสามารถเขาถึงทรัพยากรมนุษยของหุนสวนฝายตางประเทศ 
(แรงงานมีฝมือ) 
 
    v19.21 
เพื่อสามารถเขาถึงแรงงานคาแรงตํ่าของหุนสวนฝาย   
    v19.22         ตางประเทศ (แรงงานไรฝมือ) 
เพื่อลดอุปสรรคตางๆ เก่ียวกับบริษัทตัวแทนหรือลิขสิทธิ์      v19.23 
 อื่น ๆ  (โปรดระบุ) ___________________________________      v19.24 
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สวนที ่4: การบริหารจัดการ 
 
19. จํานวนผูบริหารในคณะผูบริหารของบริษัทรวมทุนฯ มีจํานวนเทาใด__________ราย                    v20    FF       
โดยมาจาก  บริษัทแมฝายตางประเทศ จํานวน _______________ ทาน  v20.1 FF 
                    บริษัทแมฝายไทย   จํานวน _______________ ทาน v20.2 FF 
                    อื่น ๆ (โปรดระบุ) __________________________ จํานวน ______________ ทาน v20.3 FF 
 
20. ใครเปนคนแตงต้ังผูจัดการทั่วไปคนแรกของบริษัทรวมทุนฯ? (กรุณาใสเคร่ืองหมาย 9) 
F  1)  หุนสวน (บริษัทแม)ฝายตางประเทศ        F  2)  หุนสวน (บริษัทแม) ฝายไทย          v21 F 
F  3)  อื่น ๆ (โปรดระบุ) _____________________ 
 
21. ใครเปนคนรับผิดชอบการแตงต้ังผูจัดการทั่วไปคนตอๆ มา? (กรุณาใสเคร่ืองหมาย 9) 
F  1)  หุนสวน (บริษัทแม)ฝายตางประเทศ        F  2)  หุนสวน (บริษัทแม) ฝายไทย          v22 F 
F  3)  อื่น ๆ (โปรดระบุ) _____________________ 
 
22. ในความเห็นของทานหุนสวนฝายตางประเทศ(บริษัทแมฝายตางประเทศ)ของทานมีสวนรวมในการใหความชวยเหลือ 
บริษัทรวมทุนฯ ของทาน ในประเด็นตาง ๆ ดังตอไปนี้มากนอยเพียงใด? (1 = ไมไดชวยเหลือเลย   2 = ชวยเหลือนอย  3 = 
ชวยเหลือปานกลาง  4 = ชวยเหลือมาก     5 = ชวยเหลือมากอยางยิ่ง   กรุณาใสเคร่ืองหมาย 9)  
 
ระดับการมีสวนรวม 
ประเด็นการมีสวนรวม 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
การออกแบบโรงงาน เทคโนโลยี และการกอสราง       v24.1 
การฝกอบรมพนักงาน       v24.2 
การตลาดและการสรางภาพลักษณ/เอกลักษณของบริษทัในตลาดทองถิ่น      v24.3 
การไดรับการสนับสนุนทางการเงินจากตางประเทศ       v24.4 
การไดรับการสนับสนุนทางการเงินจากในประเทศ       v24.5 
การไดรับการสนับสนุนและคําอนุมัติจากรัฐบาล       v24.6 
การสงออก      v24.7 
การเปนคนกลางในการนําสินคาเขาจากตางประเทศ       v24.8 
การนําเขาสินคาประเภททุน เชน เคร่ืองจักร ฯลฯจากตางประเทศ       v24.9 
การใหความรูและเทคโนโลยีอยางตอเนื่อง       v24.10 
การปรับปรุงและการปรับเปล่ียนเทคนิคการบริหารจัดการรูปแบบใหม      v24.11 
การปรับปรุงและการปรับเปล่ียนเทคนิคการผลิตสินคารูปแบบใหม      v24.12 
การดําเนินการทําวิจัยและพัฒนาผลิตภัณฑ       v24.13 
การใหคําแนะนําเก่ียวกับกลยุทธทางธุรกิจ       v24.14 
อื่นๆ (โปรดระบุ) ____________________________________      v24.15 
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23. ในความเห็นของทาน หุนสวนฝายไทย (บริษัทแมฝายไทย) มีสวนรวมในการใหความชวยเหลือ บริษัทรวมทุนฯของทาน       
ในประเด็นตางๆ ดังตอไปนี้มากนอยเพียงใด? ? (1 = ไมไดชวยเหลือเลย   2 = ชวยเหลือนอย  3 = ชวยเหลือปานกลาง     4 = 
ชวยเหลือมาก     5 = ชวยเหลือมากอยางยิ่ง    กรุณาใสเคร่ืองหมาย 9)  
 
ระดับการมีสวนรวม 
ประเด็นการมีสวนรวม 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
การออกแบบโรงงาน เทคโนโลยี และการกอสราง       v25.1 
การฝกอบรมพนักงาน       v25.2 
การตลาดและการสรางภาพลักษณ/เอกลักษณของบริษทัในตลาดทองถิ่น      v25.3 
การไดรับการสนับสนุนทางการเงินจากตางประเทศ       v25.4 
การไดรับการสนับสนุนทางการเงินจากในประเทศ       v25.5 
การไดรับการสนับสนุนและคําอนุมัติจากรัฐบาล       v25.6 
การสงออก      v25.7 
การเปนคนกลางในการนําสินคาเขาจากตางประเทศ       v25.8 
การนําเขาสินคาประเภททุน เชน เคร่ืองจักร ฯลฯจากตางประเทศ       v25.9 
การใหความรูและเทคโนโลยีอยางตอเนื่อง       v25.10 
การปรับปรุงและการปรับเปล่ียนเทคนิคการบริหารจัดการรูปแบบใหม      v25.11 
การปรับปรุงปรับเปลี่ยนเทคนิคการผลิตสินคารูปแบบใหม      v25.12 
การดําเนินการทําวิจัยและพัฒนาผลิตภัณฑ       v25.13 
การใหคําแนะนําเก่ียวกับกลยุทธทางธุรกิจ       v25.14 
อื่นๆ (โปรดระบุ) ____________________________________      v25.15 
24. ทานประเมิน ระดับการพ่ึงพา ที่บริษัทรวมทุนฯของทานตองพึ่งพา  หุนสวนฝาย(บริษัทแม)ตางประเทศ และ       
หุนสวน(บริษัทแม)ฝายไทย  สําหรับกิจกรรมดังตอไปนี้อยางไร? (กรุณาประเมินระดับการพึ่งพาเปนตัวเลข 1 ถึง 5)   โดยที่ 1 = 
ไมมีการพึ่งพาเลย 2 = มีการพึ่งพานอย, 3 = มีการพึ่งพาปานกลาง, 4 = มีการพึ่งพามาก,  5 = มีการพึ่งพามากอยางยิ่ง     
กรุณากรอกเพื่อใหคะแนนทุกชอง 
 
หุนสวน หุนสวน 
กิจกรรม 
ฝายไทย ฝายตางประเทศ 
การเงิน  v26.1.2  v26.1.3 
กิจกรรมทางการตลาด  v26.2.2  v26.2.3 
การวิจัยและพัฒนาผลิตภัณฑ  v26.3.2  v26.3.3 
การบริหาร และการจัดจางทรัพยากรมนุษย  v26.4.2  v26.4.3 
นโยบายและการปฏิบัติดานการตอบแทน  v26.5.2  v26.5.3 
การฝกอบรมและการพัฒนา  v26.6.2  v26.6.3 
กระบวนการผลิต   v26.7.2  v26.7.3 
ความรูดานเทคนิค   v26.8.2  v26.8.3 
ความรูดานบริหาร   v26.9.2  v26.9.3 
วัตถุดิบ  v26.10.2  v26.10.3 
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กิจกรรมการควบคุมคุณภาพ  v26.11.2  v26.11.3 
การสงออก  v26.12.2  v26.12.3 
การนําเขา   v26.13.2  v26.13.3 
 
25. บริษัทรวมทุนฯของทาน มีการดําเนินงานตาง ๆ ในเรื่องตอไปนี้ เหมือนกันกับ หุนสวน(บริษัทแม)ฝายตางประเทศ 
หรือหุนสวน(บริษัทแม)ฝายไทย มากนอยเพียงใด? (กรุณาใสเคร่ืองหมาย 9) 
โดยที่ 1 = เหมือนกับหุนสวน(บริษัทแม)ฝายตางประเทศทุกประการ 
  2 = คอนขางเหมือนกับหุนสวน(บริษัทแม)ฝายตางประเทศ 
  3 = ผสมผสานการดําเนินงานตามวิธีของหุนสวน(บริษัทแม)ทั้งสองฝาย 
  4 = คอนขางเหมือนกับหุนสวน(บริษัทแม)ฝายไทย 
  5 = เหมือนกับหุนสวน(บริษัทแม)ฝายไทยทุกประการ 
 
ระดับความเหมือน 
การดําเนินงาน 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
นโยบายและการปฏิบัติดานการตอบแทน       v27.1 
การบริหารและการสรรหาทรัพยากรมนุษย       v27.2 
การฝกอบรมและพัฒนา       v27.3 
กระบวนการผลิต       v27.4 
การวิจัยและพัฒนาผลิตภัณฑ       v27.5 
การกําหนดกลยุทธ       v27.6 
การวางแผนงบประมาณ       v27.7 
การวางระบบบัญชีและการปฏิบัติดานบัญชี      v27.8 
การ บริหารตนทุนและการวางระบบตนทุน       v27.9 
ระบบสารสนเทศทางการบริหาร       v27.10 
ระบบการกําหนดราคา       v27.11 
การตลาด      v27.12 
การควบคุมคุณภาพ       v27.13 
อื่นๆ  (โปรดระบุ) ___________________________________      v27.14 
 
 
สวนที ่5: ผลการดําเนินงาน ความสามารถในการเรยีนรู และขอตกลง ของบริษทัรวมทุนระหวางประเทศ 
 
26. เมื่อบริษัทรวมทุนฯกอต้ังข้ึน โดยไดมีการกําหนดระยะเวลาการรวมทุนเปนที่ชัดเจนหรือไม?  
F  ไมม ี  v28.1 FF 
F  มี    เปนระยะเวลากี่ป? __________ป  และจะส้ินสุดในปใด? _พ.ศ.____________   v28.2 FFFF 
 
27. บริษัทรวมทุนฯมีวิธีการประเมินผลการดําเนินงานของบริษัทอยางไร? (ตอบไดมากกวา 1 ขอ)  
 
F 1)  ระดับของรายรับ F  2)  ระดับของความสามารถในการทํากําไร   v29.1 F v29.2 F 
 297
F 3)  ช่ือเสียง F  4)  ผลปฏิบัติงานของพนักงาน v29.3 F v29.4 F 
F 5)  มูลคาหุน F  6)  ปริมาณของการถายโอนเทคโนโลยี v29.5 F v29.6 F 
F 7)  สวนแบงทางการตลาด F  8)  ระดับของการควบคุมตนทุน v29.7 F v29.8 F 
F 9)  การควบคุมคุณภาพ F  10) อื่น ๆ (ระบุ) ______________________ v29.9 F v29.10 F 
      
28. ในแตละขอความดานลางนี้ กรุณาใสเคร่ืองหมาย 9ในชองที่แสดงถึงความคิดเห็นของทานไดดีที่สุด   
โดยที่ 1= ไมเห็นดวยอยางยิ่ง, 2 = ไมเห็นดวย, 3 = เฉย ๆ, 4 = เห็นดวย, 5 = เห็นดวยอยางย่ิง 
ความคิดเห็น 
การดําเนินงาน 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
วัฒนธรรมองคกรของหุนสวน(บริษัทแม)ฝายตางประเทศคลายคลึงกับวัฒนธรรม
องคกรของหุนสวน(บริษัทแม)ฝายไทย 
 
    v30.1 
วัฒนธรรมประจําชาติของหุนสวน(บริษัทแม)ฝายตางประเทศคลายคลึงกับวัฒน
ธรรมประจําชาติของหุนสวน(บริษัทแม)ฝายไทย 
 
    v30.2 
29. กอนกอตั้งบริษัทรวมทุนฯ   ขนาดของหุนสวน(บริษัทแม)ฝายตางประเทศ และขนาดของหุนสวน(บริษัทแม)ฝายไทย  / 
(คิดจากมูลคาสินทรัพยสุทธ)ิ 
F  1)  มีขนาดใกลเคียงกัน F 2)  มีขนาดตางกัน  v31 F 
 
30. ทานใหการประเมินกิจกรรมของบริษัทรวมทุนฯตางๆดังตอไปนี้อยางไรบาง เม่ือเทียบกับความคาดหวัง  
ของทานเมื่อเร่ิมกอต้ังบริษัทรวมทุนฯนี้? 
ความคิดเห็น 
คอนขาง 
ดีกวาที่คิ
ด 
คอนขาง
แยกวาที่
คิด 
ดีกวาที่คิ
ดมาก 
เทากับที่
คาดไว 
แยกวาที่
คิดมาก 
กิจกรรม  
ดานการตลาด       
สวนแบงทางการตลาด      v32.1.1 
การโฆษณาและการสงเสริมการขาย      v32.1.2 
การกระจายสินคา      v32.1.3 
ช่ือเสียง        v32.1.4 
การบริการลูกคา         v32.1.5 
ดานการเงิน       
ระดับยอดขาย         v32.2.1 
ความสามารถในการทํากําไร      v32.2.2 
ผลตอบแทนตอการลงทุน         v32.2.3 
การควบคุมตนทุน         v32.2.4 
ระยะเวลาคืนทุน         v32.2.5 
ดานกลยุทธ       
ความมีอิสระของบริษัทรวมทุนฯ      v32.3.1 
ความไววางใจระหวางหุนสวน         v32.3.2 
ความรวมมือกันระหวางหุนสวน      v32.3.3 
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การบรรลุวัตถุประสงคเชิงกลยุทธ      v32.3.4 
ดานเทคโนโลยี การวิจัยและพัฒนา       
การถายโอนเทคโนโลยีและการพัฒนา       v32.4.2 
การมีสวนรวมของหุนสวนในเรื่องการวิจัยและพั
ฒนา 
 
    v32.4.3 
การออกแบบผลิตภัณฑ      v32.4.4 
การผลิตและการควบคุมคุณภาพ         v32.4.5 
ดานการบริหารทรัพยากรมนุษย       
การบริหารคาตอบแทน      v32.5.1 
ผลการปฏิบัติงานของพนงังาน       v32.5.2 
การปรับปรุงทักษะของพนักงาน       v32.5.3 
 
 
31. ในความเห็นของทาน  ทานคิดวา ระดับความพึงพอใจตอผลการดําเนินงานของบริษัทรวมทุนฯของแต 
        และฝายเปนอยางไร?  (โดยที่ 1 = ไมพอใจมาก  2 = ไมพอใจ  3 = พอใจปานกลาง  4 = พอใจมาก   
        5 = พอใจมากอยางยิ่ง   
กรุณาใสเคร่ืองหมาย 9) 
 
ระดับความพึงพอใจ 
ประเภท 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
หุนสวน(บริษัทแม)ฝายตางประเทศ       v33.1 
หุนสวน(บริษัทแม)ฝายไทย       v33.2 
ผูจัดการของบริษัทรวมทุนฯ      v33.3 
 
32. หุนสวน(บริษัทแม)แตละฝายดําเนินธุรกิจมาเปนระยะเวลาเทาใด? 
หุนสวน(บริษัทแม)ฝายตางประเทศ 
F  1)  นอยกวา 5 ป F  2)  5 – 10 ป v34.1 F 
F  3)  11 – 20 ป F  4)  มากกวา 20 ป 
 
หุนสวน(บริษัทแม)แมฝายไทย 
F  1)  นอยกวา 5 ป F  2)  5 – 10 ป v34.2 F 
F  3)  11 – 20 ป F  4)  มากกวา 20 ป 
 
33. หุนสวน(บริษัทแม)ฝายตางประเทศเคยมีประสบการณทํางานรวมกับบริษัทตางชาติใดๆ มากอนหรือไม? 
F ไมมี  v35 F 
F  1)  มีนอยกวา 5 ป F  2)  มี 5 – 10 ป  
F  3)  มี 11 – 20 ป F  4)  มีมากกวา 20 ป 
  
34. หุนสวน(บริษัทแม)ฝายไทยเคยมีประสบการณทํางานรวมกับบริษัทตางชาติใดๆ มากอนหรือไม? 
F ไมมี  v36 F 
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F  1)  มีนอยกวา 5 ป F  2)  มี 5 – 10 ป  
F  3)  มี 11 – 20 ป F  4)  มีมากกวา 20 ป 
 
35. กรุณาประเมิน ระดับความสามารถในการเรียนรู (learning capability) ของบริษัทรวมทุนฯที่เก่ียวกับประเด็น   ตาง ๆ ดังตอไปนี้: 
(โดยที่ 1 = ตํ่าสุด  2 = ตํ่า  3 = ปานกลาง  4 = สูง  5 = สูงสุด  กรุณาใสเคร่ืองหมาย 9) 
  
ความสามารถ 
ประเด็น 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
เรียนรูในการหลีกเล่ียงความขัดแยงทางวัฒนธรรมประจําชาติ      v37.1 
เรียนรูในการหลีกเล่ียงความขัดแยงทางวัฒนธรรมองคกร      v37.2 
เรียนรูในการตอบสนองเปาหมายของบริษัทรวมทุนระหวางประเทศ      v37.3 
เรียนรูในการตอบสนองเปาหมายของบริษัทแมแตละฝาย      v37.4 
เรียนรูในการเลือกกลยุทธที่เหมาะสม       v37.5 
เรียนรูในการออกแบบโครงสรางองคกรที่เหมาะสม       v37.6 
เรียนรูในการรักษาและการสรางผลกําไรใหแกบริษัทแมทั้งสองบริษัท      v37.7 
เรียนรูในการบริหารทรัพยากรมนุษยอยางมีประสิทธิภาพ      v37.8 
ภาพรวมของการเรียนรูของบริษัทรวมทุนฯ       v37.9 
 
 
36. กรุณาประเมิน ระดับของความผูกพันจริงจงัขององคกร (organisational commitment) ของบริษัทรวมทุนฯ 
ในหนวยงานหนาทีห่ลักตาง ๆ ที่มีตอความสําเร็จขององคกร (โดยที่ 1 = นอยมาก  2 = นอย  3 = ปานกลาง   4 = มาก    5 = 
มากที่สุด) 
  
ระดับ 
ฝาย 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
ผูบริหารบริษัทรวมทุนฯะดับสูง       v38.1 
ฝายการตลาด       v38.2 
ฝายผลิต       v38.3 
ฝายทรัพยากรมนุษย       v38.4 
ฝายการเงิน       v38.5 
ฝายวิจัยและพัฒนาผลิตภัณฑ       v38.6 
ภาพรวมของบริษัทรวมทุนฯ      v38.7 
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37. กรุณาประเมิน ระดับของความผูกพันจริงจังระหวางหุนสวนฝายตาง ๆ  ที่มีตอความสําเร็จของ 
         บริษัทรวมทุนฯ (โดยที่ 1 = นอยมาก  2 = นอย  3 = ปานกลาง   4 = มาก    5 = มากที่สุด) 
ระดับ 
ฝาย 
1 2 3 4 5 
    หุนสวนฝายตาง ๆ (บริษัทแมฝายไทยและฝายตางประเทศ)      v39 
 
 
ทางทานมีความตองการรายงานสรุปผลการศึกษาในคร้ังนี้หรือไม?            V40 F 38. 
 F  1) ไมตองการ    F 2) ตองการ, กรุณาระบุช่ือและที่อยูเพื่อที่จะไดจัดสงมาใหในภายหลัง 
     ___________________________________________________________ 
     ___________________________________________________________ 
     ___________________________________________________________ 
     ___________________________________________________________ 
39. ขอเสนอแนะอื่น ๆ (ถามี)  อาทิ ขอคิดเห็นเก่ียวกับ คําถามในแบบสอบถาม  หรือ ขอมูลเพิ่มเติมเก่ียวกับบริษัทรวมทุนฯของทาน 
เปนตน 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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